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Abstract
This thesis contends that to uncover the ‘real’ symposion from its literary and 
artistic representations is a difficult task. Every representation of the symposion 
is informed by its author’s wider textual ambitions. Its shape, the roles it plays, 
and the meanings it conveys are all determined by considerations other than 
providing an authentic snapshot of sympotic life.
However, by acknowledging and investigating these authorial strategies, 
it might just be possible to catch a glimpse of the event they purport to represent, 
as this close reading of the Symposia of Plato and Xenophon aims to show. For, 
at the heart of Plato and Xenophon’s ambitions lies an interest in the protocols 
and procedures of the symposion, even as these are shaped for philosophical
ends.
Chasing the symposion via this route will lead us into a world of 
philosophy and education, where the democratic city clashes with and is 
subsumed into processes of elite self-fashioning. The performances in Plato’s 
idealised symposion are epideixeis which affirm (at the same time as they open 
up and explore) their performers’ claims to be well-educated, symposion-gQing 
kaloi kagathoi. By contrast, the epideixeis of Xenophon’s symposiasts take part 
in a discussion of kalokagathia, and suggest how the symposion might (or might 
not) facilitate its learning. Both Plato and Xenophon are concerned with the 
symposion as a location for kalokagathia and with kalokagathia as a process.
In its quest for the symposion, this thesis uncovers two distinct, but 
related, conceptions of the symposion and suggests some new ways of reading 
Plato and Xenophon’s Symposia. For Plato, the symposion operates alongside
the more traditionally ‘philosophical’ content of his dialogue. 
Xenophon imposes his writerly agenda on top of his symposion, 
merits of his textual Symposium over the symposion.
By contrast,
extolling the
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Preliminary Notes
References to ancient names and works are made according to the list of 
‘Authors and Works’ set out in A Greek-English Lexicon Compiled by Henry 
George Liddell and Robert Scott., revised and augmented by H. Jones and R. 
McKenzie (Oxford, 1968), xvi-xxxviii.
Abbreviated titles of modern journals are cited in accordance with the 
‘Liste des Periodiques Depouilles’ in L’Annee Philologique, volume 71 (Paris, 
2000), xxi-xlvii.
References to the Symposia of Plato and Xenophon are taken from the 
recent editions by C. J. Rowe (1998) and A. Bowen (1998) respectively. Both 
derive their text from the relevant Oxford Classical Text (Burnet, 1901; and 
Marchant, 1921), but modify it to take into account changes suggested by 
subsequent scholarship. In addition, for Plato’s Symposium, I have consulted 
Dover (1980), and Robin (Bude, 1989); and for Xenophon’s Symposium, I have 
referred to Thalheim (Teubner, 1915) and Ollier (Bude, 1961).
Finally, the Symposia of Plato and Xenophon (like other authors and their 
works) will be given their traditional Latin title - the Symposium. However, the 
symposion will be transliterated in its hellenised form, as will Greek value-terms 
and other cultural phenomena. This not only follows common usage, but 
highlights the distinction between text and institution which underlies my 
approach. All Greek transliterations are made in their nominative or infinitive
forms.
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Introduction
Parties are a popular object of cultural debate in twenty-first century Britain. 
They are in our theatres {Abigail’s Party, Whitehall Theatre, London), on our 
television screens {The Dinner Party Inspectors, C4; Guess Who’s Coming to 
Dinner?, BBC2) and (we are told) in our homes. Self-styled party experts like 
Paul Burrell, Victoria Mather and Meredith Etherington Smith are all on hand to 
teach us how to entertain with style.1 They give us advice on how to plan our 
parties, who to invite and how to invite them, what food and drinks we should 
serve, and how we should behave.2 At the heart of this popular interest and 
introspection lies a voyeuristic interest in what takes place in the dining rooms of 
our fellow Britons, and an anxiety about what goes on behind our own closed
1 Burrell. 1999. Victoria Mather and Meredith Etherington Smith are the etiquette experts in 
Dinner Party Inspectors', cf. note 3, below.
2 See Burrell, 1999: 8, whose wonderfully unironic Entertaining With Style reinforces tlie notion 
that there are correct ways of entertaining, and that anyone can entertain correctly with just a little 
help from the experts. The former butler to Diana, Princess of Wales, writes ‘style is not the 
exclusive preserve of the rich and famous. Style can be achieved by anyone and is often most 
effective when simply executed. We all entertain; it may be as simple as inviting a friend for 
lunch or dinner at home, as special as a family gathering at Christmas, a clirislening or a 
wedding, or as challenging as a children’s party. Whether we entertain on a simple level or with 
lavish flair depends on our individual style and how we want to show our hospitality, and also on 
the strength of our budget ... I will take you through the steps to ensure that your party is a 
success’. Cue advice on planning, selecting drinks, good maimers and some menu suggestions 
which change according to the different seasons.
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doors.3 These plays, books and television programmes tell us that (we should 
care that) there are right and wrong ways of doing a party and demand we (know 
it is socially important to) ask how to throw a party, how to behave at one, and 
what makes a party a failure or a success.
Mike Leigh’s improvised television drama Abigail's Party opens up the 
party to this kind of critique.4 The viewer is invited into one middle-class, 
suburban living room, where Beverley and her husband Laurence are hosting a 
party for their neighbours. Yet, while the hosts try to supply the right drinks, 
play the right music, and make polite conversation, their efforts are painfully 
undermined from within. Marital unhappiness, snobbery, sexual infidelity and 
violence permeate the conversations, and eventually spill over into the party 
itself, bringing discomfort, anger and, finally, death. As the horror of this event 
unfolds, another party, Abigail’s party, takes place next door. The audience’s 
experience of this event is constructed entirely through the observations made by 
Beverley and her guests regarding what they imagine should be, and is, going on 
there. The two parties stand against one another, acting as testimony to the
3 These concerns are clear from Dorota Nosowicz’s review in OTV 8 June 2003, page 21. on 
The Dinner Party Inspectors, which belongs to the currently fashionable television genre of 
‘reality TV meets self-help manual’: ‘Social commentator Victoria Mather and society hostess 
Meredith Etherington Smith are the ‘dinner party inspectors’ analysing six dinner parties - each 
with a purpose. First in line is Jamie, professional solo cellist and foodie, who is introducing his 
long-lost sister to liis closest friends for the first tune. What follows is an, at times, embarrassing, 
funny and competitive evening, during which our commentators, who are watching remotely 
from a spare bedroom, show us how Jamie’s guests commit all sorts of appalling social faux pas. 
Some excruciating moments and hilarious commentary. Great fim’.
Originally televised in 1984.
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transgressive potential of a social gathering fuelled by alcohol, and the need for it 
to be contained. This anxiety is embodied in the figure of Abigail’s mother 
whose concern for her daughter’s party mounts as Beverley’s party spirals out of
control.
The social components of the party as a place where friends, family and 
acquaintances come together under specific (quasi-)ritual circumstances to eat, 
drink and communicate makes the party a prime target for anthropological 
investigations too. Focusing on the communal nature of eating and drinking, 
anthropologists define it as a ‘rite of commensality’, which Grignon describes as 
‘a gathering aimed to accomplish in a collective way some material tasks and 
symbolic obligations linked to the satisfaction of a biological individual need’.5 
As Grignon shows, these ‘material tasks and symbolic obligations’ not only 
establish communality between guests (as the studies found in Douglas’ 
collection on Constructive Drinking show), but also involve the construction of 
identity through opposition, separation and segregation.6 By coming together to 
eat and/or drink, party-goers make statements about themselves as members of 
their immediate group, and in relation to those who are not present. However, 
the manner in which they do so is crucial to the identities which are being created 
and affirmed. For example, in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain, the tea 
ceremony offered its participants the opportunity to prove to one another that 
they were ladies or gentlemen.7 In Japan, participation in the tea ceremony was,
5 Grignon, 2001: 24.
6 Douglas, 1998. Grignon, 2001: 25-31.
' Emmerson, 1992: 13. As Emmerson (5) notes, the importance of tea-drinking to this process of 
self-identity is reflected in its establishment as a common motif in portraits of the rich and 
aspirational at this time.
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and still is, linked intimately to status and identity, where performing the Way of 
Tea affirms a person’s character and, in the wider world, his or her national 
identity. Moreover, the ceremony itself encourages its practitioners ‘to look 
within, to discover not a new self but the natural self so often covered up by 
successive layers of civilisation’.8 As a component of the Buddhist tradition, the 
Japanese tea ceremony consciously fashions itself as an event for self-discovery 
and (in Western parlance) identity.9 These two possible uses of tea and the tea 
party emphasise the diversity which can exist between superficially similar 
gatherings grounded in different cultures and eras.10 Commensality may underlie 
the various practices which we call ‘parties’, but to understand the functions they 
fulfil it is necessary to look at individual examples within their immediate
cultural milieu.
Popular interest in the social phenomenon of the party and sociological 
investigations into it have been accompanied by an increased interest in the 
Greek drinking party (symposion) amongst academics over the past twenty years. 
Drawing on studies of lyric poetry and anthropological theories on social
8 Castile. 1971: 19.
9 I use the tenn ‘identity’ here with caution. Tire Buddhist idea of a ‘natural self which exists 
independently of society is quite different to Western understandings of identity as i) something 
outside of the self, created just as it is imposed by society: cf. Althusser, 1971, Foucault, 1976; ii) 
coming into existence through die agency of the identifying = identified subject, in otiier words 
through die acts of identification: cf. Borch-Jakobsen, 1988; and on self-positioning cf. Hall, 
1987; or iii) social performances: cf. Buder, 1999.
10 See also die essays collected by McDonald, 1994. By focusing on drinking and gender, diese 
articles remind us that the act of drinking is not only determined by the culture of die parly at 
which drinking takes place, but by its cultural significance in wider society.
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organisation and communal drinking, Oswyn Murray defined the symposion as a 
rite of commensality and placed it at the heart of aristocratic social relations in 
the archaic city.11 Over the next two decades, this symposion became the touch­
stone for further investigations into the drinking party, whether based on 
Homeric epic, lyric poetry, or Athenian figured vases. The archaic symposion 
emerged as a meeting place for aristocrats to come together, drink, sing, and 
establish their communality apart from the polis. Within this atmosphere, the 
symposiasts gained the chance to compete with one another, and to explore their
identities. The few works which have discussed the institution in the classical
period claim variously that it continued unchanged into the fifth century, spread 
amongst the lower classes, and lost its defining characteristics and social 
significance at this time.12
If anthropological recognition of the limitations of traditional theories of 
‘commensality’ is not enough to suggest Murray’s model be reconsidered, then 
post-structuralist developments in literary theory are. As I will show in chapter 
1, some of the readings on which Murray and his successors founded their 
symposia do not stand up to scrutiny. By treating representations of the 
symposion in epic, lyric poetry and art as direct doorways into the past, some 
scholars denied the poet or painter any intention beyond illustrating reality. They 
downplayed whatever other ambitions the poet or painter may have had in 
shaping and creating the event they depict; and they overlooked the possibility
11 Murray. 1982, 1983a, and 1983b. All the works mentioned in notes 11-15 will be considered 
in greater detail in chapter 1.
12 On the classical symposion as i) unchanged from the archaic period, see Murray. 1990c, and 
Davidson, 1997: 43f; ii) spread amongst lower classes: Fisher, 2000; iii) lost its social 
significance: Rossi, 1982:49-50.
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that their sympotic representations may have had meanings or purposes beyond 
revealing the truth.
Stehle’s work on sympotic poetry has started to disrupt the standard 
model of the symposion, replacing the happy hetaireia with a more ambiguous, 
disturbing and dangerous event.13 Moreover, studies of the symposion on the 
comic stage have disclosed how the poet’s theatrical and ideological ambitions 
shaped the dramatised event.14 For comic playwrights who represented the 
Greek drinking party, the symposion was not a static institution with set 
sociological functions, but a literary device, and a vehicle for conveying their
social concerns.
In this thesis I will turn these observations towards my study of the 
literary, dramatic and philosophical representations of the symposion found in 
Plato and Xenophon’s Symposia. Over the past century, Plato’s Symposium has 
been approached primarily as evidence for Platonic doctrines. Although the 
dialogue’s dramatic character has long been recognised, no serious attempt has 
been made to ask what the symposion, or the discourses in which it participates, 
add to the Symposium. By contrast, until very recently, the symposion provided 
the primary point of departure for studies of Xenophon’s Symposium. Its £taie to 
life’ depiction of the drinking party was the only redeeming feature of what was 
often regarded as an otherwise worthless text.15 Yet, although this negative 
assessment of Xenophon’s Symposium has been successfully challenged, the role
13 Stehle, 1999: 213-261. See also the earlier but often conveniently ignored works by Donlan, 
1985; Levine, 1985.
14 For example, Bowie, 1997; Piitz, 2000; Wilkins, 2000: 202-222 .
15 Guthrie, 1969: 341-344. Discussed in chapter 4, page 155, below.
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of the symposion in the Symposium has not yet been fully reassessed. Like the 
party at Agathon’s house, Xenophon’s symposion draws on, and builds into, 
wider social discourses which give the symposion its cultural meaning, and 
hence, its ‘reality’.16 To represent the symposion I must look at these literary and 
philosophical representations and ask not what happened in the symposion, but 
what meaning it had for Plato and Xenophon, and what meaning they invested in 
it for their imaginary readers.
Part 1 of this thesis will investigate Plato’s representation of the 
symposion, and its role in his Symposium. By engaging with Agathon’s party as 
a dramatic performance within the dramatics of his dialogue, I will investigate 
Plato’s ambitions for it as a social phenomenon, and the effects he creates by 
putting it at the centre of his Symposium. This will influence our understanding 
of the symposion and propose an alternative way in which Plato’s dialogue might 
be read. In part 2,1 will turn my attention to the symposion in Xenophon’s text. 
While Plato presents his readers with a model version of the symposion, 
Xenophon’s party critiques itself through the entertainments it offers, the 
conversations of its guests and the figure of Socrates. The drinking party chez 
Agathon acts as a training ground for kaloi kagathoi which informs positively 
our reading of Plato’s Symposium. But the events at Callias’ house undermine 
this aspect of the symposion, and promote Xenophon’s text over the party itself 
as a place for learning kalokagathia.
16 I use the term ‘discourse’ in the Foucauldian sense of ‘practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak’: see Foucault, 1972: 49. The relationship which Foucault envisages 
between discourses and reality are discussed by Mills, 1997: 48-77.
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The dynamics of viewing and performing will be central to these 
investigations. Plato sets up his symposion as a staged performance, with 
repercussions both for the symposiasts who attend it and for the reader-viewer of 
the Symposium. The symposiasts perform for, watch and test one another, whilst 
the reader-viewer observes this going on. Chapter 2 will ask what role this focus 
plays in Plato’s symposion, and how it affects our understanding of it. This will 
be followed in chapter 3 by a close study of one particular performance, 
Pausanias’ encomium of Eros. Like the other speeches in Plato’s Symposium, 
Pausanias’ encomium opens up its performer to the gaze and judgement of his 
fellow symposiasts (and the Symposium's reader-viewer). By reading the speech 
as part of the sympotic experience, rather than a philosophically defective 
account of eros, I will investigate how Plato presents one symposiast negotiating 
the demands of the symposion.
Viewing and performance also define Xenophon’s symposion. However, 
as part of its self-critique, the symposion takes advantage of its performances to 
assess the place and value of viewing and performing in the symposion. As 
chapter 4 will show, these performances create a hierarchy into which different 
entertainments and different entertainers must fit. Moreover, in both Symposia, 
the processes of viewing and performing are allied to the negotiation of identity. 
The participants in Plato’s Symposium shape their performances as epideixeis, or 
proofs, of their status as kaloi kagathoi. In Judith Butler’s words, the actions and 
speeches of the symposion are ‘performative’.17 Through their individual and 
group performances, the symposiasts create the very identities they hope to
17 On performalivity, see Butler, 1990, 1993, and 1999, whose ideas are considered from a
sympotic perspective oil pages 57-58 (chapter 1), 85 (chapter 2) and 201-202 (chapter 4).
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confirm. In doing so, they expose this identity to renegotiation. The competitive 
and communal elements of the symposion, which will be discussed in chapter 2, 
facilitate this process. The speech of Pausanias therefore provides an interesting 
insight into how the symposiast might seek to affirm and recreate his identity as 
kalos kagathos in the symposion.
The events of Xenophon’s symposion are also ‘performative’ (in Butler’s 
sense of the word). However, Xenophon is more explicitly concerned with his 
symposiasts’ performances as a means of exploring kalokagathia. In chapter 4, 
we will discover that the uninvited laughter-maker and hired dancing troupe are 
as vital to this process as the invited guests. Their performances offer the 
viewing symposiasts a means of reassessing and exploring their own self­
conceptions. Like Pausanias, and Plato’s other symposiasts, Caliias’ guests 
ground their kalokagathia in their performances. But moreover, as chapter 6 will 
show, they link their personae as kaloi kagathoi explicitly to their ability to teach 
kalokagathia. Xenophon’s symposiasts are kaloi kagathoi, and in being kaloi 
kagathoi they (should) teach one another kalokagathia.
However, at the same time as Xenophon produces a symposion in which 
kaloi kagathoi teach one another to be better men, he undermines the 
symposiasts’ ability to do this. Socrates is the symposiarch of Xenophon’s 
symposion-. he sets the pattern of drinking for the evening, and co-ordinates the 
entertainments. However, in chapter 5, I will emphasise the differences between 
the symposion Socrates tries to create, and the symposion which actually takes 
place. Moreover, despite his leading role, Socrates stands outside of the 
symposion. He is a gelotopoios, and a spoudaiogeloios', he makes laughter, and 
at the same time mediates its dangers through his serious jokes. Xenophon
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creates the impression that without Socrates the symposion would spiral out of 
control, and the teaching, learning and exploration of kalokagathia would fall by 
the way.
The potential failings of the symposion as an educational model are 
further highlighted through the performances of the symposiasts. Taking the 
speeches of Niceratus, Critoboulus and Charmides as examples, chapter 6 will 
show how Xenophon sets up a model for learning kalokagathia which 
demonstrates the symposiasts’ failure to live up to Socrates’ ideal. The 
symposion offers its participants the opportunity to mingle and improve 
themselves by association with other kaloi kagathoi. However, the calibre of the 
kaloi kagathoi means that this ideal is never brought to fruition. In answer to 
Lycon’s question, where might one learn kalokagathia, Xenophon answers 
emphatically ‘not in the symposion". Rather, it is Xenophon’s text, the 
Symposium, as a literary and philosophical representation of the symposion,
which fulfils this function. Its structure and contents invite the reader to assess
the merits, or otherwise, of the symposion, and suggest that reading Xenophon’s 
Symposium offers a more profitable route to kalokagathia than participating in 
real-life versions of the event it depicts.
In short, Plato and Xenophon offer models of sympotic life which are 
shaped by their philosophical and literary ambitions for the symposion and for 
their Symposia. Like twentieth-century playwrights and anthropologists, they are 
sociologists of the symposion, who explore its social dynamics and potential 
functioning. But this project is contained by their desire to present a 
(philosophically) ideal way of doing a symposion, or reading a Symposium. My 
thesis presents a new theoretical approach for interpreting literary representations
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of the symposion which puts the textual strategies which lie behind these 
representations at the heart of its analysis. This methodology uncovers how 
ancient Greeks may have thought about the symposion, or envisaged it 
functioning on a sociological level, and how they could manipulate its 
representations for literary and philosophical ends. By remaining alert to the 
problems of using literature as a direct source of historical evidence, I hope to tie 
down the classical symposion in a new way.
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Chapter 1: Approaching the Symposion. Some 
Methodological Considerations
For scholars of the ancient world, the symposion has long been a recognised 
feature of Greek life.1 However, developments in our understanding of the 
phenomenon over the past century or so have been slow, gradual and determined 
to a large degree by scholarly interest in other areas. From Reitzenstein’s study 
of Epigramm und Skolion through to Vetta’s collection of articles on Poesia e 
Simposio nella Grecia Antica, the symposion emerges as a self-standing 
institution because of its function as a place where skolia, lyric poetry and elegy 
were performed.2 3However, in the 1980s, the symposion underwent a period of 
historicisation. Influenced by anthropological investigations into social 
organisations and rites of commensality, Murray focused on the social 
construction, operation and function of the aristocratic drinking group. The 
poetry of the symposion combined with other elements of the sympotic
1 See. for example, Reitzenstein, 1893; Burckhardt, 1957; Jacobstlial, 1912; Von der Mulill,
1975.
2 Reitzenstein, 1893; Vetta, 1983. The influence of this trend is apparent in Rossi, 1982. His 
study of ‘Il simposio greco arcaico e classico come spettacolo a se stesso’, which treats the 
archaic symposion as if it gained its meaning solely tluough the performance of poetry. On this 
reading, when poetry supposedly faded into tire background of sympotic experience in tire 
classical period, the symposion ceased to exist; cf. Rossi, 1982; 50.
3 See Murray, 1982: 47-48; 1983b: 197, 199; 1990b: 3-5; and 1995a: 9ff. Nowadays Murray, 
2003: 14-15, recognises tire role these theories played in iris investigations twenty years ago. He 
further attributes Iris approach, which I will analyse below, to a tacit acceptance of the Marxist- 
materialist requirement that all cultural and aristic products be viewed as direct consequences of 
social forces. Hence, Iris symposion became linked to exploitation and modes of production.
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experience to create an institution of political, sociological and psychological 
import.
Although not everybody agreed with this interpretation, Murray’s work 
freed the symposion from the constraints of lyric poetry and provided an 
opportunity for scholarship on it to flourish.4 On the one hand attempts were 
made to uncover the format of the Greek drinking party and its sociological 
functions more fully. And on the other hand, it became the subject for socio­
historical investigations into homosexuality and pederasty, the status of women, 
and Greek aristocratic concerns.5 That the symposion could be turned to this end 
was itself a consequence of academic developments: women’s studies and gender 
theory had made their mark on classical scholarship via the efforts of Pomeroy 
and Dover, who put women and homosexuality on the agenda for a new 
generation of ancient historians.6 The archaeology, literature, poetry and art of 
the symposion were called upon to illuminate the sociological questions now 
being asked.
Thus, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is impossible to talk 
of the symposion as ‘ gemutliche Trinken in frolicher Gesellschaft’, as Pauly and 
Wissowa’s Real-Encyclopadie once did.7 The ‘modern’ symposion is an 
‘institution’ with clearly definable traits and purposes. Although some debate 
exists over its social composition in the classical period, the symposion is
4 On opposition to Murray’s model symposion, see pages 23ff and 47-49. below.
5 A quick glance at the contents of three recent collections on the symposion, namely Murray 
1990a, Slater, 1991 and Murray and Te?usan, 1995, will show the extent to which these questions 
dominate contemporary scholarship.
° Pomeroy, 1975; Dover, 1989 (first edition 1978).
Pauly and Wissowa, 1893-1978:11.4, 1267.
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accepted as a closed affair and a rite of commensality. With wine as its catalyst, 
it offered participants the opportunity to explore and affirm their identities 
individually, within the sympotic community, and in relation to society at large. 
By examining contributions to this view of the symposion as a historical 
institution of sociological and psychological import, I will investigate their 
methodological approaches. In particular, I will consider whether the questions 
they ask, and the answers they give, can be justified in light of the poetic and 
artistic evidence they use.
Historians and the Symposion.
Until the developments outlined above took hold, the symposion remained a 
recognised but often neglected aspect of Greek society. Studies of aristocratic 
lifestyles might have broadly acknowledged it as a component of everyday 
aristocratic life, but despite a 1926 lecture by Von der Muhll, finally published in 
1957, interest in the event itself remained low.8 However, as just discussed, a 
combination of scholarly trends permitted Murray to help rescue the symposion 
from obscurity and place it at the heart of investigations into feasting and 
drinking in the ancient world. The symposion also came to the attention of
8 Von der MulilL 1975 (originally published in 1957). In his study of Athenian society and 
Aristophanic comedy, Ehrenberg, 1943: 73-85, esp. 78-80, included the symposion amongst a 
number of defining aristocratic activities without any great thought. Donlan, 1999: 155-178, also 
placed the symposion in this context, although he viewed it from a sociological and functional 
perspective, implicating it in ‘die conscious fostering of a particular manner of life’ by which 
Athens’ upper class created an image of itself as different from and better titan its fellow citizens. 
But despite tliis intriguing conclusion, Donlan chose not to investigate how exactly the symposion
fulfilled this role.
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Schmitt-Pantel, who drew it into the civic realm of the polis9 Together, these 
two scholars produced a blue-print for the archaic symposion which has 
influenced other historians seeking to understand its role in the archaic and 
classical city. However, their use of literary and artistic evidence creates 
problems for their attempts to investigate the symposion as a social and historical 
institution. Yet, their approach derives in part from earlier efforts to understand 
the symposion which tackled the evidence in similar ways.
In his 1978 teaching pamphlet, Vickers outlined a picture of the 
symposion which reflected the general impression of it established by the late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German-speaking scholars Burckhardt 
and Von der Muhll.10 Burckhardt based his symposion on Plutarch’s Seven 
Sages, ‘welches in seiner spaten Fiktion das Kostiim einer sehr alten Periode 
durchzufuhren sucht’.11 Eating, drinking, flute-playing, mixing wine, religious 
ritual and the act of reclining were placed alongside conversation as the 
symposiori’s key components.12 Topics of conversation and an atmosphere of 
wit, joking, dispute, malice and amiability were uncovered through the poetry of 
Theognis and Xenophanes and artistic representations of the banquet on painted 
vases, and in funeral and cultic reliefs.13 Thinking more about its historical 
development, Von der Muhll constructed the symposion as an originally Eastern, 
ritualised occasion attended by the nobility, and related to the numerous other
9 Schmitt-Pantel. 1990. 1992.
10 Vickers, 1978.
11 Burckhardt, 1957: 144.
12 Burckhardt, 1957: 144-145.
Burckhardt, 1957: 146.
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Greek festivals and thiasoi (religious groups) centred on eating and drinking.14 
In addition, he scoured archaic poetry and classical literature for evidence of the 
actual sympotic experience, drawing from them depictions of the entertainments 
on offer, the games played, and the rules of drinking followed there.15 For 
Burckhardt and Von der Muhll, descriptions of feasting and drinking in Homer, 
the archaic poets, and the literary Symposia of Plato, Xenophon and Plutarch 
were undistorted reflections of real-life events, unmediated by genre or authorial 
design.
Despite recognising the difficulties involved in viewing the world of 
Homer as a reflection of any historical culture, Murray has few misgivings about 
equating Homeric society with eighth-century Greece.16 Hence, where Von der 
Muhll rejects any continuity between the seated banquets found in epic poetry 
and the reclining banquets of the archaic period on the basis of their differing 
forms, Murray finds a connection in their social functions.17 18Under the influence 
of structuralist theory and anthropological studies on rites of commensality and 
the ‘Mannerbund’ (men’s group/bond) he identifies the ‘feast of merit’ depicted 
in the Iliad and Odyssey as a predecessor for the archaic and classical 
symposion n These feasts were not merely occasions for eating and drinking, but
14 Von der Miihll. 1975: 486. 488-489.
15 Von der Mulill, 1975: 490-495.
16 Murray, 1983b: 198.
17 Von der Miilill, 1975: 483-487; Murray, 1983a: 259ff; 1983b: passim:, 1995a: 221-224.
18 Murray has been particularly influenced in his understanding of Homeric banquets as ‘feasts 
of merit’ by Jones, 1974. The Homeric ‘feast of merit’ is discussed in Murray, 1980: 47-52; 
1983a: 259-262; 1983b: 196-197; 1995a: 224.
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‘a structural element within Homeric society’.19 The ‘feast of merit’ combined 
the fostering of bonds of solidarity and obligation amongst leaders and their 
warbands (or Mannerbunde) with the conscious display of agricultural surplus. 
Thus, Homeric feasting was a central component of aristocratic competition for 
honour (time)20
However, investigations into Homeric epic as the written culmination of 
centuries of on-going oral composition have led others to ask whose world the 
Iliad and Odyssey reflect21 Continuing Parry and Lord’s comparative approach, 
Morris suggested that on the basis of contemporary oral traditions, the world 
portrayed by Homer was the era in which he lived. It might have been modified 
by the poet’s distancing techniques, but it was essentially a poetic representation 
of eighth-century Greece.22 Thus, Morris successftilly critiques the arguments 
of Finley and Snodgrass, who identify the ‘Homeric world’ with tenth- and 
ninth-century Greece and as a pastiche of artificial elements respectively.23 
However, his own conclusions are not water-tight. Morris’ equation of Homer’s 
world with the eighth-century depends on dating the writing down of the epics to
19 Murray. 1983b: 196.
20 The creation of bonds between waniors: Murray, 1983a: 260; 1983b: 196; 1991: 83-84; 
1995a: 220; 1995b: 5. On the warband as the sociological phenomenon of the ‘Mannerbund’, see 
Murray, 1982: 50-51. Agricultural surplus and competition for time-. Murray, 1983a: 260; 1983b: 
196-197; 1990b: 3-4; 1995a: 219.
21 Parry, 1987; Lord, 1960. For a substantial bibliography on tire topic of using Horner as 
evidence for social history, see Morris, 1986: 130-138. Osborne, 1996: 367-368, provides a list
of more recent books and articles.
22 Monis, 1986.
Morris, 1986: 95-115. See Finley, 1977, and Snodgrass 1974.
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this period; yet, recent research favours a seventh- or sixth-century date.24 25
Moreover, his claim that ‘non-literate societies float in a kind of perpetual 
present’, and therefore the institutions of the Iliad and Odyssey must be derived 
from the poet and his audience’s world, does not hold up to scrutiny. Morris 
argues that the technique of epic distancing, which involved ‘archaising’ features 
of everyday life as well as inventing and presenting ‘Heroic man’ as superior to 
his modern counterpart, allowed the poet to make Homeric society recognisable 
to, but different from, that of his audience. He remarks that ‘vanished 
institutions with no present referent could mean nothing’.26 However, if fifth- 
and fourth-century audiences could accept the heroic feasts of the Iliad and 
Odyssey as features of the distant past, when ‘feasts of merit’ were not practised,
there is no reason that Homer’s immediate audience would need to see their own
habits reflected for the poems to ‘make sense’. As Osborne notes, ‘the places 
and objects described in the poems will in many cases have been entirely 
unfamiliar to any audience of the Homeric poems. Such descriptions owe their 
existence in the poems not to the pleasure of a shock of recognition, but to the 
ability to conjure up a lost world which stimulated critical thought about the 
present situation’27 By attempting to find eighth-century symposia in the 
feasting halls of Homeric epic, Murray avoids thinking about the relationship
24 For example. Burgess, 2001: 49-53 convincingly dates the writing down of the Homeric 
poems to at least the seventh century, if not later, while Nagy, 1996: 42-43 and 108-109, posits an
initial date of c.550 BC, but notes tliat the text continued to be altered down until the second
century.
25 Morris, 1986: 87.
26 Morris, 1986: 89-90; 90.
Osborne, 1996: 147.
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between text and reality. Yet, the feasting which took place in the house of 
Odysseus and in the mess tents of the Iliad may have gained its reality in the 
imaginations of its audience alone.
This methodological question remains an issue when Murray bridges the 
gap between Homeric feasting and the archaic symposion by turning to political 
and social developments in the seventh and sixth centuries. The rise of the 
hoplite soldier and the spread of wealth and political power amongst larger 
sections ofpolis populations reduced the ‘feast of merit’ from a building block of 
wealth and stability in the community to a private, inward-looking gathering of 
aristocrats, detached from the wider polls,28 The men who came together to 
drink were no longer defenders of the community but ‘an aristocracy of leisure’. 
Under these new political conditions ‘the symposion became a refuge from the 
real world, an escape into entertainment and luxury for its own sake’.29 This 
postulated connection between the shift in political and monetary capital and the 
emergence of the symposion enables Murray to explain the differences between 
the old ‘feasts of merit’ and the new, exclusive gatherings. Moreover it allows 
him to extend his psychological profiling of the earlier event into the archaic 
symposion. Solidarity and bonding were still key aspects of the sympotic 
experience; however, they were redirected according to the new political and 
social requirements of the archaic city.
By linking the symposia implied by the poetry of Alcaeus with the 
accepted picture of political upheaval and social change in the Greek world, 
Murray finds an explanation for why the symposion of the archaic period is
28 On the value of the Mannerbund to its community, see Murray, 1980: 51-52.
29 Murray, 1983b: 196; 198. See also, Murray, 1982: 51; 1983a: 263; 1995a: 224ff.
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different from its Homeric ‘predecessor’. This allows him to depict the new 
symposion as a direct descendant of the feast of merit.30 He justifies his use of 
Homeric evidence for ‘real societies’ by stating that this evidence ‘seems to 
relate to and confirm the picture of the importance of the symposion in the 
Archaic period’.31 Yet, in the very next sentence he states ‘the development of 
the [archaic] symposion out of the Homeric feast shows the same type of social 
change that we find elsewhere’ ,32 Thus, his picture of Homeric feasting derives 
from the archaic symposion, which in turn derives from the Homeric event.
This circular thinking is also reflected in Murray’s understanding of the 
development of the symposion within the archaic period. Maintaining a level of 
gross generality, Murray argues that the shift in political power in Greek poleis 
away from the aristocracy and towards a broader segment of the population led 
the aristocracy to withdraw from society. The symposion, as part of the 
aristocratic lifestyle, ‘became enclosed within itself, no longer relevant to wider 
social functions’ and provided aristocrats with an escape frompolis life.33 At the 
same time, Murray remarks that ‘the ritual of the symposion also of course 
became more diffused, as the new military class took on the attitudes of the old, 
and even intruded itself into the public sphere’.34 In effect, he claims that there 
were two symposia, one attended by the old aristocracy, and one where newly 
enfranchised hoplites met. Yet, every one of his articles on the symposion talks
30 Tliis picture of the changing archaic world was established by Murray, 1980, but has recently 
been developed more hilly by Monis, 1996, Osborne, 1996, and Kurke, 1999.
31 Murray, 1983b: 198.
32 Murray, 1983b: 198.
33 Munay, 1983b: 198; cf. Murray, 1983a: 263.
34 Murray, 1983b: 198; cf. Murray, 1982: 50-51.
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about the institution as a purely aristocratic phenomenon. Wishing to tie his own 
symposion into anthropological studies of the Mannerbund, he remarks ‘in the 
case of Greece I see the phenomenon as closely tied to the needs, aims and life­
style of the aristocracy’.35 The hoplite symposion which ‘of course’ developed 
with the diffusion of political power is either quietly merged into the aristocratic 
event, or surreptitiously ignored.
Murray’s blind-spot regarding the non-aristocratic symposion is in part 
due to his selection and interpretation of the evidence available for the archaic 
event. The poetry of Theognis, Alcaeus, Archilochus, and Anacreon is 
interpreted as products of aristocratic society. Hence, when Murray reads 
Alcaeus’ vitriol against Pittacus he generalises this theme to imply the Greek 
symposion was the preserve of discontented, disenfranchised aristocrats.36 
However, as Morris has shown, even assuming an exclusively aristocratic venue 
for the symposion, two different political positions are found within archaic 
poetry.37 On the one hand, lyric poetry contains heroic themes and values which 
reflect ‘elitist’ desires to create and reassert traditional aristocratic authority.38 39
On the other, the elegy of Solon, Theognis, Phocylides and Xenophanes reveals a 
‘middling’ tradition, which reflects a ‘Principle of Equal Consideration of 
Interests’. This poetry promotes moderation as the key value of the good
35 Murray. 1983b: 198-199.
36 Murray, 1983b: 198. In this interpretation Murray follows Rosier, 1980: see pages 37-38, 
below.
37 Morris, 1996.
38 Morris, 1996: 31-36.
39 Morris, 1996: 20, 28-31. Under this principle each citizen receives the right to speak and be
heard, but a select gr oup of citizens still takes decisions for the community as a whole.
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citizen, and thus allows members of the aristocratic elite to align themselves with 
their less well-off fellow citizens, whilst asserting their possession of moderation 
{sophrosyne), virtue {arete), and wisdom {sophia), qualities which entitle them to 
rule 40 In addition, the poetry of Theognis recognises two different types of 
symposion. Theognis warns his listeners against participating in the symposia of 
the bad {hoi kakoi)\ while attendance at the symposia of good men {hoi esthloi) 
benefits the symposiast, he who mixes with the bad will find his mind 
destroyed.41 Murray describes the andron, or men’s room, as a place of refuge 
where the symposiast might escape polis life and reinforce his membership of a 
distinct group based on common political values and trust {pistis). He further 
claims that the function of the sympotic group was to foment ‘unity for action 
within the polis in defence of class privileges’. But this picture tells only part of 
the story.42 The symposia of non-aristocrats and of non-elitist and middling 
aristocrats remain out of view.
Murray’s studies of the archaic symposion led the way for other 
classicists to investigate the symposion as a historical institution. However, his 
methodology has never been questioned and, with only a few exceptions, his 
conclusions have not been challenged.43 Thus, his version of the symposion 
continues to provide the standard model on which innovative scholars like James 
Davidson build their accounts.44 However, Morris’ study of the archaic city 
emphasises the plurality of experiences and opportunities for self-positioning
40 Morris. 1996: 30.
41 Theognis 31-8 W.
42 Murray, 1995a: 226.
43 See note 4, above.
44 Davidson, 1997: see below, pages 45-47.
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available to the Greek aristocrat within the city. It thereby suggests that 
Murray’s symposion, where disenfranchised aristocrats gather to define 
themselves against the polis, should not be approached uncritically.
Schmitt-Pantel is one of the few scholars to openly challenge Murray’s 
symposion. In La Cite au Banquet, she reinscribes the symposion with the 
religious and public elements rejected by Murray, by placing it within the context 
of public feasting.45 She collapses the distinction between the private and public 
spheres, claiming that communal meals and sympotic activity are indissociable 
forms of commensality in the archaic world.46 Within the city, public and private 
forms of commensality are ‘plus complementaires qu’antagonistes’47 The 
author extends this observation into classical Athens where aristocrats continued
to gather together, gaining mutual affirmation through their association. But the 
symposion co-existed with a wide range of other activities which involved eating 
and drinking, for example feasting at the tholos and prytaneion at state expense. 
Thus, two systems of feeding the classical community existed. Sacrifice 
constituted the democratic redistribution of surplus to the demos, and symposia 
provided occasions for aristocratic redistribution.48 The aristocratic symposion,
45 Schmitt-Pantel on Murray: 1992.46-48.
46 In her article in Sympotica, Schmitt-Pantel, 1990, 25, clarifies her understanding of the 
distinction between prive and public-. ‘I do not mean to cast doubt on Hie “private” character of 
the symposion in tlie sense that it was “restricted to some” or “not open to all”, but rather on its 
“private” character in the sense that it was “connected with the world of tlie private”, a notion 
basically created to oppose that of the “public world” in the sense of tlie “political world’”.
4' Schmitt-Pantel, 1992: 484, and 147-202.
Sclunitt-Pantel, 1992: 487.
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the religious festivals of the polis and state provisions for its officers were 
different manifestations of the same social phenomenon.
Schmitt-Pantel finds a place for the elite symposion within the wider 
community of the polis, but her account assumes the integrity of the symposion 
as a closed, aristocratic institution. Like Murray, this assumption affects her 
analysis of the poetic and artistic material associated with the symposion49 Both 
scholars take these as direct evidence for everyday aristocratic life, to the extent 
that changes in sympotic imagery on Athenian figured vases at the end of the 
fifth century are for Schmitt-Pantel Techo des transformations sociales dans la 
cite’.50 The sources they examine are interpreted as products and reflections of 
the exclusive aristocratic symposion. Their possible circulation at non- 
aristocratic gatherings and their consumption by, interaction with, and relation to, 
non-aristocratic symposiasts remain unexplored.
Art and the Symposion.
Stein-Holkeskamp attempts to redress this problem in her article ‘Lebensstil als 
Selbstdarstellung: Aristokraten beim Symposion".51 By examining a selection of 
sympotic representations from the repertoire of the vase painter Euphronius, she 
contends that a decrease in the representation of luxury items, the disappearance 
of weapons and hunting imagery, and Euphronius’ depiction of himself at a
49 Schmitt-Pantel’s division of poetry depending on the occasion for which it was composed, 
and of artistic representations of feasting into generic banqueting scenes of aristocratic life, and 
scenes of the symposion presented as a private affair does not change this: Schmitt-Pantel, 1992:
17-41.
50 Schmitt-Pantel, 1992: 19.
31 Stein-Holkeskamp, 1992.
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symposion, demonstrate that by the last quarter of the sixth century the 
symposion was no longer an aristocratic affair. By this point, Athens’ new 
political elite had adopted aristocratic practices to strengthen its position.52 
Hence, vase-paintings now reflected the lifestyles of the nouveau riche. With 
this interpretation, Stein-Holkeskamp confirms the symposion’  s private role but 
challenges the notion of its continued importance as an aristocratic 
phenomenon.53 Late archaic vases display the comparatively humble lifestyle of 
the men who use them.
With this approach Stein-Holkeskamp follows Dentzer and Schmitt- 
Pantel, who also assume that the feasting and symposia depicted on Athenian 
figured vases reflected reality.54 However, her conclusions are challenged by the 
possibility of reading her vases in other ways. Stein-Holkeskamp assumes that 
Euphronius’ paintings represent the symposion exactly as their viewers 
experienced it: late sixth-century Athenian symposiasts reclined on stripy 
mattresses rather than couches (klinai) in dining rooms devoid of all luxury.55 
However, as Osborne noted with regard to the Homeric world, the symposion 
represented on the vase need not relate precisely to any historical drinking 
party.56 Euphronius’ symposia may be stylised or idealised representations of 
actual drinking parties, or relate only tendentiously to the real-life event. In this 
connection, the slaves and low-status men and women who painted Attic pottery 
were unlikely to have been symposiasts as Murray, Schmitt-Pantel and Stein-
52 Stein-Holkeskamp. 1992: 44.
53 ‘Privatisierung’: Stein-Holkeskamp, 1992: 45.
54 Dentzer, 1982: 125-126. See also Felir, 1971.
55 Stein-Holkeskamp, 1992: 45.
56 For Osborne’s comment, see above, page 18.
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Holkeskamp imagine them.57 But, to accept that Euphronius replicated the 
symposion on his vases would be to assert that men and women of all statuses 
took part in the event, not just the aristocracy or members of the nouveau riche. 
Although Stein-Holkeskamp wishes to expand the composition of the symposion 
so that it might now include vase painters, she does not address the issue of the 
painter’s probable status; nor does she consider the possibility that Euphronius 
gave his name to one of his painted symposiasts in order to indulge in a spot of 
wish-fulfilment, fantasy, irony or humour.58
Thus, it is just as likely that the symposia which decorate late archaic 
black-figure vases are products of their painter’s imagination and intentions as 
depictions of actual Greek drinking parties. The painter might represent the 
symposion as a ‘hyper-reality’, depicting something which is beyond or different 
to, even whilst it is recognisable as, that event. Alternatively, he might ‘other’ 
the symposion through the inclusion of satyrs, male-female transvestism, 
Scythian garb, ugly figures and obscene behaviour in sympotic scenes. Recent 
studies have suggested that this ‘othering’ might remove the symposion from the 
real world of the viewer, offering him a platform from which to think about
57 Webster. 1972: 4ff. argued that potters and painters could attain high status within Athenian 
society; however, this proposition is challenged by Williams, 1995: 15 Iff, who claims that tlie 
average pottery factory employed a mixture of metics, slaves and citizens.
For example, Neer, 2002, shows that images of potters at symposia echo die playful and 
competitive atmosphere of tlie sympotic event. He further ties diem into die socio-political 
upheaval diat char acterised die late fifth century, arguing diat pictures of potters at parties do not 
so much reflect social upheaval but take part in it: Neer, 2002: 127-128.
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himself in relation to the satyric, the feminine, the barbarian, the divine, and the 
‘other’.59
Furthermore, by arguing that mattresses and sparse wall-hangings imply 
austerity and therefore poverty, Stein-Holkeskamp imposes her own assumptions 
about austerity onto the symposion. However, the passing of Solon’s sumptuary 
legislation and a move towards less ostentatious grave markers in sixth-century 
Athens suggest on-going social, moral and political concern with private and 
public displays of luxury.60 As Kurke’s study of luxury (habrosyne) in lyric 
poetry and elegy indicates, enjoyment of a luxurious, orientalising lifestyle was 
the cornerstone of aristocratic identity in the seventh century. This developed in 
reaction to the increased distribution of wealth and political power amongst 
wider sections of the polls,61 Hence, Sappho’s claim to love habrosune is a 
‘programmatic political statement’.62 However, Solon’s sumptuary legislation 
and the poetry of Xenophanes reveal that in the sixth century a debate evolved
59 On satyrs on Athenian vases, see Lissarrague. 1990, and on transvestism, see Frontisi- 
Ducroux and Lissarrague, 1990. Kurke, 1992: 97-98, and Dupont, 1999: 69-70, give different 
interpretations of the images they discuss. Schmitt-Pantel, 1990: 425-470, discusses the banquets 
of Persians and non-Greeks, as well as of die gods, while Miller, 1995, asks whether symposiasts 
in Persian hats were exploring their non-Greek side on die pots and in real life. On divine 
symposia on Atiienian figured vases see Carpenter, 1995. For die juxtaposition of female- 
barbarian-satyr on Attic head jugs, read Lissarrague, 1990: 58. Sutton, 2003, discusses ugliness 
and obscenity in die symposion.
6tJ Changes in funeraiy habits are charted by Kurtz and Boardman, 1971, and interpreted by 
Morris, 1996: 24-25, 39-40 and Osborne, 1996: 312ff, who relate die change in funerary stelai to 
the growth of democracy too.
61 Kurke, 1992: 94-96.
62 Kurke, 1992: 96, discussing Sappho 140 L-P.
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concerning ‘how the wealth of the elite within the polis should be used’.63 The 
modernising side of this discourse is also found in several fragments of Solon’s 
poetry, in which the poet returns frequently to the topic of wealth: greedy men 
threaten to destroy Athena’s city, and satiety (koros) gives birth to arrogance 
(hybris).6* Bad men (hoi kakoi) are wealthy, while the good (hoi agathoi) are 
poor, but the latter can always count on the wealth of their virtue (arete), whilst 
money comes and goes.65 In these poems Solon binds the issue of luxury and 
elite display within the language of morality: moderation in all things, including 
feasting and drinking, are the mark of the aner agathos, who does not flaunt his 
wealth, and is a good and virtuous man.66 Thus, if Euphronius’ sympotic 
paintings did represent the reality of his drinker’s experience (and I have argued
63 Kurke. 1992: 103.
64 Solon 4; 6 W. For a more nuanced understanding of hybris, see Fisher, 1992.
65 Solon 15 W.
66 In contrast to Kurke, 1992: 96, who states that only Xenophanes and Semonides are not 
uniformly positive in their judgement of habrosune, my reading of Solon’s poetry places its 
author firmly on the side of those who seek to curb excessively luxurious lifestyles amongst his 
city’s aristocracy. The connection Solon makes between ploutos, kakos, and hybris on the one 
hand, and poverty and agathos on die odier takes one step fordier Sappho’s (148 L-P) comment 
that ‘wealth (ploutos) without excellence (arete) is no undestructive neighbour./ But the mixture 
of both holds the peak of blessedness’ (discussed by Kurke, 101). Solon suggests that weald) and 
arete cannot be combined in diis way. Similarly, in 24 W Solon contrasts a life characterised by 
gold and silver, land and horses, with that in which filling one’s stomach, enjoying a young boy 
or girl, and one’s own youthfulness are more important tiian wealth. Thus, when he links diis 
latter lifestyle to habra pathein, translated by Kurke (93) as ‘die good life’, he in effect redefines 
die aristocratic lifestyle of habrosune as one which allows die aristocrat to enjoy die benefits of 
liis status widiout die excesses of private luxury. On Solon as a poet of the ‘middling’ tradition, 
see Morris, 1996: 30.
APPROACHING THE SYMPOSION 29
they did not), the simplicity of the late sixth-century andron might have reflected 
political and moral trends towards moderation amongst one section of Athens’ 
aristocratic elite, rather than the assumed relative poverty of its nouveau riche.
The above observations show how difficult it is to use the images on 
sympotic vases as direct evidence for everyday symposia. In addition, the 
relationship between vase-painting and reality is made more difficult by the 
question of who actually used so-called sympotic vessels. Of the approximately 
fifty percent of Attic figured vases whose provenance is known, more than eighty 
percent were found in Etruscan tombs.67 This fact has opened up a seemingly 
irresolvable debate over whether Athenian pottery was made explicitly for the 
export market or reached Etruria, and the various other places around the 
Mediterranean where pots have been found, second hand.68 This issue impacts 
on the extent to which Athenian figured vases can be used as evidence for the 
symposion. If vases were intended for sale outside Athens, were they decorated 
specifically with this audience in mind? The answer to this question affects the 
deployment of Athenian figured vases and their iconography as evidence for
67 Lewis. 2002.
68 See Spivey, 1991: 139-141, whose study of amphorae potted and painted by tlie Nikostlienes 
group implies that at least some workshops geared their production towards foreign markets. 
Gill, 1991, disagrees, suggesting instead that Athenian pots were originally made for an Athenian 
market but that traders exported them as moveable ballast. The idea that breakable ceramic ware 
would have been carried as ballast has been criticised by Sparkes, 1996: 166, who proposes 
instead that workshops produced vessels specifically for tlie export market alongside or 
independent of those intended for sale. A similar claim is made by Johnston, 1991, whose study 
of market influences on shapes and decoration concludes that while there was a healthy market 
for Attic figured vases across tlie Mediterranean, a second hand trade and home market existed
too.
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developments in Athenian culture and ideology. For example, Schmitt-Pantel 
uses the red figure kylix Florence 3922, which depicts men reclining, drinking, 
playing kottabos, and listening to a flute boy, as evidence for the practicalities of 
the Greek banquet69 But if this picture was only ever seen, or intended to be 
seen, by the people who buried it in a tomb in Chiusi, Italy, can it really be taken 
as an indicator of Greek practice? Similarly, Bremmer’s use of ‘pederastic 
courtship scenes’ on black- and red-figure vases to support his views of a 
disintegrating aristocratic archaic world witnessed through erotic practices in the 
symposion becomes problematic 70
Even if the original provenance of sympotic scenes in the workshops of 
the Cerameicus is taken as sufficient to allow analysis of the vases within 
Athenian culture, a further question remains over which members of Athenian 
society made use of figured pottery.71 This question is related specifically to the 
value of Attic ceramic figure-ware in archaic and classical Athens.72 Vickers and 
Gill’s proposal that these vases were poor men’s imitations of the silver- and 
gold-figure metal containers used by the rich was quickly challenged by 
historians of ancient art.73 In general, the low monetary value of ceramic goods 
has been accepted; however, a low cost does not necessarily dictate a lower class 
purchaser. Neer observes that plate remained rare in Greece before the fourth 
century and so the ‘luxurious’ living of Athens’ elite must be judged by the
69 Schmilt-Pantel. 1992: 22.
70 Bremmer, 1990: 143-144.
71 Note that a good deal of black- and red-figure ware has been found in the Agora, suggesting 
Athenian use in some contexts: see Moore, 1986 and 1997.
■z Vickers, 1985; Gill, 1991; Vickers and Gill, 1994.
7j See, for example, Cook, 1987; Robertson, 1992: 4-5.
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standards of their own time.74 75This uncertainty implies that cups and kraters 
need not have portrayed specific aristocratic symposia. Indeed, scenes of 
drinking, game-playing, and general revelry need not represent the symposion, as 
Murray, Schmitt-Pantel or Stein-Holkeskamp understand it, at all.
Beard responds to these problems by stating that ‘the questions matter ... 
But given that (on the present state of the evidence) certainty is impossible, it is 
better to admit our ignorance and think constructively about how different 
answers to such questions would lead to different interpretations of the images’. 
Thus, studies which locate black- and red-figure ware within the Athenian 
symposion are not wrong to do so. However, where the problems of provenance 
and use are not recognised, and the dynamics surrounding the production of an 
image and the interaction of this image with its viewer are ignored, any 
conclusions reached remain open to challenge.
In The Aesthetics of the Greek Banquet, Lissarrague negotiates these 
problems by blurring the boundaries between the world depicted on his drinking 
vessels and the physical world of the symposion16 This technique is illustrated 
by his discussion of a red-figure stamnos dated to c.480.77 Both sides of this 
stamnos depict male figures reclining on separate couches. On one side, a 
woman stands between two reclining men and pours wine for one of them; on the 
other, two couches are occupied by a bearded man and a youth. A krater sits 
under one handle, and an altar under the other. Lissarrague remarks:
/4 Neer. 2002: 210; 214-215.
75 Beard, 1991: 19.
76 Lissarrague, 1990.
77 Oxford 1965.127. Lissarrague, 1990: 23-25.
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‘Youths and adults are linked in this image, which is arranged as a 
continuous frieze around the whole vase. The painted surface is not 
circular but cylindrical; still, like the earlier example, the space is 
pictorially constructed as an uninterrupted circle. It is worth noting 
that this image appears on a stamnos, and that a krater appears under 
one of the handles - twice removed, a vase painted on a vase. By 
imagining this krater among the drinkers, we find something like a 
reverse symmetry, a mirror image, between the drinkers in the hall 
and their depiction on the krater. The pictorial surface is cylindrical, 
hence centrifugal, while the couches in the room are arranged so that 
they converge. The image sends the guests a reflection of their own 
activity’.78
Lissarrague concentrates on the ‘pictorial vocabulary’ of the Oxford stamnos, 
and above all on how the picture’s composition speaks to its viewer.79 However, 
the identity of that viewer is not fixed. Initially, he talks about how we, the 
modern viewer, might imagine the vase working in a symposion. From here, he 
suggests how the cup and its imagery might operate within the actual event. 
Lissarrague then relates the altar in the scene to the ‘earlier stage of the banquet, 
but without showing the sacrifice’. He thereby links the image firmly with what 
is ‘known’ about the symposion from literary texts.80 The simultaneous
78 Lissarrague. 1990: 25.
79 ‘Pictorial vocabulary’: Lissarrague, 1990: 28.
80 Lissarrague, 1990: 25.
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distinction between, and blurring of, modern and ancient audiences helps 
Lissarrague to avoid talking about the symposion as a physical event. Further, it 
allows him to create an impression of the symposion without making any definite 
statements about what it was. However, the overall effect of this method and his 
continual return to lyric and elegiac poetry and literary representations of the 
symposion, build a picture of what happened in the andron. The symposion 
emerges from his study as a location for experiencing the madness of Dionysos, 
challenging and shaping identities, and testing self-control; it is not just a place 
where poems were sung and games played.
Lissarrague approaches the archaeological and artistic evidence for the 
symposion in a subtle manner which recognises a multiplicity of possible 
readings for any one image. However, he ultimately uses Athenian figured vases 
which are connected with wine through their shape and imagery to describe the 
Realien of the symposion. In his chapter on ‘Reflections’, he states,
‘In its ingredients the symposion includes the images that circulate 
with the vases passed from hand to hand, along with wine, poetry and 
music. It provides room for the expression of a culture that is as 
visual as it is verbal, based on an acquaintance with both picture and 
song. The imagery depends for its effect on the memory of the 
painters, who transmit and transform the iconographic motif, and on 
the memory of the drinkers, who recognize the painted scenes and 
their own likenesses in the mirror of the vases’ (my emphasis).81
Lissarrague. 1990: 103.
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By searching for the symposion on vases and within images connected to wine, 
and in the interaction of these vessels with their sympotic viewers, Lissarrague 
hopes to come closer to the sympotic experience. While he does not accept the 
images as direct representations of reality, his elision of himself with the 
sympotic viewer inevitably brings his own preconceptions about what the 
symposion is into the equation. Moreover, he uses archaic poetry, tragic and 
comic plays, and the Symposia of Plato and Xenophon to back up the picture he 
is creating without considering whether the symposia represented in these 
sources can be used unproblematically in this way.
Artistic representations of the symposion therefore provide a tantalising 
source of evidence for the event they portray, but extreme caution is required 
when trying to assess the nature of the insight they give, and how this insight 
might be used. Although the search for ‘reality’ is unavoidable, Lissarrague 
employs a useful, self-critical and self-aware approach which attempts to ‘see’ 
the symposion through the possible experiences generated amongst symposiasts 
by their drinking vessels. This movement away from direct interpretations of 
sympotic representation as reflections of reality and towards a more complex 
analysis is reflected in twentieth-century scholarship on the poems performed in 
the symposion too.
Poetry in the Symposion
At the same time as historical accounts of the symposion started to appear, 
renewed focus on lyric poetry also brought it to the fore. Through the studies of 
Gentili, Rosier and Rossi, the symposion emerged as the primary location for the
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performance of all varieties of monody.82 Henceforth (and somewhat circularly), 
it became a crucial factor in their analyses of archaic poetry. Just as Lissarrague 
promotes a methodology for vase-paintings which focuses on the interaction 
between object and viewer, so these scholars emphasise the importance of the 
poet-audience relationship. As Rosier shows, previous scholarship treated 
elegiac and lyric poetry as a source for ‘Selbstzeugnis’ (personal testimony). 
Hence, the poet used his medium to convey personal thoughts and experiences.83 
By contrast, Rosier and Gentili sought to understand archaic poetry in light of its 
audience and in the moment of its performance.84 For Gentili, lyric poetry, 
performed before an audience, informed and instructed; but it also ‘needed to 
win the sympathy of that audience, and hence a surface of explicit statement 
embodying social attitudes that the audience can share comes back into poetry’.85 
Thus, lyric embodied ‘a “performance psychology” aimed at giving public 
dimensions to what is personal and subjective, which set up an emotional rapport 
between speaker and audience’.86 Using these criteria as the basis for his 
analysis, Gentili looked at the work of several poets to consider the ideas and
82 This location was first suggested by Reitzenstein. 1893: cf. Jacobstlial. 1912. See Gentili. 
1981, and 1988; Rosier, 1980; Rossi, 1982. Cf. Vetta, 1983, whose compilation brings together a 
number of essays on die topic of poetry and tlie symposion published since die 1940s, and
translates diem into Italian.
Rosier, 1980: 9ff; ‘Selbstzeugnis’: 11. In some comers, such an approach is still mainstream 
today. For example, West, 1993: ix, says of Lyric poetry ‘we have virtually no contemporary 
prose literature, and we rely on lyric above all for evidence of the beliefs, attitudes and opinions 
most prevalent in those times ... it shows us real Greeks speaking their minds’.
34 Rosier, 1980: 33-34.
85 Gentili, 1988: 3, 24; 22-23.
86 Gentili, 1988: 42.
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attitudes shared by the poet and his audience. For example, the poetry of 
Anacreon, composed in or for the symposion, reveals the symposiasts’ 
understanding of the operation of Eros at their communal gatherings.
Rosier took a similar approach to Alcaeus’ poetry, asserting that three 
particular components shaped his work: the sympotic occasion, the poem’s self- 
identification with the sympotic group through the use of‘we’ and ‘you (plural)’, 
and the presentation of views and aims specific to the friendship group 
(hetaireia)™ Thus, Alcaeus’ poetry acted within the symposion to promote 
bonds of friendship, turning the group into an embodiment, or representation, of
the institution.
As noted above, this analysis of Alcaeus was particularly important in 
shaping Murray’s view of the historical symposion as a place for togetherness 
and bonding. Thinking about the topics which dominated lyric poetry, Murray 
concluded that songs recording heroic deeds, warfare, and erotic desire reflected 
the shared interests of their listeners.87 88 89 90 When the poet spoke directly to his 
audience on these matters, he reaffirmed their communal identity. In addition, 
this process of self-affirmation had a political edge. For example, Alcaeus, a 
vocal opponent of the ruling tyrant of Mytilene, spoke within the symposion of 
his political aims and the importance of pistis amongst friends. With his shared 
confidences, he built community, reciprocity and trust amongst the present 
members of his hetaireict, men who held similar ambitions and opinions
87 Gentili. 1988: 89-104.
88 Rosier, 1980: 37.
89 Rosier, 1980: 37.
90 Murray, 1983a: 265-268; 1983b: 198.
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concerning thepolis9i On this analysis, lyric poetry provides an insight into the 
means and processes of the symposion, and adds a political dimension to our 
understanding of its nature. Murray notes ironically that ‘originating perhaps in 
the genuine social needs of the polis, it [the symposion} could end by becoming 
an alternative to the polls' 92 93
Murray’s symposion also owes much to Rossi’s study of the symposion as 
a ‘spettacolo a se stesso’ which introduced the concept of ‘sympotic space’. 
Rossi describes how singing at the archaic symposion involved not only the 
recitation of poetry composed specifically for or in the symposion, but also a high 
level of improvisation.94 The direct participation of guests in singing, and 
conversational deliberations as well, blended with the exclusive composition of 
the party and its poetry’s themes to create a closed and self-sufficient space.95 
Within this space each symposiast presented himself in turn, so that ‘diventa 
elemento di spettacolo per gli altri’. This self-presentation was part of a process 
of self-definition by which the outside world was excluded from the symposion, 
and the solidarity of the group, which Rossi describes as Ta funzione principale 
del simposio’, is reinforced.96 By locating lyric poetry within the symposion, 
Murray follows in the footsteps of Gentili, Rosier and Rossi. Rossi’s 
psychological ‘sympotic space’ complements the physicality of the andron, 
encouraging Murray to identify which messages different poems give out to their
91 Murray. 1995a: 226: 1983b: 198.
92 Murray, 1995b: 13.
93 Rossi, 1982.
94 Rossi, 1982: 44.
95 Rossi, 1982: 45-7.
96 Rossi, 1982: 48.
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audience and to think about how these messages create a sense of shared 
community.97 However, his work enters a catch-22 situation where his ideas 
about the sociological functions of the symposion inform his readings of the 
poetry performed there, so that the genre ends up supporting his ideas about the 
symposion as a conventional rite of commensality.
Other scholars have also built on the work of Rosier and Gentili,
deepening Murray’s impression of the archaic symposion as a place for 
friendship, bonding, and political machinations on the part of disenfranchised 
elites. Bowie reconsiders the evidence of martial exhortations in elegy to show 
that they could have been made in a civilian symposion. At the same time, he 
examines the relationship between the poems’ words and the self-identification 
of the listening symposiast-citizen-soldier.98 Similarly, Roster’s own studies on 
memory and on truth consider how lyric poetry encapsulates aspects of the 
symposiast’s experience.99 In the former, Rosier investigates how the symposion 
offered a location for the development and expression of a communal memory. 
He notes, ‘Mnemosyne in the symposion includes not merely remembering but 
also eliciting memories from others’.100 By bringing to mind previous symposia, 
wars and political events, lyric poetry served an interest in history and reaffirmed
97 On the creation of a sociological ‘sympotic space’ tlirough the physical components of the 
andron see Berquist, 1990. Murray himself talks about tliis ‘sympotic space’ in 1990b: 7, and 
1995a: 224. See also Cooper and Morris, 1990, who show how round dining rooms provided a 
space with different effects on social interaction.
98 Bowie, 1990.
99 Rosier, 1990; 1995.
100 Rosier, 1990: 232.
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the collectivity of the sympotic group.101 102 103Rosier uncovers this process of 
community building in his study of poetic references to ‘wine and truth’ too. 
Wine led symposiasts to speak truthfully and frankly, encouraging an atmosphere 
of ‘mutual acceptance’ where the drinker could speak without fear of criticism. 
More importantly, openness created closeness amongst guests at the symposion, 
who were expected to hide nothing from their hetaireict™
The treatment of poetry as an active, spoken force within the symposion 
illuminates the communal preoccupations of symposiasts, and suggests a means 
by which poetry could create a sense of communality between guests. This is 
especially true of poems whose subject was the symposion. For example, Levine 
shows how the poems attributed to Theognis reveal their poet’s preoccupation 
with the symposion as a microcosm of the polis™ Themes of education, the 
mean (to metriori), good order (kosmos), cunning (metis) and a utopian desire for 
peace underlie the poet’s idealising depictions of the drinking party and of the 
city.104 However, although it demonstrates one way in which the poet and his 
audience conceived of the symposion, Levine does not think about the relevance 
of this for understanding the sympotic audience or event. Theognis’ presentation 
of the symposion as a polis raises interesting questions for his audience’s 
positioning of themselves, their attitudes, desires and traditions within their 
immediate and wider communities; however, as in the works of Gentili, Rosier, 
Murray and Bowie, these issues remain unexplored.
101 Rosier. 1990: 233-234.
102 Rosier, 1995: 109.
103 Levine, 1985.
104 Levine, 1985: education: 178-179; ho inetrios and. kosmos: 179-185; metis'. 185-190; utopia:
190-194.
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Moreover, the idealising picture of the symposion-wxm-polis, with its 
companionable atmosphere and expressions of trust is a reflection of the poetry 
which Murray, Gentili, Rosier and Levine chose to discuss. Donlan’s study of 
pistos, philos, and hetairos in the poetry of Theognis implies that the dynamics 
of trust and friendship which these poems associated with the symposion were far 
removed from this ideal.105 According to Theognis’ prescriptions, the 
symposiast must continually look out for duplicity and treachery amongst his 
drinking companions. Friendships formed amongst hetairoi at the symposion 
could not be guaranteed outside the andron in serious matters or difficult 
times.106 107 *Moreover, these friendships were repeatedly put to the test, and 
deception between friends was not only to be expected, but necessary. This 
last proviso resulted directly from social upheaval within the polis. Theognis 
warns his listener that when stasis characterises relations within a community, its 
effects extend into the symposion.
Even the poetry of Alcaeus betrays the uncertainty of friendship. Written 
from the perspective of exile, the poet complains that Pittacus has broken his 
oath to the hetaireia.109 Thus, whilst it recreates the symposion as a place of 
harmony, loyalty and friendship, lyric poetry also reveals the presence of 
disruption and distrust. Hence, it encapsulates what Ferrari refers to as Two
105 Donlan. 1985.
106 Donlan, 1985: 229-230: Theognis 115-116, 643-644, 857-860; 79-82, 697-698, 645-646 W.
107 Donlan, 1985: 231ff: Theognis 125-128, 417-418, 641-642, 571-572; 253-254, 851-852, 91­
92; 63-64 W.
1OS Donlan, 1985: 240-241.
109 Alcaeus, 129 W.
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procedures of good and bad exchange’.110 Because the archaic polis was 
governed by the principle of ‘being a friend to one’s friends and an enemy to 
one’s enemies, doing good to the former and bad to the latter’, the bonding of 
social groups of friends by necessity led to the exclusion of those who could 
become enemies. However, economic pressure might culminate in the exclusion 
of those who are presently one’s friends from the group and their redefinition as 
enemies. 111 Thus, good exchange which created bonds of friendship was 
continually challenged by bad exchange where ‘bad exchange is simply what 
happens when the outsiders we inevitably exclude through good exchange will 
not stay excluded, but insert themselves where they do not belong, as a spurious 
presence’.112 From this vantage point, Theognis’ poetry defines the symposion as 
a convergence point for good and bad exchange, where the surreptitious presence 
of interlopers continually undermines the harmony between friends. It is a place 
where social bonds and personal identities are endangered and undermined, and 
not simply reaffirmed.
This process is brought to the fore by Stehle in Performance and Gender 
in Ancient Greece ,113 Her chapter on the symposion concentrates on the direct 
relationship between the performance of poetry and the creation and/or 
reinforcement of gendered identities through the interaction of the speaker and 
his audience. Stehle’s study proceeds on the basis that the poetry of Alcaeus, 
Theognis and his contemporaries was not confined to the symposia which these
110 Ferrari. 1988: 51.
111 Ferrari, 1988: 51.
112 Ferrari, 1988: 52.
113 Stehle, 1997.
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poets attended. Instead, it spread organically from symposion to symposion, and 
down the generations, so that poems and their audiences continued to interact 
anew into the fifth century.114 By harnessing a modern theoretical perspective, 
Stehle follows in the traditions of Gentili and Rosier, but pushes their 
conclusions one step further.
Drawing on contemporary performance theory, Stehle emphasises ‘the 
self-presentation of performers to their audiences’ so that performances become 
‘acts of staging themselves’.115 Moreover, these acts have ‘enabling and 
legitimating’ dimensions: the self-presentation of the performer gains reality and 
acceptance through the act of performing, and the interaction with the audience it 
requires.116 For Stehle, this process of self-performance and affirmation by men 
and women before a gendered community is inextricably bound up in 
perceptions of masculinity and femininity. Taking up Gleason’s view of 
manhood as ‘enacted through body languages’, she states that for men ‘gender is 
a powerful code through which self-display and competition with others is 
channelled’.117 In poetry and performance this code is ‘used for ideological ends 
and manipulated between visual and linguistic levels’.118
The performance of poetry within the symposion did not merely create 
community between viewer and listener. Rather, like other forms of 
entertainment enjoined there, it participated in the closed discourse of the
1,4 As previously claimed bv Rosier. 1980: 87-88: 95-97.
115 Stehle, 1997: 7. She thereby gives a more theoretical basis to Rossi’s claim that the 
symposiast, like tire symposion, was a ‘spettacolo a se stesso’. See note 2 and page 37, above. 
li" Stehle, 1997: 9.
37 Stehle, 1997:11. Stehle quotes Gleason, 1990: 391.
11S Stehle, 1997: 14.
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hetaireia, helping individual symposiasts find a voice for themselves within the 
collective whilst remaining a part of that fragile group.119 The employment of 
gendered imagery helped the singer to tread this thin line. He found a place in 
the sympotic group by positioning himself against the female other: the group’s 
enemies became feminised, whilst the singer’s portrayal of himself as the ideal 
male distanced himself, and his audience, from the female world.120 This 
positioning could involve a political element. For example, Alcaeus describes 
the life of a political fugitive from a first person perspective: he laments his 
leading of a rustic life, far from the assembly and council of the political world, 
and compares himself to one Onomacles, ‘the Athenian wolf-man’.121 Stehle 
suggests that by adopting this persona, the symposiast might highlight the 
cohesion of the present hetaireia through contrast. However, she also adds that 
the audience’s reception of the performance of this poem was not predictable. 
The pre-existing status of the performer within the drinking group determines 
their response more than the poem itself. An unpopular symposiast might find 
himself putting forward the case of the lone wolf-man, rather than distancing him 
from his adopted persona.122
Stehle’s analysis locates the poetry of the symposion within a 
performance culture. Where Rosier and Gentili focus on the poet’s performance 
as an embodiment of the ideas and ideals of the sympotic group, Stehle views the 
recitation of innovative or traditional poetry as act of self-presentation by which
119 Stehle. 1997: 217-227.
120 Stehle, 1997: 228-230.
121 Alcaeus, 130b PLF.
122 Stehle, 1997: 228-235.
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the symposiast attempts to communicate and establish his own identity before his 
audience. In addition, the act of viewing forces the audience to interact with this 
self-representation, to find common ground with the speaker, or to reject his 
persona. Stehle thus provides a tantalising new perspective from which to view 
the competitional and community-building aspects of the symposion.
Finally, Dupont provides an alternative insight into the symposion via the 
poetry performed there. She claims rather plausibly that poetry within the 
symposion was originally fluid and oral and bound to the ritual of the symposion. 
Different types of poems were appropriate to different stages in the drinking 
party, and these underwent free ‘hot’ recomposition via the inspiration of the 
Muse at every event.123 However, in the sixth century, lyric was written down to 
aid its memorisation by performers at local and panhellenic festivals. The 
sympotic personae of Ur-poets like Anacreon and Alcaeus became symbols of 
communal self-expression.124 Although poetry may have continued to be recited 
in the symposion, it was now memorised and ‘cold’. The symposion was no 
longer spiritually enthused and poetry lost its original function as a stage-marker 
in its rituals.125
Dupont’s analysis of the oral symposion is highly imaginative and draws 
its validity from comparison with Andalucian flamenco rather than evidence 
from the ancient world. Moreover, her quasi-structuralist division between ‘hot’, 
oral, changing culture and ‘cold’, written, fossilised culture does not stand up to 
scrutiny. As Stehle’s analysis shows, the memorising of poetry did not render its
123 Dupont 1999: 42ff.
124 Dupont, 1999: 51-66.
125 Dupont, 1999: 85-87.
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recitation cold and devoid of meaning.126 Lyric poetry was not meaningful in 
and of itself, but gained its meaning through the act of performance in the 
symposion.
The Classical Symposion: History and Comedy
Aside from Stehle’s innovative rethinking of poetry’s role in the symposion, the 
majority of studies on the symposion considered so far develop a clear and 
coherent picture of their subject as a historical institution which functions 
sociologically and psychologically to sustain a politically obsolete aristocracy in 
a hostile or disinterested world. Yet what happened to the symposion in the 
classical period as the political dynamics shifted and stabilised again? Murray 
suggests that in Athens at least the basic characteristics of the institution, namely 
its exclusivity and antagonism towards the polis, survived. Moreover, the parody 
of the Eleusinian Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms drew the demos' 
attention to the hybristic nature of the symposion and the post-party komos 
(revelry).127 Despite the symposion's continued influence on literature into late 
antiquity, ‘its social significance lessened as democratic norms of behaviour 
became more prevalent’.128 The political situation in fifth-century Athens caused 
an even greater split to emerge between the aristocratic sympotic group and 
democratic society.
Davidson upholds Murray’s view of the classical symposion as an 
alternative reality for aristocrats in democratic Athens and as an ‘almost perfect
126 See further, chapter 5. page 256-7, below.
127 Murray, 1990c.
128 Murray, 1982: 50.
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example in fact of the anthropologist’s commensal model of drinking in which 
socialising is paramount’.129 However, his approach to the symposion is 
problematic. The opening chapter to Courtesans and Fishcakes claims that his 
study of ‘the consuming passions of classical Athens’ will be a study of 
discourses; he hopes to reveal how an incident or concept was talked about and 
conceived, rather than to indicate a particular truth.130 In line with this he warns 
against using texts as ‘windows ... as if the Greeks wanted to give us a view on 
the ancient world’.131 However, he also cautions against going too far in the 
opposite direction, claiming that, ‘in fetishising a culture’s representations of the 
world in this way, Foucault and his followers sometimes seem to forget about the 
world itself, which is still waving through the window, as if what a culture says 
is, is, on some important level, as if the Greeks walked around in a virtual reality 
they had constructed for themselves from discourse.’132 133Davidson thus presents 
his own work as critically and theoretically aware; indeed, his examination of the 
opscw-eater (opsophagos) negotiates these problems superbly. It therefore comes 
as a great surprise when his analysis of fifth- and fourth-century vase-paintings 
and poetry, and the Symposia of Plato and Xenophon, results in a discussion of 
the practical arrangements of the symposion, the drinking of wine and the various 
entertainments on offer to symposiasts; for example, comedy, acrobatics, flute- 
girls and hetairai.^3 On the whole, he forgets that representations of the 
symposion also existed within a culturally significant discourse, and, to use his
129 Davidson. 1997: 43.
130 Davidson, 1997: xxi.
131 Davidson, 1997: xxii-xiii.
132 Davidson, 1997: xxv.
133 Davidson, 1997: 43-51; 51-52; xix, 81, 91-97.
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own metaphor, do not provide direct windows into the classical andron. 
However, Davidson redeems himself with an analysis of maritime metaphors for 
the symposion. From these he discerns that the symposion was ‘a dynamic series 
of circulations, evolving in time as well as in space, with the potential for 
uncoiling into long journeys, expeditions, voyages’.134 The sympotic voyage is 
facilitated by the interplay between wine and conversation, which binds the 
participants in sociability and competition.135 In these observations, Davidson 
fulfils his initial promises, and approaches the symposion as a textual construct, 
part of a discourse on the symposion which extends beyond representing ‘reality’ 
or providing metaphors for actual experience. However, in his analysis, 
Davidson is constrained by earlier attempts to understand the sociology and 
psychology of the symposion. His classical symposion is virtually identical to 
Murray’s archaic institution.
This view of the classical symposion has come under fire from Fisher as 
part of his wider project to redefine current perceptions of the extent to which the 
‘common people’ were involved in supposedly aristocratic leisure-time 
occupations.136 * Davidson sees the symposion as a counterpoint to drinking 
practices of the demos, which centred on the local kapeleion (tavern), ‘a far more 
demotic and promiscuous space than the private and selective androtf.ir> In 
contrast, Fisher convincingly argues that the symposion, defined as an all-male
134 Davidson. 1997: 44.
135 Davidson, 1997: 51.
136 Fisher, 2000. See also Fisher, 1998, and 2001: 51, where he argues that by the late fifth- 
century the gymnasion andpalaistra were attended on a regular basis by tlie demos, and that tlieir
associated courting rituals now involved non-aristocratic youths.
13> Davidson, 1997: 53.
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event at which guests reclined, drank and were entertained, was enjoyed not only 
by Athens’ elite, but also moderately wealthy citizens who aspired to luxurious 
lifestyles.138 Thus, the Athenian demos could relate to images of the symposion 
on the comic stage not as ‘an alien world of license and misbehaviour’, but as an 
activity with which they were personally familiar.139 Rather than excuse scenes 
in which comic characters indulge in symposion-X\\tQ activities as some kind of 
fantastical wish-fulfilment, he establishes that good food and wine were available 
to the common man through a number of social mechanisms: the political 
institutions of the prytaneion and tholos, religious festivals, the meetings of 
thiasoi and of social associations.140 These activities presented opportunities for 
drinking, conversation, and entertainment akin to the variety encountered in the 
‘official’ symposion, as it is described by Murray and Davidson. Fisher accepts 
that in the classical period groups of aristocrats may still have gathered together 
for private parties in the men’s room of their houses. However, he disputes the 
extent to which these gatherings were of the conspiratorial, anti-democratic 
variety, or that these were in any way the norm. Instead, he claims that that kind 
of symposion was ‘a deliberate perversion of more conventional practices of 
sociability’.141 Fisher places Murray's symposia, internally focused gathering- 
places for the anti-democratic elite, within the wider context of commensality in 
classical Athens, and finds them to occupy only a small place in the overall 
scheme. However, he also finds the trappings of these symposia, the andron, the
138 Fisher. 2000.
139 Fisher, 2000: 356-369. ‘An alien world of license and misbehaviour’: Murray, 1990: 149; 
quoted in support of his own position by Davidson, 1997: 53.
140 Fisher, 2000: 360-366.
141 Fisher, 365.
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couches for reclining, the drinking, the conversations, and the various 
entertainments in other events where men gathered together. For Rossi, this shift 
towards a politically impotent gathering of non-aristocratic citizens signalled the 
disappearance of the ‘real’ symposion™2 In contrast, Fisher proposes that while 
the aristocratic symposion may have been the exception rather than the rule in the 
Athenian city, its formula invaded social gatherings throughout its population.
Like scholars of the archaic symposion, Fisher finds a place for the 
classical institution within the polis. However, while they attempt to analyse the 
symposion from within, he locates himself outside the walls of the aristocratic 
andron. He refuses to study it as a psychologically, sociologically or politically 
potent event. This approach is quite different from earlier attempts to describe 
the historical reality of the symposion and of sympotic experience, and raises the 
question of whether Murray’s symposion, with its community building and 
competition, exists in the classical period..
Recent approaches to the symposion through Old Comedy similarly 
bypass traditional preoccupations with uncovering the ‘real’ institution through 
its literary and artistic representations. Although Wilkins discusses current 
debates on the nature of the classical symposion, he avoids becoming bogged 
down in the issue by focusing on comic symposia as ‘versions of the symposion' 
experienced in elite and non-elite andrones across the city.142 43 In his analysis, he 
talks explicitly about ‘comic exploitation of sympotic features’, and the ‘comic 
presentation of the paraphernalia of the symposion', reflecting his opinion that
142 Rossi. 1982: 49-50.
143 Wilkins, 2000: 208.
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‘the comic world reflects the “real” world of the polis, but at a remove.144 Thus, 
the poet utilises the repertoire of sympotic entertainment to create a symposion 
which is, firstly, recognisable as the event, and secondly, fits the requirements of 
a particular scene or play, or the comedic genre.145
Wilkins’ view of the comic symposion is also found in the studies of 
Bowie and Piitz.146 Bowie shows how Aristophanes deploys the symposion to 
different ends in different plays. In Clouds and Knights, it acts as a locus for 
representing exclusion from and inclusion in civilised, democratic society. In 
Clouds the disrupted symposion becomes a synonym for the degeneration of 
relations within the oikos and polis, caused by new philosophical modes of 
thinking.147 And in Knights the action which takes place within the symposion 
indicates the relationship between Demos and the Paphlagonian. At the 
beginning of the play the mastery of the Paphlagonian over Demos is portrayed 
by their relations at the dinner table, and later Demos’ dominance is restored 
through the same motif.148 In his interpretation of these two plays, Bowie uses 
the term symposion in its widest sense, so that it refers individually to the acts of 
dining, drinking and their associated singing. In Wasps, the symposion is more 
strictly defined as an aristocratic after-dinner drinking party. In this play, the 
sympotic topos links into the exploration of democratic, monarchic and 
oligarchic justice. The aristocratic symposion is shown to operate according to
144 Wilkins. 2000: 205: xvii.
145 Wilkins, 2003, extends tliis analysis to include ‘sympotic’ representations in tragedy as well 
as comedy.
146 Bowie, 1997; Piitz, 2000.
147 Bowie, 1997: 4-5: Nu. 1354-1358, 1364-1367.
148 Bowie, 1997: 6-8: Eq. 40-70, 85ff, 116Iff.
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its own laws and so offers an alternative to the justice of the democratic law 
courts, and the monarchic justice earlier dispensed in Philocleon’s kitchen.149 
Finally, in Lysistrata, Acharnians, Peace and Ecclesiazusae, the symposion is a 
symbol of peace and prosperity. The women’s plans to end the war are
configured throughout Lysisirata as a symposion and komos, while the imagery
%
of the symposion infuses Dicaeopolis’ personal peace.150 In Ecclesiazusae the 
symposion ‘does not simply symbolise a social utopia, but actually constitutes it: 
the democracy is replaced by a form of sympotic communion’.151 Putz’s study of 
Aristophanic comedy also identifies the connection between the symposion and 
themes of peace and utopia.152 Moreover, she demonstrates that Aristophanes’ 
choice of sympotic imagery was firmly dictated by plot development and theme. 
The symposion was deployed whenever the achievement of peace allowed 
feasting to resume, circumstances in the polis and the lives of his characters 
made feasting possible, and conflict between the generations was at issue.153 
Thus, Bowie and Piitz reveal that in each of Aristophanes’ plays, the symposion 
as an event and as a structuring theme plays a different role. Whenever 
Aristophanes reproduced the symposion on the theatrical stage, he shaped its 
events and dialogue to fit his immediate concerns. The comic symposion was
149 Bowie. 1997: 8-11.
150 Bowie, 1997: 12-15: Lys. 195-7,1228-1235; Bowie, 1997: 15-18: Ach. 582-586, 937-939.
151 Bowie, 1997: 19.
152 Piitz, 2000: xi, 3-145. Cf. Carriere, 2003, who connects Aristophanes’ sympotic utopias with 
Aristophanes’ ambitions as a political moderate.
15j Piitz, 2000: 135. In the first group Piitz places Acharnians, Peace and Lysisirata1, in the
second, Birds, Ecclesiazusae, Wealth and Frogs1, and in the last, Clouds, Wasps and Knights.
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never merely an institution or an event, but a way of communicating ideas about 
the polis.
Ruffell also discusses this aspect of the comic symposion.^ However, 
he shifts the perspective away from the direct intentions of the comic playwright, 
and towards his audience in the theatre of Dionysos. Ruffell’s interpretation of 
the comic symposion as ‘metafestive’, that is a (Dionysian) festival within a 
(Dionysian) festival, underlies his analysis of the symposia of Aristophanes, 
Eubulus, Plato and Theopompus.154 55 By allying the symposion with komoidia, 
Ruffell describes the comic symposion as a performance, and a spectacle for the 
consumption of a civic audience.156 Thus, like comedy itself, it speaks to its 
audiences’ political concerns. In the case of the symposion these are more 
specifically the ‘fears of political activity outside of mainstream civic and 
democratic procedures, and in particular the expressions of political and cultural 
alternatives’.157 In short, ‘the metafestive symposium is concerned with civic 
ideology, and the rival claims of the construction of this ideology’,158 Ruffell 
plugs the comic symposion directly into the theatrical process, emphasising the 
social role played by comedy, and the relationship between performance, 
audience and occasion. These are crucial to understanding the viewer’s response 
to sympotic representations. Ruffell’s argument influences Wilkins, who talks of
154 Ruffell. unpublished.
155 Ruffell, unpublished: 1.
156 On comedy and its audience, cf. Slater, 2002.
157 Ruffell, unpublished: 12.
158 Ruffell, unpublished: 13.
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the symposion as a discourse, an act through which socially potent themes are 
raised and explored.159
These recent interpretations of the comic symposion mark a significant 
shift away from previous preoccupations with the history, sociology and 
psychology of the event. They recognise that the symposion on stage is not a 
reflection, or representation of reality. It is a constructed image which might 
draw on and appeal to its writer’s and audience’s experiences, but which has 
been shaped according to its creator’s specific literary strategies, namely plot 
development and underlying themes. Moreover, the performed symposion 
communicates with and gains meaning through its interaction with its viewers.160 
Therefore, the constructed symposion, although created in the mind of one 
playwright, is a socially potent force. The interaction between staged symposion 
and audience builds on social conceptions of the sympotic event, for example the 
predominance of eating, drinking, talking and sex. Furthermore, the symposion 
participates in /?6>//.s-wide discourses on citizenship, democracy, justice, and
freedom.
An Approach to the Symposion? Some Answers and Some More Questions 
The approach which Wilkins et al take towards the comic symposion draws 
(explicitly or otherwise) on the observations of so-called literary theory. Various 
views of theory disrupt ‘common sense’ attempts to uncover ‘reality’, and
159 Wilkins. 2000:211-212.
160 Tliis observation will be of special importance when investigating Plato’s symposion in
chapter 2, below.
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question the validity of any cultural product to convey ‘the truth’.161 As Goff 
observes, in its various post-structuralist, deconstructive, feminist, and Marxist- 
materialist forms this ‘theory’ focuses ‘on the way that meaning is produced and 
conveyed rather than on the meaning itself of the texts’ (my emphasis).162 This 
way of critical thinking affects our approach as ancient historians to what our 
sources are and what they do. White’s work on history as narrative emphasises 
the ‘literary’ nature of the written documents we, as historians, use.163 And if 
they are literary, then they are open to the same analysis and deconstruction as 
any other piece of literature. On the one hand, questions of narrative strategies 
and authorial ambitions must inform the reading of our texts. And on the other, 
we must think about what meanings are created through the act of being read. In 
Derrida’s famous formulation, ‘il n’y a pas de hors-texte’.164 The represented 
symposion gains its ‘reality’ within the ‘categories, concepts, codes, and 
structures of representation which creates it’.165 Moreover, this ‘reality’ only 
gains its potency through the interaction between the text in which it is 
represented and the text’s reader.
Hence, Kennedy cautions against searching for reality in literary 
representations, noting that the very term ‘representing ... opens up a 
disjunction, expressed as between “art” and “the world”, or “literature” and 
“life”’.166 But, as Kellner remarks, ‘rhetoric, representation and reality ... cannot
161 On Theory versus Common Sense, see Culler. 1997: 4.
162 Goff, 1995: 1.
163 White, 1978, and 1980.
164 Derrida, 1974: 158.
165 Norris and Benjamin, 1988: 20.
166 Kennedy, 1993: 1.
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be separated from one another’.167 Historical investigations into the symposion 
must begin by accepting that the symposia represented in lyric poetry, works of 
art, and other ‘historical sources’ are informed by their author’s narrative and 
rhetorical strategies and ambitions. They do not provide straight-forward snap­
shots of reality. Yet, as Kennedy and Kellner both admit, reality always sneaks 
back in: ‘in criticizing the “rhetoric” of reality (that is the way others use the 
term), one cannot avoid creating a “reality” within which one’s own discourse is 
ostensibly grounded’.168 Moreover, a representation is a representation of 
something which creates some kind of reality through the discourses it takes part 
in, and through the meanings it creates.
For, as Martindale remarks, ‘meaning ... is always realised at the point of 
reception’.169 Thus, the act of reading is complicit in the creation of any text’s 
meaning. The reader and audience of lyric poetry, the viewer of a figured vase, 
the audience at a play by Aristophanes and, as we will see, the reader of 
philosophical dialogues, do not find their meaning in whatever ‘text’ they 
perform, read about or see, but contribute towards its creation. Hence, the 
processes of ‘viewing’ the symposion are essential components in a discourse 
which gives the drinking party its social significance.
Engaging with our sources for the symposion from this theoretical 
perspective avoids the pitfalls encountered by Murray, Schmitt-Pantel, Stein- 
Holkeskamp and Davidson in their efforts to reconstruct a historical institution. 
It reflects more closely the efforts of Lissarrague, and the scholars of lyric poetry
167 Kellner. 1989: 2.
168 Kennedy, 1993: 23.
169 Martindale, 1993: 3.
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(in particular Stehle), who focus on the symposion. as a point of reception for 
artistic and written texts. By adopting a theoretically aware approach, I hope to 
combine these benefits into my study of Plato and Xenophon’s Symposia. 
Firstly, keeping the problematic relationship between representation and reality 
in mind, I will avoid treating the symposion of either Symposium as a direct 
presentation of the historical event. The philosophical ambitions which shape the 
symposia of Plato and Xenophon will remain at the forefront of my investigation.
Secondly, Plato and Xenophon’s symposia are framed within a written 
text, yet the dramatic components of the dialogues bring them alive to the reader- 
viewer. As I will discuss in chapter 2, the reader of a Symposium engages with 
the events of its symposion in a similar (if not identical) manner to the spectator 
in the theatre of Dionysos. Through the written text, he is invited to view Plato 
and Xenophon’s symposia as if they were being acted out in front of him. This 
thesis will investigate the dynamics of these symposia from within their texts, 
looking at how the performances of their participants create the event. And I will 
ask how these performances invite the reader-viewer to respond to and interact 
with them, and what meanings might be engendered in the process.
I will therefore be dealing with two levels of performance: the 
performances between participants in the represented symposion, and the 
performance between reader, symposion and text. To help think about them, I 
will engage (like Stehle) with modern performance theories which will at once 
embroil me in the question of making identities. Goffman’s analysis of social 
gatherings led him to conclude that the interaction between two individuals 
involves non-verbal conversation between the performer and his audience. ‘Each 
individual can see that he is being experienced in some way, and he will guide at
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least some of his conduct according to the perceived identity and initial response 
of his audience ... he can be seen to be seeing this, and can see that he has been 
seen seeing this’.170 A person’s performance is informed by the situation in 
which he performs, and the response of his audience. Moreover, the 
performances reflect on their performer’s identities. A person presents his or her 
identity forward to be confirmed by the recognition of his or her audience.
For Butler this analysis is too ontological.171 Building on (and in doing 
so contributing towards) the theoretical developments discussed above, she 
suggests that a performer does not only reveal his identity through the act of 
performing, but creates it. Butler therefore pushes De Beauvoir’s observation 
‘one is not born a woman, but rather becomes one’ a step further; one’s gender is 
continually renegogiated and redefined through social performance.172 She 
notes, ‘woman itself is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot 
rightfully be said to originate or end. As an ongoing discursive practice, it is 
open to reinvention and resignification’.173 Identity is therefore ‘performative’.
170 Goffman. 1963: 16. Cf. Goffman, 1959.
171 Butler, 1990: 279-280. See also the anthropologist Cohen, 2000: 5, who remarks ‘Goffman’s 
legacy to identity studies was intellectually seductive and profoundly damaging, because it 
overstated die gamelike character of social interaction, and die extent to which individuals and 
groups can control dieir own destinies. Il understates culture. Il ignores self-consciousness and 
the commitment made by individuals, and perhaps groups, to views of themselves which, 
contrary to anodier horrendously overused term in identity studies, diey do not regard as 
“negotiable”.
172 De Beauvoir, 1953: 295; Butler 1993: 3-9.
173 Butler, 1999: 43.
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In an effort to avoid again imposing modern theory on the ancient world, 
I intend to use Butler’s arguments to help me investigate the classical symposion, 
rather than to classify or define what goes on there. However, my approach still 
runs the risk of presenting yet another (albeit quite different) essentialising 
account of the symposion. One of the central dilemmas which post-modernism 
frequently fails to address is its own tendency to assert a ‘true’ way of reading 
which leads to some form of reality.174 Furthermore, the Greeks had no word 
for ‘performance’ or for ‘identity’. The performances which take place in the 
symposia I will study are thedriai, sights or spectacles which are defined 
primarily through the processes of being watched; epideixeis, competitive 
displays, demonstrations or ‘proofs’, where the emphasis is on showing; and 
agones, competitive performances through which participants acquire social 
status. As Goldhill shows, these ‘performances’ are bound up in the politics of 
the city. 175 Moreover, recent understandings of ‘identity’ emphasise the 
existence of ‘identities’, the different ways and means by which an individual 
constructs himself within, and is constructed by, society. This construction is 
further filtered through the individual’s participation in culturally specific 
discourses of class, gender, and race or ethnicity. In our Symposia, all three 
‘performances’ will be found contributing to the symposiast’s construction of his
174 Though see Fuss, 1989, who not only recognises the impossibility of escaping essentialism, 
but positively embraces it. Indeed, as Harvey, 1990: 359, reports, critics of post-modernism seek 
to transcend its limitations by a return to ‘realism’ and historical-geographical materialism.
175 See Goldliill, 1999: 1-10.
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identity; as a result, I focus on the symposiast as a (well-educated) (symposion- 
going) (Athenian) (citizen) (male).176
176 I use these brackets with caution to indicate tlie co-existence and independence of these
categories within tlie person of tlie symposiast.
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Chapter 2: The Synousia and the^Jw in Plato’s Symposium
There is something for everybody in Plato’s Symposium', story-telling, speech­
making, drama, sex, drunkenness, philosophical disputation, erotic theory, and 
Platonic Forms. In antiquity this banquet became a model for actual 
philosophical practice, and, together with Xenophon’s Symposium, it spawned an 
entire genre of literary and philosophical endeavour.1 As Plutarch remarks, Plato 
and Xenophon have left models (paradeigmata) not only for meeting together 
and conversing with one another through wine, but for remembering what has 
been said.2 Today, Plato’s Symposium provides endless scope for studying the 
philosopher’s theories and methods. Yet although historians have nonchalantly 
plundered its speeches for evidence of Athenian social customs, nobody has yet 
approached the Symposium as a source for the symposion.
This reluctance stems in part from the canonical place which Plato and 
his dialogues occupy in Western philosophy. Until very recently, scholars who 
studied Plato’s works tackled him exclusively as (what they understood to be) a 
philosopher. They may have disagreed over his methods and his conclusions, but
1 Tliis at least was tlie view of Second Sophistic writers who envisaged Plato and Xenophon as 
tlie progenitors of a long tradition of sympotic writing; see, for example, Plu. Moralia 612d. Cf. 
Relihan, 1992, and Mossman, 1997. However, Huss, 1999a: 13, tentatively suggests that Plato 
and Xenophon had tlieir own model Symposium in Antisthenes’ Protreplicus on tlie grounds that 
a fragment (SSR V A 64) of tliis text might imply a sympotic setting. Cf. Bowie, 1994, for other 
possible origins of tlie philosophical symposion, and Rutherford, 1995: 179, who places the 
Symposium within a wider literaiy tradition of a 'sympotic genre’. And on tlie philosophical 
banquets of the Hellenistic period, see Tecu§an, 1993.
Plu. Moralia 686d.
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by unwritten consensus Plato was defined first and foremost as the Father of 
Western Philosophy.3 Even recent attempts to unsettle his elevated position 
approach him above all as a writer of philosophy, although they recognise his 
conception of philosophy and his own dialogues are not exactly what we have 
traditionally thought them to be.4 However, Plato is slowly re-emerging from 
this enforced isolation. Monoson’s study of Plato’s Democratic Entanglements 
puts the philosopher back into the Athenian polis5 Her Plato is not an armchair 
anti-democrat detached from political life, but an enthusiastic participant in 
‘contemporary demotic forms of civic discourse and the democratic ideals 
celebrated therein’.6 Ludwig’s study of Eros and Polis submerges Plato even 
deeper into these discourses, comparing Aristophanes’ speech on eros in the 
Symposium to other discussions of eros within the city.7 By aligning Plato with 
Homer, Thucydides, the tragedians, and orators, Ludwig treats the Platonic 
dialogue form as one genre for investigating issues which other forms of 
literature also explore. Plato and his philosophical investigations cannot be 
isolated from the political discourses which produce them. As Dover remarks,
‘Plato writes not as a scholar or a scientist but from the first to last as an
3 For the ubiquity of tliis dogma, see Kraut, 1992b: 1, who opens the Cambridge Companion to 
Plato with tlie comment ‘Plato stands at the head of our philosophical tradition, being tlie first 
Western thinker to produce a body of writing that touches upon the wide range of topics that are 
still discussed by philosophy today’.
4 See, for example, tlie essays collected by Klagge and Smith, 1992, Press, 1993, and Gonzales, 
1995.
5 Monoson, 2000.
6 Monoson, 2000: ix.
' Ludwig, 2002.
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advocate, and heir to the tradition of didactic poetry, a nurseling of Attic drama 
and a product, no less than the politicians and litigants, whom he criticised so 
articulately, of a culture which admired the art of a persuader’.8
I will not go so far as Ludwig in detaching the Symposium entirely from 
its philosophical context.9 After all, Plato’s dialogues are distinctive because 
they show an explicit interest in the nature and virtues of mankind, and how best 
to examine and achieve these by doing what he calls philosophy. However, by 
consciously setting the search for erotic theory and Platonic Forms to the side, I 
will reassess Plato’s ambitions for the Symposium. In this chapter, I will show
that the dramatic dimensions of the text offer an alternative view of the
Symposium which fits more closely with Plutarch’s understanding of the text as a 
paradigm of sympotic behaviour.10 By setting up his symposiasts as a spectacle 
for his reader’s observation, Plato offers a model of good sympotic practice. 
Moreover, this practice is tied closely to the social and political identity of its 
participants as kaloi kagathoi. Agathon’s guests display and negotiate their 
identities through their performances within the symposion. Hence, in chapter 3, 
I will analyse one particular performance, the speech of Pausanias, to investigate 
this process in action. Plato’s Pausanias engages with wider political discourses 
on sexual desire to affirm his own place within the closed society of the 
symposion. However, Plato is not only concerned that ‘we learn (from reading 
the Symposium^) to become fit. company ’ (my emphasis), as Henderson
8 Dover. 1980: viii.
9 Indeed, Halliwell, 2003, criticises Ludwig for tliis act of severance, which prevents him fully
grasping Aristophanes’ conception of self-love.
10 Plu. Moralia 686d, discussed on page 60, above.
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suggests.11 The symposion is intimately connected to the quest for and display of 
the virtue associated with being kalos kagathos (which Xenophon terms 
kalokagathia) and involves the symposiasts in performative mimeseis.
Dramatising the Symposion
As already noted, Plato’s Symposium offers itself up to a variety of 
interpretations. Some scholars have found an expression of the Form of Beauty 
in Socrates/Diotima’s discussion of Eros.12 Others unpack Plato’s erds from the 
dialogue as a whole, picking out specific speeches to compare and contrast with 
one another.13 Their conclusions might be drawn into a wider study of Platonic 
eras, or used to illuminate tensions within the text: for example, the short­
comings in Socrates’ ideas about erds, and/or the question of Socrates’ 
effectiveness as a teacher.14 Alternatively, the action and speeches of the
11 Henderson. 2000: 289.
12 See for example, Ferrari, 1992: 253-260, finds Socrates/Diotima outlining a path to Beauty 
and True Virtue. Bumyeat, 1977, Pender, 1992, Steiner, 1996, and Edmonds, 2000, examine 
how Diotima’s metaphor of ‘spiritual pregnancy’ envisages tlie initiate of Eros experiencing 
Beauty (although they disagree about how pregnancy is envisaged and who the Midwife of 
Beauty is). See also Halperin, 1990: 113-151, who wonders why Diotima is a woman.
13 For example, on Aristophanes’ speech, see Dover, 1966, Rockford, 1974, Ludwig, 1996; and 
on the speech of Pausanias: Gallagher, 1974; Gorgeinanns, 2000. On the speeches in general, see 
Strauss, 2001, Rosen, 1968, Penwill, 1978, and Mooney, 1994.
14 For example, Halperin, 1985, Osborne, 1994, and Price, 1989 draw tlie erds of tlie Symposium 
into a wider Platonic theory of love, while Price also compares it to Aristotle’s theories of 
friendsliip. Brentlinger, 1970, Schein, 1974, Gagarin, 1977, Nussbaum, 1986, Price (on 
Nussbaum), 1991, Gregory and Levine, 1998, and Henderson, 2000 all contemplate tlie 
implications of tlie difference between Alcibiades’ speech and what has gone before.
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symposion might reveal some underlying themes; for example, the relationship 
between comedy and tragedy, the critique of genres, and the question of how to 
do philosophy.15 Sometimes, aspects of the symposion are deployed to other 
effects, perhaps to shape the Symposium as a festival of Dionysos, or to give its 
contents a socio-historical significance.16
Although the majority of these studies are above all concerned with 
philosophical issues like Forms, theories of desire, teaching, and doing 
philosophy, they approach the Symposium not only as the embodiment of 
philosophical dogma, but as a text which functions on dramatic and literary 
levels too.17 Plato manipulates the drama of the evening, the setting, the 
characters and their performances, to give his philosophical arguments potency 
and form. For example, Alcibiades’ drunken arrival in the andron and his 
encomium of Socrates offer Plato a chance to critique Socrates’ earlier account
15 See Plochmann. 1971. On comedy and tragedy in tlie Symposium, see Bacon, 1957, Clay, 
1975, Brock, 1990, Patterson, 1982. On tlie symposion as an analysis of tlie encomium form, see 
Nightingale 1993 and 1995. And on tlie symposion as a critique of doing philosophy, see 
Halperin, 1992, Arieti, 1995, and Henderson, 2000.
16 Sider, 1980; Blanckenliagen, 1992. In addition, the Symposium has been hijacked by psycho­
analysts as a vehicle for tlieir conceptions of self and desire: see for example, the article by tlie 
French feminist Irigaray, 1989.
17 Tlie literary and dramatic components of the Symposium were virtually ignored in early 
twentieth century work on tlie dialogue. Although recognised by Bury, 1909: lxi, the dramatic 
elements were sidelined in favour of the Symposium's linguistic and philosophical aspects. 
However, the importance of setting and character are now widely recognised: cf. Blanckenhagen, 
1992; Blondell, 2002. On tlie Symposium as i) drama, see Wolz, 1970, Arieti, 1995, and Press, 
1995; ii) performance, see Von Reden and Goldliill, 1999, and Henderson, 2000; iii) literary 
‘work of art’, see Frede, 1992.
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of eras'.18 And, as we will soon see, Aristophanes’ hiccuping not only effects a
change of seating which aligns one set of speakers against the other, but
demonstrates the competitive components of the symposion. In addition, Plato’s
dialogues do not follow a set pattern, or expound philosophical issues in certain
ways, but represent a genre in evolution. Nightingale argues that Plato used the
dialogue form to define (his way of doing) philosophy.19 This required him to
critique other discursive forms from within.20 21Hence, Nightingale contends that 
• *21the Symposium critiques the praise-genre of the encomium.
Nightingale’s view of the Symposium as a critique of genre is echoed in
Clay’s investigation into ‘tragic’ and ‘comic’ elements in the dialogue. Clay 
concludes that the Symposium establishes Plato as the poet discussed in the final 
scene, a man who can combine tragedy and comedy in one play. On this 
analysis, the dialogue is a ‘tragi-comedy ... or a new form of philosophical 
drama’22 Thus, Cartledge’s observation that Plato’s dialogues ‘may well have 
owed much to his first-hand experience of Athenian dramatic exchanges’ tells 
only part of the story.23 Plato’s dialogue consciously incorporates and
18 See note 14. above, for references.
19 Nightingale, 1995: 10. Nightingale asserts tliat Plato is the instigator of the dialogic tradition. 
Yet, Clay’s discussion of the sokratikoi logoi highlights the ancient tradition that the teachings of 
Socrates were first put into written form by Alexamenus of Teos and Simon the Shoe-maker: 
Clay, 1994: 32-33. However, the form of their treatises remain unknown, and their existence 
does not deprive Plato of liis innovating role.
20 Nightingale, 1995: 11.
21 Nightingale, 1993, and 1995: 111 -131.
22 Pl. Smp. 223c6-d6. Clay, 1975: 249.
23 Cartledge, 1997: 9.
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manipulates elements of the two dramatic forms, producing a new form which 
alleges to offer an alternative, and indeed better, path to wisdom and 
understanding.24 Or, as Henderson more sensationally puts it, Philosophy offers 
Theatre a ‘show-down’.25
Plato’s dramatic ambitions for the Symposium, or rather his symposion, 
are developed in the opening scenes of the dialogue.26 Apollodorus tells his 
current audience that he is not unrehearsed in telling the story of Agathon’s 
symposion because just the other day someone he knew (Glaucon) asked him to 
tell it, and, as he explained to them, he had got the story first-hand from 
Aristodemus. Aristodemus had also told Phoenix the story (who told it to 
someone else, who then told it to Glaucon), and Apollodorus had verified his 
version of events with Socrates. This is the story Apollodorus will now tell, and
24 Clay, 1975: 251 and 2000: 121, presumably following Diogenes Laertius 3.5-6. states twice 
that Plato began his career as a tragic poet, but does not question tlie validity of this tradition. On 
tlie Platonic dialogues as versions of tragedy, see also, Nussbaum, 1986: 126-132. As we shall 
see below, Halliwell, 2002: 55, observes that Plato’s dialogues depend on the same element of 
mimesis as other forms of poesis\ this contingency might provide a more productive starting point 
for investigating tlie relationship between the dialogue form and poetry.
"5 Henderson, 2000: 292-293. Although Halliwell, 2002: 55, observes that ‘all of Plato’s 
dealings with poetry come from a position not of uncomprehending hostility toward, but 
profound appreciation of, as well as indebtedness to, tlie traditions of poetry themselves’, thus 
taking the sting out of tliis supposed attack.
26 My analysis will focus on a select number of dramatic features in Plato’s text, which elevate 
the symposion into a performance. For Plato’s Symposium as a theatrical performance in its own 
right, see Nussbaum, 1986: 126-134. hi addition, Gordon, 1999: 65-69, and 84ff, outlines some 
of the linguistic, structural, and processual features which establish Plato’s dialogues as a form of 
theatrical poetiy.
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which occupies the rest of the Symposium21 Halperin suggests that this layering 
of narration reflects Plato’s concerns with story-telling, and highlights the 
potential for oral wisdom to become lost or exposed as false within the textual re­
telling.27 8 However, whilst it embroils the reader in the processes of transmission, 
the opening drama has a distancing effect too. The conversation reported by 
Apollodorus establishes the symposion in a by-gone era, when Agathon still lived 
in the city and before its narrator had met Socrates.29 This sets the action above 
and apart from the present day, in much the same way as the andron at the house 
of Agathon provides a physical cocoon for the coming action.
With its multi-layered narrative and scene-setting, the opening of the 
Symposium marks off one set of dramatic action (Apollodorus’ telling of the 
symposion) from another (the symposion). Thus, it is a paratext, ‘a threshold ... 
a “vestibule” that offers the world at large the possibility of either stepping inside 
or turning back ... as Philippe Lejeune put it, “a fringe of the printed text which 
in reality controls one’s whole reading of the text’”.30 The opening scenes 
create a frame for the activities of the symposion, and a viewpoint from which 
they might be observed. The effect is to shape the symposion as a performance. 
Goffman writes of theatre in general, ‘a line is ordinarily maintained between a 
staging area and an audience region ... The central understanding is that the 
audience has neither the right nor the obligation to participate directly in the
27 Pl. Snip. 172al-174a2.
28 Halperin, 1992: 113-116. Discussed below in chapter 5, page 256.
29 Pl. Smp. 172a4-c7. On tlie possible significance of tlie historical setting see Nussbaum, 1986:
168-71; Blanckenliagen, 1992: passim} and Halperin, 1992: 100.
30 Genette, 1997: 1-2.
THE SUNOUSIA AND THE AGON 68
dramatic action occurring on the stage’.31 In Plato’s Symposium, the symposion 
constitutes the staging area, whilst Apollodorus’ listener and the Symposium's 
reader become its audience. The reader finds himself within the Symposium - 
but not the symposion - learning about Agathon’s party at the same time as 
Apollodorus’ audience. Thus, by contrast to Henderson, I argue that reading this 
text does not equate with being a guest.32 The ‘amateur dramatics’ of the 
Symposium place the reader and the symposiasts on opposite sides of a divide. 
From his position in the audience, the reader can watch the symposiasts in their 
symposion. The interaction between them remains primarily extra-textual and
one-sided.
Although the Symposium begins with Apollodorus’ telling of the story, it 
ends at the same time and in the same way as Agathon’s symposion. As day 
breaks, Aristophanes and his host fall asleep, and Socrates wanders off towards 
the Lyceum with Aristodemus in tow.33 This asymmetry echoes the dramatic 
structure of some Greek tragedies like Euripides’ Hippolytus and Electra, where 
a god or central character sets the scene at the beginning of the play, but does not 
reappear in the guise of narrator at the end. The action which follows the 
prologue is made to speak for itself and at the end of the play/dialogue the 
audience must reflect on and perhaps dissect what they have seen without further 
authorial guidance,34 The introductory framing device and this failure to return
31 Goffman. 1974: 124-125.
32 Henderson, 2000: 289.
33 Pl.Smp.223d7-ll.
34 The similarity between the opening and closing scenes of these plays and the beginning and 
end of the Symposium remind us drat Plato’s dialogue form interacts with and develops out of the 
dramatic tradition, but tins similarity should not be pushed too far. The dramatic prologues
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to the narrator at the end emphasise the ‘plottedness’ of the Symposium35 The 
Symposium is the story of a story, with Plato and Apollodorus as poietai, 
weaving a sympotic tale for their respective audiences.
These dramatic elements do not make the symposion or the Symposium 
into a piece of theatre, but they do show its author enmeshed in and engaging 
with the dramatic tradition.36 As a written drama, the Symposium garbs itself in 
the attributes of the theatre, presenting the symposion within it as a theorici, a 
spectacle which seeks to engage the reading, listening, and imagining audience.37 
It therefore immerses itself in the politics of performance and of viewing. In 
recent years, these politics have been investigated thoroughly by scholars of the 
Greek theatre, in particular those working on Athenian tragedy. Numerous
proceed in monologue form, whilst the opening scene of tlie Symposium is comprised of a 
dialogue. Moreover, the action of tlie symposion is mediated tlirough Apollodorus’ narration, 
while tlie authority of the tragic poet/narrator is conveyed tlirough the voices of his characters.
35 Cf. Henderson, 2000: 293.
36 Three striking differences exist between Plato’s Symposium and (lie plays of the Athenian 
stage. Firstly, tlie ritual contexts within which tlie plays of the Great Dionysia and Lenaea are 
performed do not have their correspondence in the reading or recitation of the Platonic dialogue. 
Therefore, an intrinsic part of tlie audience’s dramatic experience is missing: cf. Goldhill, 2001c: 
44-46, on tlie importance of these rituals in tlie theatrical experience. Secondly, in terms of its 
stracture, story-pattern and action, tlie Symposium does not meet tlie requirements of either 
comedy or drama. For example, of tlie typical comic progression, from prologue, tlirough 
parodos, agon, parabasis, consequence of the agon, to exodos, only the spirit of tlie agon is 
recreated in the Symposium-, cf. Cartledge, 1990: 18-20. Thirdly, E. Hall, 1997: 93, describes 
(liree typical story-patterns which comprise tlie tragic plot, but do not lit the mythologem of the 
symposion-. the male performer represents i) mythical Athenians interacting with outsiders; ii) 
women; and iii) significant slaves.
Goldliill, 1999: 5-6.
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studies have investigated the social import of the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, 
and Euripides in the exact moment they were staged.38 Thinking about 
democratic culture, the collectivity of the audience, and themes of association 
and difference, these studies suggest that the classical Athenian theatre provided 
an arena in which social observations could be made, tensions recognised and 
resolutions explored.39 At a polis level, the theatre acted as a locus for ‘civic 
ideology’, which might be defined as a performative discourse through which the 
audience as ‘we’ found a place for itself within its continually (re-)constructed 
civic world-view.40 Thus, the tragic and comic performances of the Athenian
38 See Vemant and Vidal-Naquet, 1990; the collection of essays in Euben, 1986; Winkler and 
Zeitlin, 1990; Goff, 1995; Silk, 1996; and Pelling, 1997. Recently scholarship on Old Comedy, 
and particularly on Aristophanes has turned to focus on tlie issue of how the comic play interacts 
with its audience, or thinks about comedy in relation to die audience as collective representatives 
of tlie Atiienian democracy. Since Henderson, 1990, argued that Aristophanes incoipoiated 
political comment into his comedies, its workings have also been investigated by Sutton, 1994, 
Konstan, 1995, and McClure, 1999, who search for civic ideologies within Aristophanes’ plays. 
In addition, Slater, 2002, demonstrates how Aristophanes self-consciously draws attention to die 
theatrical nature of liis plays in order to make comments on political life. Although see Bryn 
Mawr Classical Review 2003.06.08 (Fletcher on Slater), 2003.07.07 (Buckler on Fletcher on 
Slater), and 2003.07.13 (Fletcher on Buckler on Fletcher on Slater), for a debate on the merits of 
diis approach.
39 Tlie validity of diese diemes as areas for exploration, and of dieir conclusions, are challenged 
point by point in an article by Griffin, 1998, who prefers to see die success of tragedy in terms of 
its emotional appeal. His critique and focus on the emotional have in turn been analysed by 
Goldliill, 2001c, who shows that tiiere is plenty of room for emotional interaction and a 
subconscious process of self-identity in die tragic performance.
40 Goldhill, 1990. Tliis definition is intended to reflect die wide-ranging attempt to provide some
answers to die question ‘what is ideology?’ proposed by Eagleton, 1991: 1-31. However, to even
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stage offered the citizen audience, to whom the plays were primarily directed, the 
opportunity to reflect upon their identity as male, theatre-going, citizens of the 
Athenian democracy.41 Moreover, the audience itself became bound up in the 
performance. Goldhill describes ‘the pervasiveness of the values of performance 
in Greek culture and in particular the special context of democracy and its 
institutions, where to be in an audience is above all io play the role of democratic 
citizen' (his italics).42 The staging of a play and attendance at its performance 
were events which allowed the citizen actors and citizen audience to engage in a 
dialogue concerning the identity of the polis, and to thereby investigate their 
place within it. Together, actors and audience performed an act of civic ideology 
whilst at the same time questioning it, and discussing what it meant to be a 
participant in the democracy.
Goldhill’s claims for the Athenian theatre are similar to Plato’s views on
the psychological efficacy of dramatic mimesis on its audience, expressed in 
book ten of the Republic. As Halliwell observes, ‘part of the potency of poetry is 
located by Plato in its performance on public occasions where it functions as
attempt such a definition is perhaps disingenuous when Eagleton himself refuses to boil ideology 
down to one single concept. Instead, drawing on die works of the twentieth century thinkers 
Althusser, Hirst and Geuss, he outlines some possible ways of defining it.
11 The presence of representatives from around Adieus’ empire, metics, and possibly women and 
children, at die Great Dionysia does not negate die power of drama as a vehicle for civic 
ideology. Goldhill, 1997: 58, notes diat ‘many texts treat the proper or intended audience of 
tragedy as the collectivity of citizens’. The non-citizen audience could still interact widi the play 
as a facet of civic ideology, even if it was in a completely different way from citizen spectators.
Goldhill, 1997: 54.
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ideological rhetoric for the polis as a whole’.43 By shaping the symposion as a 
theorici and pushing his readers into the role of spectator Plato throws the 
theatrical experience onto them. The Symposium builds up a picture of elite 
values and behaviours against which the reading and listening audience are 
invited to position themselves. However, unlike the tragic and comic poets, 
Plato’s audience does not equate with the entire citizen body. Although it is 
difficult to conclude who Plato’s target audience was, his written dialogues 
demand their audience have the time, money and learning to devote to their 
study. To this extent, Plato’s audience was a philosophy-doing, and perhaps 
wealthy, elite. And if, as Blondell and Nussbaum suggest, the dialogues are 
intended to draw their audience into doing philosophy through association, then 
the reader must be able to imagine himself as a member of a sympotic group44 
In this case, the relationship between performance (the symposion of the 
Symposium} and audience (potential performers in the symposion} remains self­
reflexive, but the ideology which is being shared, explored and created is that of 
a probably wealthy, symposi a-going, philosophy-doing elite; an elite, however, 
whose members might also be citizens of democratic Athens.45
The dramatic underpinning of Plato’s Symposium therefore opens up the 
staged symposion to investigation as a place for the performance and discussion 
of elite values and behaviour. With its focus on the physical and verbal
43 Halliwell. 2002: 61.
44 On Blondell and Nussbaum, see page 107 and note 104, below.
43 I use tlie term ‘elite’ to describe the relative status of the members of Plato and Xenophon’s 
symposia, in respect to tlie non-elite phauloi whom they define themselves against. My 
investigations in chapters 3, 4 and 6 will show that in our two Symposia, die symposion, as an 
event and a discourse, provide a means of constructing what being ‘elite’ entailed.
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interaction between guests, the narrative provides an image of a past, but near­
contemporary elite society for the reader’s consideration and evaluation. The 
location of the symposion in a time before Athens’ defeat by Sparta, the 
oligarchic coups of the very late fifth century and the restoration of democracy, 
means that the identity of the reading audience does not scan exactly onto the 
identity of the men they observe.46 However, this need not be a particular 
concern. As Zeitlin discusses, a key feature in the operation of tragedy and 
comedy is its chronological and temporal remove.47 Further, Plato is writing for 
his current audience; the social references he makes are ones that he expects 
them to understand. In the next two sections, I will investigate what meanings 
the symposion at Agathon’s house might create for the reader of the Symposium. 
As I will show, Plato did not only choose a sympotic setting in order to facilitate 
his philosophical discussion of erds. Through the action of the symposiasts, he 
advances his ambitions for the symposion as a gathering {synousia) of kaloi 
kagathoi. Plato’s sympotic ideal blends communality with competition, and 
promotes the symposion as a testing-ground for being kalos kagathos. And 
through the symposion, Plato puts performance at the heart of elite self-identity. 
In these terms, the Symposium (and symposion) is a lesson in virtue which stands 
apart from (if still alongside) his theory of Forms.
46 On tlie dating of Plato’s Symposium to the mid-380s, see Dover, 1965. Cf. chapter 4, note 34.
47 Zeitlin, 1990.
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Competition and Communality in the Synousia-Symposion
As Tecu§an discusses, the institution of the symposion makes regular 
appearances in dialogues other than the Symposium4* It provides the 
background setting for the Timaeus’, and in the Republic, Gorgicts and Theaetelus 
the symposion is criticised as the preserve of hoi kakoi, men completely lacking 
in virtue. Conversely, in the Laws, the Athenian Stranger suggests the drinking 
party as the model for the further education of its city’s elite. Finally, Socrates 
outlines for the eponymous sophist of the Protagoras the best forms that 
gatherings of kaloi kagathoi could take * 49 However, between these texts, Plato’s 
moral judgement of the symposion swings between positive, negative and 
neutral. Tecu§an credits this to a shift in Plato’s thought in the last decade of his 
life. This shift does not concern the symposion per se, but reflects changes in the 
philosopher’s attitudes towards wine and the irrational, and his new 
understanding of the roles they play in the lives of men.50 His evaluation of the 
symposion's guests swings accordingly: at one moment the symposion is 
occupied by kakoi {Republic, Gorgias, Theatetus) and the next a place where 
citizens might learn to become more virtuous (Laws). And in the Protagoras, 
Socrates describes for us two different symposia, one undertaken by men who are 
phauloi, and one where the symposiasts are kaloi kagathoi.
Thus, Plato’s varying representations of the symposion, and of its 
participants, depend on the immediate context in which they are expressed.
Tecu§an, 1990.
49 For references, see Tecu§an, 1990: 238-245.
50 Tecu§an, 1990: 260. However, on the problem of dating Platonic dialogues according to
thematic developments from one text to another, see Kahn, 2002.
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Hence, it is impossible even to talk about ‘Plato’s views on the symposion' in a 
definitive way. However, the ideal symposion inhabited by kaloi kagathoi, 
which Socrates puts forward in the Protagoras, seems to reflect and inform his 
depiction of the drinking party at the house of Agathon.51
In the Protagoras, Socrates uses the symposion as a means of establishing 
the correct form which a gathering, or a synousia, of kaloi kagathoi should take. 
Although he begins by using the drinking parties of ‘low-born people of the 
agora' (hoi phauloi kai agoraioi anthropoi) as a metaphor for talking about 
poetry, he soon recommends that his companions proceed according to his model 
of the good symposion!synousia'.
Kai yap outoi, bta to pp SuvaoGat &AAf|A,otg St’ baoTcov 
ouvstvat ev to) 7e6tco pr|8s 8ta Trig baurmv cpcovrig Kai tcov 
Xoycov t6v feaoTcov utco dTtaiSsuoiag, Ttptag koiouoi Tag 
abXrjTptSag, teoXXoo ptoGoupsvoi dXXoTplav cpcovriv Tfjv tcov 
abXcov, Kai Sta Tqg feKEtvcov cpcovrig &AAfiA,oig obvEtotv- 67101) Se 
KaXol KdyaOol oupTtoTat Kat 7C£7rat8EupEvot staiv, obK dv ISotg 
out’ abXrjTplSag oGte 6pxrjoTpl8ag oiks vpaXTplag, bOX abrobg 
abwlg 'iKavoug 6vTag oovsivai dvso tcov Xfjpcov te Kai TiatStcov 
tootcov Sta Trig abrcbv cpcovrig, Xbyovrag te Kai dKobovrag ev 
pspEi baorcov Koaplcog, k&v Tiavo 7toXbv oivov 7ticooiv.
51 The suggestion that tlie Protagoras ‘informs’ tlie Symposion assumes tlie former precedes tlie 
latter, as tlie traditional chronology of Plato’s dialogues, based on thematic developments, 
suggests. Cf. Taylor, 1991: xviii-x, although Taylor liigliliglits tlie inadequacies of tliis method of 
clironological analysis. Tlie relative dating of Platonic texts is also discussed by Kahn, 2002.
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‘For these men, through their inability to be with (suneinai) one
another themselves over drink and with their own conversations -
such is their lack of education - put a premium on the m//as-girl, and 
pay large sums for the other sound of auloi, and they carry on their 
intercourse by means of that other voice; but wherever the 
symposiasts are kaloi kagathoi and educated (pepaideumenoi\ one 
would see neither az/Zox-girls nor dancers nor harp-girls, but they can 
entertain (suneinai) themselves with their own conversation, without 
such idle talk or playfulness, speaking and listening to themselves in 
turn in a dignified fashion, even if they drink a great deal of wine’.
(Pl. Prt. 347c5-el Burnet)
The format of the gathering which Socrates recommends fits exactly the pattern 
of entertainment which Eryximachus proposes to Agathon’s guests.52 The doctor 
explains that the aulos-gir\ is to be expelled from the andron because,
ppag 8e 8iot Zoycov dXXf|X,ou; cuveivat to Trjgepov.
‘Today, we will be with one another through words’. (Pl. Smp. 
176e8-9)
Both men advocate a symposion where guests associate and interact verbally 
with each other. This focus is reflected in the prominence of suneinai in both 
passages which, in the context of a gathering, may be defined as ‘to be together’,
52 As noted, but not explored, by Taylor. 1991: 148.
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or ‘to converse with’. This sense of close interaction amongst guests is further 
highlighted by reference to allelon, ‘one another’, and in the Protagoras through 
Socrates’ repeated use of the plurals auton and heauton to signify the (lack of) 
voice, speech and education of low-born and well-educated symposiasts at group 
levels. Eryximachus’ invitation to his fellow symposiasts to be united together is 
further echoed in Socrates’ definition of good and bad symposiasts/synousiasts. 
In the Protagoras, the philosopher groups together the well-educated kaloi 
kagathoi who are able to come together in their own voices and words against 
low-born men {phauloi anthropoi) who gather in the agora and cannot speak for 
themselves.53 This distinction is enhanced by his further association of the 
former group with his own immediate circle:
outco 8c Kai at TOtaiSe auvoootat, fedv pev XaPcovrai dvSpcov, 
ototTtep iqpcov oi TioXXoi (paotv stvat, obSev Seovrai &XAoTpta<;
(pcovpg obSe TtotrjTcbv.
‘And thus, such gatherings {synousiai), if they are made up of the sort 
of men most of us claim to be, do not need the voice of others, nor of 
poets’. (Pl. Prt. 347el-3 Burnet)
Through their own ability to speak for themselves, the people present at the 
current synousia are connected explicitly with the well-educated kaloi kagathoi
53 On tlie association between social status and speaking see chapter 3, in wliich tlie ability to 
speak cleverly is presented by Pausanias as a mark of difference between men who desire in right 
and wrong ways: 127-137. Moreover, as chapter 4, page 164, will discuss, the aulos, as a 
signifier of‘other voices’, played a part in these democratic ideologies: cf. Wilson, 1999.
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who attend the ideal symposion which Socrates has just outlined. This 
association may even be extended out to the supposed reader of the Protagoras', 
wishing to believe himself just this type of man, he is also drawn into 
comparison and identification with the group.
By making Eryximachus frame the symposion as a synousia in which 
each symposiast will contribute a speech in turn, Plato’s symposion fits the 
anthropological model of commensality on which Murray bases his archaic 
symposion. Their participants indulge in ‘rituals of eating and drinking together, 
as equals and as expression and reinforcement of community values’.54 
However, the way in which the synousia-symposion recommended in the 
Protagoras and in the Symposium effects this commensality has its own cultural 
and institutional specificity. Against a background of moderate drinking, each 
symposiast will speak and listen to his companions in turn. He will thereby act 
out his similarity to the other educated men gathered in the symposion who also 
display their ability to speak with their own voice. At the same time, he will 
reinforce his difference from the low-born members of the democratic citizenry 
who frequent the agora, and whose inability to speak results in their participation 
in a wholly inferior sympotic affair. Both processes create a sense of place for 
the symposiast within the solidarity of the immediate group.
Moreover, in practice, the conversation which Socrates and Eryximachus 
each recommend for the well-educated symposiast has the potential to disrupt the 
very unity that it creates.55 As Nightingale observes, the round of speaking in 
Plato’s Symposium has a distinctly agonistic edge: with each person speaking and
54 Murray. 1990b: 5.
Pl. Smp. 177c7-d5.
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listening in turn, ‘the result is a series of attempts to achieve originality within 
determinate generic boundaries, to manipulate stock techniques (“amplification” 
and “comparison”) and material (the ancestry, accomplishments and virtues of 
the subject) and yet produce something superior to the other offerings’.56 Thus, 
the speeches in the symposion are individual performances designed to persuade 
the audience of the superiority of their argument, and the greater skill of their 
speaker. These speeches are encomiastic examples of epideixeis, defined by 
Lloyd as ‘pretentious exhibition speeches’ and ‘exercises in persuasion’ by 
which pre-Socratic philosophers and medicine men sought to convince audiences 
comprised of their peers of the correctness and greatness of their thought.57 The 
speech-making of the symposion therefore exists within, and is shaped by, the 
competitive culture which permeates the intellectual life of the Athenian polis. 
Moreover, Goldhill notes,
‘epideixis requires an audience; when competitive, as epideixis 
almost inevitably is, it necessarily triangulates competition through 
an audience. It establishes a dynamic of self-representation where 
self-promotion is restricted by the fears and limitations of the group 
constituted as an audience. Epideixis becomes the site where the 
self-advancement of the citizen is negotiated in the city of words’.58
56 Nightingale, 1995: 111.
57 As noted by Plochmann, 1963: 3; Lloyd, 1989: 61, 133.
58 Goldliill, 1999: 3-4.
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Although Goldhill locates the epideixis within the democratic processes of the 
city, his observations are as valid when the epideixis is confined to the elite 
world of the symposion. The speeches given by Plato’s symposiasts not only 
seek to persuade their audience of the correctness of its speaker’s encomium. 
Rather, as the discussion of Pausanias’ speech in the next chapter will show, they 
are occasions for the symposiast to negotiate and advance his position within the 
drinking group. The ‘city of words’ which he must manipulate is the language of 
his audience, the means by which well-educated, symposi on-going, philosophy­
doing citizens of the Athenian democracy construct positions for themselves 
within their immediate circle, and in society at large.
In the Protagoras, Socrates blurs the boundaries between the drinking 
party and the synousia to reinforce the competitive element underlying both 
events. Further similarities can be found in the location of each gathering in the 
private house of someone rich and famous. Indeed, in the location of Protagoras 
it is possible to imagine an allusion to Eupolis’ play The Flatterers, where a 
number of famous philosophers converse at a symposion in the house of 
Caliias.59 A significant overlap occurs between the two guest lists: Socrates, 
Pausanias, Agathon, Eryximachus, Phaedrus and Alcibiades are present on both 
occasions.60 And in addition, even before Socrates demands that its participants 
concentrate their efforts on verbal sparring, the synousia vj&s progressing 
according to the philosopher’s model for the ideal symposion-, covering a great
59 Eupolis 157 K.-A.
60 See Blanckenhagen, 1992: 58, who uses tliis coincidence to advance a deliberate ‘then’ and 
‘now’ relationship between tlie two texts which adds poignancy to the dialogue through the 
known fates of Alcibiades, Socrates and Agathon.
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many subjects, Callias’ guests already spoke and listened in turn. Moreover, in 
his competitive conversation with Socrates, Protagoras deploys archaic poetry in 
a similar manner to the speakers of the Symposium, and likewise, he receives 
applause and praise from its listeners.61 Finally, Socrates tells his audience that 
if they are to interact with one another directly, they should avoid the kind of 
meetings that good symposiasts are also instructed to avoid. Instead, Callias’ 
guests are urged,
ev Totg eaorcov Afryou; Ttetpav dAAijAcov AapPavovT£<; Kai 
8186 vxeq.
‘To test (peirari) one another in mutual argument’. (Pl. Prt. 348al-2 
Burnet)
Socrates issues this invitation to the synousiasts as part of his subsequent 
challenge to Protagoras: talking to one another in their own words, rather than 
those of the poets, they should make a test of (peirari) the truth and of 
themselves.62
By speaking and listening in turn, the symposiasts put each other to the 
test. Further, in light of Socrates’ challenge to Protagoras, Eryximachus’ act of 
setting up Eros as the topic of conversation for the evening is itself a competitive 
act; and by agreeing to put themselves on show, his companions accept the terms
61 Although of course it also leads Socrates to provide his model symposion in protest: Pl. Prt. 
338e6 ff.
Pl. Prt. 348a2-6.
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of this competition. However, it is also an indication of the cohesion of the 
group. This is clear from Alcibiades’ retort to Protagoras, who delays 
responding to Socrates’ request. He says,
’Q KaXXta, Sokci oot, ecpq, Kai vnv KaXrag npcorayopac; Tcoielv, 
o6k bOsXcov sire Scooei A.oyov cits pq Siacatpetv; epol yap ob
SoKci-
‘Callias’, he said, ‘Do you think Protagoras is being fair now, not 
wishing to make clear whether he will give an answer or not? 
Because I don’t think he is’. (Pl. Prt. 348b3-5 Burnet)
As Alcibiades goes on to explain, Protagoras’ procrastination disrupts the flow of 
events; if the sophist does not wish to debate with Socrates, then he should say 
so, and allow someone else the opportunity to do so.63 *However, his reticence 
also disrupts the communal atmosphere, because he has failed to perform in the 
manner expected of a member of the synousia. The importance of performance 
is reflected in Socrates’ recommendation that his companions emulate 
(mimeisthai) the sort of person (toioutos) who uses his own words and voice 
when talking and listening in the ideal symposion, and in an ideal synousia.M By 
taking turns to speak and test one another, Protagoras and Socrates imitate and 
hence act out their identity as well-educated kaloi kagathoi. The judgement of 
their audience, and their continued acceptance within the immediate community,
63 Pl. PrZ. 348b5-8.
64 Pl. Prt. 348a2-3. On appropriate translations for mimesthai, see Halliwell, 2002: 16-17.
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relies on the success with which they can demonstrate their belonging via the 
testing ground of the spoken word (logos).
The resemblance between Socrates’ recommended drinking party in the 
Protagoras and the events of the Symposion encourages a comparison between 
the guests who attend both. Just like the well-educated kaloi kagathoi of the 
ideal symposion, Agathon and his guests come together through their words 
whilst at the same time testing their abilities in a round of speech-making. Are 
the Symposium's symposiasts therefore kaloi kagathoil As I will discuss in 
greater detail in chapter 6, the meaning of kalos kagathos and its associated 
virtue kalokagathia was a contested topic in antiquity, as well as amongst 
scholars today. Towards the end of the fifth century, the traditionally aristocratic 
attributes of beauty and goodness became, in their amalgamated form, an 
indicator of moral worth. The term kalos kagathos thus came to encapsulate the 
social connotations of an elite, noble upbringing, within an emerging political 
and philosophical debate on the moral implications of being kalos kagathos65 
Yet, although the various discussions of erds in the Symposium suggest 
understandings of, or ask questions about, to kalon and to agathon, the formula is 
never used to describe the symposiasts as individuals or as a group.66 However,
65 See pages 263-273.
66 Socrates’ speech (199c5-212c3) in par ticular explores tire relationship between to kalon and 
to agathon. Through Iris elenclric debate with Agathon and his recollection of Diotinra’s speech, 
Socrates initially considers whether what is good is necessarily beautiful and vice versa, and 
whether something lacking goodness necessarily lacks beauty, before exploring more specifically 
on tire attainment of beauty. The two concepts are sometimes brought into association with one 
another ( 202dl-d4), and twice describe a specific quality {kalos kai agathos) which someone 
might search after (203d3-7) or think he possesses (204a3-5).
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the relationship between kalokagathia and the doing of philosophy is intrinsically 
linked. Diotima warns Socrates that those who philosophise might think 
themselves to be kalos kagathos when they are not.67 68Yet, when Alcibiades 
arrives he declares that listening to Socrates’ apparently banal conversations aids 
those who wish to become kaloi kagathoiPlato may be suggesting that those 
who ‘do philosophy’ are not kaloi kagathoi, or that only those who listen to 
Socrates might become kaloi kagathoi. Alternatively, Alcibiades, who is 
remarkable within the Symposion for his excessive drunkenness and wilful self­
denigration, may be presenting a dubious view.
The place of the kalos kagathos and kalokagathia in Plato’s Symposium is 
therefore far from straightforward. As good symposiasts (according to the 
Socrates of the Protagoras) Agathon and his guests might be considered kaloi 
kagathoi', however, Plato does not explicitly name them as such. Moreover, the 
Symposium suggests that being kalos kagathos involves more than just doing 
philosophy; so more than simply discussing Eros, to use philosophising in its 
loosest sense. Yet, Plato’s symposiasts might be the very men who (Diotima 
would believe) claim to be kaloi kagathoi on account of their discussions of Eros. 
In this respect they are kaloi kagathoi, intent on proving themselves to be kaloi 
kagathoi to one another. If they fail to be kaloi kagathoi in Diotima/Plato’s eyes, 
it is because of their philosophising does not meet the grade. Yet, by listening to 
the wisdom of Socrates they (as Alcibiades’ claims) might learn to be kaloi 
kagathoi too. Thus, despite failing to describe the symposiasts as kaloi kagathoi, 
the Symposium allows for them to be thought of in this way.
67 Pl. Smp. 104a3-5.
68 Pl. Smp. 222a 1-6.
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In this light, the performances of the synousiasts/symposiasts are 
therefore ‘performative’: through their interaction in the symposion, the 
symposiasts ‘effectively constitute the identity they are said to express or 
reveal’.69 Moreover, as Butler shows, the performative act is not simply a matter 
of ‘being’ but of negotiating one’s identity through the act of performance. 
Using transvestism as her example, she claims that, 'in imitating gender, drag 
implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself - as well as its 
contingency ... In the place of the law of heterosexual coherence, we see sex and 
gender denaturalised by means of a performance which avows their distinctness 
and dramatises the cultural mechanisms of their fabricated reality’ (Butler’s 
emphases).70 In a similar way, the symposiasts imitate the style of the kaloi 
kagathoi in order to present themselves as, and hence become, kaloi kagathoi.
Thus, the symposion, as it is represented by Plato, is a microcosm of elite 
behaviour which simultaneously reinforces a set of proposed ‘norms’. However, 
in the very moment these norms are enacted through performance, they come 
under scrutiny. When Plato’s kaloi kagathoi participate in the symposion, they 
construct an identity for themselves in imitation of what is expected of them as 
well-educated symposiasts. However, this process of display exposes the 
constructed component of that identity for all to see. The coherence in 
kalokagathia (the embodiment or expression of being kalos kagathos} can only 
be maintained by a successful performance. Every performance exposes the 
symposiast to possible failure, and the resulting loss of their primary social 
identity.
69 Butler. 1999: 180.
70 Butler, 1999: 177.
THE SUNOUSIA AND THE AGON 86
Ill the Protagoras, Plato presents a model for the ideal symposion and 
synousia which emphasises the relationship between the synousia (a general 
social gathering) and the symposion (a specific type of synousia}. The practical 
details which make the symposion a special type of synousia, for example the 
absence of sympotic ritual, sitting rather than reclining on couches, and, most 
significantly, the lack of drinking, disappear behind a shared emphasis on correct 
modes of behaviour for members of Athens’ educated elite.71 This version of the 
ideal symposion resonates with the more elaborate depiction of the event found in 
Plato’s Symposium. In the epideictic round of speaking and listening in turn, 
Pausanias, Phaedrus, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon and Socrates each 
seek to convince one another of their ability to speak with their own voice and to 
participate in such an event. They thereby assert their shared identity as 
members of the symposi on-going, well-educated, Athenian elite. Thus, Plato 
shapes his symposion as a place in which competing and being together exist 
side-by-side. However, this relationship is not antagonistic. As I will now show, 
competition in Plato’s Symposium is not given free rein, but is restrained by the 
requirements of maintaining a sense of communality amongst Agathon’s guests.
Competitive Strategies in Plato’s Symposion
Negotiation and interaction between the competitive and communal elements of 
the symposion are seen again and again in the conversational and physical ploys 
of the gathered symposiasts. In particular, as Nightingale’s brisk survey shows, 
the round of encomiastic speech-making is permeated by competitive 
strategising: building on Phaedrus’ initial challenge to writers who have failed to
Though note that some of the svnousiasts at tlie house of Caliias do recline: Pl. Prt. 315d.
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praise Eros, each speaker tries to get the better of those who have gone before.72 
However, her preoccupation with the encomium as a genre, which she maintains 
Plato wants to present as flawed, leads her away from a close examination of 
these strategies, and of the purpose and effects of competition within the 
symposion. By examining the opening gambits with which several speakers 
preface their contributions and the episode of Aristophanes’ hiccups, I will make 
up this shortfall. My investigations will provide an insight into how competitive 
performances shape Plato’s symposion into an agon and the ways in which its 
agonistic operations relate to, and are constrained by, the dictates of 
communality.
The potential for competition, testing and judging within the symposion, 
which is first intimated by the conversation between Agathon and Socrates on the 
latter’s arrival in the andron, is reiterated later on by Socrates, as he addresses 
Eryximachus in anticipation of Agathon’s encomium:
KaXcog yap aurog pycbvioat, co ’ Epo^lgays* si 8s ysvoto ob vbv 
syc6 s’tgi, paX?tov 8s iocog ob soopat SKSt8av Kai ’ AyaGcov Slxp 
sb, Kai gaV dv cpopoto Kai sv icavrl s’lrjg cbottsp syco vbv.
‘You have competed {agonizesthai} well, Eryximachus; but if you 
were to be in the position I am now, or rather the one I will be in 
when Agathon has spoken well, you too would be terrified and as 
desperate as I am now’.73 (Pl. Smp. 194al-4)
72 Nightingale, 1995: 111.
73 Oil tlie competition between Socrates and Agathon, cf. Pl. Smp. 175e7-10.
THE SUNOUSIA AND THE AGON 88
With his praise of Eryximachus, Socrates presents the speech-making 
symposiasts as participants in an agon, or contest. Eryximachus has competed 
well, but the pressure is now on Socrates, who, occupying the last couch, will 
need to give a speech which tops that of Agathon. Earlier in the evening, 
Socrates had complained of this seating arrangement, but commented that 
everyone would just have to do their best and be satisfied with that.74 Now, with 
the competition underway, Socrates appears to change his mind. Building on 
Eryximachus’ observation that he would have difficulty following Aristophanes’ 
speech, the philosopher professes to be worried that his best efforts will not be 
enough to eclipse the tragic victor, Agathon.75 Recalling Socrates’ fears, 
Nightingale remarks, ‘the encomiastic genre, Socrates suggests, is a contest with 
winners and losers - a contest where the language of commendation is a vehicle 
for the author’s pursuit of glory’.76 However, the competition which Socrates 
refers to is not confined to the genre of encomium, but relates to the encomium 
as an event. In praising Eryximachus for his skill at competing in the agon 
(agonizesthai), Socrates commends his ability to participate in the speech­
making of the symposion and not his skill at giving encomia. Indeed, Socrates’ 
poor opinion of his predecessor’s attempts at praising Eros soon becomes very 
clear.77
74 Pl. Smp. 177e4-7.
75 Pl. Smp. 193e5-8.
76 Nightingale, 1995: 112.
77 Pl. Smp. 198c6-b5.
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According to Nightingale, Socrates’ praise of Eryximachus and his 
confession of fear depict the symposion as an agon which proceeds according to 
the standard zero-sum formula.78 As Gouldner observes, Greek society was 
founded on a contest system which acted as ‘a mechanism for social mobility or 
a method for distributing prestige or public status among the citizen group’79 
The agon was founded on a ‘win-lose’ precept, whereby a citizen could increase 
his standing by defeating an opponent whose status decreased accordingly.80 
Moreover, zero-sum competition was conducted through performances which 
took place in the city’s training grounds (palaislrai), the Pnyx and the lawcourts, 
and in the arenas of sexual relations and state liturgies. A good performance 
glorified its performer and increased his standing beyond, and at the expense of, 
all those whose performances he bettered.81 Winkler situates zero-sum 
competition alongside androcentricism and the symbolism of the phallus as items 
that in Athenian society ‘would not generally have been regarded as 
negotiable’.82
78 Nightingale. 1995: 111.
79 Gouldner, 1965: 45-46.
8U Gouldner, 1965: 49-50. The zero-suinAvin-lose concept filtered into modern conceptions of 
ancient Greece from tlie business world via anthropological investigations into tlie ‘shame 
cultures’ of twentieth century Mediterranean societies. See, for example, tlie collection of essays 
compiled by Perisliany, 1966; and the analysis of classical Athens as an lionour-shame, zero-sum 
culture provided by Cohen, 1991.
81 With tlie exception of sexual relations, all participants in these competitions are of Athens’ 
aristocratic elite. On the competitive aspects of leitourgiai, see Wilson’s account of tlie khoregicr.
Wilson, 2000: 144-147.
82 Winkler, 1990b: 174.
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Nightingale’s analysis of Socrates’ fear implies that Plato’s symposion is 
yet another site for zero-sum competition: each speaker must build on and better 
the contribution of his predecessor or else he will be deemed a failure. However, 
a closer study of some of the competitive elements of sympotic banter will show 
that the zero-sum formula provides an inadequate interpretation of competition 
within this symposion. Socrates’ fear of failure is not necessarily concomitant 
with a desire for outright victory.
Following Socrates’ lead, Nightingale identifies the moments when 
speakers refer to the efforts of their predecessors as a key strategy in the 
competitive encomium. Looking back to previous speeches, speakers summarise 
their failings and promise to provide something far superior.83 For example, 
Pausanias, the second symposiast to speak, opens his own contribution with an
allusion to Phaedrus’ encomium:
Oh KaXdog pot Sokei, co <Fat8p£, TcpoPEpXqcOai qpiv 6 Xoyog, to 
&7tX(og obrcog TtapqyyE^Gai syKCopta^siv ’'Epcora. e’t psv yap 
sig qv 6 "Epcog, Ka^cbg dv et%e, vbv Se ob yap eotiv slg- pij 
Svrog 8s hvog SpOoTEpov fecm rcpoTEpov TtpoppqGrivat Srcotov 
5ei EKaivslv. syco ohv Ttsipaoopai touto bravopGcoaaoOai,
TipcoTov psv ’’Epcora (ppdoai Sv 8ei hTtaivstv, ETtsvca ETtaivsoai 
d^icog too Gsob.
‘Phaedrus, our subject does not seem to me to have been put forward 
to us well, to have been instructed simply to give an encomium to 
Eros. For if Eros were one, it would be fine, but as it is he is not one;
Nightingale. 1995: 111.
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and as he is not one, it is more correct first to say beforehand which 
Eros one should praise. And so I will try to put this right, to declare 
firstly which Eros one should praise, then to give an encomium 
worthy of the god’. (Pl. Smp. 180c4-d2)
In the first instance, Pausanias’ criticism of the way the question regarding Eros 
is phrased, and the innovations he promises in his own speech, appear to be 
competitive strategies: they denigrate Eryximachus, the proposer of conversation, 
and Phaedrus, whose observations informed the proposal, and who has just given 
his own response. Moreover, they promote Pausanias as more intelligent and 
knowledgeable than both men. Similarly, the introduction to Eryximachus’ 
contribution appears to open with a jibe intended to knock Pausanias off his self- 
erected pedestal:
Aoxei Toivnv poi dvayKaiov slvar, bTierSq Hanoaviag bppqoag 
feTci tov Z6yov KaZcog ob% 'iKavcog djrsTsZsae, 8stv bps 
TtsipaoOai TsZog ferciOstvat too Zoyco.
‘As Pausanias started upon his speech well, but did not bring it to a 
fitting conclusion, in my opinion it is necessary to try to impose an 
ending on his speech’. (Pl. Smp. 185e6-186a3)
The doctor asserts that although his fellow symposiast started well, he did not 
end his speech in a satisfactory way; Eryximachus says that he will now do what 
Pausanias could not. However, the gambits with which Pausanias and 
Eryximachus open their speeches are not exclusively competitive. Pausanias’
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criticisms of Eryximachus and Phaedrus are delicately concealed behind a 
modest and impersonal veneer. He does not attack either man directly, and his 
initial comment ‘it does not seem well to me’ (ou kalos moi dokei) could be 
perceived as diffident, rather than aggressive. Further, Pausanias addresses 
Phaedrus personally, thereby establishing an immediate link between the 
foregoing speech and his own efforts. Eryximachus’ reference to Pausanias has a 
similar effect. Furthermore, Eryximachus’ opening lines are not completely 
hostile: he praises what he thinks Pausanias has done well, and highlights his 
deficiencies only to negotiate a starting point for his own encomium. Indeed, the 
doctor does not disparage the previous speech, but presents his monologue as a
continuation of it.
Thus, with opening comments which compare and contrast coming 
encomia with those which have gone before, Pausanias and Eryximachus 
institute an element of rivalry which is fitting to the competitive spirit of the 
epideixis and encomium. However, the two men are also concerned to establish 
connections with the previous speeches as a way into their own. They attempt to 
show their audience that they can participate in the logos of the symposion, and, 
therefore, that they belong to the group as well-educated kaloi kagathoi. The 
same considerations are apparent in the backwards references and banter of the 
other speakers too. Pausanias’ concern to praise Eros correctly is echoed in 
Agathon’s assertion that previous speakers have concentrated on the good Eros 
brings to men; in contrast, he will praise the god in his (Eros’) own terms.84 
Aristophanes makes a similar distinction between the contributions of Pausanias
Pl. Smp. 194e4-7.
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and Eryximachus, mankind’s opinions of Eros, and what he will now say.85 Each 
speaker is concerned to do something different from the other symposiasts. 
Their introductions subtly imply the superiority of their own approach without 
rejecting earlier contributions out of hand. This conscious avoidance of win-lose 
tactics is reflected in the fluidity of the evaluatory process which accompanies 
the round of speaking. As Socrates and Eryximachus claim, as each speech is 
given, it becomes more difficult for the symposiast on the next couch to think of 
something clever to say. However, as the attention of the audience follows the 
circle, the efforts of the previous speakers recede from view. Individual 
symposiasts might attempt to summarise the failings of previous contributions, 
but the reaction of the wider audience remains out of view. Only occasionally 
does a speech elicit a reported response: Eryximachus gives high praise to 
Aristophanes, the crowd cheer when Agathon finishes his encomium, and 
Socrates receives praise from everyone except Aristophanes.86 There is no clear 
increase in appreciation as the symposion proceeds from beginning to end: the 
last speaker does not receive the loudest praise, and most audience responses 
(and indeed some speeches) are not even recorded. It is enough that the speakers 
participate successfully in the round of speaking and listening for the event to 
flow. The competition of the symposion lies more in testing the ability of the 
symposiasts to show themselves capable of acting like a member of the sympotic 
group, than in the linguistic or rhetorical merits of their individual speeches.
The purpose of competition in the symposion, and the importance of 
synousia in shaping it, prevent the agonistic spirit of aristocratic relations from
85 Pl. Stop. 189c3-9.
86 Pl. Smp. 194e4-5; 198al-3; 212c4-6.
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spilling over into zero-sum warfare. Introductory and concluding allusions to the 
listening audience and the absence of outright winners and losers maintain the 
status of the drinkers and the equilibrium of the symposion. However, this 
overriding situation does not prevent its participants from indulging in 
competitive behaviour which provides a real challenge to the standing of other 
symposiasts within the group. The deceptively facile bout of hiccups suffered by 
Aristophanes provides the starting point for one such instance in which 
competition struggles to take hold of the symposion.
In the past, the hiccuping episode has given rise to various analyses. It 
has been thought of as i) a means of satirising Aristophanes, ii) a ‘symbol of the 
inarticulateness of poetry and justice’, iii) an assertion of life after Pausanias’ 
rejection of bodily desires, iv) a clowning reaction to a surfeit of ‘lugubrious 
theorizing’, and v) an excuse by which the speeches and arguments of 
Aristophanes and Eryximachus might be transposed.87 8 Most recently, Sonin has 
invested Aristophanes and Eryximachus’ hiccups and sneezing with 
physiognomical meaning. Drawing out the symbolic significance of these bodily 
functions, she adds depth to their operation as a disruptive and mocking force in 
the Symposium" However, when Aristophanes’ hiccups are viewed within the 
competitive framework of the symposion, they take on a quite different 
significance. His bout of hiccups allows Aristophanes to issue a series of
87 Agathon concludes his speech with an appeal to Phaedrus: Pl. Smp. 197c2-4; Socrates 
similarly addresses Phaedrus and the wider audience: 212bl. Eryximachus and Aristophanes turn 
attention to one another in the final lines of tlie encomia: 188el5; 193d7-e2.
88 i) Bury, 1909: xxii-xxiii; ii) Rosen, 1968: 91; iii) Mitchell, 1993: 47; iv) Brentlinger, 1970: 
13; v) Ploclunann, 1963: 10, and Henderson, 2000: 310.
Sonin, 1999: 151-175.
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challenges to Eryximachus which put the doctor’s professional and social status 
to the test; and, when Eryximachus rises to the challenge, Aristophanes finds 
himself under siege. Both men must utilise their wit and intelligence to maintain 
their positions in the immediate group, and prevent the symposion falling into 
disarray.
When he has finished recounting Pausanias’ speech, Apollodorus tells his 
audience,
flauoavlou Se Tiauoapevoo (SiSaoKOUcn yap pe loa X.eyeiv 
obrcool o’t ootpol) &cpri 6 ’ ApioToSppog Seiv pev ’ Apiorotpavp 
Xeyeiv, Tu^stv 8e auTCo rivet p otto TtArjopovrig p otto Tivog 
dXXou Xbyya feTriTcercTCOKbiav Kai ob% oiov re elvai Xeyetv, bXk' 
e’lTteiv aurov (ev rf| Kara) yap abrob tov tarpov ’ Epn^lpa/ov 
KaTaKeioOai) “"Q ’ Epu^lpa%e, SiKaiog el p rcaboal pe Trig 
?voyydg f| Xeyeiv b7tep bpou, ecog dv eyed nabocopar. Kai tov 
’ Epu£ppa%ov e’lTteiv AAAa 7toif|oco dpeporepa raura- eyed pev 
yap bped ev red oed pepei, on 8’ breiSav naboi], ev red eped. ev cd 
8’ dv eyed Xeyco, eav pev ooi eOeXi] drcveuoTl e^ovn rroXbv 
Xpovov icabeoOai p Xby£,- e’l 8e pf|, uSau dvaicoy/uXlacjov. e’l 8' 
dpa Ttavn ’io%npd eoriv, dvaXapcdv ti toiootov olco Kivrjoaig dv 
tt)v plva, rcrape- Kai feav touto Ttoipopg arcaS, fj 81g, Kai ei 
Ttavu ioxupa feori, naboeTai”. “ObK dv (pOavoig Xeycov”, (pavai 
tov ’ ApiooTcpavrp “byed Se raura 7ioif|oco”.
‘When Pausanias came to a pause (for wise men teach me to balance 
things in this way), Aristodemus said it was necessary for 
Aristophanes to speak, but he happened to be having a fit of the
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hiccups, whether on account of being full, or some other reason, and 
it was impossible for him to speak, except to say (for the doctor 
Eryximachus was reclining in the couch down from him), 
‘Eryximachus, you are bound either to stop my hiccups or speak for 
me, until I stop’. And Eryximachus said, ‘but I will do both these 
things: for I will speak in your turn, and when you stop, you in mine.
While I am speaking, if you wish to hold your breath for a long time, 
your hiccups should stop; if not, gargle with water. But if then they 
are really severe, take up something to tickle your nose, and sneeze; 
and should you do this just once or twice, even if they are really 
severe, they will stop’. ‘If you start speaking’, said Aristophanes, ‘I 
will do these things’. (Pl. Snip. 185c4-e5)
Aristophanes asks Eryximachus to take his place in the round of speaking whilst 
he cures his hiccups. At first glance this appears to be a request to keep the 
conversation going and the circle of speaking intact; even if the speaking order 
has changed, the actual proceedings will continue undisturbed. However, the 
actual effect of Aristophanes’ appeal is to disrupt the communality of the 
symposion. By asking Eryximachus to take his place and cure his hiccups, 
Aristophanes issues his fellow symposiast with a challenge. As a result of this 
seemingly benign request, the doctor is now required to jump into the round of 
speech-making a turn early. At best, Eryximachus will have his encomium 
ready, and so need only improvise a connection between his own coming 
contribution, and those which have gone before. In this case, Aristophanes’ 
request simply heightens the tension a little bit, requiring Eryximachus to give
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his contribution under some unexpected, on-the-spot pressure. However, at 
worst, Eryximachus has not yet composed his encomium of Eros, and is faced 
with the more difficult task of improvising something suitable there and then. 
Thus, by asking the doctor to change places with him, Aristophanes hopes to 
increase the level of difficulty Eryximachus must face as he puts his ability to act 
like a good symposiast on display for the gathered kaloi kagathoi. Moreover, 
this test is combined with a trial of Eryximachus’ professional status. Earlier in 
the evening, Eryximachus gave the symposion his doctorly opinion on the 
medical drawbacks of drinking.90 Now, he is confronted with an ailment in need 
of immediate remedy, and his success or failure in curing it will be acted out 
before the same men to whom he previously lectured.
Eryximachus rises to Aristophanes’ challenge; he proposes a number of 
treatments the comic playwright might try out, and gives a speech which, given 
the lack of censure from the other guests, appears to satisfy the demands of the 
occasion. Moreover, after applying the sneezing method, Aristophanes’ hiccups 
disappear.91 92However, although Eryximachus comes through unscathed, he has 
by no means ‘won’ the competition. Having issued Aristophanes with a 
selection of remedies for his hiccups, he must speak against what Henderson 
usefully calls the ‘interactive backing track’ of Aristophanes’ hiccups, gargling 
and sneezes. While these noisy antics provided an alternative focus for the 
listening audience, we might imagine the sympotic group distracted by the sight 
of the poet holding his breath, and tickling his nose. In the drama of the
90 Pl. Snip. 176cl-d5.
91 Pl. Smp. 189al-3.
92 Henderson, 2000: 310.
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Symposium, Eryximachus’ cures inadvertently create a platform from which the 
comic poet can carry out a visual and aural assault on the doctor’s performance.
However, having come through the fray, Eryximachus now turns his 
attention towards Aristophanes, and uses the privileged position of his ‘victory’ 
to gain the upper hand. When the poet rambles on about his hiccups and 
sneezing, Eryximachus chastises his adversary:
"'QyaOe, cpavai, ’ AptoTocpavsg, 6pa Tt TCOtcig. ysXcoTOTtoteic; 
peAXcov Zsyetv, Kai cpuXaKa pe rob Xoyon dvayKa^eig yiyvsoOat 
too oeanrou, eav ti ysXotov ebiriq, s^ov ooi ev eipf|vr} Xeyetv.
‘Aristophanes, my good man’, he said, ‘look at what you are doing.
You are about to speak, and you are playing the laughter-maker 
(gelotopoieiri), and force me to become the guardian of your words, 
in case you say something laughable (geloiori), when you should 
speak in peace’. (Pl. Smp. 189a7-b2)
Eryximachus’ warning to Aristophanes tries to set limits on Aristophanes’ 
behaviour. By acting like a gelotopoios, a man of low status who is hired at 
parties to provoke laughter through his self-debasing antics, Aristophanes 
complicates his position within the sympotic group.93 As Xenophon’s depiction 
of Philippus shows, the figure of the gelotopoios enacts his own feeble status
93 On tlie derogatory connotations of being a gelotopoios, see chapter 4, pages 194-205, and
chapter 5, pages 235-251, below.
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through his performances.94 Thus, Eryximachus’ accusation that Aristophanes 
acts like a gelotopoios does not merely charge him with ‘buffoonery’, as 
commentaries on the Symposium assume.95 Instead, Eryximachus chastises 
Aristophanes because he puts himself on display as a lowly, self-abusing 
gelotopoios, when his performances should demonstrate his membership of an 
elite group.96
Aristophanes’ hiccups bring disruption to the symposion several times 
over: through the poet’s challenge to Eryximachus, the attempted sabotage of the 
latter’s speech, and the reduction of a member of Athens’ elite to a quite 
ridiculous hiccuping, giggling, sneezing, breath-holding, and now gelotopoios- 
like spectacle. By chastising Aristophanes, Eryximachus regains the control 
which Aristophanes’ challenge earlier deprived him of. He once again sets 
himself up as symposiarch, a role he had earlier adopted when proposing the 
evening’s topic of conversation and establishing the amount of wine to be 
drunk.97 Presenting himself again as the guardian of the symposion A good order, 
Eryximachus counters the negative effects of Aristophanes’ challenge by 
repositioning himself on the moral high-ground. However, far from being 
disappointed that the doctor has emerged successfully from the fray,
94 See chapter 4, page 197fF, below.
95 For example, Rowe, 1998: 49, 153.
96 Of course Aristophanes is a gelotopoios of sorts, writing comic plays intended to provoke the 
laughter of his audiences. But Eryximachus makes tlie point that this behaviour is not suitable for 
the symposion. On tlie gelotopoios, and the dangers which accompany his laughter making, see 
chapters 4 and 5, below.
97 Pl. Smp. 177al-d5; I76e4-l().
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Aristophanes gracefully accepts Eryximachus’ victory, and his new position of 
authority:
Kai tov ’ Apiorocpavri yeAacavra e’txetv, Eb Aeyeig, co 
' Epo^ipa%e, Kai pot eoTco dpprjra rd e’tprjgeva. dAAa pfj pe
qmXaTTe, cbg eyed tpopobpat 7iepl tcov geAAovTcov £>r}0fpec0at, 
ob ti gfj yeAota e’i7ico - touto pev ydp dv KepSog eirj Kai rpg 
pperepag pobopg eTctyropiov - dAAa pf| KarayeAaoTa.
And laughing, Aristophanes said, ‘you speak well, Eryximachus; 
please let the things I said be unspoken. But don’t keep watch on me, 
because I am afraid of what I am about to say, not that I will say 
something laughable (geloid) - for that would be an advantage and 
in the province of our muse - but lest I say something contemptible 
(katagelastdy ,98 (Pl. Smp. 189b3-7)
Aristophanes plays out their new relationship in two ways. Firstly, by laughing 
at Eryximachus’ description of him as gelotopoios, he admits that for the 
moment the doctor has the upper hand. However, even here, Aristophanes
98 I translate kalagelasta as ‘contemptible’ in accordance with Dover. 1980: 112. Following 
Eryximachus’ accusation of gelotopoiein, Aristophanes agrees that there is a danger that liis 
comic performance will earn tlie derision of liis fellow symposiasts on this count. It is this which 
informs liis fears, not a worry that he will not be able to say something serious, as Rowe, 1998: 
153, suggests. This provides one solution to Corrigan’s, 1997: 57, conundrum regarding these 
passages: ‘die meaning of yeAmTO7toielg and yeAoiov is unclear: funny in a positive sense
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cheekily retains the advantage. He may have used his hiccups to challenge the 
Eryximachus’ professional abilities, but the comic playwright claims that the 
doctor has momentarily taken over his professional function, referring to the 
source of his comic inspiration as tes hemetercis mouses, ‘our muse’. This 
comparison is not flattering to Eryximachus, whom it embroils in the imagery of 
the laughter-maker. Moreover, Aristophanes confesses his fear that his coming 
performance will not live up to his profession and social standing and that he will 
again say something that paints him as gelotopoios. As a result he will fail in the 
competition of the symposion and his membership of the sympotic group will be
lost.
However, if Aristophanes hopes to gain any quarter from the man his 
antics nearly humiliated by painting himself as inferior and worried he is quickly 
disabused of this notion. Eryximachus lays the situation out in black and white:
BaXcov ye, (pavai, cS ’ Apioroqxxvsq, o’let feKtpeu^eoGaf dAXa 
7ip6oe/8 tov vonv Kai ouTcoq Xeye cbg bcoocov Xoyov. iocog 
pevToi, dv 8o£,q pot, dcpqoco oe.
‘Having cast, Aristophanes’, he said, ‘you think to escape: but take 
heed and so speak in the knowledge that you will be called to 
account. But perhaps, if I so decide, I will let you off. (Pl. Smp. 
189b8-c2)
or comic buffoonery in a negative sense?’. Laughter and (self-)abuse in Xenophon’s Symposium. 
are discussed in chapter 5, below.
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Eryximachus recognises Aristophanes’ proclaimed inferiority as the ploy for 
sympathy that it is; having set Eryximachus the challenge of talking on the spot, 
Aristophanes must now take whatever the doctor decides to throw at him. 
Aristophanes’ position in the group is put at issue, and Eryximachus alone will 
decide whether Aristophanes’ performance lives up to his status as comic poet 
and his membership of the .yy/??/?as76z-going elite.
In conclusion, the hiccuping episode is not simply a device by which 
Plato can change the order of speaking, or defend Socrates’ reputation by 
showing Aristophanes in a bad light; nor is its only role to provide a physically 
derogatory assessment of the foregoing speeches. By focusing on the banter 
surrounding the speeches of Eryximachus and Aristophanes, Aristophanes’ 
hiccuping emerges as a platform from which the comic poet can mount a good- 
spirited attack on one of his fellow drinkers. The episode thus plays out the 
competitive tensions which exist within the symposion. However, it also reveals 
a concern amongst the symposiasts that these tensions be resolved. Although 
Eryximachus is keen not to excuse Aristophanes for putting his position to the 
test, harmony between the two symposiasts is restored when Eryximachus judges 
Aristophanes’ speech positively. Not only does the doctor say that he found 
Aristophanes’ logos pleasurable but he comments that he is glad not to be 
required to follow it99 As before, the desire to maintain an atmosphere of 
synousia restrains the competitive spirit of the symposiasts. Moreover, the 
episode again reveals that sympotic competition is primarily performative. 
Challenges are set and judgements made in relation to the symposiasts’ ability to 
perform as they should: they must participate in the round of speaking in a
99 Pl. Snw. 193e4-8.
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manner which reveals their status as members of the sympotic group, members 
of Athens’ well-educated elite. Yet, this process only confirms status once it has 
been put at issue, and made a test of Every time a symposiast takes the floor, 
what it means to be a symposiast is (or has to be) (renegotiated, (re)stated, and 
(re)affirmed.
The banter between the symposiasts reveals a careful balancing of 
competition and communality in Plato’s symposion. The moments of interaction 
studied above bear witness to the fragility of a game which imbues the 
competition with an element of communality, and vice versa. Yet, although the 
symposion acts as an arena for the testing of status, the competition which takes 
place there is not fully of the zero-sum variety. The symposion provides its 
participants with the opportunity to promote their standing through performance, 
but the atmosphere of synousia means that the chances they will fail are minimal. 
No-one acts hybristically like Philocleon in the Wasps, and so the group remains 
undisturbed.100 The symposion therefore provides a safe venue for the 
exploration and testing of what it means to be an educated, symposia-gving,
Athenian male.
Conclusion: Testing, Training and Mimesis in the Symposion
In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger recommends wine as a medium for 
testing and training one’s sense of shame (aischyne), as well as courage 
(andreid), excellence {arete) and moderation (sophrosyne). Wine offers its 
drinker a safe environment in which to face, fight and conquer the dangerous and
100 Ar. K 1303£f. On Phiiocleon’s behaviour. see below, chapter 4. 167-169.
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shaming impulses it arouses.101 However, the symposion, where men drink 
together, offers its participants a slightly different challenge. In nature and by 
practice the symposiast has already established his superiority over wine. His 
drinking must therefore demonstrate (epideiknusthai) his excellence (arete)-, he 
should neither behave incorrectly nor drink too much, and so act with 
sophrosyne.102
The testing {agon) and training (gymnasia) which the Athenian Stranger 
promotes through the symposion takes a similar form to the performances 
recommended in the Protagoras and witnessed in the Symposium. According to 
Socrates in the Protagoras, the good symposiast-synousiast should be able to 
converse correctly, no matter how much wine he has drunk. And at Agathon’s 
house, the symposiasts drink moderately and subsume their potentially shaming 
sexual desires into a round of speech-making. Yet, the symposiasts continue to 
test and be tested by one another, and in the process of testing they train 
themselves to be kaloi kagathoi. Their epideixeis act as proofs to their 
kalokagathia.
However, if Plato’s ambitions in the Laws are taken to their extreme, then 
the agon of the symposion is a training ground for a man’s participation in the 
polis. Yet, the symposion restrains the zero-sum competition which the 
symposiasts practice from its most damaging excesses. This raises two 
possibilities. On the one hand, Plato’s symposion provides a safe arena in which 
its participants might try out the competitive strategies they will need to master if 
they are to participate frilly in political life, without endangering their identity.
101 PI. Lg. 646a-649b.
102 Pl. Lg. 648d-e.
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On the other hand, Plato rejects zero-sum competition as a component in the 
social relations between, and in their performances as, kaloi kagathoi. In its 
place, he provides an alternative model of identity construction based on 
mimesis. Thus, Plato may envisage his symposion operating in a polis where a 
win-lose ethic does not operate; or he may imagine it as a place for developing 
the skills which participation in zero-sum competition demands without the 
danger of losing status. However, a third explanation lies in Plato’s ambitions 
for the symposion as an educational mimesis. As I will now discuss, the 
symposiasts’ mimeseis provide their audience with models of virtue for direct 
imitation. The absence of zero-sum competition may not relate to Plato’s 
ambitions for the institution of the symposion, but for the symposion in the 
Symposium.
While Socrates encourages the synousiasts of the Protagoras towards a 
mimesis of kaloi kagathoi, the dramatised symposion is itself a mimesis, a poetic 
imitation of the real-life event. For the reader-viewer, the consequences of this 
are two-fold. Reading the Symposium out loud, the reader becomes a performer 
of the mimesis. Hence, as Halliwell concludes from Plato’s analysis of mimesis 
in the Republic, ‘the reciter is drawn intensely into, and thereby takes on, the 
mental and ethical cast of each speaker ... so mimesis functions here as a process 
whereby the world of the poem becomes the world of the mind imaginatively 
(re)enacting it’.103 He is not merely a silent guest in the symposion, but takes on 
the part of all the guests in turn. Blondell suggests that this process encourages 
the reader of Plato’s dialogues to enter into them and take part in the doing of
103 Halliwell. 2002: 53.
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philosophy.104 However, in the Symposium, the dramatic setting offers the reader 
an alternative experience. The reader engages with the symposion as a place for 
testing and training, and becomes embroiled alongside the symposiasts in their 
epideixeis of kalokagathia.
Moreover, watching from outside, the viewer is also an audience for the 
symposion. Again Plato’s Republic offers a way of understanding the viewing 
audience’s position. As Halliwell observes, ‘for audiences as such, Republic 10, 
no doubt drawing on genuine scrutiny of the behaviour of mass audiences in the 
Athenian theatre, posits a psychically deep engagement with characters, and a 
‘surrender’ to the emotions they evoke, but one that takes the form of ‘sympathy’ 
rather than ‘identification’ and leaves some degree of (sub)conscious dissociation 
from the characters’.105 In the guise of reader-performer, the reader of the 
Symposium takes on the experience of the symposiast who is testing out his 
identity. Yet, as the reader-viewer he can subject their performances to scrutiny. 
The reader can ready himself for participating in the symposion, just as future 
soldiers are trained for the hardships of battle by witnessing real-life military 
exploits.106
In the act of reading or reciting the Symposium, the reader experiences the 
potential responses of both performer and audience. This allows him to
104 Blondell, 2000: 143. See also, Nussbaum, 1986: 126ff, and Bowen, 1988. Gordon, 1999: 
44-60, posits a similar interaction between reader and Platonic text, but bases her observations on 
‘reader response theory’, rather than the ambitions which emerge from readings of Plato’s 
dialogues. On reader response theory, see Iser, 1978 and 1989; Freund, 1987.
105 Halliwell, 2002: 81.
106 Monoson, 2000: 217-218, on Pl. R. 467c-e, and 218 n. 24 on Plato’s ambitions for liis
spectators in the Gorgias and Republic.
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experience the symposion as a symposiast, and engage with it at a distance. The 
reader can see how to act in the symposion-, and at the same time he joins the 
symposiasts in acting in it. By engaging in their performances he learns not only 
about the symposion as a place for communality, competition and identity 
exploration, but receives an interactive lesson in how to behave in this 
symposion. The sympotic frame through which Plato’s reader experiences the 
philosophical discussion of beauty and erds, and thereby learns to do philosophy 
(posited by Nussbaum and Blondell as the main purpose of Plato’s dialogues), 
offers that reader an alternative way of achieving virtue: by doing ‘philosophy’ in 
the symposion ,107
Through the text of the Symposium, Plato provides a model symposion for 
his reader’s imitation and contemplation. It is a safe place for the kalos kagathos 
to display, but also re-negotiate and reaffirm, his identity. Even the drunken 
Alcibiades, with his shocking encomium of Socrates, fits this bill. The 
symposiast can engage safely in competition with his companions, knowing that 
the communal atmosphere of the symposion will not allow any permanent
reduction in his or their status.
In the next chapter I will delve deeper into Plato’s sympotic mimesis by 
zooming in on the speech of Pausanias. The content of his encomium contributes 
towards Plato’s philosophical discussion of Eros, a version of erds against which 
Socrates’ bare-footed, philosopher-like god can be examined. However, it is also 
defined by Pausanias’ desire to participate successfully in the testing ground of 
the symposion. As with all the other speeches, its shape and content demonstrate 
and test its speaker’s kalokagathia. Yet, more than anyone else, Pausanias
107 For references to Nussbaum and Blondell. see above, note 104.
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engages directly with the issue of what it means to be kalos kagathos. His 
discussion of male sexual relations in the polis suggests not only how the kalos 
kagathos should act in erotic affairs, but how he should talk about it in the
symposion.
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Chapter 3: Democracy and Elites in the 
Speech of Pausanias
Almost nothing is known of the historical Pausanias outside of his Platonic 
persona. However, in this incarnation he is above all a man of Eros. In the 
Protagoras he lies next to a young kalos kagathos named Agathon, whom the 
narrator imagines to be his boyfriend (paidika)) Aristophanes alludes to this 
relationship in the Symposium, where Pausanias praises Eros with an exploration 
of sexual conduct in Athens and elsewhere.1 2 Moreover, in Xenophon’s 
Symposium, Socrates alludes to Pausanias, the lover (erastes) of Agathon, as an 
expert in these matters.3 Building on this erotic persona, Pausanias’ speech 
offers an insight into identity-formation within the sympotic community in two 
ways. Firstly, like all other contributions to the round of speech-making, his 
epideixis displays techniques which its speaker deploys in order to prove himself 
capable of talking as a kalos kagathos within the symposion. And secondly, it 
presents (and thereby tests out) a code of conduct for the kalos kagathos in his 
erotic relationships. At the same time as Pausanias invests himself in (the
1 Pl. Prt 315d-e.
2 Aristophanes on Pausanias and Agathon: Pl. S'mp. 193c7-8; Pausanias’ praise of Eros: 180c- 
185c.
Xen. Smp. 8.32-34. Thesleff, 1978: 168, and Bowen, 1998: 123, claim tliat Xenophon’s 
knowledge of Pausanias and liis opinions derives directly (indeed, Bowen suggests is 
niisremembered) from Plato’s Symposium. However, Huss, 1999a: 418, gathers evidence which 
implies Pausanias was a more widely known figure. See below, chapter 6, pages 293 and note 
90, for Xenoplion/Socrates’ treatment of Pausanias as an ‘expert’ in eros.
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success or failure of) this model, he demonstrates how the kalos kagathos might 
construct his erotic and social identity by talking about erds.
Philosophy, Sexuality and the Imaginary Community of the Symposion 
Without simplifying too much, Pausanias’ speech enters modern scholarship in 
two particular ways. On the one hand, philosophers examine its place within the 
philosophical discourse of the Symposium', and on the other, historians extract it 
from its literary context to give weight to their theories about sex and sexuality in 
the classical Athenian city. The first approach can be found in the works of 
Bury, Rosen, and Strauss, and more recently in an article by Gorgemanns. All 
four separately conclude that Pausanias provides a self-interested and ‘wrong’ 
account of erds to justify his own sexual preferences and relationships.4 
However, the opinions of these scholars occupy a wide spectrum. For example, 
Bury characterises Pausanias as a ‘first-rate pleader’, whose speech is infused 
with sophistry, inconsistency, and contradiction.5 Equally as damning, Rosen 
makes the accusation that Pausanias ‘is seriously concerned with neither logic 
nor morality. He is engaged in an intricate and sophistic attempt to secure his 
own erotic advantage.’6 Both scholars believe that Socrates’ later account of 
Eros teaches Pausanias the error of his ways.
4 Bury, 1909: xxvi-xxvii; Rosen, 1968: 63; Strauss, 2001: 67-69; Gorgemanns. 2000: 189-190. 
Note that Strauss’ On Plato's Symposium, 2001, is a posthumously published collection of 
lectures originally presented in 1959, worked up by Strauss in tlie following decade, and later by 
their editor, Bernadete.
* Bury, 1909: xxvi-xxvii.
Rosen, 1968:63.
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Alternatively, Strauss places Pausanias’ speech within the polis, and 
connects it to Plato’s political, rather than erotic, philosophy.7 * Pausanias’ 
encomium asserts the legality of its speaker’s practices through a ‘defence of 
pederasty’: only the man of virtuous reputation can have erotic success. 
However, like the defences offered by Eryximachus and Aristophanes, Strauss 
maintains that this speech fails because its scope is too narrow; hence, it cannot 
be applied at a universal level.9 Gorgemanns also locates Pausanias’ argument 
within the polis, but relates it more traditionally to Platonic ideas about desire. 
But where Bury and Rosen consider Pausanias to be a scheming, self-interested 
erastes, Gorgemanns’ virtuous Pausanias tackles the problem of pederasty in 
Athenian custom (nomos) and its ‘Doppelmoral’ in a measured and conservative 
way.10 He concludes that it is not Pausanias who fails in his response to erds, but 
the polis.
The second approach to Pausanias’ encomium positions it within the 
Athenian polis too. But whereas Strauss and Gorgemanns link it with Plato’s 
philosophical ambitions for the Symposium, social historians detach Pausanias’ 
account of Athenian customs from the text and the sympotic setting in which it is 
performed in order to provide evidence for sexuality and sexual lives in classical
Athens.
7 Strauss’ approaches to Plato are often controversial; cf. Bumyeat, 1985; and Kraut, 1992b: 47­
48. While his interpretation of Pausanias’ speech per se offers little new, its application feeds 
into his idiosyncratic view of the Symposium as a political dialogue (even if it is tlie ‘least 
political’ dialogue of them all: Strauss, 2001: 11).
s Strauss, 2001: 67-71.
9 Strauss, 2001: 72.
tv Gorgemanns, 2000: 189-190.
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In the 1970s, sex and sexuality burst onto the academic scene as exciting 
new, no-holds-barred, topics of inquiry. In the field of ancient history and 
classics, Dover ‘outed’ the ancient Greeks as a nation of homosexuals and 
pederasts. He took male-male sexual relations off the sidelines to which they had 
been relegated and placed them at the heart of Athenian society.11 12Pausanias’ 
description of the erastes’ pursuit of his potential beloved (erdmenos), and the 
attempts of the erdmenos to evade being caught, became testimony for Dover in 
his attempt to construct an ancient ‘scheme of values’ for erotic conduct in the 
Greek polis n This scheme of values divided the Athenian citizenry into active, 
male, penetrating erastai and passive, unmanly, penetrated erdmenoi. Thus, the 
potential for an adult male to become unmanly through taking on the role of the 
erdmenos lay inherent in it. However, this problem was neutralised by confining 
sexual passivity to adolescence.
Dover’s ‘scheme of values’ became the basis for Foucault’s model of
ancient Greek sexuality. In his unfinished monograph series, The History of 
Sexuality, Foucault intended to illuminate the constructed nature of sexuality, and 
to promote new ways of understanding its operation in the modern world.13 In 
volume 2, The Use of Pleasure, he travelled back to fourth-century Athens to 
establish that sexuality could be constructed in a radically different form to its 
current, post-Christian, twentieth-century manifestation. In addition, he sought 
to demonstrate how sex emerged as a category and an issue at this time. The 
series of oppositions which Dover identified between passive and active,
" Dover. 1989.
12 Dover, 1989: 81-91; 81.
13 Foucault, 1985: 3.
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penetrator and penetrated, dominant and subordinate fulfilled both these 
demands. Modern conceptions of our own society as a continuity of ancient 
Greece and Rome offered a false sense of familiarity against which Foucault 
could strike, giving his presentation of an alien Athenian value system an added 
twist.14 In addition, Dover’s Athenian scheme of values attempted to render 
sexuality safe by creating a series of complex rules and regulations which 
simultaneously revealed and off-set the anxieties which sex raised. It thus 
provided a clear example of the ‘problematisation’ of sexual values which 
(Foucault contended) still govern western understandings of sexuality today15. 
Like Dover, Foucault turned to Pausanias for illumination and confirmation of
the protocols surrounding sexual relations between males which showed ancient 
concerns over the honour of young men engaging in shaming sexual pursuits. 
His acceptance of Pausanias’ model of erotic relations is reflected in his opinion 
of Aristophanes’ speech: in his presentation of an alternative version of sexual 
conduct for men, the comedian is regarded as challenging society’s (and 
Pausanias’) ‘norms’.16 Yet, if Dover or Foucault had read Aristophanes’ speech 
alongside, rather than in opposition to, Pausanias’ account of eros, their
14 However, by taking ancient Greece as his starting point, Foucault’s genealogical approach 
puts its author as much in thrall to ancient Greece and Rome as tlie people whose monolithic 
understanding of sexuality he attacks. As Poster, 1986: 2081T, explains, Foucault is interested in 
tlie pre-Christian, Greek world as ‘different’ from our own to tlie extent tliat he smothers 
potential similarities between tlie two, but he ultimately succumbs to the ‘Tyranny of Greece’.
15 On ‘problematisation’: Foucault, 1985: 14-32, 33-78.
Foucault, 1985: 232-233.
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understanding of male-male sexual relations (and Foucault’s argument about 
sexuality) might have looked quite different.17
Foucault’s investigations brought about a major shift in modern 
conceptions of ancient sexuality, and gave rise to a wide range of work inspired 
by his theories and observations. For example, in One Hundred Years of 
Homosexuality, The Constraints of Desire, and Before Sexuality, Halperin, 
Winkler and their associates explore further the social construction of sexuality 
in the ancient world.18 Halperin in particular highlights the differences between 
modern and ancient conceptions of homosexuality, demonstrating how the 
active-passive debate first recognised by Dover pervades classical discourse, in 
contrast to the notions of ‘acceptance’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘rejection’ which
17 As Ludwig, 1996 and 2002: 28-63, shows, Aristophanes presents an alternative to Pausanias’ 
account of Athenian nomoi which is equally valid within tlie Symposium and Athens, and which 
is not incongruous with it. His promotion of lifelong partnerships between men is also 
recommended by Pausanias (Pl. Smp. 181dl-7: cf. Ludwig, 1996: 557), and liis praise of former 
erornenoi as ‘manly’ fits liis ambitions for Athenian society (Ludwig, 1996: 5531T; 2002: 49-54). 
Although the discussion between Pausanias and Aristophanes reveals a discourse surrounding sex 
and sexuality, tlie resultant impression of a society negotiating its sexual nomoi does not 
correspond exactly to the ‘problematisation’ which Foucault envisages. On Ludwig’s 
interpretation of Aristophanes’ speech, see Halliwell, 2003, mentioned in chapter 2, note 9,
above.
18 Halperin, 1990; Halperin, Winkler and Zeitlin, 1990; Winkler, 1990a. But tlie reaction to 
Foucault’s contribution to ancient history and the classics has not always been positive. For 
example, feminist scholars like Dean, 1994, Foxhall, 1994, and Richlin, 1991 and 1998, have 
taken issue with the Foucauldian emphases on male experience, while Black, 1998, complains 
that by distancing himself from Freudian psychoanalysis, Foucault has taken tlie sex out of 
sexuality. For a selection of perspectives on The History of Sexuality in tlie classics, see 
Larmour, Miller and Platter, 1998.
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dominate contemporary discussions today.19 Winkler also draws on Dover and 
Foucault’s work, labelling their scheme of values or ‘fundamental conceptions’ 
as ‘protocols’ which dictated how men presented their behaviours to one 
another.20
However, the Dover-Foucault-Halperin-Winkler model has recently been 
challenged by Davidson. His nuanced analysis of the rhetoric of pleasure in 
fourth-century Athens demonstrates that the oppositional model, which Dover 
and Foucault have made an institution, does not correspond to a straightforward 
division between the praise of activity, dominance and penetration, and the 
condemnation of passivity, submission and being penetrated. Rather, the 
Athenian citizen is judged by the amount of pleasure he seeks in sex (and also 
eating and drinking): those who moderate their passions, either for penetrating or 
being penetrated are praised, whilst those who do not are castigated with the 
labels katapugon or kinaidos21
As Fisher observes, there is no reason why the moralising models of 
Dover, Foucault and Davidson cannot exist side by side.22 Describing his own 
approach to the question of ‘homosexuality’, he notes ‘there were a good many 
conflicts, variations and moral problematisations throughout the society.’23 
These emphases on variety and problematisation are developed by Hubbard, who 
follows Thorp in questioning the extent to which ancient Greek constructions of 
homosexuality, and attitudes towards it, really differed from their modern
19 Halperin, 1990: 97.
20 Winkler, 1990a: 5.
21 Davidson, 1997: 175-182.
22 Fisher, 2001: 47.
23 Fisher, 2001: 36.
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counterparts.24 Focusing on Old Comedy, he provides evidence for the censure 
of relations between men and men, and men and boys, on the grounds of the 
relationship alone. Hubbard forcefully asserts that, ‘the principal issue was 
always class, not who was penetrating who’.25 Yet, he produces an argument 
which avoids reducing attitudes towards homosexuality to a matter of class 
status 26 For example, when Aristophanes describes Agathon as smelling of little 
boys’ penises he signifies Agathon’s elite status; but he also builds on the 
tragedian’s other known characteristics: for example, his effeminate behaviour.27 
The acts of oral and anal penetration, pederasty, and sexual relations between 
men were not only socially, but also morally, inscribed. Hubbard concludes, 
‘For the classical Athenians ... homosexuality was neither persecuted nor 
completely accepted, but was, to borrow a term from Foucault, 
“problematised”’.28 Reclaiming the language of Foucault from his so-called 
followers, Hubbard reminds his reader that Athenian constructions of
24 Hubbard, 1998; Thorp, 1992.
25 Hubbard, 1998: 70. Hubbard’s vehemence is more due to liis desire to reject the monolithic 
perspective of Halperin and Winlder, which came to dominate discussions of homosexuality in 
die 1990s, dian any socialist, or Marxist, agenda of liis own.
26 Aldiough Hubbard is attuned to (if not convinced of) the distance between modern and 
ancient notions of sexuality, die problem of using modem conceptions of ‘class’ to comprehend 
die ancient world seems to have eluded him. My study of kalokagathia in chapter 6 highlights 
some of the difficulties involved in attempts to study fifth- and fourdi-century Atiienian society 
dirough a class prism.
27 Hubbard, 1998: 57-58; Ar., Thes. 253-255.
Hubbard, 1998: 72.
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‘homosexuality’ were not as black and white as Dover, Halperin and Winkler
29suggest.
This unsettling of Doverian and Foucauldian views of male sexuality in 
Athens requires a return to Pausanias’ speech. Any new reading must 
contextualise the speech within a society whose attitudes towards sex were 
diverse, and (like the symposion} not straightforwardly accessible. Sexual 
‘customs’ and ‘norms’ did not exist independently of the political, legal and 
theatrical rhetoric which created them. As Fisher’s study of Aeschines’ Against 
Timarchus shows, within these media, sexual acts were never simply functions of 
the body.29 30 Instead, they were blank canvases onto which the immediate 
intentions of the speaker, and his assumptions about the opinions of his audience, 
could be projected. By second-guessing the attitudes of his audience towards 
sexual promiscuity, buggery, prostitution and so on, the speaker created (what on 
some readings would appear to be) a coherent picture of Athenian attitudes. 
However, this coherency was an illusion; the various oratorical accounts of 
Athenian nomoi were products of their speaker’s interested reconstruction of his
29 However. Hubbard’s sense of achievement is undermined by Parker. 2001: 326. who criticises 
him alongside these scholars for tlie unquestioned assumption that Greek sexuality neatly 
divided, like sexuality supposedly does in tlie West today, between ‘hetero-’ and 
‘homosexuality’. Her article shows that tlie two ‘biological sexes’ (and I use tliis term with 
perhaps more caution than Parker herself) can map onto a variety of ‘genders’. On tlie 
discontinuity between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, see also Butler, 1999: 119-140, who contends that (lie
notion of ‘biological sex’ is equally as constructed as ‘gender’.
30 Fisher, 2001: 44ff. See also Sissa, 1999.
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audience’s attitudes and expectations, not the attitudes and expectations 
themselves. They thereby plug into the city’s ‘imaginary’.31
Recent investigations into the social imaginary in ancient Greece have 
concentrated on the civic arena of the classical Athenian polis. For example, 
Loraux investigates the imaginary of the democratic city reflected in, and created 
and conveyed by, funeral orations (epitaphioi) composed in the fifth and fourth 
centuries.32 By analysing the epitaphioi of Thucydides’ Pericles, Gorgias, 
Lysias, Plato, Demosthenes and Hypereides as if in performance, Loraux shows 
how spoken assertions about the city and its citizens made before a demotic 
audience gave rise to (and reflected) communal conceptions of the democratic 
city and its citizens.33 Similarly, Ober’s analysis of fourth-centuiy lawcourt 
speeches shows how defendants and prosecutors both plugged into a communal 
discourse on the values associated with the good citizen. Presenting themselves
31 This notion of a community as imaginary is usefully discussed by Anderson, 1990: 6-7, who 
remarks, ‘the members of even tlie smallest nation will never know most of tlieir fellow- 
members, meet them, or even hear- of them, yet in tlie minds of each lives the image of their 
communion ... Communities ar e to be distinguished, not by tlieir falsity/genuineness, but by tlie 
style in which they are imagined’. On tliis analysis, eveiy political and social grouping builds its 
identity on an ‘imagined’ community, which thinks of itself as ‘limited’, ‘sovereign’, and, most 
importantly, as a ‘fraternity’.
32 Loraux, 1986.
33 Although, as Loraux, 1986: 8-12, acknowledges, the grouping together of these different 
types of texts by different writers with different intentions, not all of which involved public 
performance, creates problems for her arguments.
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as hoi metrioi, ‘middling men’, they professed to share the hopes, fears, desires, 
attitudes and lifestyles of the average man in the agora.34
However, their approaches might be applied equally to the smaller 
community of symposiasts in Plato’s Symposium, where the exploration and 
affirmation of status were established through ‘public’ performances. From this 
perspective, the speech of Pausanias does not provide evidence for fixed 
Athenian practices, or a ‘scheme of values’ according to which these practices 
are assigned praise or blame. Rather, Pausanias’ encomium of erds gives an 
example of how a symposion~^o\n%, Athenian male citizen might imag(in)e his 
own lifestyle, in accordance with his political and social status in the city. 
Strikingly, however, Pausanias does not detach himself from the rhetoric of the 
democracy. Instead, it is central to his conception of elite identity.
Model Behaviours: Aphrodite Pandemos versus Aphrodite Ourania
The first section of Pausanias’ speech sets eros within a mythological and 
moralising framework, and demonstrates the speaker’s interaction with the 
symposion and the city. On the one hand, the distribution of erotic behaviour 
under the headings of Aphrodite Pandemos and Aphrodite Ourania places his 
account within the competitive speech-making of the symposion. On the other 
hand, the manner in which morality is inscribed onto these behaviours typifies 
aristocratic strategies of self-definition in relation to the Athenian demos. 
Pausanias thereby claims an ‘aristocratic’ identity for Pausanias and his
audience.
34 Ober, 1989: 251-289. Ober’s ideas will be discussed further in chapter 6, page 270-271.
below.
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Pausanias opens his account of erds with the assertion that there is not 
one Eros, but two Erotes. This dive into mythology is a typical opening gambit 
for speakers in Plato’s Symposium35 For example, Phaedrus and Agathon also 
appeal to the traditional stories related by Hesiod and Parmenides to promote 
their own descriptions of Eros.36 Furthermore, the entire contribution of 
Aristophanes takes the form of a pseudo-mythology; the motifs of monstrous 
double humans, human transgression, divine punishment, and the mediation of 
transgression and punishment through sex are all common elements of ancient 
Greek folklore.37 Hence, Pausanias begins his encomium by launching straight 
into the competitive fray. With his account of two Aphrodites, he will employ 
the common motif of mythology, but, he declares, in a more intricate, innovative 
and imaginative way than his predecessor, Phaedrus.38
In The Children of Athena, Loraux showed how mythological stories 
acted as a primary site for the imaginary of classical Athens.39 Retold and 
replayed in civic life, myths of autochthony, and those involving Pandora, 
reinforced the Athenian citizen’s identity as an Athenian and, in terms of gender,
35 The tendency for sympotic speakers to appeal to tlie authority of dead authors is critiqued by 
Socrates in Xenophon’s Symposium', cf. chapter 6, pages 292-294 ff.
36 Pl. Smp. 178bl-cl; 195b6-c4.
3 7 The similarities between Aristophanes’ myth and traditional myths concerning the gods are 
charted at some length by Dover, 1966. Dover’s claim that Plato gives Aristophanes a story with 
closer affinity to myth than comedy is challenged by Reckford, 1996: 64, n. 1, but his
observations still hold.
35 Tliis is the sense of liis introduction; Pl. Smp. 180c4-d3. Agathon uses similar tactics, but 
makes liis one-upmanship over Phaedrus more explicit: Pl. Smp. 195b6 ff.
39 Loraux, 1993.
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as a man. Myths, therefore, were not simply stories, but tales which could be 
manipulated, reinvented and redirected in the name of civic consciousness. By 
welding two separate myths about the birth of Aphrodite to an explanation for 
different behaviours Pausanias does precisely this, albeit on a smaller, sympotic, 
scale. While Phaedrus and Agathon purport to retell correct versions of stories, 
using the poems of renowned mythographers as their testimony, Pausanias 
consciously plays with these versions, offering a new mythology in which he can 
situate his own unique encomium of Eros. He therefore goes one step further 
than Phaedrus in his use of myth, taking the competition to a new level. Like 
Aristophanes, who must follow and at least attempt to better his predecessor’s 
effort, Pausanias uses myth to create his own mini-cosmos, with its own customs 
and associated system of morality.40 Later, he expands this cosmos to embrace 
what he implies are the customs of the Athenian city at large. However, the 
erotic realm over which his two Aphrodites reign is constructed according to 
Pausanias’ ambition to talk his fellow drinkers into recognising and accepting his 
‘imaginary’ world.
Thus, Pausanias’ assertion that there are two Erotes, and hence two 
Aphrodites, acts as a typical starting point for his spoken contribution to the 
symposion, and structures his subsequent discussion of eros. Recalling the 
stories of Aphrodite’s birth recorded by Hesiod and Homer, Pausanias derives 
two models of erds, each of which belongs under the auspices of the appropriate
40 In tlie ‘creating a new mythology’ stakes, Pausanias is clearly trumped by Aristophanes, 
whose whole speech is one big mythology. Indeed, Ludwig, 1996: 552-553, sees Aristophanes’ 
contribution as a satire on Pausanias’ entire account. Socrates too engages in this competition, 
inventing a new genesis for Eros by giving him Penia, ‘Poverty’, and Ponos, ‘Resource’, as 
parents: Pl. Smp. 203bl-c5.
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Aphrodite 41 The difference in generation between the two Aphrodites becomes 
the basis of the division between them, and the content of their related models of 
behaviour.42 Pausanias asks rhetorically,
8’ ob Sbo red 0ed; rj pev ye 7iou Ttpecpurepa Kai appTcop 
Obpavob Ooyarrip, pv 8p Kai Obpaviav bEovogd^opev f| 8e 
vecorepa Atoq Kai Atcovriq, i^v 8f| flavSripov KaXoupev.
‘So how could we suppose that the goddesses are not two? At all 
events, there is the older and motherless daughter of Ouranos, whom 
we also give the name Ourania; and the other is the younger daughter 
of Zeus and Dione, whom we call Pandemos.’ (Pl. Smp. 180d5-el)
With this statement Pausanias introduces the labels by which he maintains a 
division between the two Aphrodites: Ourania, and Pandemos. The former title 
conveys a sense of the heavens, of timeless authority, and the exclusive realm of 
the divine; in contrast, the latter means literally ‘of all the people’. Although, as 
Dover notes, both ourania and pandemos are known epithets of the goddess in 
Athens, the slogan pandemos grounds the younger Aphrodite fully in the world
41 Hesiod, Th. 188-209. Homer.//. 5.370-430. Cf. Dover. 1980: 96: Rowe. 1998: 141. The lines 
along which Pausanias divides Eros, or at least die manner in which he uses tliis divide, may be 
unique to Pausanias, but tlie notion that there was more than one type of erds relating to 
particular forms of desiring is found in Euripides’ Theseus, fr. 388 Nauck, and Aeschines 1.132­
159; cf. Gorgemanns, 2000: 181 andn. 13.
42 On tlie importance of genesis as an general dieme of the Symposium, see Brentlinger, 1970, 1,
26.
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of the polis and democracy.43 Thus, the erds which Pausanias will ascribe to 
Aphrodite Pandemos is couched in terms of the politically active Athenian 
masses. Pausanias may distinguish between Aphrodite Ourania and Aphrodite 
Pandemos on the basis of their mythological geneses, but the opposition which 
he creates is highly political. If Aphrodite Pandemos is goddess to the many, 
Aphrodite Ourania might reside with those who place themselves apart from the 
political masses: Pausanias’ audience, the symposion-gting, aristocratic elite.
In short, the mythological basis for Pausanias’ argument allows the 
speaker to give his account of erds an explicitly political dimension. Whatever 
Pausanias now says will be coloured by the labels ‘ouranian’ or ‘pandemic’. In 
addition, he imposes a moralising rhetoric on top of this politicised account of 
erotic practice. Moving away from mythology into the ‘real’ world, he states:
7taoa yap TCpa^ig <S8’ e%ev abrf| b(p’ bauTrig 7rpaTTopsvp outs 
KaXf| o6ts aioxpa. ... KaXcbg psv yap TipaTiopsvov Kai 6p0oog 
xa?v6v ytyvsrai, pfj 6p0cbg Ss aio^pov. obrco Sp Kai rd spav 
Kai 6 ’'Epcog ob 7tag bon Ka?tog ob§s d^tog byKcoptd^soOat, 
dJkkd. b KaX,cbg TtporpsTtcov fepav.
‘For every action is like this: done by itself, it is neither fine (kale)
nor shameful (aischra)........ but done in a fine way (kalos), and
correctly (orthos), it becomes fine (kcilori), and being done 
incorrectly (me orthos) it becomes shameful (aischron). Thus indeed 
it is with desire (to erari) and Eros: not every one is fine (kalos) or
43 Dover. 1980: 96-97.
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worthy to be given an encomium, but only the Eros which urges us 
on to desire in a fine way {kalos}.' (Pl. Smp. 180e4-181 a2, 181 a4-7)
Pausanias’ outline of‘ouranian’ and ‘pandemic’ behaviour as correct and 
incorrect, and kalos and aischros, employs a traditionally aristocratic vocabulary 
of moral judgement.44 It characterises the love of Aphrodite Pandemos as not 
only ‘truly of the people’ (aleihos pandemos}, but also that hon hoi phauloi ton 
anthropon erdsin, ‘which base men desire’.45 From Aeschylus onwards, phaulos 
was used by elite writers to describe the antithesis of the classical, aristocratic 
ideal.46 As Cartledge notes, the phauloi of the fifth and fourth centuries were the 
exact opposite of the pseudo-Xenophon’s hoi gennaioi, ‘the well-born’, and hoi 
chrestoi, ‘the good’.47
With these characterisations, Pausanias emphasises the moral exclusion 
of the demos from the sympotic, aristocratic group. However, he also qualifies 
the pandemic lover in accordance with his actions:
spcSot 8e o't toioutoi KpcoTov psv ob% pTTov yuvatKcbv q 
KGtiScov, §7isira (Sv Kai fepcoot raw ocopdrcov paAAov q t©v 
x|/n%(Sv, erceiTa cbq ftv Suvcovrat dvoqTOTaTcov, ttpog to 
SiaKpa^acGat povov pXeTtovTEq, dpsXouvTeg 8e tod KaXcog q pq.
44 See Adkins, 1960, and Yamagata. 1994: 225-238. The combination of these terms reflects tlie 
Homeric connotations of kalos, ‘seemly’, and aischros, ‘unseemly’, identified by Yamagata.
45 Pl. Snip. 181a8; 181bl-2.
40 Donlan, 1977: 97.
4/ Cartledge, 1998: 65. For more on tire phauloi, see chapter 6, page 268, where we will also
learn how moral polarities might be employed in relation to various segments of society.
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‘Firstly, such men [hoi phauloi ton anthropon] desire women no less 
than boys; secondly, of those they desire their bodies rather than their 
souls; then again, they desire those who are as foolish as can be 
(anoetotaloiy. looking towards the end result alone, they do not care 
if it is done well or not.’ (Pl. Snip. 181b2-6)
On this model, pandemic and ouranian lovers can be distinguished on the 
following grounds: whether they desire women and boys or only boys; whether 
they desire their bodies or their souls; and the intellectual capabilities of the 
objects of their desire. This last consideration is thought to determine the 
intentions or attitude of the lover, whether he is interested in acting kalos, ‘well’ 
or in simply seeking sexual gratification. The principal consideration for 
assessing a lover as pandemic or ouranian is therefore not his social status, but 
his behaviour. The pandemic lover is considered phaulos by his association with 
the female as well as the male, his focus on the satisfaction of bodily desires, and 
his lack of concern over the approval or disapproval his behaviour will attract. 
He refuses to be measured according to the standards of merit and shame which 
Pausanias would seek to impose on him. In contrast, the ouranian lover 
embraces these restraints, and seeks to act in the most praiseworthy way. 
Pausanias’ pandemic lover is highly reminiscent of the katapugon or kinaidos, as 
described by Davidson. The lover who is phaulos is unwilling to play the game 
set out for him by his peers just as the katapugon and kinaidos refuse to restrain 
their sexual appetites to meet social expectations.48
48 Davidson. 1997: 167-182.
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Thus, despite describing the pandemic lover as ho alethos pandemos and 
ho phaulos ton anthropon, the distinction Pausanias makes does not primarily 
refer to his membership of the politically active Athenian masses. Instead, 
Pausanias uses the labels to identify the behaviours which he considers incorrect, 
(me orthos') and shameful (aischros), when carried out by members of the 
aristocratic elite. Before such an audience, he charges those who fit the 
pandemic criteria with behaving like wretched, low-born, members of the 
Athenian masses. In the mouth of Pausanias, pandemos and phaulos become 
first and foremost words of moral condemnation, rather than (or perhaps 
concomitant with) political abuse.
Pausanias’ definition of the pandemic lover is quite straightforward; 
however, his description of correct love, experienced by those under the 
influence of Aphrodite Ourania, is far from clear-cut. In the first instance, the 
man who loves correctly rejects the female, and loves only boys: to phusei 
eromenesteron kai noun mallon echon agapontes, ‘feeling affection for those by 
nature more vigorous and having greater minds’.49 Here, Pausanias repeats 
commonly held views of the inferiority and weakness of women, and plugs his 
argument into his city’s discourse on gender.50 The Athenian man is praised or 
condemned by the associations he forms: the shameful pandemic lover matches 
himself with the physically and intellectually inferior woman, while the youthful 
vigour and intelligence of his beloved youth reflects back positively on the
49 Pl. Smp. 181c6-7.
50 For tliis view of women, see for example Xenophon’s Symposium 2.9, where Socrates claims 
that women can be educated in spite of their inferiority in reasoning (gnome) and strength 
(ischus).
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standing of his ouranian erastes. Thus, Pausanias not only discusses the 
‘homosexuality’ of the Athenian male in terms of the sexual desire of one male 
for another, but places it within a gendered hierarchy of position.51 On 
Pausanias’ understanding, the biological sex and socially constructed gender of a 
man’s object of desire feeds back into that man’s standing within an elite 
community which defines itself as composed of desiring, symposion-going,
aristocratic, Athenian, citizen, males.
However, it is not only the sex and gender of his lover which affects this. 
Pausanias states that the age and intelligence of a chosen beloved are equally as 
important. The pandemic lover, whose behaviour is characterised by
shamelessness, desires weak women and boys who, like himself, lack 
intelligence. By contrast, the ouranian lover, who is concerned to desire in a fine 
way, will choose a youth whose suitability is manifest in his newly developing 
intelligence.52 The focus on the maturity of the mind as a criterion for suitability 
moves the sphere of reference away from the bodily realm, towards the soul, and 
prefigures Pausanias’ future arguments regarding the conduct of boys in sexual 
relationships with men.53 The would-be lover is warned against associations 
with younger boys, whose intelligence is not yet in evidence because the final
51 Like Fisher. 2001: 27. I employ tlie term ‘homosexuality’ with reservations and caution. 
Restricting its definition to ‘the desire of one male-sexed person for another’ will hopefully avoid 
tlie dangers of imposing modem ideas about sexuality, itself a modem construction, on tlie past. 
On these dangers, see Foucault, 1976 and 1984, passim;, Halperin, 1990: 29-38; and Parker, 
2001, discussed in note 29, above.
52 Pl. Smp. 181c7-d3.
53 Pl. Smp. 184a5-b7.
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destination of their souls and bodies in terms of vice and virtue are uncertain.54 
Pausanias proposes that if a desiring man wants to ensure that he conducts 
himself in a fine way, he must wait until the object of his desire is old enough 
that any tendency towards moral decrepitude or excellence is clear. Therefore, it 
is not mental agility that Pausanias is concerned with, but the moral propensity of 
the potential beloved as one basis on which the character of the beloved, and 
hence of his older partner, will be judged.
To summarise, in spite of its mythological beginnings, Pausanias’ speech 
locates erds firmly within the contemporary Athenian polis. Sexual relations are 
described within the boundaries of Athenian behaviour, and placed within the 
city’s moral landscape. However, far from providing a straightforward account 
of Athenian mores with regard to sexual desire, it points to a diversity of 
attitudes within the city.55 This is suggested by Pausanias’ wish to present his 
audience with strict models of‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’, and ‘fine’ and ‘shameful’ 
patterns of behaviour. But, by promoting one form of erotic behaviour, 
Pausanias inadvertently attests the existence of other types of relationships too. 
Long-lasting partnerships between men and suitable youths, which Pausanias 
will later commend, existed alongside those which he characterises as pandemic: 
transient and permanent sexual relations between men and women, and between 
men and younger boys. Pausanias’ attempt to confine erds within one overriding 
model betrays the multiplicity of citizen male experiences which it seeks to hide.
54 Pl. Smp. 181el-3.
55 Tliis point is made by Fisher, 2001: 34, who notes, ‘by the period of full democracy, as our 
literary sources become more abundant, Athenian society itself became more complex, and 
increasingly contained many contradictory ideologies and values ... As (lie speech given to 
Pausanias in Plato’s Symposium explained, tliis was especially true of same-sex relations' .
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Moreover, Pausanias constructs his model of erotic relations within
contemporary discourses relating to democracy and gender. Opposing Aphrodite 
Ourania with Aphrodite Pandemos, he draws on the vocabulary of anti­
democratic rhetoric, inscribing political status onto his account of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ erds. In this way, he takes to the floor like Ober’s forensic orator: forced to 
defend his actions before the masses, he couches his appeal in the vocabulary of 
merit and shame - although in Pausanias’ case the ‘masses’ are his fellow 
symposiasts. By using anti-democratic rhetoric, lawcourt tactics, moral 
vocabulary and traditional gender hierarchies, Pausanias imagines himself as an 
aristocratic Athenian male citizen erastes, and places his words and actions 
within the politicised and gendered discourses of classical Athenian society. He 
thus demonstrates his identity as kalos kagathos by deploying the shared 
language of an elite audience of Athenian males who defined themselves through 
traditional aristocratic value-structures, and through a contemporary discourse of 
democratic opposition.
In the process, Pausanias contributes to the continued development of 
these discourses. His moral and political definition of the phaulos, his 
moralising of erotic behaviour, and his creation of gender-based sexual 
hierarchies provide his audience, immediate and extratextual, with potential ways 
of thinking about erds and about being a desiring man; or more precisely, about 
being a male, desiring, elite member of the Athenian city. The competition of 
the symposion offers Pausanias an opportunity to interact with, but also redefine 
the criteria for acting like, and talking about acting like, a kalos kagathos.
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Ho Peri Ton Erota Nomos in Greece and Athens
With his moralising overview of erds and its associated relationships complete, 
Pausanias turns to discuss ‘the custom regarding erds (ho peri ton erota nomos}, 
in a selection of Greek poleis outside of Athens, and then in Athens itself.56 
Penwill suggests that his purpose is to compare and contrast the customs of 
different cities to the benefit of Athens.57 On this reading, Pausanias politicises 
the symposion by promoting its participants as citizens, positioning them against 
non-Athenian ‘Others’. By establishing a divide between Athenian and non­
Athenian customs, and then aligning his own model of erotic behaviour with 
Athenian nomoi, Pausanias endeavours to construct an image of himself which 
fulfils the requirements of the sympotic competition. Pausanias calls upon the 
language of his audience’s imaginary in order to align himself with the group, 
and to insinuate his own speech into an established discourse of erotics.
Sex in the Non-Athenian City
Kai Sq Kai 6 Ttepl tov bpcoTa vopoq ev pev Taig dXXaig TioXeci 
voqoai |5d8iog, dTiXmg ydp (bptoTav 6 §’ ev0a§e Kai ev 
AaKebalpovi rcoiKiXog. ev ’'HXibi pev ydp ical ev Boicotov;,
Kai ob pq ooipol Xeyeiv, dTtXcog vevopoObrqTai KaXov to 
yapl^eoOai bpaoraig, Kai ouk dv Tig elnoi obre veog obre 
7iaX,aiog <±>g a’io%p6v, 'Iva olpai pf| Tipaypar’ b%cooiv Xoy©
Tteipcbpevoi TtelOeiv Tong veoug, aTe dSbvaTOi ?veyeiv.
56 Pl. Smp. 182a8.
57 Penwill, 1978: 145.
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‘And, indeed, the custom regarding desire in other cities is easy to 
observe, for it is defined absolutely (haplos)-, but here and in 
Lacedaemonia it is complex (poikilos). But in Elis and in Boeotia, 
and where they are not clever at speaking (me sophos legein), it is 
ordained by law simply as good (kalos) to grant favours to lovers; 
and no-one would say, neither young nor old, it is shameful 
(aischros), so that, I believe, they can spare themselves the trouble of 
trying to persuade (peilhein) the young by word (logos), because they 
are incapable of speaking (adunatoi legein)' (Pl. Smp. 182a8-b5)
Pausanias describes the erotic customs of Boeotia and Elis as straightforward and 
absolute (haplos)-. a youth might indulge his lover’s sexual desires without fear 
of criticism.58 This lack of moral appraisal stands in direct contrast to the outline 
he establishes for acting out one’s desires in shameful and praiseworthy ways. 
However, Pausanias’ criticism of this custom does not lie primarily in the 
behaviour it necessitates, nor in the arbitrariness with which it is applied. Rather,
Pausanias is dissatisfied because the customs exist as a result of their followers’
inability to speak cleverly. This deficiency prevents the lover and beloved from 
participating in the kind of educational, erotic relationship which Pausanias has
58 Therefore tlie interpretation of tliis passage provided by Strauss, 2001: 68. is back to front. 
He claims ‘tlie savage Greeks say giant favours as you please. Tlie Athenians say grant favours 
with discretion’. However, Pausanias’ description reveals he is not concerned dial Elis and 
Boeotia ‘have no restrictions whatsoever’, but tliat they follow one absolute pattern of behaviour. 
And Athenian custom is not praised because it has numerous restrictions, but because of its many
levels and variations.
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already described as kalos59 However, his censure of the inability to speak in a 
sophisticated fashion and to persuade others with words reflects the concerns of 
the Athenian democracy. The ability to speak was integral to an Athenian 
citizen’s identity as a member of the democratic community. Isegoria and 
parrhesia, ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘frank speaking’, were essential aspects of 
the deliberative and decision-making processes characteristic of Athenian 
democracy. Moreover, when Herodotus attributes Athenian military victory to 
their internal political situation, isegoria is used to signify the new democracy.60 
Freedom of speech, alongside frank speaking, was bound ideologically to the 
democratic Athenian city as ‘a principle that helped create Athens’ democratic 
identity and shaped daily conduct’.61
Hence, despite the predominance of rhetoricians in the assembly, it was 
still necessary for each citizen to believe himself able to convey his concerns 
verbally: the ability to speak lay at the centre of ‘Athenian patriotic self-image’. 
The Athenian who did not speak freely, nor frankly, and so did not put himself, 
his intentions and his beliefs, on display as a citizen, might come under suspicion 
and criticism.62 This belief extends into Pausanias’ criticism of the Boeotians
59 And he will soon describe in more detail: Pl. Snip. 184d-e.
60 Hdt. 5.78.1.
61 Wallace, 1996: 114. Hansen, 1991: 83, also recognises tlie connection between parrhesia and 
Athenian polis ideologies when he records that Alliens named one of its ships Parrhesia, 
alongside Demokratia and Eleutheria. See IGII2 1624.81. Note that isegoria and parrhesia were 
also envisaged as key components of tlie democracy by those who appraised it; for example,
Plato (Republic 557b) and Isocrates (7.20). Cf. Wallace, 1996: 105.
62 See Monoson, 2000: 56-59.
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and Eleans. Because they cannot speak well, they do not make judgements of 
praise or shame.
In addition, the ability to persuade and a willingness to be persuaded by 
others were crucial features of democratic practice. In his study of Persuasion in 
Greek Tragedy, Buxton documents its role in Athenian political life, as attested 
in the poetry of Solon, the assembly speeches reported by Thucydides, and the 
lawcourt orations of the fourth century. He concludes, ‘persuasion was not only 
central to Athens’ own idealised version of her political life, as represented, e.g. 
in Euripides’ Suppliants, but to her real life also ... Faith in public argument lay 
at the root of the Athenian democracy.’63 Further, at Athens persuasion (peitho), 
was vital to the lover’s image of himself as a successful suitor 64 As Rothwell 
notes, Gorgias’ presentation of the seduction of Helen is built on the combined
63 Buxton, 1982: 16. Buxton (pages 58-63) also asserts that peitho is a symbol of the civilised 
Greek world, in contrast to tlie uncivilised world of tlie barbarian. Thus, he creates a series of 
binary oppositions revolving around peitho, and its opposite, bia. These are: peithol bi a. 
civilised/uncivilised, inside po/zs/outside polis, zzozzzos/absence of nomos, dz/re/absence of dike, 
mankind/animals, Greeks/barbarians. However, Pausanias’ location of the inability to persuade 
within Greek poleis where nomos rules destroys tlie coherence of these polarities. Pausanias does 
create a mini-polarity between Athens and non-Athenian states. However, it does not provide an 
absolute model for self-definition, but co-exists with oilier oppositions, and differs in significance 
at different stages in tlie speech. Moreover, Pausanias’ presentation of non-Athenian Greeks 
reinforces Harrison’s, 2002: 7, view that, ‘tlie Greeks themselves, moreover, were far from being 
a homogeneous group. Though tlie projection of a barbarian “other” may often serve to reinforce 
tlie unity of the “Greek”, it may also slied light on tlie fragility^ of the Greek-barbarian antithesis’.
64 Indeed, Rothwell even suggests tliat peitho might be translated as ‘persuasion’ in a rhetorical 
context, and as ‘seduction’ in tlie affairs of eras'. Rothwell, 1990: 30. On tlie connection between 
peitho and erds in ancient Greece, see further Gross, 1995: cli. 2.
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powers of bia, ‘force’, erds and peithd.65 Thus, Pausanias’ comment on the 
inability of poor speakers to persuade merges the democratic citizen with the 
successful lover. For the moment, the attributes by which an Athenian citizen 
defines himself are those of any lover, whether pandemic or ouranian.
Pausanias thus draws a distinction between the Athenian’s capacity for 
speaking and persuasion, deliberation and judgement on the one hand, and the
Boeotian’s and Elean’s one-dimensional nomos on the other. This difference is
reiterated when Pausanias sums up: wherever it is deemed good to gratify lovers 
it is because of the mental laziness (tes psuches argia) of the law-givers.66 Non­
Athenian Greeks thereby share an affinity with the Pandemic lover, who carries 
out his relations in a shameful way, and desires women and boys who are 
anoetotatos, ‘as foolish as can be’.67 The lover of ignorant youths becomes 
associated with those who follow the uncomplicated custom which allows boys 
to gratify their lovers. The former lover is ‘of the demos', criticised from within 
the moralising language of an aristocratic elite. By contrast, the latter is 
portrayed as thoroughly removed from the democratic world, unable to 
participate in the spoken discourses which characterise Athenian civic life. This 
seemingly incongruous juxtaposition highlights the cultural complexity of 
Pausanias’ world view. Pausanias blurs the boundaries between aristocratic
rhetoric, which underlies his description of the bad lover as ‘pandemic’, and 
democratic ideology, which informs his view of Greek men who do not belong to 
the democratic Athenian polis. He styles himself as an aristocrat, a member of
65 Rothwell. 1990: 26-27.
66 Pl. Smp. 182dl-3.
67 Pl. Smp. 18lb5.
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Athens’ wealthy elite, positioning himself against the Athenian masses, and as a 
member of the Athenian citizenry, aligning himself with those masses against
non-Athenian Greeks.
Unlike at Athens, the actions of Boeotians and Eleans, and of all men 
who cannot speak cleverly, are not circumscribed by any moral discourse. The 
inability to participate in a reasoned logos allows no room for debate, or for a 
multiplicity of erotic relationships. Pausanias’ criticism of Boeotian and Elean 
habits is not based on their habits per se, but the deficiencies of their 
practitioners in the realm of self-expression and self-identity. Most strikingly, 
Pausanias’ aristocratic concerns over their erotic customs are filtered through the 
language and ideology of Athenian democracy. A similar criticism informs his 
representation of erotic nomoi in the Persian-controlled cities of Ionia.
Trig 8e ’ Icoviac; Kat dAAoOt 7ioXXa%ou aio%pdv vevopioTai, 6001 
bxo pappapoig o’ikoucuv. Toig yap Pappapon; Sia rag 
TupavviSag a’roxpov touto ye, Kat q ye cpiAoootpia Kai f| 
(piXoyupvaoTla- ob yap oipai ouptpepei Toig dpyouoi cppovqpaTa 
peyaZa feyylyveoOai tcov dp^opevcov, ob8e cpiAAac; toxupag 
Kai KOivcovla<;, 6 Siy paXioTa qnXei Ta Te dXXa 7iavTa Kai 6 
bpax; feprcoieiv.
‘But in parts of Ionia and in other places where they live under 
barbarians, it [gratifying lovers] is considered shameful. It is because 
of tyranny that this thing is shameful to barbarians, as indeed are the 
love of wisdom (philosophia) and the love of bodily exercise 
(philogumnastia) as well. For I believe it is not profitable to rulers
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for great thoughts (phronemcita megala) to be engendered in their 
subjects, nor strong affection and fellowship, which all other things, 
but especially erds, are wont to create. ’ (Pl. Smp. 182b5-c4)
Again Pausanias’ argument is bound up with political rhetoric. On the one hand, 
the Ionians lack some of the properties which Thucydides’ Pericles attributes to 
the Athenians: love of wisdom (philosophid) and love of beauty (philokalia), the 
latter being redundant in the absence of erdsG* As Wohl observes, in the 
Funeral Oration, Pericles redefines the predominantly elite practice of 
philosophici as an ideological mark of democratic citizenship.68 9 When the 
aristocratic Pausanias deploys its absence as an accusation against Ionians it too 
contains this democratic significance. While the erotic customs of the Boeotians 
and Eleans are dictated by their inability to speak cleverly, those of the Ionians 
are constrained by the desires of non-Greek-speaking tyrants to stamp out 
opportunities for any kind of verbal and physical interaction amongst their 
subjects. Although the language of shame re-enters the frame, the morality 
behind it is dictated by the desire of barbarian rulers to keep their subjects from 
engaging in activities which might threaten their power: that is, philosophic, 
gymnastic and erotic activities which create strong personal bonds and high­
flying aims in men. These are not the moral criteria by which any self- 
respecting, philosophy-doing, gymnasi on-going Athenian would measure himself 
or his compatriots.
68 Th. 2.40.1.
69 Wohl, 2002: 41-44. On Wohl’s discussion of how tliis idealisation of democratic citizenship
is constructed through a discourse linking erds and tlie polis, see Halliwell, 2003.
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The folly of Boeotian, Elean and Ionian practices resides within the 
inability of individuals to take part in what Pausanias regards as the defining 
activities of the Athenian polis, in the latter, this is extended from open debate to 
the practice of philosophy and the enjoyment of gymnastic activities.70 The rule 
of the tyrant infringes on the rights of the individual to lead his life, and carry out 
his relationships as he likes. This feature of life under tyranny stands in 
opposition to Pericles’ characterisation of Athens in the funeral oration 
composed by Thucydides. In his programmatic description of the democratic 
city, Pericles asserts that everyone can go about his daily business without 
interference from his neighbours.71 The anti-tyrannical, pro-democratic 
overtones of Pausanias’ comments emerge again in his proud declaration that,
epycn 8e touto epaOov Kai o't fev0a5s Tupavvot- 6 yap 
’ AptoToyeiTovog spcog Kai p ' AppoSlou tpiMa pspatog yevopevq 
KareXncsv aincov Trjv &PXHV-
‘Here, the tyrants learned this by deed; for the desire (erds) of 
Aristogeiton and the affection (phiHa) of Harmodius, being steadfast, 
brought an end to their rule.’ (Pl. Smp. 182c4-6)
70 Although participation in philosophy remained an ostensibly elite occupation (even if the idea 
of loving wisdom was drawn into tlie self-conception of tlie democratic polis), Fisher, 1998, 
argues convincingly tliat by tlie fourth centiuy, participation in the gymnasion, where much 
philosophical activity took place, was a regular feature of Atiienian life for citizens of most 
wealth groups.
Th. 2.37.2.
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With the exemplum of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, Pausanias taps into a long 
tradition of veneration in classical Athens. As Thucydides complains, despite the 
passing of time between Aristogeiton’s attack on Hipparchus and the expulsion 
of the Peisistratids from Athens, the two events were elided in the popular mind, 
and the erastes and eromenos were lauded as tyrannicides extraordinaires. 
Their statue was set up in the Agora, later to be recast and re-erected when 
destroyed by the Persians, and their descendants were given the heroic honour of 
dining privileges in the prytaneion13 In the Athenian psyche, Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton were synonymous with the destruction of tyranny and the 
establishment of democracy.72 * 4 Moreover, they played a key role in shaping the 
Athenians’ conception of their past, and hence, of their present and future too. 
When Pausanias boasts of their accomplishment, he aligns himself with the 
mentality of the Athenian masses.75
Pausanias concludes his comments on non-Athenian practices with the 
observation that,
72 Th. 1.20. On Thucydides’ exposition on the tyrannicides, see Loraux. 2000: 65-82. She 
asserts (79-81) tliat Thucydides invented tlie erotic bond between Harmodius and Aristogeiton in 
an attempt to attack the revered status of the liberators and in die hope of expunging erds from 
tlie present. However, if these were Thucydides’ ambitions, he was more than unsuccessful; tlie 
speech of Pausanias refers to tlie erotic relationship between Aristogeiton and Harmodius as if it 
were tlie most important part of an accepted tr adition (although of course Pausanias presents it as 
such for liis own reasons).
7 J For a more detailed list, see Taylor, 1981:185.
74 See Podlecki, 1966; Fomara, 1970.
75 See Loraux, 2000: 71-72. As she notes, for Thucydides, tlie factually erroneous story of 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton belonged to the plethos, ‘the “crowd”, but also the majority and tlie 
regime that represented it’.
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obTeog ob psv aioxpov stsOt] /apl^ecOai epaoTaig, Kaxia tcov 
Qspsvcov KstTai, tcov pev ap%ovTcov 7tX.eovs^ia, tcov 8e 
dp/opsvcov dvavbpfa-
‘Thus, where it is set up as shameful to grant favours to one’s lovers, 
it rests on the moral defect of those who set it up, the greed of the 
rulers, and the lack of manliness (anandria) of the subjects.’ (Pl.
Smp. 182c6-dl)
He therefore makes the subject Greeks living under Persian tyranny just as 
responsible for the prohibition of same-sex relations as the tyrants who impose 
the rule. This context allows Pausanias to imbue the charge of anandria with 
political and social meaning. The Ionian has anandria because he is ruled by 
another, and does not stand up to the tyrant to claim his freedom. This freedom 
involves not only political self-determination, but the right to attend the 
gymnasion, participate in philosophy, and take part in homoerotic affairs.
In the opening part of his speech, Pausanias works within the traditional 
vocabulary of aristocratic moralising to present a version of erotic relations 
which bolsters his claim to membership of Athens’ anti-democratic elite. But, 
his account of erotic nomoi outside Athens shows the speaker interacting closely 
with the contemporary democratic discourses by which the Athenian citizenry 
imagined itself as positively diverse, clever-speaking, anti-tyrannical, and 
different in these ways from all other Greeks. Moreover, by constructing his 
sympotic identity through his erotic relationships, Pausanias takes part in a
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discourse which is allied closely to the democracy. Wohl’s investigation into the 
‘spirit of democracy’ demonstrates the extent to which democratic discourse was 
configured through the imagery of erotics. For example, the tyrannicide myth 
envisaged Athenian democracy as the product of an erotic bond between 
Aristogeiton and Harmodius, and Hipparchus’ thwarted erotic ambitions. It 
linked pederasty to the democratic values of freedom, courage, and self- 
sacrifice.76 And Pericles’ Funeral Oration invites the demos to imagine itself 
within the erastes-erdmenos relationship, both as lover and beloved of the city.77 
However, the sympotic, agonistic context of Pausanias’ speech lends his 
interaction with democratic discourses an interesting twist. The men whose 
consciousness Pausanias seeks to reflect are not politically active members of the 
Athenian demos, but men whose wealth and lifestyle set them apart from the
masses.
Pausanias’ speech therefore exists within a network of competing and 
complementary discourses which permeate the Athenian city. Traditional anti­
democratic sentiment and democratic conceptions of the city and its citizens are 
subtly woven together in an epideixis of Pausanias’ kalokagathia. In her 
discussion of the funeral oration, Loraux emphasises the continuity between elite 
and democratic discourses within Athens. The democracy adopted aristocratic 
value-concepts like arete, andreia, and kalokagathia because it had no cultural 
alternative within which to define itself.78 The speech of Pausanias testifies to a
76 Wohl. 2002: 4ff: cf. 267-269.
77 Wohl, 2002: 30-72.
7b Loraux, 1986: 218. Tliis assertion will have consequences for our study of Xenophon’s
kalokagathia-. see chapter 6, pages 269ff, below.
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similar exchange, but one that moves in an opposite direction. When aligning 
himself with Athens against other Greek poleis, the fifth- and fourth-century 
aristocrat could not define himself outside of the language of the democratic city.
In the 1970s, Althusser’s study of ideology led him to describe the 
process of interpellation by which a dominant ideology imposes itself on an 
individual who is compelled to define herself or himself as a ‘subject’ within that 
ideology. The individual only achieves its identity (although it is ‘always 
already’ a subject) when ‘hailed’ by the ideology which shapes it.79 Although 
Althusser’s conception of ideology has been criticised and his view of subject 
formation undermined, it seems that on one level at least Pausanias has 
undergone interpellation.80 Although he is a member of Athens’ elite, Pausanias 
is hailed by his polis as a member of the democracy; hence, he becomes a 
member of the democracy, and talks in its language, whether or not he holds anti­
democratic sympathies. Similarly, Pausanias’ account of sexual customs in Elis, 
Boeotia and Ionia, encourages and assists his elite audience to define itself 
against non-Athenians; they too might identify themselves with the Athenian 
masses and Athenian democracy, and through their engagement with democratic 
ideology.
79 See Althusser. 1971: 160-171.
80 See, for example, Hirst, 1975; Eagleton, 1991: 18-22, who also evaluates Hirst’s criticism, 
and Mills, 1997: 29-47. On Hirst’s argument against interpellation, see note 9 in tlie conclusion,
below.
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The Custom at Athens
When Pausanias returns to the topic of the erotic custom at Athens, the axis of 
identification shifts once more so that the symposiasts are again invited to 
identify themselves in relation to the polis. Rather than indulging in more 
moralising rhetoric, Pausanias tries to find a place for himself, his audience, and 
the relationships he recommends, within the city.
In the introduction to his discussion of ho peri ton erota nomos, 
Pausanias positions Athenian practice against the customs of other cities on the 
grounds that their customs are defined simply (haplos), but at Athens they are 
many-coloured (poikilos)*1 Thus, he describes the erotic custom at Athens as 
‘variegated, complex, or shifting’, a characteristic associated with the Athenian 
democracy.81 2 For example, in the Republic, the term poikilos describes the 
make-up of the democratic city: Socrates mockingly characterises Athens as a 
beautiful and poikilos assemblage of lifestyles.83 With his initial observation, 
Pausanias therefore makes a distinction between the straightforward form of 
erotic relations engaged in by Boeotians, Eleans and Ionians, and the many 
different and changing forms of relationship available to the citizens of Athens.
81 PL Smp. 182a8-9.
82 Tliis definition of poikilos is given by Carson, 1986: 24. The term poikilos was also 
variegated, complex and shifting. For example, Hesk, 2000: 36, shows that it might be associated 
with 'deceit, intricacy, fabrication and beguilemenf. Rosenstock, 1994: 376-378, equates die 
democratic poikilia of Plato’s Republic with the emasculation of citizens; and Monoson, 2000: 
224-226, suggests Plato uses it tiiere to describe democracy pejoratively as ‘decorous’.
8j Pl. R. 561e3-4. Cf. Rosenstock, 1994: 377, and 390 n. 30, who also maintains that Plato 
connects the poikilia of the city explicitly to women, and diereby to the democracy as ‘the site of
emasculation’.
DEMOCRACY AND ELITES 143
At Athens, the sexual custom is not absolute {ouch haploun estiri), nor easy to 
understand {ou rhaidion katanoesai}.
Yet, when Pausanias goes on to describe the custom at Athens, we find 
that he is not interested in the variety of Athenian customs, but only in promoting 
a good ‘ouranian’ mode of conduct within it. On the one hand, Pausanias aligns 
his practices with the city’s nomoi. But on the other hand, he creates a 
disjunction between this picture of tolerance and acceptance of the erastes- 
erdmenos relationship at a communal level, and the negative reaction of 
individual citizens to it. Within this disjunction, Pausanias recommends a model 
of erotic behaviour which will promote virtue and excellence within oneself and 
one’s beloved, but which is still configured within communal civic space.
Pausanias describes the actions of the erastes who pursues and catches 
his beloved by entreaty and supplication; he sleeps in doorways and acts in the 
most slavish of fashions. He is praised for this by friends and enemies alike, and, 
moreover, by the city, which not only tolerates this reversal of moral norms but 
encourages and facilitates it.84 5 86Everyone cheers on men who pursue and catch 
their prey, as if they were doing nothing shameful {ouch hos ti aischron 
poiounti). Indeed, custom praises them when they undertake behaviour for 
which they would normally be denounced.87 With this claim to universality, 
Pausanias stamps society’s authority on his own account. He and his fellow
84 Pl. Snip. 183d4-5: 182d4.
85 Pl. Smp. 182d4-183c2.
86 Pl.Swp. 182d6-183al.
87 Pl. Smp. 182e6ff, 183b2-6.
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erastai can rest assured that their actions have the full consent of the city where 
the custom states that gods and men give full license to those who are in love.
However, not everyone in the city accepts this approbation of the erastes- 
eromenos relationship. Using conversation as a signifier of erotic relations once 
again, Pausanias outlines the opposition of fathers to pederastic relations, and 
their condemnation by young boys and old men:
brcsiSav 8s 7iai8aya)yobg fe7tiozqoavzeg ol rcazepeg zoig 
fepcopevoig gf| bcooi SiaXeyeoOai zoig epaozaig, Kai zcp 
7iai8aycoy(p zabza Kpoozezaypcva p, qXiKirozai 8s Kai bzaipoi 
dvsiSl^cooiv &av zi opcooiv zoiobzov yiyvopsvov, Kai zobg 
6vsi81^ovzag ab o'l 7ipeoPuzspot pp SiaKco^ocooi pp8c 
A,oiSopcboiv cbg o6k dpQcog A,syovzag, sig 8s zabza zig ab 
pXs\|/ag pypoaiz’ dv TtaXiv a’loyiozov zd zoiobzov sv0a8s 
vopl^eoOai.
‘But when fathers set up slaves over erornenoi and do not allow them 
to converse (dialegesthai) with their erastai, and these commands are 
given to the slave; and also when friends equal in age reproach him if 
they see something of the sort happening; and when again old men do 
not hinder nor abuse those making the reproaches for speaking 
incorrectly, then someone looking at these things might believe the 
opposite, that this sort of thing was considered (nomizesthai) very 
shameful here’. (Pl. Smp. 183c4-d3) *
Pl. Smp. 183b-c2.
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Under Pausanias’ analysis, the men who seek to prevent relationships 
between erastai and erdmenoi do so against their city’s nomos. 89 They thus 
reject one of the key components of the democracy, that all men might do what 
they please without interference from their neighbours.90 They do not allow the 
custom at Athens to be poikilos, but seek to prevent erotic relationships taking 
place altogether. By contrast, Pausanias promotes his solidarity with Athenian 
customs when he returns to the topic of how to desire and be desired in good and 
bad ways. ‘Our nomos1 is designed to test pandemic and ouranian erastai, and 
provides a path for erdmenoi to follow.91 And, two of the city’s nomoi 
concerning the pursuit of boys and the pursuit of wisdom must be combined into 
one which will make the erdmenos1 granting of favours a fine thing.92
Pausanias creates an account of ‘our nomos at Athens’ for his audience
which seeks to give the erastes-eromenos relationship universal validation in the 
civic community, of which the symposion is a subset. Thus, he constructs 
himself and his audience as good citizens who comply with their city’s demands. 
Under the city’s care, good ouranian desire can promote personal excellence in 
the erastes and erdmenos. By giving men and boys license to behave in
89 Note that although tlie focus in tliis passage lies on tlie actions of the younger parlner, and tlie 
scorn he reaps as an erdmenos, it is tliis conversing or relationship which is shaming. Tliis is in 
contrast to Dover, 1989: 81-84, who argues tliat rules surrounding pederasty are aimed purely at 
protecting tlie erdmenos from disgrace; and to Foucault, 1985: 197, who ignores tliis opinion as 
an inconvenience, rather than a condemnation of tlie erastes-eromenos relationship.
90 The connection between freedom of action and speech and democracy is made by Lys. 26.5, 
Th. 2.37.2-3, 7.69.2, and Arist. Pol. 1317a40-bl4. Cf. Wallace, 1996: 105.
91 Pl. Smp. 183e6-a2, 184b6-7.
92 Pl. Smp. 184c7-d2.
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shameful ways (the erastes begging, supplicating and acting in a generally 
slavish manner; the erdmenos allowing himself to be caught by his pursuer and 
gratifying him sexually), Athens offers them the opportunity to become more 
virtuous. The lover shows himself to be (and so becomes) kalos by behaving in a 
fine way; and the boy receives an education in arete and wisdom from his 
erastes93 The ouranian lover is not only a good citizen, but a man of virtue and 
excellence, who is well-educated and can educate others, and whom we might 
imagine at home in a group of kaloi kagathoi.
As discussed above, modern scholars have viewed Pausanias’ account of 
erotic relations in Athenian society as a case of special pleading on the speaker’s 
part. They observe that Pausanias’ discussion recognises the existence of other 
attitudes towards erds, and accuse him of providing a definitive account of 
Athenian nomoi. Under my analysis, this interpretation is still correct. 
However, Pausanias’ motivations are not as facile as these scholars imply. 
Pausanias is not concerned to give a definitive account of Athenian nomoi, but to 
align himself with them in order to present an encomium of Eros which fulfils 
the requirements of the sympotic event. The speaker must convince his listeners 
that he is a well-educated kalos kagathos, just like them; therefore, he must draw 
on their imaginary, and recreate it in his speech. As this section has shown, 
Pausanias’ contribution to the symposion suggests that in this imaginary, the 
kalos kagathos might position himself with or against the Athenian polis, but 
never fully outside of its rhetoric and ideologies.
Pl. Snip. 184d3-e5.
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Conclusion: Plato and the Symposion
The speeches of the symposion all take part in the sympotic process of affirming 
and displaying kalokagathia. However, by centring Pausanias’ speech on erotic 
practice, Plato allows a more detailed display of sympotic self-fashioning. 
Pausanias constructs his identity not only through participation in the symposion, 
but through (talking about) his conduct under the influence of erds too. As 
Pausanias gives his encomium of Eros, his extra-textual audience share in the 
epideixis of kalokagathia, witnessing how to negotiate the demands of the 
symposion through their companion’s performance. In other speeches, the 
symposiast will experience erds as a force for social good (Phaedrus), harmony 
(Eryximachus) or the creation of beauty (Agathon), as a passionate longing of the 
soul (Aristophanes), and as a facilitator in the pursuit of True Virtue (Socrates). 
But in the speech of Pausanias the reader encounters erds as a tool for self­
definition and expression within the symposion.
Plato’s symposion is shaped according to its author’s ambitions both for 
the event of the symposion and the text of the Symposium. It is a philosophical 
occasion: not only do the symposiasts contribute towards a discussion on Eros, 
but they also participate in the quest for virtue which underpins Plato’s other 
Socratic dialogues.94 By imbuing it with the latter purpose, Plato grants the 
symposion a sociological power. On the one hand, like the symposion of the 
Laws, the drinking party at Agathon’s house is a training ground for the city’s 
elite. They experiment with zero-sum competition, and test out their identities 
within a safe, communal environment. However, in this way the symposion 
becomes a place for exploring and affirming kalokagathia. Like Pausanias, its
94 See Hobbs. 2000.
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participants open up their identities as kaloi kagathoi to critique. The symposiast 
uses his performance to negotiate suitable behaviours, and ways of speaking, for 
the kalos kagathos. Hence, Pausanias’ account of erotic customs not only 
defines Pausanias’ outlook, but needs to convince the symposiasts that his 
viewpoint constitutes his kalokagathia. In the Symposium, Eros is not only a 
topic of philosophical interest, but a way for the symposiasts to construct their 
identities as kaloi kagathoi.
Or, to approach the symposion as a component of its text, the literary and 
dramatic representation of the symposion puts its reader-viewer on the path 
towards kalokagathia. Plato’s Symposium offers him the chance to enter into the 
symposion, and experience its processes from a variety of different perspectives. 
By listening to Pausanias, the reader witnesses his attempts to define himself in 
the symposion, in relation to his fellow symposiasts and the democratic city. Yet, 
as we established in chapter 2, the distance he retains as reader allows him to 
evaluate these experiences at length. He learns how to do a symposion, and at 
the same time learns how to talk and act like a kalos kagathos.
The dramatics of Xenophon’s Symposium engage the reader in a similar 
way. But where Plato implicitly provides a model symposion for his reader’s 
consideration, Xenophon consciously shapes his text into a discussion of how to 
do a symposion. The entertainments which characterise Xenophon’s symposion, 
the conversations of the guests, and the leadership of Socrates, give rise to an 
event which critiques itself. Further, Xenophon’s reader not only experiences the 
symposion as a place for displaying kalokagathia, but is invited to question its 
merits in this respect too. While Plato’s symposion gains its potency through its
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literary representation in the Symposium, Xenophon’s ambitions for his text 
undermine the efficacy of its symposion.
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Chapter 4: How to be a Good Symposiast and Other 
Performances. Entertainment in Xenophon’s Symposium.
’ AH' spot 8oksi tcov KaXcov K&yaOcov dvSpdov spya ob povov
Ta psTa OKObSfig TipaTTopsva d£,iopvrjp6vsoTa stvai dXXa Kai 
Ta sv Taig 7iaiSiat<;. ol<; 8s 7iapaysvopsvog Tatka yiyvcooKco 
SpAxooai pouXopai.
Well, in my view not only the serious deeds of hoi kaloi kagathoi 
andres are worth remembering, but also those done in play. And I 
wish to show you whom I was with when I learned this. (Xen. Smp. 
1.1.1-2.1)
Nf| At’, KaX?da, TsXecog bonag. ob yap povov Seixvov 
dpep7tTOV 7iaps0r|Ka<;, tikka Kat Gsapara Kai dcKpoapara qSiOTa 
Ttapsxei^.
By Zeus, Callias, you entertain us perfectly. For you have not only 
set out dinner blamelessly, but you also provide pleasures for the eye 
and ear. (Xen. Smp. 2.2.4-6)
’ Skk' fepol psv SoksI, do &v8psg, cboTcsp ZcoKparrjg §(prj tov 
olvov, obrmg Kai abTrj rj Kpaoi<; tgov ts 7tat8cov Tp<; <8pa<; Kai 
tgov tpGoyycov Td<; psv A,b7ia<; Koipt^siv, Tf|v 8’ duppoSVcriv 
systpsrv.
But it seems to me, gentlemen, as Socrates said of wine, that this 
mixture of young boys in their bloom and their sounds soothes our 
pain and awakens Aphrodite. (Xen. Smp. 3.1.3-6)
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From the outset, Xenophon’s symposion is set up as a meeting place for kaloi 
kagathoi, where seriousness (spoude) and playfulness (paidia) co-exist and 
interact. As it develops, spoude and paidia mix with the pleasures of viewing 
and listening, and solemnity and grief are replaced with sexual desire. This 
symposion is a place for dancing girls, aulos- and /riZ/rara-players, beautiful 
youths, laughter-makers, acrobatic displays, joking and conversing. Yet, in 
giving his drinking party this character and tone, Xenophon is not merely 
recreating an actual fourth-century symposion, providing ‘a most vivid and 
realistic picture of that curious institution of the time’.1 As our first excerpt 
informs us, the playful and serious deeds of the symposiasts at the house of 
Callias are axiomnemoneuta, ‘worth remembering’ in their own right. With this 
opening claim, Xenophon sets out the programme for his Symposium and places 
it alongside the Hellenica, where the historical events of the late fifth and early 
fourth centuries are described programmatically as ta axiologa. The compilation 
of worthy stories give the Hellenica a didactic frame. As exempla, the events 
described fit their author’s moralising interest in the pursuit of imperial power 
and the nature of rulership.2 Thus, Xenophon’s assertion that the serious and
1 Guthrie. 1969: 341. The same opinion was surprisingly evinced recently by Gera, 1993: 135 
n. 6. In her otherwise insightful analysis of Xenophon’s Symposium, she comments that liis text 
‘seems true to life despite tlie author’s clironologically untenable claim to have been present at 
the party he describes’.
2 Although Xenophon gives no explicit statement of purpose in tlie Hellenica, Tuplin, 1993: 36­
40, has identified five key passages which give tlie text a programmatic form. Xen. Hell. 2.3.56, 
4.5.14, 4.8.1, 7.2.1, and 7.5.27 connect tlie subjects of tlieir disquisition with tlieir moral or 
practical ‘worth’. These passages imply that Xenophon constructs his ‘liistory’ didactically 
around to axiologon. Qi. Tuplin, 1993: 18, 163-4. And see further Proietti, 1987: xix, where
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playful deeds of the kaloi kagathoi are worth remembering is also programmatic, 
alerting the reader to the didacticism of his Symposium.
The entertainments which characterise Xenophon’s Symposium and set it 
apart from its Platonic counterpart are therefore crucial components of their 
author’s textual designs. The visual and aural delights which Caliias and his 
guests watch, listen to and create raise questions concerning sympotic protocol. 
In our second passage, Socrates remarks that these pleasures provide perfect 
entertainment for the symposiasts. But, as we shall see, this statement is part of a 
wider concern with what makes a good symposion, and what makes a good 
symposiast. The performances of guests and entertainers alike create a forum for 
asking how the good symposiast should behave in the symposion. Should he 
watch and listen, or produce the entertainment himself? If the former, how 
should he watch and listen. If the latter, how ought he conduct himself as an 
entertainer, providing sights and sounds for his fellow symposiasts to enjoy? At 
the heart of these questions lies the symposiast’s status as ho kalos kagathos 
aner. How should the kalos kagathos act in the symposion? And what about 
those who are not kaloi kagathoi?
However, Xenophon’s Symposium is not only a handbook on good 
sympotic practice. As a place where these questions are discussed, his 
symposion offers a practical lesson in kalokagathia. By spectating, listening and 
performing, the symposiast participates in the process of being kalos kagathos. 
As I will show, the sexual desire which pervades the symposion, recognised by 
Charmides in the third passage above, provides a framework for this
Xenophon’s Constitution of the Lacedaemonians is interpreted as a recollection of axiologa, in 
just tliis way.
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investigation. The performance, viewing and discussion of erds, and the beauty 
which arouses it, present ways of looking at and responding to beauty. In 
addition, they investigate the positive and negative connotations of beauty and 
desire for the symposiast who is kalos kagathos.
Moreover, just as Plato’s reader is drawn into Agathon’s andron through 
the text’s dramatic elements, so the reader of Xenophon’s work is pulled directly 
into the process. By watching and listening to the performances of guests and 
entertainers, readers might (learn to) become kalos kagathos too. However, the 
Symposium has an additional lesson for its imagined reader. Although Xenophon 
represents the symposion as a place for experiencing the learning of 
kalokagathia, his reader ultimately learns about it through the text of the 
Symposium. Thus, Xenophon challenges his own idea that kalokagathia might 
be taught and learned within the andron. By reading the Symposium, the fourth- 
century kalos kagathos learns all he needs to know.
In the following three chapters, these claims will be more fully explored. 
However, before embarking on this investigation it is important to note that 
Xenophon’s symposion is a very busy place, where different types of 
performances overlap and combine, and the viewer’s gaze constantly shifts from 
spectacle to spectacle. My study of the Symposium reflects this to some degree. 
I look at the same episode or incident from different angles in different chapters. 
While this might be disconcerting for my reader, it is very much in the spirit of 
the Symposium, which gains its authority through its textuality. It requires its 
reader to re-visit the symposion again and again, to use the observations which 
arise from one episode to inform his understanding of other performances and 
events. My analysis of Xenophon’s Symposium consciously reflects this.
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Xenophon: Litteratus, Teacher and Sytnposiarch.
In recent studies of Xenophon and his work it has become almost de rigueur for 
scholars to open their investigations with a resume of the mistreatments suffered 
by one of antiquity’s best-loved authors at the hands of supercilious nineteenth- 
century scholars and their intellectual descendants.3 Higgins’ introductory 
assertion that a work on ‘Xenophon qua Xenophon’ requires no justification, is 
immediately followed by an attempt to justify his work. This signals the extent 
to which in 1977 the opposite of his statement was actually the case.4 In his 
summary of ancient and modern attitudes towards the Cyropaedia, Tatum 
supplies one explanation for this situation.5 Xenophon and his writings were 
revered and influential throughout antiquity and again in the early modern 
period. However, in the nineteenth century, with the emergence of philosophy 
and history as disciplines with precise attributes and qualities, Xenophon’s 
supposedly historical and philosophical works were found wanting.6
Xenophon emerges from Tatum’s account as a victim of academic 
fashion, denied any lasting value by his perceived failure to live up to the 
standards set by Thucydides and Plato at a time when these standards were being 
used as benchmarks for good historical and philosophical practice. This failure 
led to, and was ultimately strengthened by, his general characterisation as a 
gentleman scholar whose work was just not up to the mark. Chroust described
3 Or they at least complain about how unfair tliis treatment is: as well as Higgins. 1977. Tatum. 
1989, Anderson, 1974, Gera, 1993, Tuplin, 1993, Bartlett, 1996b, and Gray, 1998, all introduce 
tlieir studies of Xenophon and/or liis texts in tliis way.
4 Higgins, 1977: xi; xi-xiv.
5 Tatum, 1989: 3-33.
Tatum, 1989: 32.
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Xenophon as an ‘economist, apologist and literary dilettante’ and reduced his 
Socratic writings to ‘fanciful products of creative writing’. Guthrie was 
similarly scathing about Xenophon’s accomplishments, summarising the 
characteristics of his work as ‘a certain literal-mindedness and a tendency to 
prosiness, a pedestrian outlook which is sometimes frankly dull, and little sign of 
any capacity for profound philosophical thought’.7 8 Yet, as Goldhill has shown, 
these characterisations fall apart under close analysis. The same Xenophon 
whom Irwin described as ‘a familiar British type - the retired gentleman, staunch 
Tory and Anglican, firm defender of the Establishment in Church and State, and 
at the same time a reflective man with ambitions to write edifying literature’, was 
a political radical, an innovator in literary form and the defender of ‘a trendy and 
shocking philosopher’.9 Similarly, Cartledge, who once accepted Irwin’s 
depiction, now urges us to appreciate the character of Xenophon’s writing in its 
own terms.10
In the space of twenty-five years the traditionally accepted and negative 
appraisal of Xenophon’s character and ability has been proven inadequate and 
inaccurate. New readings of Xenophon have begun to emerge as ‘part of the on­
going process of competitive reception that characterises all writers deemed 
worthy of inclusion in a literary canon’.11 We study Xenophon now for the 
reason that he has been neglected in the past; we want to reclaim and promote a
7 Chroust, 1957: 10: 8.
8 Guthrie, 1969: 335.
9 Goldliill, 2002: 289: quoting Irwin, 1974: 410.
10 Compare Cartledge, 1987: 61-62, 64-65, with Cartledge in Cartledge and Waterfield, 1997: 
xvii-xix.
Cartledge in Cartledge and Waterfield, 1997: xvii-xviii.
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previously shunned author to prove his (and our own) worth. But in addition, 
Xenophon’s renewed popularity can be attributed to post-structuralist 
developments in the fields of history and literary theory. The rise of ‘theory’, 
discussed in chapter 1, has brought to the fore the positivistic and empiricist 
assumptions which until recently remained implicit in Classics.12 This 
development has destabilised ‘history’ as a concept, and challenged the idea that 
the primary motivation of ancient writers was to convey reality.13 Hence, Gray 
feels obliged to preface her analysis of Xenophon’s Hellenica with her own 
understanding of ‘history’, making a distinction between ‘what happened in the 
past’, and written history as ‘a record of what happened in the past’. This
‘introduces the writer as a medium between the historical events and the written 
record, the subjective element’.14 Xenophon is no longer a failed Thucydides or 
Herodotus (indeed, recent works have proposed that these men were not 
‘historians’ in the traditional sense either) but a man who writes with his own 
moral, ethical and philosophical intentions.15
12 Goff 1995: 1, 16ff.
13 Goff, 1995: 6. Cf. Foucault, 1970 and 1972; White, 1979; Kellner, 1989.
14 Gray, 1989: vii.
15 On tlie relationship between Xenophon and Thucydides, and tlie other historians of tlie fourth 
century, seeTuplin, 1993: 18-36. And on Xenophon’s relationship to Herodotus, see Gray, 1989: 
3-9. But note dial since Harlog, 1988, questioned the ‘historicity’ of Herodotus’ historic^ the 
methods of Herodotus and Thucydides have themselves undergone reanalysis. For a sample of 
ideas, see Lateiner, 1989; Harrison, 2000; Kurke, 1999; and Thomas, 2000, on Herodotus. And 
on Thucydides, see Loraux, 1980; Hornblower, 1994; Rood, 1998; and Kallet, 2001. In general, 
see Kraus, 1999; Pelling, 2000; Luraglii, 2001, Barker, 2002.
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Moreover, despite an increased awareness that modern conceptions of 
ancient philosophy are not consonant with fourth-century understandings, 
scholars working on Xenophon have been reluctant to extend the title of 
philosopher to Xenophon.16 Yet, the discrepancy between modern and ancient 
ideas about philosophy and their expectations of philosophoi is articulated 
nowhere better than through their respective assessments of Xenophon. In sharp 
contrast to the negative evaluation discussed above, Xenophon’s works were 
valued enough to be preserved across the Hellenistic period to emerge later as 
major influences on the writings of the so-called ‘Second Sophistic’ period in the 
late first and second centuries AD. In literary and stylistic terms, they became a 
model of the attic style.17 Xenophon’s Anabasis and Cynegeticus were 
stylistically and thematically a direct influence on Arrian’s history of Alexander 
and his work on hunting.18 Reflections of his Symposium can be found in 
Plutarch’s Table Talk and Athenaeus’ Dinner Party of the Sophists, and less
16 Tliis is true even of Flaceliere, 1961: 93, who laments Xenophon’s negative comparison with 
Plato, when tlie former has his own ‘separate’ talent and genius. Moreover, ‘je ne suis pas loin de 
penser que le Banquet est, avec l’Anabase, l’un de ses meilleurs ouvrages’. Modern awareness of 
this pro-Plato bias and attempts to overcome it are discussed in chapter 2, pages 60-61, above. 
For more detail, see tlie articles collected by Klagge and Smith, 1992, Press, 1993, Gonzales,
1995, and Annas and Rowe, 2002, which upset traditional ways of thinking about Plato and liis 
works with some new approaches. They have been aided in their task by Glucker, 1987 and
1996, Burnyeat, 1998, and Taylor, 2002, whose discussions of nineteenth-century attitudes 
towards Plato demonstrate tlie extent to which earlier ‘paradigms’ (to use Taylor’s term) shape 
our current approaches to him.
17 Swain, 1996: 28, and 43, 62, 253, 309, 384.
18 On Arrian and Alexander, see Bosworth, 1988: passim;, on Xenophon and limiting, see
Phillips and Willcock, 1999: 22-23.
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reverently, in Lucian’s Symposium. The questions raised by Xenophon’s 
Socrates in Memorabilia and Symposium concerning beauty and viewing are 
engaged with and reacted against by Lucian in De Domo, and discussed further 
in Images and For the Images}9 And in addition, Favorinus’ Memoirs and 
Musonius Rufus’ The Exile that is Not an Exile borrow their format from the 
Memorabilia™ Finally, Xenophon was explicitly praised by Eunapius as
Sevocpcov 6 (piAoooqjoq, dvqp povoc; dxdvTCOV (piXoooqxnv sv 
Xoyou; re Kai, spyotq qnXoooqnav Kocpqoac;.
The philosopher Xenophon, the only man out of all the philosophers 
to adorn philosophy in word and deed. (Eun. VS 452f)
Even if, as Anderson believes, Eunapius employed this encomium to 
tendentiously support his own wish to record trivia, the sentiment expressed was 
not unusual.19 20 21 Arrian either styled himself, or, as Bosworth suggests, was 
honoured by others through their styling of him, as ‘Xenophon’.22 Xenophon 
provided a touchstone for Greekness, literary style and philosophy through (and
19 Discussed by Goldliill, 2001b: 161, 189; and Zeitlin, 2001: 213, 227.
20 Cf. Bowie, 1997; Whitmarsh, 2001: 283-285.
21 Anderson, 1993: 130-1, who also notes Quintillian’s (10.1.75) high praise of Xenophon. 
Moreover, as Cartledge, in Cartledge and Waterfield, 1997: xix, records, Polybius (6.45.1) 
describes Xenophon as ‘most learned’, and Athenaeus (504c) calls liis prose ‘sweetest and most 
graceful’.
Bosworth, 1988: 25-26.
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sometimes against) which second-century sophists might style themselves and
their own works.
These developments in academic self-awareness, together with the high 
regard in which Xenophon was held in antiquity, have provoked a re-evaluation 
of Xenophon’s status as a writer, philosopher, historian and moralist. For 
example, over the past ten years, the Cyropaedia has gone through several 
transformations. Rescued from its romantic legacy and nineteenth-century 
obscurity, Due and Tatum independently redefined Xenophon’s account of the 
education of Cyrus as a moralising treatise on the ideal leader.23 However, for 
Nadon this interpretation was too simplistic. By retracing the characterisation of 
the Persian king, he demonstrated how Xenophon’s Cyrus failed to live up to the 
idealised model of kingship which Xenophon set up within his text. The 
Cyropaedia does not so much supply its reader with a model of how to be a good 
leader, as a literary discourse on education and leadership framed through the 
figure of Cyrus.24 As Cartledge observes, ‘the Cyropaedia thus not only 
introduces a new genre of literature, the pseudo-historical novel or romance, but 
also reflects a new model of political theory, pro-monarchist and not so much 
anti- as non-civic’.25 Further, Gera advocates that Cyrus’ rulership offers the 
opportunity for Xenophon to provide a critique of republic versus empire, while
23 Due, 1989; Tatum, 1989.
24 Nadon, 2001.
25 Cartledge, 1993: 105. Although, see Hesk, 2000: 127ff, who accepts Cartledge’s hypothesis 
for tlie Cyropaedia in general, but states tliat Cambyses discusses education and military 
deception in civic terms and grooms his son for life in a language of law and responsibility which 
is highly reminiscent of tlie Greek polis.
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Too concludes that the Cyropaedia offered a paradigmatic assertion of the 
superiority of Athens, and its education system, over Persia.26
These studies interpret Xenophon’s text in it own terms, focusing on 
Xenophon’s authorial ambitions, and the strategies by which they were realised. 
In this one work, Xenophon crosses the boundaries between the (modern) genres 
of biography, romance, and political and educational theory. His interests 
overlap to some degree with those of Plato, particularly in relation to the 
processes of paideia and political organisation. Yet, these topics are explored in 
a non-Platonic way.27 Rather than mediate his concerns through a Socratic 
figure, or the dialogic form, his moral and political observations emerge through 
the dialogue and action at various points within the text, and through the 
Cyropaedia as a whole.28
Thus, recent investigations into the Hellenica and Cyropaedia 
demonstrate Xenophon’s competence in shaping and creating genres to fit his 
didactic needs, and whatever moral issues he wishes to explore. However, this 
new understanding of Xenophon, his techniques and his ambitions has only 
started to influence work on his Symposium. In the 1970s, Lacey suggested that 
the primary aim of the Symposium was to exonerate Socrates by presenting an 
inoffensive, and hence earnestly dull, account of the philosopher and his
26 Gera. 1993; Too, 1998.
27 Although, as chapters 2 and 3 of tliis thesis have implied, Plato’s dialogues are equally as 
‘literary’ as Xenophon’s Socratic and non-Socratic works.
“8 However, Hesk, 2000; 123 n. 7, 136, shows tliat Socrates ‘haunts’ Cambyses’ education of 
Cyrus through the similarities between liis instructions and the philosopher’s advice on deceiving 
friends in Plato’s Republic and Xenophon's Memorabilia.
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practices.29 30In 1995, Hulse could still cite this as Xenophon’s primary intention, 
although his evaluation of Xenophon’s talents is not so harsh. He finds merit in 
the Memorabilia and Symposium through their ability to bring the modern reader 
closer to the historical philosopher than their Platonic equivalents. Xenophon 
was interested above all in proving Socrates was a virtuous philosopher; hence, 
his (inferior) discussion of erds in the Symposium is constructed to this end, 
rather than as a philosophical account of erds™
Indeed, recent criticism has accepted that Xenophon’s Symposium is not a 
philosophically impoverished source for the historical Socrates, nor its author a 
failed philosopher. Bartlett demonstrates that although Xenophon uses the 
Symposium as a vehicle for the promotion of Socrates, the action of the 
symposion and the underlying theme of erds actually critique Socrates’ 
philosophy.31 Moreover, the tables prepared by Huss indicate that the 
relationship of this text and its Platonic counterpart is complex: the two Symposia 
share stylistic devices, motifs and some underlying themes.32 However, 
Xenophon is not only replicating Plato’s dialogue but redeploying some of its 
features in innovative ways. For example, the structural similarity of the opening 
devices all' emoi dokei (Xenophon) and doko moi (Plato), covers, or perhaps 
highlights, the difference in the events which both narrators recall. Further, 
Xenophon’s use of the first-person here invests his work with an authority which 
Aristodemus’ observation does not lend to Plato’s account. Similarly, both
29 Lacey. 1971: 37.
30 Hulse, 1995: 45.
31 Bartlett, 1996b.
32 Huss, 1999a: 449-453.
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Symposia allude to the combination of spoude and paidia, but it is introduced at 
different points in the text, is given different emphases, and is developed in 
different ways.33 The same can be said of the character of the aklelos, the 
inclusion of Gorgianic elements, the beauty of Socrates, the references to Ploutus 
and Penia as gods, and the use of comparisons. If, as is generally accepted, 
Xenophon’s text as we have it is the latter of the two Symposia, I would propose 
it is not so much derived from Plato’s original as it is inspired \yy it.34
However, even this supposition is unnecessary: Xenophon’s text is 
interesting and complicated enough to warrant its examination apart from its 
Platonic counterpart. Huss identifies a number of literary influences in 
Xenophon’s text, aside from Plato’s Symposium. These include Plato’s 
Charmides, Cratylus, Phaedrus, Protagoras, and Theatetus', pseudo-Plato’s 
Alcibiades 7; Aeschines’ Aspasia, Caliias, Milliades, On Theognis, Protrepticus, 
and Teleauges-, Antisthenes’ Physiognomicus', the symposia described by Ion of 
Chios and the comic poet Plato; and, Aristophanes’ Clouds and Eupolis’ comic
33 On spoude and paidia, see this chapter, pages 167ff.
34 On the respective dating of Plato and Xenophon’s Symposia, see Guthrie, 1975: 365 n. 3, who 
summarises tlie arguments before Dover, 1965. From liistorical and textual evidence, Dover 
deduced that die Platonic Symposium was the earlier work, written in 385-379. However, 
Thesleff, 1978, challenged tliis by proposing that i) Plato and Xenophon both relied on a third, 
'original’ work, now lost, or ii) Plato used Xenophon’s version as a model for his treatise, in light 
of which Xenophon subsequently rewrote liis work to include Socrates’ monologue on erds, the 
key evidence for dating Xenophon as later. Thesleff liimself finds the latter argument more 
probable, and it was recendy accepted by Bowen, 1998. However, by tracing the literary 
influences apparent in Xenophon’s work, Huss, 1999a: 13-18, convincingly argues for a single 
composition dale during or after the 360s, once Xenophon’s exile from Athens was over. Cf. 
note 87, below, on die errors in Thesleffs argument concerning die Beauty Competition.
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plays, Aulolycus and the Flatterers. Moreover, Xenophon’s Symposium also 
interacts with his Oeconomicus and Memorabilia35 In addition, Xenophon may 
have drawn on a wider genre of Socratic Symposia, whose works are now lost.36 
The Symposium therefore interacts fully with the literary and philosophical 
culture of the fourth-century Athenian city. It is the product of a vibrant 
engagement with a variety of literary authors, conventions and genres, not a pale 
imitation of Plato’s Symposium.
This is reflected in Gray’s reading of the Symposium as a piece of 
‘wisdom literature’ designed by its author to establish Socrates as the new 
Simonides and his methods as the new wisdom.37 According to Gray, ‘it is the 
adaptation of old stories to display the new wisdom that marks his [Xenophon’s] 
contribution, and perhaps the development of these stories into a new literary 
form marked by greater dramatic and thematic unity’. By constructing his 
symposion to facilitate the ‘display of wisdom’, and thereby allowing Socrates to 
take the traditional role of wise man, Xenophon creates a genre for exploring 
frequently asked questions in a Socratic manner.38 Moreover, I contend that 
Xenophon’s Symposium not only develops in response to existing literary genres, 
but that it draws on a wider cultural discourse which views the symposion as a 
testing ground for character.
35 For references and discussion, see Huss, 1999a: 18-25. He adds (18) that tlie now lost 
Socratic dialogues of Antisthenes and Aeschines may also have influenced Xenophon.
36 See above, chapter 2, note 1.
37 Gray, 1992.
38 Gray, 1992: 74. For an analysis of tliis argument, see chapters 5 and 6, pages 228-229 and
292ff.
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In a number of fourth-century lawcourt speeches, appropriate and 
inappropriate sympotic behaviours illuminate the virtue or baseness of their 
agent. In Lysias’ first speech against the younger Alcibiades, the hybris of his 
opponent is illustrated through his behaviour at drinking parties hosted by the old 
tyrant Archedemus.39 While still a youth, the younger Alcibiades drinks, reclines 
under a blanket with his host, revels until daylight, and keeps his own hetaira. 
On these grounds, Lysias labels him ‘most disreputable’ (ponerotaios), and 
hopes the jury will agree.40 Similarly, the good and bad symposiast is drawn into 
Aeschines’ prosecution of Timarchus, where the defendant is described as an 
extravagant diner and a lover of m/Zos-girls and hetairai and his alleged pimp 
Misgolas is criticised for his love of lyre-playing boys.41 Moreover, the aulos, 
which was intimately connected with the symposion, was itself an object of 
reproach.42 The suppression of its player’s voice, as well as the voices of others, 
put it at odds with the Athenian ideal in which a citizen defined himself through 
his ability to speak.43 To be a lover of auletrides was not only a criticism of 
inappropriate or excessive sexual conduct within the symposion, but a reference
39 The authorship of Lysias 14, Againsl Alcibiades, was contested in antiquity. However, Carey. 
1989: 11-12, 147-148, summarises some of the methods used to establish its authenticity, or 
otherwise, over tlie past one hundred years, and concludes dial Lysias was the audior of the 
speech.
40 Lys. 14.25.
41 Aeschin. 1.42, 74; 1.41
42 Wilson, 1999: 85-90.
43 See Wilson, 1999: 86. We witnessed a similar process of self-definition in action in
Pausanias’ criticism of die Boeotians and Eleans, discussed in chapter 3, pages 130-135.
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to that lover’s disgraceful preference for the ‘other voice’ of the aulos over and 
above his own.44
However, the notion of correct and incorrect ways of doing the symposion 
was already in circulation in the sixth and fifth centuries. The poet(s) of the 
Theognidea suggest(s) how their listeners should behave in the company of 
friends whilst drinking, and how they might gain benefit from their symposia45 
Their poems stipulate how much wine to drink, how to conduct conversations, 
what not to say, and how to learn from the experience.46 The late sixth-/early 
fifth-century poet Xenophanes describes a version of a good symposion where 
the floor is cleaned, incense burned, and libations made. He asserts that the good 
symposiast should not drink more than he can hold, nor tell the old myths about 
strife and violence. Instead, the stories and conversations of the symposion 
should focus on arete, and as such benefit its participants and listeners 47 In 
addition, a poem by the oligarch Critias presents an idealised symposion, where 
good and bad sympotic practice are framed through an opposition between
44 Socrates similarly condemns parties where hoi phauloi ton andron come together to listen to 
tlie flute rather than talk in Pl. Prt. 347c. Cf. chapter 2, pages 75ff.
45 On Hie contested authorship of tlie Theognidea, see tlie compilation of articles edited by 
Figueira and Nagy, 1985. Cf. Dupont, 1999: 51-98, whose model for tlie ‘invention of Anacreon’ 
(if approved) might be extended to Theognis too.
46 Thgn. 509-510, 627-628, 959-962, 989-990; 295-298, 413-414; 563-566 W.
47 Xenopli. 1 W. This poem is discussed at some length by Ford, 2002: 46-58, esp. 53-58. He 
comments that traditionally Xenophanes’ prohibition on telling stories about Titans, Giants and 
battles has been interpreted as a pre-Platonic attack on poetry (46-7; for bibliographical 
references see 47, n. 5). However, Ford contextualises the poet’s prescriptions within the 
symposion, finding in it the symposion's ‘traditional concerns’ with ‘justice and graciousness in 
speech’, and an authorial assertion of wisdom.
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moderate Spartan and debased Athenian customs,48 Finally, these tensions are 
reflected in Wasps, where Bdelycleon’s attempts to educate his father in the ways 
of the symposion are placed against the debacle which the old man makes of 
them.49
Thus, Xenophon’s Symposium, and indeed Plato’s text as well, takes part 
in a long-standing literary tradition which seeks to circumscribe the sympotic 
experience, and to shape its activities for the moral benefit of participants and 
audiences alike. Xenophon’s interests in correct drinking patterns and the proper 
way to conduct conversation within the andron find their precedents here. By 
putting his concerns into a dramatic format, and drawing on the events and ideas 
found and explored in many other contemporary texts, Xenophon gives shape to 
his symposion. Xenophon’s adaptation of the sympotic form blends elements of 
contemporary literary genres and compositional techniques with traditional 
understandings of the symposion as a place where identities are created, shaped 
and revealed through good and bad sympotic practice.
With these observations I join Gray and Huss in their re-evaluation of the 
Symposium as a worthwhile object of study for cultural historians of classical 
Athens, and assert its utility as a source for ideas about and conceptions of the 
symposion. I propose that the Symposium is a unique work which draws on 
traditional literary genres, but redefines them according to contemporary interests 
and in innovative ways. Its traditional concern with good and bad sympotic 
practice is melded to Xenophon’s interest in kalokagathia, an interest which
48 Critias. 6 W.
49 Ar. V. 1175-1264; 1299-1321. On tlie symposion in Wasps, see below, pages 170-173.
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emerges strongly in Memorabilia and Oeconomicus too.50 Earlier poets and 
contemporary orators used specific types of entertainment to outline good and 
bad sympotic practice, and the good and bad character of symposiasts; but, 
Xenophon extends this analysis through the acting-out of these entertainments. 
The performances of a dancing troupe, a laughter-maker, and the conversations 
of the invited symposiasts help Xenophon fulfil his promise to show the kaloi 
kagathoi he was with when he learned that the playful and serious deeds of the 
kaloi kagathoi were worth remembering.
Xenophon’s Symposium is therefore an epideixis, a proof composed via 
display.51 When Callias invites Socrates into his andron to receive an epideixis 
of his worth (axiori), the host imitates the process by which Xenophon entices the 
reader into his Symposium with promises to show hoi kaloi kagathoi andres, 
whose deeds are axiomnemoneuta52 Unlike Theognis, Xenophanes, Critias, and 
Plato, Xenophon will not simply tell his audience how good and bad men behave 
at symposia. As the architect of this symposion, indeed its symposiarch, he will 
use the epideixeis of Callias’ andron to show them.
Making your Own Entertainment: Spoude and Paidia in the Symposion 
OBtoi psv 8rj, cn &v8peq, 'tKavol rsprcstv bflctq (paivoviaf ppsig
50 On tlie centrality of the kalos kagathos to tlie Oeconomicus, see Ambler, 1996: 103. 113-14: 
and in Memorabilia, see Tredennick and Waterfield, 1990: 59-61. Kalokagathia in these works 
will be discussed in chapter 6, below.
The term and concept of epideixis is discussed with relevant bibliography in chapter 2.
32 Xen. Smp. 1.6.1-3. Or perhaps Xenophon imitates Callias. The fluidity of the boundaries 
between the textual Symposium and tlie world of tlie symposion, considered in chapter 5, leaves 
tlie question of who imitates who open.
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8e tootcov 618’ 6ti TtoXb psX,Tlov£<; o’topeOa elvai- ook a’io%pov 
obv e’l jxrjS’ feKixeiprjoopev cwvovTeg dxpeXeiv ti f] ebtppaiveiv
‘Gentlemen, these people are clearly competent to give us pleasure;
but I know that we believe ourselves to be much better than them; 
and so is it not shameful if we do not try to benefit and cheer one 
another while we are together?’ (Xen. Smp. 3.2.2-4)
When Socrates recommends that he and his fellow symposiasts should take 
responsibility for their own entertainment, it is on the grounds that they are polu 
beltiones, much better, than the dancing girls and boys. This focus on social 
status underlies Xenophon’s characterisation of his guests, and hence informs his 
representation of their words and actions in the symposion. From the start, 
Xenophon introduces his guests as hoi kaloi kai agathoi andres, men whose 
behaviour embodies the virtue of kalokagathia which is so important to Athenian 
elite ideology.53 These kaloi kagathoi are men whose playful and serious deeds 
are axiomnemoneuta, worth remembering, and who will be the focal point for 
Xenophon’s didacticism.54
This introductory assertion elevates the playful to the same level of 
importance as the serious, and rehabilitates it as a worthwhile topic of 
gentlemanly consideration.55 Xenophon undertakes this task in deference to
53 However, it is also important to democratic ideologies too, as will be discussed chapter 6. 
below.
But turn to chapter 6 for an alternative assessment of Xenophon’s kaloi kagathoi.
55 See Bartlett, 1996b: 174.
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Socrates’ playful educational methods. As Bartlett notes, ‘Socrates’ life seems to 
have been devoted to the serious inquiry into what virtue (‘gentlemanliness’, i.e. 
kalokagathia) is, and, as a result he had neither the time nor the capacity to act 
seriously’.56 57As I will reveal, this absorption of serious investigation into play 
marks the combination of spoude and paidia in the Symposium. Socrates tries to 
lead the symposiasts towards the greatest playfulness; however, it is the deeds of 
the kaloi kagathoi which interest Xenophon and give substance to his symposion. 
The symposion's reputation as a place for paidia offers the author a suitable 
location to display the kaloi kagathoi and their playful deeds. In his 
representation of Sophocles at a symposion, Ion of Chios says of his 
contemporary, ‘he was playful in wine’ (paididdeipar' oinon)51 Elsewhere, the 
same poet offers Dionysus of the symposion a life of drinking, playing (paizeiri), 
and judicious counsel.58 Moreover, an anonymous poet of the fourth century 
places paidia and spoude side by side in the symposion 59 However, whilst the 
poet contrasts playful blather with speaking seriously in turn, Xenophon injects 
seriousness into his symposiasts’ joke-making, and inserts playfulness into the 
rounds of speaking. Although Xenophon initially elevates and rehabilitates the 
playful, he is concerned with it only in conjunction with the serious. Thus, he 
makes the symposion a place where kaloi kagathoi mix spoude with paidia, and 
where (their) serious inquisitions are subsumed into the latter.
In this respect, Xenophon’s symposion is quite different from the ideal
56 Bartlett. 1996b: 175.
57 Atli. 603f.
58 Ion Eleg. 26 W.
59 Ades. Eleg. 27 W.
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synousia of Plato’s Protagoras, where Socrates urges his companions to express 
their synousia through their own voices, but ‘without foolishness or play’ {aneu 
ton leron te kai paidiori)™ Further, Socrates condemns Agathon’s encomium, 
described by its speaker as ‘in part playful, in part serious’ {ta menpaidias, ta de 
spoudes metrias) because of its banality.60 1 For Socrates at least, the combination 
of the serious and playful does not convey any serious meaning here.62 
However, Agathon clearly strives to make his contribution to the symposion 
light-hearted and serious. He equates happy and most beautiful Eros with the 
tragic poet to describe his powers over mankind, and his companions appreciate 
the effect.63
Xenophon professes to show his reader the serious and playful deeds of the 
kaloi kagathoi. Yet, where he focuses on the symposiasts as performers (rather 
than viewers), his account is comprised mainly of their spoken words. The 
centrality of the spoken word, rather than the physical actions, of the kaloi 
kagathoi within the symposion is made explicit when Socrates suggests the 
symposiasts bring benefit and cheer to one another. The companions 
immediately assume that they will do so by making conversation.64 However, 
the conversation in Xenophon’s symposion bears little resemblance to the 
speech-making in its Platonic counterpart. Apart from Socrates’ speech on erds,
60 Pl. PrZ. 347d7-8.
61 Pl. Smp. 197e6-8; 199c5-201c9. The mixture of serious and playful elements in Plato’s 
Symposium will be visited again in chapter 5.
°2 On Socrates’ assessment of Agathon’s argument in die following bout of elenchus, see 
Mooney, 1994.
03 Pl. Srop. 195e4-197e5.
64 Xen. Smp. 3.2.5-6.
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long set pieces are avoided in favour of short speeches and quick-witted banter. 
Indeed, the proceedings at Caliias’ house bear closer resemblance to the 
symposia imagined and described in Aristophanes’ Wasps, where guests tell 
jokes, sing capping songs and make funny comparisons.65 Similarly, at the 
symposion recorded by Ion of Chios, Sophocles and his friends exchange jokes 
based on famous maxims from poetry.66 67 68All these elements make their 
appearance in Caliias’ andron.
Gera observes that in this respect, as well as its focus on spoude and paidia, 
Xenophon’s symposion reflects standard elements of the literary symposion61 
However, she does not ask why Xenophon brings his text into alliance with 
earlier sympotic representations; nor does she question the extent to which events 
at his symposion really conform to earlier models. I will argue that Xenophon 
makes use of joking and comparing, standard elements of the sympotic 
repertoire, to discuss the types of logoi suitable for his symposion and his 
symposiasts. The idea that some logoi are appropriate to the symposion whilst 
others are not is not unique to Xenophon’s Symposium. For example, Plutarch 
reports that Ion of Chios records how the conversation at a symposion attended 
by Cimon turned to the topic of the general’s exploits ‘as was fitting in drink’ 
(hoion eikos en potoi}6* Further, in Aristophanes’ Wasps, Bdelycleon presents 
learning to participate in the logoi of the symposion as an important element in 
his father’s re-education. Once he has instructed the old man in appropriate
65 Ar. V. 1175-1264: 1299-1321.
66 Ath. 603f-604b.
67 Gem, 1993: 135JBC
68 Plu. Cim. 9.2.
HOW TO BE A GOOD SYMPOSIAST 172
fashions and has taught him how to swagger, he proposes that Philocleon tell 
grand and serious stories {logos semnos) to the learned and clever men.69 *
However, when he arrives at the symposion, Philocleon does not quite get it 
right. Describing the old man’s drunken antics, the slave Xanthias remarks:
Toianra rcepwPpi^ev abiobq ev geper, 
okcotetcov &ypolKroq Kai TtpoocTi ^oyoug Xeycov 
dpaOeoraT’, obSev siKorag tco Ttpaypan.
In such ways he acted hybristically (perihubrizein) to them in turn, 
joking crudely and, moreover, speaking the most ignorant words, that 
had nothing to do with the situation. (Ar. V. 1319-21 Sommerstein)
MacDowell describes the sympotic scenes of the Wasps as ‘important evidence 
for the customs of the symposion' ™ Reading Xanthias’ comment from this 
perspective, conversation becomes a primary form of entertainment in the 
andron, and a testing ground for symposiasts. The good symposiast can talk the 
talk, participating in, and creating, an overall logos for the symposion. 
Meanwhile, the bad symposiast reveals his ignorance and reinforces his 
exclusion by what he says. However, the symposion and Philocleon’s rascally 
behaviour at it are implicated in Aristophanes’ political ambitions for his play. 
On current interpretations of these ambitions, Philocleon’s hybris might be a 
consequence of his status as an uber-symposiast who plays the games of the
69 Ar. V. 1174-5: 1195.
MacDowell, 1995: 171.
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symposion too well; or it might typify his membership of a wretched demos. 
Moreover, Philocleon’s education in sympotic habits and his bad behaviour at the 
symposion fulfil the principal criteria of Old Comedy: they are ludicrous and 
funny.71 2 Hence, Philocleon’s behaviour cannot only be regarded as a breach of 
‘correct’ protocols. However, from within these different perspectives, 
Philocleon’s spoken contributions mediate his position within (or outside of) the 
sympotic group, alongside his drinking, farting, laughing and fighting. In Wasps, 
certain styles of speech appear to emphasise the symposiast’s affinity with the 
group; others put him at risk from the charge of hybris.
Where Philocleon demonstrates his status through the kinds of speech and 
actions which are unsuitable in the symposion, Xenophon uses his guests’ 
contributions to suggest how jokes, speeches and comparisons should and should 
not be made. Xenophon’s concerns here meet explicitly with (or are framed by) 
the ambitions of his symposiasts. They ask Socrates to lead them towards the 
kind of conversation which will especially (malista) bring benefit and cheer to
71 For Philocleon as an iiber-symposiast, see Konstan, 1995: 26. Konstan maintains tliat the aim 
of the symposion-scene is to spoof the antics of Cleon and liis associates mid to reveal tliat, 
though rich and powerful, they are far from gentlemen. Philocleon, whom he also argues is really 
a well-off member of Athenian society, is a symbol of tlieir pretensions, an tfZier-symposiast, and 
a tool in tlie class conflict which Wasps portrays. Olson, 1996, challenges Konstan’s evaluation 
of Philocleon, reasserting liis identity as a low-status member of tlie demos. As such, 
Philocleon’s hybris exemplifies tlie masses’ inability to improve themselves and informs tlie 
viewing audience tliat they must find new masters who can benefit and control them (143-150).
See Hubbard, 1991: 134-135. Hubbard also links Philocleon’s mischief-making to 
Aristophanes’ self-identification with liis son; both Aristophanes and Bdelycleon are 
unsuccessful in tlieir attempts to tame tlie ‘“Cleon-loving” public’ (223).
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themselves.73 *Further, they contribute to Xenophon’s assertion that the serious 
and playful deeds of the kaloi kagathoi are worth remembering. Playful 
conversations provoke the symposiasts towards contemplating serious issues 
related to kalokagathia. Moreover, like the speech-making in Plato’s 
Symposium, their conversations allow the symposiasts to engage in competition 
with one another against a backdrop of communality. Both processes provide 
lessons for Xenophon’s reader; these are what make the symposiasts’ deeds
axiomrtemoneuta.
Making Jokes
The jokes made by Xenophon’s symposiasts are innovative and spontaneous. 
They emerge naturally from the flow of conversation, and are absorbed just as 
easily into it. In this respect, they differ from the jokes of the gelotopoios. In the 
first instance, Philippus introduces himself to the audience with a joke derived 
from Aristophanes’ Frogs™ In addition, as I will shortly discuss, his most 
successful gags disrupt the conversation of the symposion. He specialises in 
visual gags which centre on his body; these reinforce his low status and distance 
him from the sympotic group. Moreover, Philippus’ jokes provoke laughter (he 
is, after all, a gelotopoios'}, while the symposiasts’ do not. The significance of 
this will be investigated fiilly in chapter 5; however, for now it should be 
observed that the success of the jokes made by invited guests is marked by the
73 Xen. Smp. 3.2.6. On tlie symposiasts’ concerns with what is fitting to tlie symposion. see 
chapter 5, 227-9
Xen. Smp. 1.11.6-12.1; 1.12.5-6. Cf. Bowen, 1998: 92. Indeed, at the beginning of Frogs (1­
31), Aristophanes plays on ‘burdened by nothing’ as a typical poor-quality joke. On Philippus’ 
introductory jokes, seepages 197ff below.
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tacit acceptance of the listening audience. These differences emphasise the 
different roles given to the various members of the symposion, and the different 
functions of their jokes. The gelotopoios' jokes highlight his lowly status as a 
gelotopoios, while the jokes of the symposiasts assert their communality and 
provide an opportunity to explore the serious business of (learning) kalokagathia.
The joke-making which accompanies the first acrobatic performances of 
the dancing troupe demonstrates this well. When the dancing girl juggles with 
hoops, Socrates remarks that on the basis of her performance, it would be wrong 
to say women were different from men, aside from their poor skills of reasoning 
and their strength. Like Ischomachus in the Oeconomicus, Socrates tells his 
audience that they should instinct their wives in whatever they see fit.75 
Antisthenes responds:
TTobg ouv, ecprj, do 2coKpaTeg, oCtco yiyvcooKcov ob Kai ob
7tai8ebetg Sav0t7t7iTiv, dXXd ypij yuvaixl tcov obocov, oigat 8b
Kai tcov yeyevrigevcov Kai tcov eoogevcov xaX87rcoTaTB;
"On, bcpp, open xal Toug 'utTtiKoug pooXogevoog yeveobat ob Toug 
eb7ret0eoTdToug dAAa Toug 0ugoei8etg Ijraoug KTcogevoug. 
vogi^oooi yap, dv Toug TotouTOog SbvcovTat KaTeypiv, paSicog 
wig ye dXXotg 't7t7iotg %pfjoeo0ai. Kdycd 8ij PouXogevog 
dv0pd)7coig ypf|o0ai Kai bgtXe'iv TabTrjv KeKTggat, eb e’tScbg 6ti 
e’t TabTpv brcotoco, paSlcog wig ye d?vXoig dTtaotv dvOpamotg 
ouveoogat.
75 Xen. Smp. 2.9.1-5. Xen. Oec. 7.5ff: for one possible explanation of tlie ambiguities of tliis
teaching, see below, chapter 6, pages 252-3.
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‘If that is your view, Socrates, how come you don’t teach Xanthippe, 
instead having as your wife the most difficult woman I believe to 
have been born, and yet to come?’
‘Because I see that those wishing to be horsemen do not buy the most 
obedient horses but the most high-spirited. For they believe that if 
they are able to restrain such horses they might easily manage the 
rest. Wishing to consult and associate with men, I have acquired this 
wife, knowing well that if I can put up with her, I will mix easily 
with all other men.’ (Xen. Smp. 2.10.1-10)
Antisthenes mocks the philosopher’s advice by pointing out his failure to educate 
his wife Xanthippe, playing with her reputation as the most awkward woman in 
the world. This challenge requires a quick response. Instead of taking offence at 
Antisthenes’ joke, Socrates builds on it. He makes fun of his wife, comparing 
her to an unbridled horse and declaring that association with her teaches him how 
to mix easily with all others.
This verbal sparring exemplifies Xenophon’s ambitions for spoude and 
paidia. Socrates’ serious comments are quickly subsumed into playful joking. 
However, a serious vein continues to run below the surface. Antisthenes’ 
challenge and Socrates’ response put the philosopher’s original teaching to 
question. Socrates begins by saying men can instruct women because women are 
only inferior in strength and reason, but ends by declaring that his wife teaches 
him. Socrates learns an important aspect of kalokagathia, namely the ability to 
be with (suneinai) other men and be useful to them, from a woman. Xenophon 
takes advantage of the playful spirit of these comments to raise questions not
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only about whether a kalos kagathos can educate his wife, but about how 
kalokagathia should be learned.
In this quick burst of joking, Antisthenes tests Socrates as a philosopher 
and as a symposiast. As the latter, Socrates proves himself capable of meeting 
the challenge: his answer draws agreement and approval from the other guests, 
conveyed by the authorial voice of Xenophon.76 With everyone settled in 
harmony, the conversation of the symposion can flow on. However, as a 
philosopher his ideas are still at issue. The Symposium's reader is invited to 
think about the topics raised, and the symposion as a place for the discussion of 
these topics through particular spoken forms.
However, the sparring between Antisthenes and Socrates is not finished. 
After watching the stunt girl dive through swords, Socrates calls his companion 
to witness the girl’s bravery as proof of his assertion on the teachability of 
women. Rather than challenge Socrates on the matter again, Antisthenes accepts 
his point, and asks if it would not be better for the Syracusan to display his 
dancing girl to the city and thereby teach the Athenians courage to dance among 
the spears.77 This time, the joke is a political one. Antisthenes uses the 
immediate apparatus of the symposion to focus the attention of the gathered kaloi 
kagathoi on the world outside. However, his abuse of the Athenian demos also 
draws their attention inward to their shared sympathies and superior status: they 
do not need to pay a dancing master to teach them andreia from a dancing girl. 
Thus, Antisthenes consolidates the drinking group and ends his quarrel with 
Socrates with a joke which will be appreciated by all. However, at this point
76 Xen. Smp. 2.10.10-11.
77 Xen. Snip. 2.13.2-4.
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Philippus, acting more like a symposiast than a gelotopoios, jumps in to cap 
Antisthenes’ joke with one of his own. He would gladly see the demagogue 
Pisander tumbling amongst knives because at the moment he is afraid to face 
enemy spears, and so does not go campaigning.78 Philippus continues 
Antisthenes’ visual adaptation of the sympotic entertainment currently provided 
by the dancing girl and his theme of cowardice and reiterates them in relation to 
one particular demagogue.
Philippus’ joke acts like a capping song (skolion), an element of sympotic 
entertainment which is not explicitly found at Callias’ drinking party. It picks up 
and extends the themes of the previous joke with the aim of improving on it. As 
Stehle notes, the capping songs found in lyric poetry and Aristophanes’ Wasps 
act as a spur to communal activity, uniting the group in a round of singing, but 
also testing each symposiast’s ability to compete.79 This capping joke and the 
series of dancing jokes which follows incorporate these communal and 
competitive elements.
The final round of joking in this episode is initiated by Socrates, who says 
that he would like to be taught some dance-steps by the Syracusan. When 
Callias asks him why, the philosopher replies:
’ Op/rpogat vrj Ala. fevrauOa 8f| byeX-aoav dKavreg.
Kai 6 ZcoKparrig pd?ca fearcouSaKOTi t© %poo©7t©, Te^dre, ixprj,
§7i’ epoi; Korepov btl tout© e’t PouXopat yupva^6pevog gaAAov 
bytalvetv ij e’t f)8iov eoGietv Kai KaOebSetv ij e’t toiout©v 
yugvaol©v eTttOug©, pij dtarcep o't 5o^t%o8popot Td okeXti pev
78 Xen. Smp. 2.14.1 -4.
Stehle, 1997: 221-222.
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7ia%6vovTai, Toug cbpoug 8e X,exTbvovTai, prj8’ ©orcep 61 rcbKTai 
robg psv cbpoug 7ia%bvovTat, Ta 8e gksXt] XsiCTUvovTai, &XXa 
TtavTi Siaxovcov t© o©paTt rcav ’icopporcov xoieiv; rj 87i’ 
fexetv© yeXare, 6ti ob Serpei (is ooyyupvaoTfjv ^pTciv, ob8’ fev 
6/Z© TipeoPbiriv ovra (broSbeoQai, dpKsaei jioi olxog 
fejtTaKXivog, cbcsTrep Kai vuv t©8c t© 7iai8l ijpKsoe to88 to 
oiKrijia evi8p©oai, Kai %8ip©vog jiev ev OTeyr) yupvaoopai, 
oxav 8e dyav Kaujia fj, ev OKia; f] ToSe yeXaTe, e’l gei£© too 
Kaipou rf|v yaoTSpa e/©v psTpi©Tspav PouX,opai 7ioif}oai 
abTrjv; fj obK iots 6ti evay%og e©0sv XapplSqg obrool 
KaieXape (is dp^ougevov;
‘I’ll dance, by Zeus’. And then everybody laughed. And Socrates 
pulled a very serious face, and said, ‘Why are you laughing at me? Is 
it because I wish to become healthy by exercising rather than eat and 
sleep in comfort, or because I eagerly desire to do these exercises, not 
like long-distance runners who thicken their legs but thin their 
shoulders, nor like boxers who thicken their shoulders but thin their 
legs, but to work my whole body to make it completely balanced? Or 
do you laugh because I won’t have to seek a training partner nor strip 
off in the crowd at my age, but the seven-couch room will be enough 
for me, just as now this room is fine for this serving boy to get up a 
sweat in? In winter I can exercise indoors, but when the heat is too 
much, I will exercise in the shade. Or do you laugh at me because I 
have a large stomach for my age and I wish to make it more modest? 
And don’t you know that just lately at dawn Charmides here caught
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me dancing?’ (Xen. Smp. 2.17.1-19.3)
Socrates’ serious face belies the hilarity of the image he conjures up, mixing him 
up with the acrobatic troupe which currently entertains the symposiasts and with 
well-toned athletes at the pcilciistrcr. he will not have to exercise in the gymnasion 
because he’ll be able to dance in the andron, at the symposion, just like the 
beautiful young dancing boy does now. Given Socrates’ large belly and 
renowned ugliness, this proposal is visually ridiculous. Socrates mocks himself 
in order to make his companions laugh. Charmides, who finds himself roped 
into Socrates’ joke, is compelled to add the image of himself dancing.80 
Philippus then extends the humour by offering a comparison of Charmides, 
saying that he believes Charmides would not be punished by the market inspector 
if his legs were weighed out against the upper half of his body.81
As with Socrates’ eikasmoi, Philippus’ comparison of Charmides is based 
on visual analogy. Far from being offensive, the gelotopoios gently mocks 
Charmides for already having the kind of balanced body Socrates says that he is 
desperate to achieve. Following this joke, Caliias offers to join in dancing 
lessons too.82 However, his offer is quickly capped by Philippus, who actually 
starts to dance, imitating the young dancers to whom Socrates earlier compared
himself.
The humour of the dancing episode therefore works to bring the group 
together in a series of verbal and performative jokes which begin by making fun
80 Xen. Swp. 2.19.5-9.
81 Xen. Snip. 2.20.1-4.
82 Xen. Smp. 2.20.1-4.
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of Socrates, but slowly extend to include several of the group’s other members. 
As the mockery comes from within the group, it causes no offence to the 
participants, who appreciate the ludicrousness of kaloi kagathoi prancing around 
like dancing boys. Again elements of competition can be seen in the desire of 
participants to cap the previous joke. However, by mocking themselves at the 
same time the symposiasts’ competition remains friendly; it loosens up the 
atmosphere and contributes to the paidia of the symposion. In the Agesilaus, the 
Spartan king’s ability to take pleasure in paidikoi logoi, ‘playful speaking’, with 
his friends characterised his euchari, ‘agreeability’, and his sympathetic 
relationship with his friends.83 Moreover, in the Symposium, it generates an 
atmosphere in which kalokagathia, and the learning of it, can be discussed. The 
playful and serious aspects of joke-making indicate to Xenophon’s reader how he 
could behave in a symposion which gains its shape and definition through its 
discussion of kalokagathia. Moreover, the reader participates directly in this 
discussion, learning how to be kalos kagathos whilst the symposiasts explore this
virtue.
Eikasmoi
In Aristophanes’ Wasps, Philocleon finds himself participating in a bout 
of comparing with one of his fellow guests. When Lysistratus compares 
(eikazein) him to a new wine or a donkey because of his exuberance, Philocleon 
responds with a comparison based on Lysistratus’ poverty.84 Thus, the 
comparisons made in that symposion take the form of verbal reconfigurations of
83 Xen. Ages. 8.1-2.
84 Ar. V. 1308-1311.
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their creator’s observations regarding their subjects’ physical appearance or 
renowned status. Although comparing figures prominently in Xenophon’s 
Symposium, it only once conforms to this type, when Philippus compares 
Charmides’ limbs to loaves of bread.85 While Xenophon’s comparisons also 
build on visual analogies, these are built up over time. Moreover, Socrates and 
Philippus undertake most of the comparing; thus, the philosopher and 
gelotopoios are drawn into comparison with one another.
As discussed above, the first comparison of the evening is initiated by 
Socrates in his asserted desire to dance. Philippus then follows this with the 
bread analogy for Charmides’ limbs, and later with a physical performance. 
Aiming to cap the sequence of dancing jokes, Philippus stretches the visual 
imagery of comparison into physical reality. Taking to the floor, he imitates the 
movements of the dancing boy and girl, contorts himself into the shape of a 
hoop, and proceeds to dance like a mad man until thoroughly exhausted.86 
Through this mimesis, the gelotopoios elicits a visual comparison between his 
own mature body, and the beautiful young bodies of the dancers. Moreover, he 
extends Socrates’ original comparison to make real the spectre of a ‘dancing 
Socrates’. The comparison therefore works in three directions, establishing 
correspondences between Philippus and the dancing troupe, between Philippus 
and Socrates/Charmides, and hence between Socrates/Charmides and the dancing 
troupe. As I will investigate further in my discussion of the gelotopoios below, 
this three-way comparison raises issues for the self-perception of the viewing 
symposiast: in Philippus’ exuberant performance, the kalos kagathos sees the
85 Xen. Smp. 2.20.1-4
86 Xen. Snip. 2.21-3.
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derisible proposal of a dancing symposiast turned into a living spectacle. 
Philippus’ performance asks the symposiasts to consider the limits of behaviour 
set for the kalos kagathos and warns them of the dangers of exceeding these
bounds.
The next set of comparisons raises similar questions. In his ‘beauty 
competition’ with Critoboulos, Socrates sets up his own body in stark contrast to 
that of his opponent. While it is possible that the beauty competition was a 
common element of sympotic proceedings, the voice-over which accompanies 
Socrates’ display makes this pageant unique.87 In this event the visual and verbal 
combine to create an event which displays the beautiful (to kalon) in order to test
and redefine it.
87 Thesleff 1978: 166 asserts tliat the beauty competition was an established feature of tlie 
symposion. However, the competition in Xenophon’s Symposium bears no resemblance to tlie 
euandria, euexia and kallisteion, tlie beauty competitions of fourth- and tliird-century Greece 
investigated by Crowtlier, 1985. Nor is it similar to the competition in Plato’s Symposion, as 
Thesleff supposes. He remarks ‘Plato has employed it [tlie beauty contest motif) with more 
refinement than Xenophon, making it essentially a contest of wisdom, dividing it into different 
stages, and having it judged not by the guests, but by Dionysus, who acts tlirough Alcibiades' . 
However, tliis conclusion is based on three invalid assumptions. Firstly, Thesleff assumes that 
tlie speeches of Agathon and Socrates can be separated from those of the other symposiasts into a 
competition of wisdom, when, as chapter 2 has shown, all tlie symposiasts display themselves 
equally tlirough tlieir encomia of erds. Secondly, he puzzlingly equates Agathon’s contribution 
with a beauty contest on tlie grounds tliat Agathon talks about beauty. And thirdly, he suggests 
Alcibiades crowns Agathon’s head as a mark of victoiy in a competition he has surely lost. 
Therefore, Thesleff s conclusion that Xenophon’s text must have priority over its Platonic 
counterpart on the grounds tliat Plato improves on Xenophon’s beauty competition cannot stand.
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Socrates begins the beauty competition against Critoboulos with a typical 
piece of Socratic elenchus, leading the latter to concede that something is 
beautiful if it serves the purpose for which it is used.88 He then attempts to prove 
that his face and body are more beautiful than his opponent’s because they are 
better fitted to their purpose. To do so he draws repeated comparisons between 
his own features and those of Critoboulos, animals, satyrs, and immortals. 
Socrates initiates the first comparison between the two competitors’ eyes, 
alleging that his are more beautiful, or better suited to seeing, because they stand 
out from his head.89 Critoboulos follows this up by asking if the crab is therefore 
the animal best equipped for seeing.90 This mention of a crab immediately draws 
the attention of the listener, viewer or reader to the crab-like properties of 
Socrates’ eyes, a comparison which the philosopher affirms. Secondly, Socrates 
uses an explicitly comparative formula to complain about Critoboulos’ 
description of his mouth:
"EotKa, §(pq, by© Kara tov oov Zoyov Kai tcov 6v©v a’to/iov to 
oropa £%eiv. bKEtvo 8e obSev T£Kpf|ptov X,oyl^q cbq by© oou 
KaXXicov e’lpl, 6ti xal NaiSeq Oeol oboai wug ^eiXqvobc; bpol 
dpoiOTsponq tIktouoiv q ool;
He said, ‘By your argument I apparently have a mouth more ugly 
even than a donkey. But do you not count this as proof that I am 
more beautiful {kalos} than you, that the Naiads, who are gods, give
88 Xen. Smp. 5.4.4ff
89 Xen. S’wp.5.5.1-7
9U Xen. Smp. 5.5.S-9.
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birth to Siienoi who are more similar (homoioteros) to me than to 
you?’ (Xen. Smp. 5.7.5-8)
Socrates’ comparison draws the philosopher into the suitably sympotic 
Dionysian world of immortal nymphs, donkeys and satyrs, and builds on 
Critoboulos’ earlier assertion that if he were uglier than the philosopher then he 
would be uglier than all the Siienoi in satyr plays.91 Throughout the beauty 
competition, Socrates aligns himself with the animal, immortal and supra-human 
realms, comparing his ‘useful’ and famously ‘satyric’ features with the 
traditionally beautiful, human features of Critoboulos.
The eikasmoi of this beauty contest visualise the comparative process that 
lies at the heart of any competition. However, they are particularly pertinent to 
the sympotic competition, because, like the comparisons of Philippus before, 
they put the body of the kalos kagathos at issue. In Philippus’ comparison of the 
hired acrobats, the gathered kaloi kagathoi are invited to view the boundaries of 
their own possible behaviours through Philippus’ moulding of the male body into 
extreme and ridiculous forms. Similarly, Socrates uses his own body, and 
comparatively that of the physically desirable Critoboulos, to reassess to kalon. 
The philosopher’s ugliness made his body particularly apt for this task. ‘The 
deliberate visualisation of ugliness [in the artistic and literary portrayal of 
Socrates satyros] represented ... a clash with the standards of kalokagathia. That 
is, a portrait like this questioned one of the fundamental values of the Classical 
polis'92 Huss further remarks, ‘Der scherzhaft dycov K<xX?tou<;, den Socrates
91 Xen. Smp- 4.19.3-4.
92 Zanker, 1995: 38.
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verliert, zeigt ...auf, dafi die wahre KaA.oKdya0ia nichts mil korplicher 
AuBerlichkeiten zu tun hat’.93 But more importantly, Socrates attempts, for the 
second time in the evening, to de-eroticise the symposion. Critoboulos has only 
just described how desirable his companions find him.94 By directing the 
symposiasts’ attentions towards the body of Critoboulos, and describing his 
physical features, Socrates both highlights his opponent’s beauty, and challenges 
it. Socrates’ reinscription of beauty as ‘being fit for use’ aims to dispel his 
audience’s erotic desires, and hence, to steer them away from the dangers of
immoderation and slavishness.
With more than a touch of paidia, Socrates provokes the symposiasts 
towards serious contemplation of their identities. If Socrates is like a satyr, and 
Socrates is kalos, are Silenoi kaloi? If so, is the kalos kagathos satyric? These 
questions again push the symposiasts to explore the boundaries of kalokagathia 
without involving them in behaviour which would ultimately negate their status.
The final comparison of the symposion arises from the Syracusan’s 
insults towards Socrates. These lead Antisthenes to call upon Philippus to 
perform an eikasmos of the offending man:
psvToi Seivoq ei, <S chtXiKTce, eiKd^etv ob §oksi 001 6 dvqp 
obrog XoibopetoOai pouXogev© soiksvou;
93 Huss. 1999a: 319.
Xen. Smp. 4.10.3-11.1.
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‘Philippus, you are clever at comparing: does this man not seem to 
you to be like (eoikenaf) someone trying to be insulting?’ (Xen.
Smp. 6.8.3-5)
Antisthenes uses his own mini-comparison of the Syracusan as someone wishing 
to be insulting in the hope of sparking off an eikasmos by the gelotopoios. 
However, before Philippus can do it, Socrates intervenes, warning him that if he 
makes a comparison, he will seem like someone trying to be insulting, just like 
the Syracusan.95 The laughter-maker protests that if he makes a comparison of 
the kaloi kagathoi, he himself might be compared to someone who praises rather 
than abuses.96 97Philippus thinks that by comparing the Syracusan to the other 
symposiasts, who are parties kaloi kai hoi bellistoi, he will be complimenting the 
latter. However, Socrates disagrees: the mere act of performing such a 
comparison will be insulting and prove Philippus to be loidoroumenos91 Like 
Philocleon in Wasps, Philippus runs the risk of over-stepping the mark with his 
comparisons.98 Socrates puts an end to the gelotopoios’ complaining with the 
order that if it is not necessary for him to speak then he should remain silent.99
Thus, the act of comparing is brought into disrepute by a series of 
threatened eikasmoi. By making comparisons of the Syracusan, the gelotopoios 
runs the risk of being compared to him. However, as Philippus finally asserts, 
making comparisons is his job: if he cannot make comparisons he must be quiet,
95 Xen. Stop. 6.9.1-2.
96 Xen. Smp. 6.9.3-5.
97 Xen. Smp. 6.9.6-7. On loidoria chapter 5, 223-224, below.
98 Ar. V. 1318ff.
99 Xen. Stop. 6.10.7-8.
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and if he must be quiet how can he make the symposiasts laugh?100 Socrates 
remains unmoved.
In short, the comparison of one symposiast by another drew the two men 
into a brief relational bond, the nature of which depended on the content and 
success of the eikasmos. Similarly, renegotiation took place between the author 
of the comparison and the group. Whilst a clever comparison brought an element 
of humour into the proceedings, it also certified the communal value of its 
author. Conversely, an insulting comparison might negatively affect the standing 
of the man who compares and the object of his comparison. Thus, an eikasmos 
which took an insult too far, into the realm of loidoria, would bring its speaker 
into opposition with the whole group, and threaten the harmony of the 
symposion. Socrates tries to enforce an etiquette which will keep the 
entertainment of the symposion entertaining. However, while the gelotopoios' 
comparisons embody the dangers inherent in kalokagathia and run the risk of 
disrupting the sympotic group, Socrates’ comparisons have no such effect. The 
eikasmoi of the beauty competition urge its viewers towards a less dangerous 
conception of to kalon. Beauty without erds avoids the hazards of slavishness
and immoderation which Socrates warns of when Critoboulos recounts his desire
for Cleinias. Thus, although Socrates and Philippus both make comparisons, the 
philosopher is not identical to the gelotopoios,101 Socrates’ eikasmoi bring 
balance and stability to the group, whilst Philippus’ comparisons threaten to 
disrupt it.
100 Xen. 6.10.5-6.
101 See farther tlie discussion on Socrates gelotopoios in chapter 5, below.
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Beauty and Desire
While the beauty competition between Socrates and Critoboulos combines 
serious and playful elements, it also plugs into the eroticism which underlies the 
entertainments of Xenophon’s symposion. Indeed, the sympotic action is framed 
by two erotically charged performances. It begins with the spectacle of 
Autolycus’ beauty, and it ends with a sexy pantomime of the wedding of Ariadne 
and Dionysus.102 Beauty and sexual desire pervade other entertainments too. 
The youthful bloom and music of the dancing troupe cause Charmides’ thoughts 
to turn to Aphrodite.103 104In the round of speaking Critoboulos praises his own 
beauty and describes the desire which the beauty of others arouses within him. 
And while Socrates seeks to de-eroticise to kalon through the beauty competition 
with Critoboulos, his hopes are thwarted when the young girl and boy reward the 
victorious and beautiful Critoboulos with a kiss. Finally, Socrates’ speech on
erds recognises and draws attention to the presence of the god in the
• 104symposion.
With his every appearance, the young boy Autolycus is connected 
intimately with desire. He is introduced as the young pankratic victor who is 
currently being courted by Callias, and when he is coaxed into revealing the 
source of his pride in the round of speaking, his contribution brings pleasure 
(hede,sthai) to his fellow symposiasts.105 However, it is his first appearance in 
Callias’ andron which allows Xenophon to unpack the sexual connotations of his
102 On tlie dancers’ final performance as a form of pantomime, see Garelli-Frangois, 2002: 
182ff; Andrisano, 2003: 297-298.
103 Xen. Stop. 3.1.3-5.
104 Xen. Smp. 8.1.3-2.1.
105 Xen. Snip. 1.2.2-4; 3.13.1.
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physical prowess at the gymnasion, and demonstrate why his words later bring 
the symposiasts such joy. When the symposiasts are washed and oiled and have 
lain down, their attention is drawn immediately to the young boy sitting beside 
his father. According to Xenophon, his modesty, self-control and kingly beauty 
(hallos) drew everyone’s eyes towards him, like a beacon in the night, and 
moved their souls.106
With this description, Xenophon transforms Autolycus from just one of 
many guests at the symposion into the evening’s first spectacle. Through his 
beauty, Autolycus comes to embody aidds, and sophrosyne, and becomes the 
focus of the adult male symposiast’s gaze. The metaphor of light, and the 
attention paid to the effect on the symposiasts’ eyes emphasise the physical 
efficacy of Autolycus’ beauty and its reception by the audience as a visual 
delight. Caliias had earlier told Socrates that his presence would make his party 
glamorous or brilliant (lampros), but it is Autolycus who seems to glow.107 The 
effect of his beauty on the symposiasts is overwhelming: some become silent, 
whilst others react with gestures (schematizesthai).™ The spectacle of 
Autolycus’ beauty evokes a reaction in his viewers, so that they become part of 
the performance of beauty and desire.
As Xenophon goes on to explain,
7tdvTSf; pev obv o't ek Gecov tou KaTE/opsvoi d^ioGcaTOt 
SoKoucsiv slvav dXX’ o'l psv §£, dXAcov ftpd<; to yopyoTEpol te 
dpaaGai Kai cpoPspcoTspov (pG&yyEoGai Kai o(po§poTEpoi slvar
106 Xen. Smp. 1.8.3-9.5.
107 Xen. Smp. 1.4.3.
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(pspoviai, oi S’ biro tou ocotppovog spcoToq bvGeoi id Te dpjiaTa 
(piXocppoveoTepcog exooat Kai Tftv (pcovriv TipaoTepav Ttoiouvrai 
Kai Ta oxftftaTa feA,eo0epic6Tepov dyooaiv. & Srj Kai
KaXAAag tote Sta tov epcoTa tep&ttcov d^ioOeaTog f|V Toig 
TeTe^eojxevoig toutco to 0eo.
All who are possessed by some god seem to be worth seeing 
(axiotheatoi)', yet those who are possessed by other gods tend to look 
more gorgonesque, to sound more fearful, and to be more violent, 
while those inspired by sober Eros hold their eyes affectionately and 
make their voice more gentle, and they hold their demeanour (ta 
schemata) more freely. So Callias then, influenced by erds, was 
worth seeing (axiotheatos) for the initiates of that god. (Xen. Smp. 
1,10.1-9)
Callias shifts the axis of viewing so that this description now applies to him. 
Under the influence of erds, Callias becomes a worthy object for his 
companions’ gaze. However, as all eyes are currently on Autolycus, Xenophon’s 
reader is the only one to witness this performance. By watching Callias watch 
Autolycus, the reader perceives the positive effects of desiring in a sober fashion, 
and learns the more appropriate, or freer, way to react to beauty in the 
symposion. Moreover, he learns how the symposiast must compose his gestures 
(schemata) to become axiotheatos. As Sonin’s study of body politics proposes, 
‘the oxfjpa, which includes both physical features and bodily motion, and yet,
108 Xen. Smp. 1.9.5-6.
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being more than the sum of physical parts, reflects also a person’s total being. 
The o%rjp.a is used as a communicative vehicle through which authors can shape 
character types ... attributed with identifiable virtues’.109 The viewer of beauty 
conveys his own status by composing his body in response to it in particular 
ways; he in turn becomes a spectacle for his viewer’s gaze. In the interaction 
between performance and spectator, Callias uses his body to assert his identity as
a sober lover. Hence, he becomes a sober lover, and someone who is worth 
seeing.110
This episode also ties into Critoboulos’ later confession of his desire for 
the beautiful young Cleinias. Here, erotic passions put the status of the kalos 
kagathos at risk. Critoboulos states that he would rather be poor than rich, and 
slavish than free, if Cleinias were his master; moreover, he would rather be blind 
to the whole world than never see Cleinias.111 Just as the symposiasts are 
aroused by Autolycus, and then by the sight of beautiful young dancers, 
Critoboulos’ desire arises upon seeing his beloved in the flesh. The act of 
looking at Cleinias’ beauty endangers his status as a free member of Athens’ elite 
as much as the kisses to which Socrates later attributes his pupils’ madness.112 
However, Critoboulos’ response to the beauty of his beloved heightens this risk. 
In his stone-like silence Critoboulos is like the symposiasts who react to 
Autolycus’ behaviour in the wrong way.113
109 Sonin. 1999: 232.
110 Note tliat Socrates also directs tlie symposiasts’ gaze towards Hennogenes, who displays his 
love of kalokagathia in a similar manner to Callias: Xen. Smp. 8.3.4-6.
111 Xen. Smp. 4.12-14. These passages will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6, below.
112 Xen. Smp. 25-6.
113 Xen. Smp. 4.24.3-25.3.
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The symposion's opening entertainment therefore offers an ideal model of 
viewing and performance, which at the same time discloses how the good 
symposiast responds to beauty. The good theates (spectator) will react with 
moderation, and hence become an object for the gaze of other men. Further, 
through the performances of Autolycus and Caliias, Xenophon attempts a 
redefinition of beauty which anticipates Socrates’ later efforts in the beauty 
competition. Beauty is not purely a matter of physical appearance, but is imbued 
with a kingly, self-controlled and modest nature. Moreover, viewing beautiful 
objects and being enthused with erotic desire need not cause the symposiast to 
lose all sense of modesty and decorum.
Xenophon uses erotic behaviour as a touchstone for Caliias’ status as a 
man who is axiotheatos and to highlight the dangers of unchecked desire, as 
embodied in the figure of Critoboulos. He thereby ties his text into wider 
discourses on erds in sympotic literature and in democratic Athens. As discussed 
in chapter 3, Pausanias uses his speech to pin-point his place within the myriad 
of erotic possibilities available in the Athenian city, and within the present 
company. Caliias’ bodily performance similarly finds a position for the 
symposiast in relation to Eros and the object of his desire, and in relation to his 
fellow symposiasts too. Unlike Pausanias, however, Caliias becomes 
axiotheatos^ his viewer (Xenophon’s reader) must now position himself and react 
according to what he sees. In doing so, he too can act out and affirm his 
identity.114
114 See also pseudo-Demosthenes’ Erotic Essay 51.7, where the speaker appears to put his own 
status at issue by offering praise and advice to tlie object of his affections. He implies tliat tlie 
quality of advice he gives to liis beloved will reflect liis character, proving that he is either
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Outside Entertainment
The performances by which Xenophon’s symposiasts entertain one another are 
interspersed with paidia and spoude, to kalon and erds, and paideia and 
kalokagathia. Playful discussions, jokes and comparisons make serious points 
and beauty and desire are explored. Furthermore, the symposiasts not only 
discuss elements of kalokagathia to the elucidation of their companions; by 
combining the serious and the playful, and interacting with beauty and desire 
they provide serious lessons on how hoi kaloi kagathoi andres should behave. 
Yet, this self-stimulated entertainment is only one aspect of the symposiast’s 
experiences. In this section I turn to discuss in greater detail the performances of 
the laughter-maker and the Syracusan’s troupe in order to evaluate their place in 
Xenophon’s sympotic discourse.
Philippus the ‘Laughter-Maker’
d>iXi7i7co<; 8’ 6 yeZ©TO7cot6(; ]<pouoa<; ttjv Gupav sItcs tg> 
b7iaKo6oavTi e’loayyeiXai ootk; te sip xal 5t’ 6 ti KaTaysoGat 
pouXotTO, ouvsoKEuaopEvog te 7tapsivai §(pp rcavTa Ta ETtiTijSEta 
c5ot£ Seikveiv TdXXdTpta, xal tov 7taiSa Se &cprj Ttdvu KtE^soGat 
Sid te to (pspEiv prjSsv xal Sia to dvapiarov clvai.
ignorant and incontinent or lives a pure and moderate life. In tliat composition, talking about 
one’s beloved, and undertaking a paideutic role towards him are configured as another platform 
on which die lover constructs liis identity as a good man and an erastes.
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Philippus the laughter-maker (gelotopoios} knocked at the door and 
told the man who answered to announce who he was and why he 
wished to enter; he said he had arrived prepared with everything 
necessary to dine at another’s expense, and he added that his slave 
was quite crushed by having nothing to carry, and from lack of 
breakfast. (Xen. Smp. 1.11.2-2.1)
"On psv ysXcqto7ioi6<; eigr tors xavTcg- qKco 8s xpoOupax; 
voptoag ysXoioTSpov stvat to dx^qrov q to KSKXqpsvov feXGelv
S7tl TO SsiTCVOV.
That I am a laughter-maker (gelotopoios} you all know. I come in
the firm conviction that it is funnier to come to dinner as an uninvited
rather than invited guest. (Xen. Smp. 1.13.2-4)
The gelotopoios was a familiar figure in classical Greece. Athenaeus recalls a 
fourth-century fragment of Aristoxenus which mentions Eudicus the gelotopoios, 
a talented imitator of athletes and boxers; and, Xenophon brings in a company of 
laughter-makers to entertain the Odrysian prince Seuthes in his Anabasis.n5 
However, Xenophon’s Symposium advances the only extensive portrait of a 
gelotopoios in action, making jokes, clowning around, imitating and doing 
comparisons of other members of the symposion. Yet, Philippus’ double 
introduction places the gelotopoios firmly within a literary framework. His witty 
banter with Callias’ doorman, his lack of invitation, and his desire to exchange
115 Ath. 19f; Xen. An. 7.3.33.
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laughter for food link the gelotopoios with three literary tropes: the parasite 
{parasilos'), the flatterer (kolax), and the uninvited guest (akletos). As Wilkins 
notes, the parasite commonly appeared in Middle and New Comedy and was 
linked intimately to the figure of the flatterer.116 Both were characterised by their 
unsolicited presence at dinner parties, and their performance of witty remarks, 
games and self-abasement in return for dinner. However, the akletos is found 
further back in time, in the art and poetry of the archaic period.117 Odysseus 
enters his home a stranger, uninvited to the party which will lead eventually to 
his reincorporation into the household. And the poet Archilochus accuses 
Pericles of coming to dinner without being called, and without bringing a 
contribution, unlike a friend. 118 The archaic akletos was characterised by his 
uninvited status and his physical, moral and social inferiority to the invited 
guests. But, in contrast to the parasitos and kolax, this inferiority was made 
explicit through performance.119 The performances provided by Xenophon’s
116 Wilkins, 2000: 71: he adds further tliat his generic predecessors might be recognised in 
various characters from Old Comedy too. See also, Bremmer, 1997: 12-16. However, Damon, 
1997: 5-7, unhelpfully elides tlie distinction between tlie two by translating kolakeuein (Xen. 
Mem. 2.9.8) as ‘to play the parasite’ rather than ‘to play the flatterer’. The kolax and parasitos 
might be connected to one another in tlie comic repertoire, but Theophrastus, Characters 2, 
implies tliat die kolax liad a range of responsibilities outside die banquet.
*17 Discussed by Felir, 1990.
118 Archil. 124b W. See Fehr, 1990: 185-187.
119 Felir, 1990: 189-192, finds support for this argument in the fat-bellied dancers 
(Dichbauchtanzer) painted on late seventh-century Corinlliian ware and sixth-century Adienian, 
Boeotian and Laconian vases. Their distended bellies, abnormally proportioned bodies, and their 
lewd and mocking participation in dancing, adiletics and courting emphasise dieir remove from
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uninvited gelotopoios exemplify these traits. However, they go one step further, 
exploring, rather than just expressing, the status of the 
parasitos/kolax/akletos/geldtopoios within the symposion, and his relationship 
with the sympotic group.
From his first appearance on the doorstep of Callias’ house, Philippus 
gives performances which are highly self-reflexive. His opening witticism that 
he has come equipped to dine at another’s expense identifies the gelotopoios as a 
pcirasitos-typQ, and at the same time supplies an example of the jokes he has 
brought with him to exchange for dinner. His subsequent joke about the slave 
who is burdened with having nothing to carry and no food in his stomach 
advertises this too. By redeploying an well-known gag, Philippus demonstrates 
his professional capabilities, and by inference promises more of the same.120 
Moreover, his choice of topic, namely the slave’s lack of breakfast, draws 
attention to Philippus’ own empty belly.121 It highlights the very situation which 
has compelled the gelotopoios to call at Callias’ house. Similarly, Philippus’ 
next joke, made before the assembled symposiasts, plays with his identity as an 
akletos, and gelotopoios. By stating that it is funnier to come to dinner uninvited 
than with an invitation, he implies that his very appearance at the symposion is 
funny, and thereby restates his primary purpose, to make others laugh.
Like the akletoi of archaic literature and figured vases, Philippus’ 
performance consciously exploits his identity as an uninvited guest who must
society. However, tlie scenes wliich Felir presents need not be read in tliis way. For references to 
other works on the padded dancers see Felir, 1990: 188, nn. 31-33, and 189, n. 34.
120 See note 74, above.
i2l See Huss, 1999a: 108.
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evoke laughter in his audience or go hungry. While parasites and flatterers in 
Old and New comic plays might explain this motivation to their audience, only 
Philippus builds this dynamic into his performance.122 Philippus is explicitly 
invited by Callias into his andron on the grounds that he bring laughter into it 
too.123 However, he has little immediate success:
SetTtvouvTcov Se ahrcSv 6 duXi/jncog yeXoiov ti ebQug ercexetpet 
Xeyetv, Iva Sfj btueXoiri d)V7iep 'evexa bxaX,etTO 'exaoTOTe fejtl 
Ta Seutva. cbg 8’ obx bxlvqoe yeXcoTa, tote gev d/GeoOelg 
cpavepog eyevero. abGig S’ 6ATyov borepov OXo ti yeXolov 
bpobXeTO Xeyetv. cbg Se ohSe tote feyeXaoav fere’ ainm, fev t© 
jieTa£,6 7tauoagevog tou Sel7ivou ouyxaX,u\|/d|Ltevog xarexeiTo.
As they dined, Philippus at once tried to say something funny, so that 
he might accomplish that for which he had been called each time to 
dinner. But when he failed to raise a laugh, he became visibly cross.
And again, a little later, he tried to say something else funny. But as 
no one laughed at him, he stopped in the middle of dinner, wrapped 
himself up, and lay down. (Xen. Smp. 1.14.1-7)
In shrouding his body and lying down, Philippus’ responds to his failure to live 
up to his professional requirements by acting out his dilemma: as he goes on to
122 Parasite-type flatterers who discuss their need to raise laughter or starve can be found in 
Eupolis, Flatterers 172 K-A, and Epicharmus, Hope or Wealth frr. 34-5 K-A. Tliis theme is 
echoed in the jokes of tlie parasitoi recored by Athenaeus, 6.245d-246e.
Xen. Smp. 1.13.5-6.
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tell Caliias, if no-one laughs at his jokes he will have no dinners to go to, and 
without this sustenance he will die.124 To emphasise his pitiful state, Philippus 
wipes his nose and makes his voice weepy. This elicits the required response: 
the symposiasts promise to laugh at him, and Critoboulos even guffaws at 
Philippus’ self-pity. Now Philippus can get up, take off his veil, rejoin the group 
and be of good cheer: as Xenophon observes, there will be contributions, and he 
will dine again!125
When his verbal jokes fail, Philippus degrades himself into a spectacle 
designed to draw his audience’s pity. By covering his body and lying down he 
physically removes himself from the circle of reclining symposiasts. His runny 
nose and tearful voice add to his self-characterisation as a poor man whom no- 
one will invite to dinner, and hence, cannot survive without the contributions of 
others. This performance emphasises the social distance between the gelotopoios 
and the circle of kaloi kagathoi with whom he currently dines, but whose 
company he is entitled to keep only as long as he makes them laugh.
Philippus’ performance is thus highly stylised. Through his words and 
actions Philippus characterises himself as an uninvited guest, defined in 
accordance with the model provided by comic parasites and flatterers. Yet, in his 
self-pity Philippus admits that he is called to dinners to make the company 
laugh.126 Somewhat paradoxically, Philippus is invited to the parties at which he 
plays the akletos. Indeed, despite his assertions, he may even have received an 
invitation from Caliias; after all, when Philippus enters the andron., the host looks
124 Xen. Smp. 1.15.2-10.
125 Xen. Smp. 1.16.3-6.
126 Xen. Smp. 1.15.4-6.
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over to Autolycus to see what he thinks of the new arrival.127 Moreover, when 
not involved in self-debasing spectacles, Philippus reclines and partakes in less 
abusive forms of joke-making. Thus, he is both an invited member of the 
sympotic group and a self-styled outsider. As the latter, Philippus’ self­
presentation draws a distinction between himself, a gelotopoios, and the other 
guests who are not required to make laughter for their invitation or subsistence. 
His claim to be akletos might be slightly disingenuous and contrived, but the 
laughter-maker’s adoption of the parasitic/flatterer persona allows him to create a 
low-status position for himself within the sympotic group, built on differentiation
and self-debasement.
This process is dramatised again when Philippus concludes Socrates’ 
dancing conversation with his own physical mimesis of the dancing girl and boy. 
He prances around in the most ridiculous fashion (hapa tes phuseds geloioteron), 
and bends backwards in imitation of the girl imitating a wheel. Then, because 
they praised the young boy for exercising his whole body in dancing, Philippus 
let his legs, head and hands go all together. Through this performance, the 
gelotopoios emphasises his separation from the sympotic group twice over. 
Firstly, his imitation of the dancing girl and dancing boy aligns him with the 
Syracusan’s troupe of entertainers. Earlier he joined in joking conversation with 
the symposiasts; but, detaching himself from the group he now becomes a 
spectacle for their gaze. Secondly, while Socrates and Charmides amuse one 
another and their companions with their proclaimed desire to dance, neither man 
goes so far as to put his claim into action. When Socrates first says he will 
dance, the entire symposion bursts out laughing. As discussed above, the
127 Xen. Smp. 1.12.3-5.
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philosopher builds on this reaction, creating a virtual spectacle for the 
symposiasts’ amusement.128 Charmides responds to this virtual image by saying 
he was panic-stricken and feared Socrates was going mad.129 When Philippus 
mimics the professional dancers, he provides a physical expression of the 
ridiculous spectacle which Socrates has just conjured up in the imagination of his 
audience. No wonder the symposiasts laugh so much they become thirsty. 
Philippus demonstrates for the audience just how ridiculous a dancing Socrates 
would be.130
In their response to the beauty of their beloveds, the bodies of Callias and 
Critoboulos become sites for the expression of their identities. Callias’ free and 
modest gestures allow others to view him as a sober lover, whilst Critoboulos’ 
stillness reveals him to be the opposite. These processes of identity construction 
are ‘performative’. Each symposiast conveys his identity according to ‘not what 
one is but what one does’.131 Philippus’ performances can also be characterised 
in this way. However, in this the gelotopoios is more akin to Butler’s 
transvestites or transsexuals, than to Callias. In Gender Trouble, Butler discusses 
how performances create an illusion of coherent identity: ‘acts, gestures, and 
desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this on the 
surface of the body, through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but 
never reveal, the organising principle of identity as the cause’ (Butler’s 
emphasis).132 In the case of transvestites and transsexuals, the surface of the
128 Xen. Smp. 2.17.1-19.3.
129 Xen. Smp. 2.19.3-4.
130 Xen. Smp. 2.23.5-6.
131 Culler, 1997: 103.
132 Butler, 1999: 173.
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body becomes a locus for competing and seemingly incompatible identities. ‘If 
the hetero sexualisation of identification and morphogenesis is historically 
contingent, however hegemonic, then identifications, which are always already 
imaginary, as they cross gender boundaries, reinstitute sexed bodies in variable 
ways. In crossing these boundaries, such morphogenetic identifications 
reconfigure the mapping of sexual difference itself.133 Similarly, the 
gelotopoios embodies two potential identities. He is a male Athenian citizen 
who reclines with the invited symposiasts; and, at the same time, his actions 
liken him to the despised, low status, self-deprecating parasitos and kolax. The 
incongruity of these identities are acted out through his performances. 
Xenophon’s laughter-maker is both an anomoly within the sympotic group and, 
through the performances he gives, an integral element of the symposion.
Where Philippus’ first performance reinforces the distance between the 
invited symposiasts and the pitiful, snivelling gelotopoios, his dancing supplies 
these same symposiasts with a warning about over-stepping this divide. 
Watching Philippus dance, the symposiasts see a counter-model to their own 
kalokagathia. What constitutes an amusing diversion when talked about between 
friends opens the kalos kagathos up to the shock, laughter and ridicule of his 
peers, as well as the possible charge of madness, when performed in the real 
world. In the body of the gelotopoios, the symposiasts witness how geloios, or 
worthy of laughter, they would become if they were to use their bodies in a 
similar fashion. Their laughter enacts their distance from the kalos kagathos and 
communicates their comprehension of the dangers inherent in acting like (and 
hence becoming) a gelotopoios.
133 Butler. 1993: 91.
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Xenophon’s gelotopoios fulfils, and indeed exceeds, the performative 
functions envisaged by Fehr as the defining features of the archaic akletos. Yet, 
he does not map directly onto the best known akletos in Greek literature, namely 
Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium. Both Philippus and Alcibiades beg entrance 
to their respective symposia from outside the door of their future host’s house, 
and then outside the door of his andron. However, the distance this creates 
between the akletos and the sympotic group is strengthened when Philippus is 
allowed in to entertain the symposiasts; but it collapses when Alcibiades is 
invited to join his friends. Alcibiades and Philippus raise laughter through their 
own debasement, Philippus by means of his self-performances and Alcibiades by 
retelling his attempted seduction of Socrates. Yet, Philippus’ performance acts 
as a locus of ‘otherness’ in relation to which the symposiasts can think about 
their status as kaloi kagathoi. In contrast, Alcibiades is kalos kagathos', his 
performance might disrupt the symposion, but by the end of the party he is fully 
integrated into the sympotic group.
Gilula downplays the importance of Philippus’ comparatively low status, 
suggesting that the difference in status between Philippus, a free-born Athenian 
citizen, and the Syracusan is more dramatic.134 However, at the same time as 
Philippus’ performances emphasise the distinction between the uninvited 
gelotopoios and the invited symposiasts, they align him further with the 
Syracusan. This is most fully apparent in Socrates’ negative reaction to 
Philippus’ request to compare {eikazein) the Syracusan. The Syracusan’s 
abusive questioning and Philippus’ proposed comparisons are each defined as 
loidoria, and are effectively silenced by other members of the symposion. Thus,
134 Gilula. 2002: 209.
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as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5, the imposed silence of the 
Syracusan and the gelotopoios positions them against the invited symposiasts 
who must not be silent, and who must contribute to the logoi of the symposion.
The negative characterisation of Philippus echoes the sentiments of a 
character in Euripides’ Melanippe Bound who expresses his or her distaste for 
hoi geloioi. He or she says,
dvSpcov 8e 7ioXX,ol tou yeXtoTO<; ouvexa 
doKouoi xapirag Kspiogouq- feyco 8e Tccoq 
piato ye?voioug, otTtvsg Tpirji ooqxuv 
a/d/Uv, b/ouot OTopara- xeig dvSpmv psv ob 
teX.ouoiv dpiOpov, fev ys?t©Ti 8’ eb7rps7teiq.
Many men therefore practice mockery for the sake of laughter.
However, I hate these funny men, who keep unbridled mouths 
through want of wise things to say. They do not count as real men, 
though laughter becomes them. (492 Nauck)
Although the wider context for this fragment is uncertain, and its tone and 
intention are opaque, Philippus’ performance embodies the two characteristics 
the speaker here attributes to the hated men of laughter: lack of sophia in 
speaking, and incompleteness as men.135 In spite of his best attempts to join in
135 Cropp in Collard, Cropp and Lee, 1995: 244, records speculations that this fragment 
belonged to a debate between Metapontus and Melanippe, or Melanippe and the Queen, or 
Melanippe and her twin sons, on topics which might have included marriage, adoption and 
lifestyle. Hartung and Webster even guess that one of die twins is arguing the case for hunting
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the round of speaking, and to do an eikasmos, Philippus remains firmly on the 
edge of the sympotic group.
Hence, Xenophon’s gelotopoios is not merely a (stereo)type who also 
invades later adaptations of the sympotic literary form.136 137Nor is he a one­
dimensional figure brought into the andron because laughter-makers were 
expected to be present at (literary) symposia)31 His performances identify him 
with the parasitos, kolax and akletos, characters who co-exist within him to 
create a spectacle for the invited symposiasts to react to, and define themselves 
against. By making himself geloios, Philippus ends the symposiasts’ 
inappropriate silence, and brings laughter back into the symposion. As we will 
see in chapter 5, this laughter also plays a role in the symposiasts’ self-definition, 
and their exploration of kalokagathia.
The Syracusan ’s Troupe
The Syracusan’s dancing troupe are a looming presence within the 
symposion. Whenever conversation lulls the young boy and dancing girls are on 
hand to perform an acrobatic stunt, play an instrument or look beautiful. Such 
performances are standard features of literary and artistic symposia. Theognis 
tells Cyrnus that his fame will be such that beautiful young men accompanied by
over the symposium (for references, see Cropp, 27). However, he ultimately concludes (255) tliat
the context is uncertain.
136 As Martin, 1931: 51-79, implies. For example, Martin compares Philippus with tlie 
gelotopoios in Lucian’s Symposium (18), and Aesopus in Plutarch’s Banquet of the Seven Sages. 
Cf. Huss, 1999a: 104-106.
137 As insinuated by Huss, 1999a: 105, who states tliat ‘Die Spafimacher sind ein normaler
Bestandteil von Symposien gewesen und werden aus dem Leben in die Literatur ubernommen’.
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the aulos will sing of him at dinner, and in Aristophanes’ Wasps, Philocleon 
abducts a young m/fos-girl from the high-class symposion he attends.138 
Although Plato originally expels the a/z/as-girl from Agathon’s andron, when 
Alcibiades later turns up to disrupt the serious round of speech-making, he 
arrives with an az/Zos-girl in tow.139 As we have already seen, m/Zos-girls and 
/d/Z/czra-players were stock signifiers for sympotic activity in lawcourt oratory. 
And finally, az//ov-girls, lyre-players, acrobats and singers are common features 
of the Athenian vase painter’s sympotic repertoire.140 However, as might be 
expected from Xenophon’s adaptation of the gelotopoios, his dancing girls and 
beautiful boys are not mere topoi. From the first, Xenophon sets them up as 
spectacles to be displayed, whose skills and beauty are amazing to behold.141 He 
describes their visual and aural performances as epideixeis, placing their 
contributions in explicit comparison with the epideixis promised by Callias and 
later provided by all the symposiasts.142 As our introductory passages claim, 
these displays contribute to the pleasure of the viewing and listening symposiasts 
and lead them on to thoughts of Aphrodite. Moreover, they act as a catalyst to 
the symposiasts’ own performances.
Thus, the Syracusan’s troupe plays an integral role in the Symposium's 
discussion of viewing and performance, sympotic procedure, spoude and paidia, 
to kalon and erds, and the doing of a Symposium. The dancing, singing, music­
138 Then. 239-243 W.
139 Pl. Smp. 176e5; 212c6-dl. These features are discussed by Wilson, 1999: 88-92, who draws 
them into tlie discourse surrounding tlie aulos, discussed on pages 164-165 above.
140 See Lissarrague, 1990: passim:, 1999: 26-35.
141 Xen. Smp. 2.1.3-5.
142 Xen. Smp. 2.1.3-2.1
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making, and acrobatics of the troupe provide the invited guests with a pleasing 
spectacle of beauty. Yet, unlike the beautiful Autolycus, the hired performers 
provoke the symposiasts towards their own playful performances, rather than 
towards serious silence. For example, the music played by the auletris and 
kitharistes leads Socrates to comment on how well Callias entertains his guests, 
which in turn leads into a discussion on scent and kalokagathia.143 Then, when 
the dancing girl begins to juggle hoops, Socrates begins a conversation on the 
differences between men and women.144 After seeing the girl dive in and out of 
swords, he provokes a discussion on the topic of andreia, and the boy’s dancing 
sparks off the series of jokes which culminates in Philippus’ mimetic debacle.145 
Finally, their performances allow the symposiasts to critique entertainments as 
suitable and unsuitable to the symposion. Charmides praises the beautiful 
dancers for provoking sexual desire in their viewers, while Socrates directs the 
symposiasts away from the dancing troupe to entertain themselves by
conversation.
The troupe’s performances thus act as spring-boards to jokes, 
conversations, and spectacles concerned with aspects of kalokagathia, and the 
contemplation of suitable and unsuitable sympotic behaviours. Under Socrates’ 
guiding hand, the symposiasts come to think self-reflexively about their own 
identities, using the performances of the musicians and dancers to stimulate their 
exploration of how brave, manly kaloi kagathoi should behave. In addition, the 
symposiasts turn away from the visual and aural displays to talk amongst
143 Xen. Smp. 2.2ff
144 Xen. Smp. 2.8ff.
145 Xen. Smp.2.UK.
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themselves, thereby realigning the viewing-performance dynamic. With their 
attention turned inwards and away from the external entertainers, the symposiasts 
fulfil the roles of performer and viewer themselves.
This continual transfer from external performance to internal display shapes 
the symposion in such a way as to mirror the evening’s drinking pattern: in 
Caliias’ andron drinks are to be served in small drafts, but often.146 Small blasts 
of dancing, music, and acrobatics are followed by quick bouts of conversation 
and humour. Moreover, in this stage of the party two different forms of epideixis 
- the physical displays of the dancing troupe and the verbal conversations of the 
symposiasts - coalesce into a discussion of different virtues. In this respect, the 
episode provides a microcosm of the symposion. Throughout the evening, the 
attention of the invited symposiasts switches continually towards and away from 
the entertainments supplied by external sources. This enables Xenophon to 
shape the Symposium into an epideixis of visual and aural spectacles, created by 
the symposiasts and their entertainers, which together address the issue of 
kalokagathia.
Xenophon thereby uses the activities of the Syracusan’s troupe to develop 
his ideas on how the symposion might operate as a place for learning and 
exploring kalokagathia. Moreover, the troupe’s final contribution, which acts 
out the wedding of Ariadne and Dionysus, feeds into his discussion on the roles 
of beauty and desire in the sympotic processes of self-performance and self­
identification.
As noted above, erotic desire plays an important role in the configuration 
of identity in the polis and within the symposion. In response to beauty, men of
146 Xen. Smp. 2.25-26.
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moderation like Callias lower their gaze, and dampen their speech and gestures; 
but they should not do so to the extent that they forsake all communication with 
their companions. Moreover, Socrates’ diversion of sympotic entertainment 
away from Aphrodite and towards conversation between symposiasts, his 
response to Critoboulos’ declared passion for Cleinias, his attempts to shape ‘the 
beautiful’ into ‘the useful’, and his speech on Eros, paint to kalon and eros as 
real dangers to sophrosyne. They must be regulated and controlled. Thus, the 
final performance by the dancing boy and girl feeds into an already established
discourse on erotics.
The wedding of Ariadne and Dionysus is performed in direct response to 
Socrates’ request for a performance which will make the symposion much more 
graceful (polu epicharitoteros).™1 Whether the spectacle the Syracusan puts on 
meets this criterion, or cheekily circumvents it, remains (perhaps deliberately) 
unclear, but the performances of the dancers certainly cheer their audience, as the 
ring-master promises.* 148 Through a combination of music and movement, 
‘Ariadne’ and ‘Dionysus’ blend mimesis with reality to produce a convincingly 
real spectacle which excites their audience so much that married men jump on 
their horses and ride home to their wives, while their bachelor friends swear to 
get married.149 Following Calame, Garelli-Fran^ois argues that this schema 
brings Dionysus, whose presence has so far been side-lined, back into the 
symposion. Further, it raises questions about the role of hetairai there, and the
14/ Xen. Smp.T 5.1-4.
148 Xen. Smp. 7.5.5-7.
149 Xen. Smp. 9.7.1-4.
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relationship between sexuality and civic life.150 Thus, Xenophon offers his 
readers a moral ending to his Symposium. The rampant desire of Critoboulos ‘est 
remplacee par un petit drame destine a sublimer des desirs qui, sagement, ne 
seront assouvis ni dans le banquet ni dans le texte’.151
However, as this chapter has discussed, erotic desire is present in the 
Symposium from the moment the symposiasts recline until they leave the andron. 
The mimesis of the young dancers does not sublimate erds, but consciously 
evokes it in the guests who watch in eager anticipation as the dancers kiss on the 
lips. When the married symposiasts ride home to their wives, it is not because 
Xenophon believes their passion ought to be sated by a woman rather than a 
man, or by a wife rather than a hetaira. Rather, these eager young kaloi kagathoi 
indulge in one last eikasmos', they rush home in order to act out their own 
mimeseis of the mimesis they have just seen. Thus, in the final act of the 
Symposium/symposion, Xenophon repositions his kaloi kagathoi one last time. 
He collapses the boundaries between viewing and performance, between jest and 
the serious identity-affirming business of sex, and between sympotic and non- 
sympotic space. He thus blurs the distinction between performance and reality. 
To all intents and purposes the dancers, who are named after the gods, are 
Ariadne and Dionysus in their bridal chamber. They kiss in earnest and declare 
their love so sincerely that the viewing symposiasts might believe they were not 
acting out forms but doing what they desired.152 The mimesis of the young 
husbands who run home to their wives extends this process further. Thus, in his
150 Garelli-Frangois, 2002: 181; Calame. 1999: 121.
151 Garelli-Frangois, 2002: 182.
152 Xen. Smp. 9.5-6.
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finale, Xenophon challenges the distinction between hired entertainer and kalos 
kagathos, the mortal and the divine, and the symposion and the outside world.
Andrisano proposes that the mimesis executed by the Syracusan’s dancing 
troupe is characterised by an excessive realism which seduces its audience in a 
trivial way. This is a consequence of their dancing master’s inability to teach his 
pupils the appropriate control required for the execution of forms. Under his 
analysis, Xenophon’s presentation of the dancers is part of an authorial critique 
of actors and their ‘pantomimes’, and his presentation of Caliias as highly 
uncultured.153 Yet, the erotic component of the performance is not excessive, nor 
a symptom of the dancers’ lack of self-control. Rather, realism is a key 
component of the visual mimesis.
In the Memorabilia, Socrates investigates the subject of representation 
(eikasia) and mimesis. His questioning convinces Parrhasius that his paintings 
can imitate character as well as physical detail, and forces the sculptor Cleiton to 
admit that the artistic imitation of feelings which affect the body in real life
153 Andrisano. 2003: 299-300. Andrisano links Xenophon’s description of the ‘Marriage of 
Ariadne and Dionysus’ to comments made by Aristotle in tlie Poetics (61b28-62all) which 
denounce the actor’s craft of mimesis when it involves dancing and flute-playing as vulgar 
{phortike). Concentrating on its physical form, she does not perceive tlie performance as an 
investigation into mimesis. She further asserts tliat tliis ‘pantomime’ demonstrates die vulgarity 
of tlie party’s host (300). However, my investigations imply that Xenophon does not condemn 
Caliias through liis symposion but uses it to construct a critique of sympotic practice. Finally, 
Andrisano links the ‘pantomime’ to the antics of the gelotopoios, ‘un bouffon consomme’, who 
uses the language of his body to amuse liis audience (296-298). Again, her interest in tlie 
symposion as a source for minor theatre (289) does not lead her to analyse how tliis language, and 
Philippus’ performances, operate in Xenophon’s Symposium.
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produces an effect in those who look at his statues.154 For Goldhill, these 
conversations are evidence for a city-wide concern with the citizen as spectator 
(theates), and ‘a new culture of viewing that changes the relations between the 
object and subject of art’. Hence, Xenophon promotes the philosopher’s 
usefulness to the city through his ability to participate in this discussion.155 But 
Xenophon is interested in these topics in their own right.156 In the Symposium, 
he uses the dancers’ performance to investigate the boundaries between mimesis 
and reality, and the ability of mimesis to influence action in the real world. The 
response of the symposiasts to the sexually charged union of Ariadne and 
Dionysus conveys the power of the image over its spectator.
As discussed in chapter 2, the Socrates of Plato’s Republic recognises some 
of the effects which a dramatic mimesis might have on its audience. In that 
dialogue, Socrates seeks to limit the ‘dangerous illusionism’ of mimesis within 
the city.157 Xenophon’s response is similarly negative, but for reasons which are 
informed by his intentions for the symposion and the Symposium. The mimesis 
which urges the symposiasts to perform their own mimeseis also leads the
154 Xen. Mem. 3.10.1-5:6-8.
155 Goldliill, 1998: 112.
156 As Halliwell, 2002: 122-124, demonstrates in liis analysis of these passages. Like Plato, 
Xenophon was interested in tlie relationship between appearance and mimesis, and tlie interaction 
between audience and mimesis. However, as my study suggests, Halliwell (124) is perhaps not 
entirely fair- in liis dismissive statement tliat Ave need not attribute to Xenophon a deep insight 
into tundamental issues of aesthetics’.
157 Tlie ‘dangerous illusionism’ of mimetic poetry is attributed by Halliwell, 2002: 110, to its 
competency in ‘insidiously expressing and transmitting a whole set of feelings about, a whole 
evaluative attitude toward, tlie “life” whose appearance it represents’.
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symposion to collapse. On a practical level, it requires the symposiasts to leave 
the andron to bed their wives. But it also causes them to experience through 
emulation the lowly and divine. As our analysis of comparisons has shown, and 
the discussion of laughter in chapter 5 will show, Xenophon seeks to protect his 
symposiasts from the dangers concomitant with becoming anything other than 
kaloi kagathoi. Moreover, I will shortly argue that Xenophon promotes his text 
over the symposion as a place for learning kalokagathia. As a literary mimesis of 
the symposion, the Symposium offers a more instructive, and safer, lesson in 
kalokagathia than witnessing visual mimetic performances in the flesh.
Conclusion
Xenophon’s Symposium is constructed from standard sympotic topor. the 
laughter-maker and dancing boys and girls are as stereotypically sympotic as the 
round of speaking between the invited guests, the conversations they hold, and 
the jokes and comparisons they make. Similarly the presence of erds and to 
kalon, of paidia and spoude, and elements of competition and communality 
reflect the symposia described in lyric poetry, and for which they were 
composed; the features which Murray, Schmitt-Pantel, Stehle, and many other 
scholars of the archaic symposion find in their symposia are also present here. 
Yet, within Xenophon’s text, each component is given its own function, its own 
life, and is developed quite apart from the requirements of the sympotic genre. 
Combined, the entertainments of the symposion provide Xenophon with a pool of 
resources which can be deployed to meet his didactic ambitions. Every 
performance and every act of viewing draws the intra-textual symposiast and 
extra-textual reader into thinking about kalokagathia.
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However, as chapter 5 will imply, this ‘model’ symposion is far from 
stable. As the symposion progresses, it assesses and establishes its own value. 
Caliias, Charmides and the other symposiasts are all concerned that the 
symposion proceed correctly. Caliias worries that it is too serious, Charmides 
commends the soothing benefits and erotic pleasures of the dancing boys and 
girls, and everyone wants to entertain each other in the best way. However, their 
ideas about the symposion are set alongside Socrates’ ambitions. In the role of 
symposiarch Socrates tries to shape the symposion to fit his idea of a good 
drinking party. This self-conscious dialogue between the symposiasts and their 
symposion makes the negotiation of sympotic practice found in Xenophon’s text 
a crucial component of good sympotic behaviour.
Thus, in the next chapter, I will investigate the dynamics which operate 
within the text of the Symposium. If, as I have proposed, Xenophon’s primary 
aim is didactic, how does he envisage his text working? Does it provide a model 
for his reader to emulate, like the symposion described by Xenophanes, or a 
sympotic anti-type, more in line with Critias’ critique? Or do his symposion and 
his symposiasts act as platforms for didactic discussion, just as the Cyropaedia's 
Cyrus acts as a locus for Xenophon’s concerns? As the first section of my thesis 
proposed, Plato shaped his symposion into an idealised synousia, offering his 
reader a chance to learn how the good symposiast behaved. By focusing on the 
role of Socrates, whose influence is so important in shaping the events chez 
Caliias, I will explore how Xenophon conceives of his project, or rather, how he 
conceives of his Symposium.
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Chapter 5: Socrates in Xenophon’s Symposium
Socrates plays a pivotal role in Callias’ symposion, and in Xenophon’s 
Symposium. Yet, his original invitation to the party was apparently quite 
spurious. Callias was already on his way home from the Panathenaea with 
Autolycus, Lycon and Niceratus when he happened upon the philosopher and his 
friends. Callias pounced upon this opportunity to invite such ‘men of pure souls’ 
{andres ekkekatharmenoi) to his party, so that his preparations would seem more 
glamorous. Socrates’ immediate reaction was to scoff, because Callias was 
always making fun of them. As was fitting {hosper eikos eri), Socrates and his 
friends refused the invitation, but when Callias appeared to be getting angry they 
agreed to accompany him, eventually reclining with Autolycus and his father in 
Callias’ andron?
When coupled with Socrates’ dominance of the symposion, a feature 
which has already begun to emerge from our study, the philosopher’s initial 
reluctance seems incongruous. But, this incongruity is crucial to Xenophon’s 
representation of Socrates, and his plans for a good symposion. In the 
Memorabilia, Socrates is the model philosopher, engaging his interlocutors in 
stimulating conversation which turns them into kaloi kagathoi2 The Socrates of 
the Symposium is a more problematic figure. His words and actions define him 
as both arch-symposiast and an outsider to the sympotic experience. On the one 
hand, Callias’ symposion gains its shape primarily through Socrates’ guidance: 
he directs the drinking, conversation and gaze of his companions as he sees fit.
1 Xen. Smp. 1.3-7.
Discussed in chapter 6, below.
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Yet the reader’s surprise in finding Socrates at a drinking party of kaloi kagathoi, 
combined with Xenophon’s own ideas about entertainments and conduct for the 
symposion, put Socrates’ self-appointed role of symposiarch at issue.3
In this chapter, I will concentrate on Socrates’ role in the symposion, and 
the Symposium. Firstly, Xenophon uses Socrates to set up two symposia for his 
reader’s consideration and evaluation: Socrates’ model symposion and the event 
which actually takes place in Callias’ andron. Through Socrates’ 
recommendations and prohibitions, it is possible to trace the philosopher’s 
attempts to shape the symposion into a measured gathering at which the 
paraphernalia of the symposion aids the symposiasts in discussing subjects which 
benefit and cheer one another. Yet, as chapter 4 showed, the symposiasts also 
engaged with the entertainments offered by a laughter-maker and the Syracusan’s 
hired troupe. These entertainments played an important role in the symposion 
beyond entertaining the guests, or (as Socrates preferred) provoking them
towards beneficial conversation. The difference between Socrates’ ambitions
and the actual progress of the symposion, allows Xenophon to open up the 
symposion to his reader’s scrutiny. He can present and explore the symposion as 
a location for pleasure and entertainment as well as for (self-)improvement and 
learning.
3 Of course. Socrates’ presence at a real-life symposion might have been surprising, but Plato 
had already established tlie philosopher’s place in literary versions of tlie event. Tliis may be one 
reason why Xenophon goes to great lengths to remind liis reader tliat Socrates should not really 
be there. Then again, Socrates is unsuited to Agathon’s party too: die unusually well-dressed 
philosopher is late and is accused repeatedly of hybris. Ci. Gagarin, 1977: 23-26; Relihan, 1992:
214.
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In addition, Xenophon styles his Socrates as a gelotopoios whose 
statements raise laughter amongst the other guests. The co-existence of two 
alternative gelotopoioi within the andron offer Xenophon the opportunity to 
investigate laughing and laughter-making within the educational atmosphere of 
the symposion. Through these two figures, Xenophon seeks to delimit laughter 
and its negative effects, whilst promoting a mode of learning we might call 
spoudaiogeloion, which places laughter at its core. By plugging laughter-making 
into the playful and serious environment of his symposion, Xenophon adds 
additional depth to his depiction of the symposion, and his ambitions for it.
Finally, I will draws these investigations together to ask how they affect 
our understanding of Socrates, the symposion, and Xenophon and his 
Symposium. Socrates’ attempts to steer the symposion in an unusual direction 
and his skills as & gelotopoios make Xenophon’s philosopher a radical character 
with particular aims and objectives. This raises the question, where does 
Xenophon align himself in relation to the character he has created? How does 
Socrates facilitate his philosophical ambitions for the symposion? And, what 
consequences do the answers to these questions have for our reading of the 
Symposium?
Socrates Symposiarchos?
From the moment the tables are cleared away until his speech on erds comes to 
an end, Socrates takes proactive steps to shape Caliias’ symposion into the kind 
of party he thinks should be taking place. He tells Caliias that he entertains his 
guests perfectly (teleds) because he provides aural and visual pleasures in the
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form of the dancing, music-making girls and boys who belong to the Syracusan.4 
He then uses the same entertainers as spurs to joking discussions on moral 
virtues. And when Charmides comments that the dancing troupe awakens 
Aphrodite, the philosopher directs the attention of the symposiasts inwards and 
away from the objects of their erotic desires; they now provide entertainment for 
one another through conversations on the personal attributes of which they are 
most proud.5 Socrates takes a leading role in these conversations, not only 
providing his own comments on the symposiasts’ contributions but bringing their 
offerings to a close when he thinks it is time. For example, he ends the 
discussion on kalokagathia and its teachability by ordering the symposiasts to 
put their conversation to the side and return their attention to the acrobatics.6 7
Again, when his companions become unruly following Antisthenes’ request that
Philippus perform an eikasmos, he starts a song which everybody quickly takes
7Up.
As we have already seen, Socrates leads the symposiasts away from 
unsuitable behaviour and towards the kind of activities he considers more fitting 
for a gathering of kaloi kagathoi. Further, he censors the actions of symposiasts 
which he considers to be at odds with his ideal. Through these manipulations, 
the philosopher’s conception of the good symposion, and good sympotic 
protocol, gradually becomes clear.
4 Xen. Smp. 2.2.4-6.
5 Xen. Smp. 3.1.3-5; 3.1.3-4.
6 Xen. Smp. 2.6-1.
7 Xen. Smp. 7.1-2.1
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Socrates’ ambitions for Callias’ symposion are made explicit late in the 
day when he responds to the acrobatics performed by the dancing girl during the 
drinking party. He states,
Sokei obv poi to psv eiq paxaipat; KufhoTav KivSbvou 
fexiSetypa elvat, 6 onp7ioo'i© obSev 7Epoof|Kei. Kai pfjv to ye 
exi too Tpo%ou dpa xepiSivoupevou ypacpeiv Te Kai 
dvayiyvcooKEiv Oabpa pev io©g ti eotiv, hSovfjv 8e obSe Tatna 
Sbvapai yv©vai tIv’ dv xapao%oi. obSe prjv to ye 
8iaaTpe<povTa<; Ta ocopara Kai Tpoxobc; prpoupevoug rjSiov p 
r|ao%iav e%ovTa<; Toug KaXob<; Kai cbpalorx; Gecopeiv. Kai yap 8p 
ob8e rcavu ti oxaviov to ye Oaupaoioig bvTUxeiv, ei tic; toutod 
SetTai, &AA’ e^eoTiv abTiKa paXa Ta xapovra Oaupa^eiv, ti 
7TOT8 6 pev Xbyvot; 8ia to Xapjcpav q>Zoya e%erv (p©g xapexsr, 
to Se xaXKeiov Xapxpov Sv q>©<; pev ob xoiei, fev abT© 8e 
aAAa eptpaivopeva xapeyeTai- Kai 7t©g to pev eXaiov bypov Sv 
ab^ei Tqv tpXoya, to 8e u8©p, Sti bypov feoTi, KaTaoPevvuoi to 
xbp. dXZa yap Kai Taura pev obK erg TabTov t© oiv©
fe7ito7teb8ei.
In my opinion, to tumble into knives is a dangerous display which is 
not suitable (prosekeiri) for the symposion. Moreove, writing and 
reading on the spinning wheel at the same time no doubt a wonder, 
but what pleasure this might provide, I am unable to think. And to 
watch them turning their bodies and imitating wheels is not more 
pleasurable than to watch them standing still, if they are young and 
beautiful. Indeed, an encounter with wonders is not entirely rare, if
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something of this sort is required, but there are things here for our 
immediate amazement: why when the lamp produces light by having 
a bright flame, does bronze, which is bright, not give out light but 
shows other lights reflected in it? And how does oil, which is wet, 
increase flame, but water, because it is wet, extinguishes fire? But 
even these topics are not as good a stimulant as wine. (Xen. Smp.
7.3.1-5.1)
With this little monologue, Socrates reveals the purpose behind the sympotic 
manipulations which we witnessed in chapter 4. The wonder of an object derives 
directly from its ability to provoke contemplation in its viewers. On this 
reckoning, the dancing troupe is suited to the symposion not only because it 
provides pleasures for eye and ear, but because it stimulates conversation 
amongst its audience. This concern with wonders (tci thaumata) resonates with 
Socrates’ remark in Plato’s Theaetetus that ‘wonder is only the beginning of 
philosophy’.8 Moreover, Socrates’ recommendations reflect precisely the kinds 
of entertainment initiated by the philosopher in the early stages of the symposion. 
Following the libations, Socrates uses the actions of the Syracusan’s troupe to 
lead the symposiasts towards a round of joking during which they not only 
engage in communal competition, but reflect on teaching and learning, the nature 
of women, bravery, and democratic Athens. Furthermore, in the rounds of 
speaking, the symposiasts themselves supply the objects for contemplation. 
Their words and their bodies, in the cases of Critoboulus and Socrates in the 
beauty competition, give the viewing and listening symposiasts the opportunity
Pl. Tht. 155d. Cf. Llewelyn. 1988: I74ff.
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to think about justice, education, beauty, poverty, wealth, piety and pandering. 
Socrates further asserts that the symposion is the perfect location for this because 
of the role of wine, whose portions for the evening were set by the philosopher
too.
For Socrates, the main purpose of the symposion is to engage in 
conversations which, according to his model for teaching, improve their 
participants.9 The dancing troupe is quite capable of bringing pleasure to their 
audience, as Socrates observed earlier. But being better men, the symposiasts 
might provide entertainments which are more enjoyable and useful too.10 The 
topics Socrates proposes for conversation in his critique of acrobatics reflect his 
interests in the natural world as they are presented by Aristophanes in Clouds, 
and they are alluded to in the Symposium by the Syracusan, when he teases 
Socrates for his famously earthly interests, and asks him to measure his distance 
from a flea.11 However, the course of the symposion raises many issues which 
relate more directly to Socrates’ moralising interests in the Memorabilia, 
Oeconomicus and Apology. Given the opportunity, Vander Waerdt would relate 
this shift in interest to an amalgamation of the historical Socrates’ ‘earlier’ and 
‘later’ concerns with nature and then morality. Talking about Socratic 
representation, he notes that the various portraits of the philosopher painted by 
Plato, Xenophon and Aristophanes were shaped by ‘the reporter’s philosophical 
agenda’. He further explains that each author picked and chose which aspects of
9 Tliis model of leaching will be discussed in chapter 6, below.
10 Xen. Smp. 3.2.1-4. This passage is quoted and discussed above in chapter 4, pages 167JT, 
above.
*’ Ar. Nu. 143-147: tliis aspect of Aristophanes’ representation is discussed by Vander Waerdt,
1994b: 4-6, and 1994c: 65-67. Xen. Smp. 6.6.1-8.2
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the philosopher’s learning he currently required.12 However, such an 
explanation, which masks the complicated task of uncovering Socratic thought 
from these literary representations, is not needed here.13 Xenophon’s Socrates 
attempts to initiate discussions amongst the symposiasts which reflects his 
methodology for investigating the natural world. Thus, it is not natural 
phenomena which are fitting to the symposion, but the style of their 
investigation.14 Socrates’ shaping of the symposion allows Xenophon to give 
expression to his primary concerns: namely, as discussed in chapter 4 and 6, the 
exploration and promotion of kalokagathia, and the symposiasts’ instruction
therein.
In his desire to direct the symposion to the greatest benefit of its 
participants, Socrates not only controls events but condemns activities which are 
detrimental to this purpose. In the aftermath of Critoboulus’ success in the 
beauty competition, the symposiasts call on him to exact his victory kisses, and 
make jokes.
6 5s ' Eppoysvqg KdvrauOa fecucoTia. Kai 6 ZcoKpaTrjg 
dvogaoat; abxov, ’'E/otg dv, stpq, do ' Epgoysvs^, sikgiv ftgtv ti 
sort 7tapotvla;
Kai Sq drcsKplvaTO* E’l gsv 6 ti sotIv feproraq, obK olSa- to 
gsvrot got Sokouv eErotg’ dv.
’ hXK', 6 5oksi, tout’, stpq.
12 Vander Waerdl. 1994c: 55ff.
13 Oil tlie problems of uncovering tlie real-life Socrates and liis doctrines, see Hulse, 1995.
14 This conclusion fits the observation by Huss, 1999a: 352, that Socrates’ final statement on tlie
stimulating effects of wine also rejects natural phenomena as suitable topics for tlie symposion.
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To toIvuv leap’ oivov Xwcetv Tobg GuvovTag, tout’ fey co Kpivco 
jeapotviav.
OloO’ obv, §(pq, 6ti Kai ob vbv ppag XuKSig gicokcov;
But Hermogenes remained silent even then. And Socrates, calling 
him by name, said, ‘Hermogenes, could you tell us whatparoinia is?’
And he answered, ‘If you ask what it is, I don’t know; but I might say
what I think it is. ’
‘Well, tell us that,’ he said.
‘I judge paroinia to be grieving one’s companions because of wine.’
‘Well, do you realise,’ he said, ‘that you grieve us now by keeping 
silent?’ (Xen. Smp. 6.1.3-2.3)
In this short round of Socratic questioning, the philosopher expands 
Hermogenes’ understanding of paroinia to include his friend’s current silence in 
the symposion. Hermogenes’ initial view of paroinia reflects the dangers 
inherent in the symposion, where the excessive consumption of wine might lead a 
symposiast towards hybristic behaviour, causing grief to his companions. This 
concept fits with the view expressed by Dionysos in a fragment from a play by 
Eubulus, where drinking too many cups of wine is said to lead directly to 
damaging hybristic behaviour.15 Theognis reveals similar anxieties when 
constructing for himself a moderate position between thirst and difficult 
drunkenness (methusis chalepey. drinking too much wine is kakos, but if drunk
15 Eub. 93 PCG.
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advisedly wine is good (agathos)}6 Thus, with his definition of Hermogenes’ 
paroinia, Socrates transfers traditional sympotic wisdom away from wine and 
onto other behaviours which might be equally detrimental to the symposion. 
Hermogenes’ paroinia arises from his non-participation in the conversation of 
the symposion. Like the drunken symposiast, Hermogenes upsets and damages 
the harmony of the sympotic group with his silence. It excludes him from the 
communal processes of joking and conversing by which Callias’ guests together 
express and investigate their shared identities. Moreover, by withdrawing into 
himself, Hermogenes does not entertain or make himself useful to his fellow 
symposiasts. No one will become a better man through his performance.
By asking Hermogenes to define paroinia, and then branding his silence 
with this term, Socrates forces his companion to consider the propriety of his 
behaviour and to participate once again in the playful conversation of the 
symposion. However, Hermogenes responds to Socrates’ request with his own 
critique. When asked to end his silence, he replies that it is impossible to be 
anything other than silent because Socrates talks so much.16 7 Thus, while 
Socrates controls and dominates the conversations of the symposion he stifles the 
flow of conversation. The symposiasts cannot benefit from one another if he is 
talking all the time. If Hermogenes’ allegations are true, Socrates’ presence 
disrupts the very processes he tries to implement in Callias’ andron. Indeed, by 
calling on his host to help him find an answer to this accusation, Socrates
16 Thgn. 509-10, 837-840 W. Similar sentiments can be found in Aristophanes’ Wasps (1252­
5), Plato’s Republic (395e), and in Demosthenes’ Second Olympiac (2.19). Note that in Against 
Conon (54.3-6), Demosthenes describes Conon’s drunken hybristic behaviour as paroinia. Cf. 
Halliwell, 1991: 287.
lz Xen. Smp. 6.2.6-7.
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concedes that he is being refuted by Hermogenes.18 The symposion he wishes to 
recreate is made difficult by the symposiast’s ambivalence to his ambitions, but 
also by his own over-interference. Socrates’ efforts to make the symposion a 
more enlightening event are implicated in the failure of his new model to take
hold.
Caliias’ remark that people are also silent when the flute plays does little 
to help Socrates’ case. However, it gives Hermogenes the opportunity to push 
his (mock?) indignation a bit further. First, Socrates complains that he doesn’t 
speak, and now Caliias recommends that he should speak to the accompaniment 
of the flute, just like an actor! When Socrates jokingly says this is exactly what 
he should do, he pulls the rug out from under Hermogenes.19 The whole debate 
collapses into playfulness. Proposing that his friend might also strike postures to 
accompany his words, Socrates resurrects the dancing motif, previously 
embodied in Philippus’ mimesis of the dancing girl and boy. As Hermogenes
knows, if he were to follow Caliias’ advice he would become like the 
gelotopoios. The boundaries between the hired entertainers, the uninvited guest 
and Xenophon’s symposiasts would become blurred. Hermogenes might as well 
remain silent, for the result would be quite at odds with Socrates’ ambitions for 
this symposion.
Aside from this irony, the resurrection of the dancing motif brings 
Hermogenes back into the visual and spoken economy of the symposion. His 
withdrawal has come to an end, and he now participates fully in its 
conversational processes. However, although Socrates’ joke concludes the
18 Xen. Smp. 6.3.1-2.
19 Xen. Smp. 6.3.3-4.5.
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discussion of Hermogenes’ silence, a conversation on the roles of silence and 
speech within the symposion is still underway. Xenophon uses Socrates’ 
definition of paroinia, and Hermogenes’ response, to reveal potentially 
problematic aspects of the sympotic experience. The Syracusan’s insults and 
Philippus’ attempts at comparing add a further depth to this discussion on silence 
and the spoken word in the symposion.
The Syracusan is annoyed because, following Hermogenes’ reintegration 
into the group and the resumption of on-going conversation between the guests, 
no-one is paying attention to his dancers.20 Hence, he begins an attack on 
Socrates, asking firstly if Socrates is the so-called phrontistes, or ‘thinker’, a 
term of abuse applied elsewhere to Socrates by Aristophanes.21 He then requests 
that the philosopher reveal the totally useless matters (andphelestata) for which 
he is famous. Socrates responds quickly, but with an element of exasperation. 
By bringing these topics of conversation to Socrates, the Syracusan forces him to 
respond withpsychra, or ‘frosty jokes’.22 The Syracusan’s insulting questions 
elicit responses which are equally unfitting to the playful atmosphere promoted
20 Xen. Stop. 6.1-3.
Xen. Smp. 6.3-8.2; Ar. Nu. 266; Aristophanes also describes Socrates’ school as a 
phrontisterion (94). However, tlie term may have a more technical application. The kinds of 
subjects which tlie Syracusan (and Aristophanes) accuses Socrates of studying are those which 
Socrates rejects when he turns away from becoming a phrontistes in tlie Memorabilia, 4.7.6. And 
later in tlie Symposium (7.2.2-3), Socrates admits he may well be a phrontistes because of liis 
interest in natural phenomena. Yet, Xenophon (Mem. 4.7.6) also states tliat men who study the 
secrets of the gods risk becoming lull of pride and deranged (paraphroneiri). Tliis implies that 
tlie charge of being a phrontistes, a man who undertakes specific types of investigations, may
incorporate an element of abuse.
22 For tliis translation, see Huss, 1999a: 341.
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within this symposion. The Syracusan’s envious ill-will (phthonos), leads the 
self-styled symposiarch to speak in a quite inappropriate manner. The wrong 
kind of conversation begets worse. Yet, the Syracusan (appropriately) fails to 
comprehend Socrates’ point, and continues with his offensive comments.
Socrates is saved from this downwards spiral by Antisthenes’ 
intervention. Using an eikasmos, he damns the Syracusan as someone wishing to 
be insulting (loidoreislhai}?3 As Hesk shows, loidoria is deployed in law-court 
speeches and some Aristophanic comedies to indicate an act which transgresses 
the bounds of accepted behaviour. Moreover, this transgression might be a 
dangerous substitute for more reasoned and forensic forms of disputation; and as 
such, it requires policing.* 24 The Syracusan incorporates these elements of 
loidoria into his verbal assault on Socrates. Born of frustration, his abusive 
remarks usurp the light-hearted and serious conversation of the evening, and 
force two of the invited guests to undertake some damage limitation. However,
these endeavours draw Antisthenes and Socrates into the realm of loidoria too.
Hesk’s study of Aristophanes’ Knights, and Demosthenes’ speech Against Conon 
leads him to assert that ‘one way of strengthening the propriety of your own 
arguments and representations is to distance yourself from the field of loidoria or 
to accuse others of engaging in it’.25 However, despite their efforts, Socrates and 
Antisthenes are unable to create this distance and find themselves responding to 
the Syracusan in ways which are equally unsuited to the occasion. Socrates
“• Xen. 6.8.3-5. On tills eikasmos and die comparison Antisthenes proposes that Philippus 
make, see chapter 4, pages 186-187, above.
24 Hesk, unpublished: 6.
25 Hesk, unpublished: 11.
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criticises him for his lack of charis with unbecoming psychra, whilst 
Antisthenes’ accusation constitutes, and attempts to provoke, an 
uncomplimentary eikasmos.
Indeed, Antisthenes’ indictment of the Syracusan as loidoreisthai 
boulomendi recognises this consequence as an intrinsic feature of loidoria. In 
the middle voice, loidorein involves an exchange of abuse.26 This sense is 
captured by Gray in her translation of loidoreisthai boulomendi as ‘one “wishing 
to abuse/be abused” ... the middle voice conveys a deliberate ambiguity’.27 28With 
his insults, the Syracusan opens himself up to the abuse of his fellow 
symposiasts, forcing Socrates and Antisthenes to risk becoming abusive
themselves.
In Socrates’ eyes, this bout of paroinia is in danger of continuing as a 
result of Antisthenes’ comparison. With his allusion to Philippus’ skill at 
comparing, Philippus might attempt to cap Antisthenes’ comparison of the 
Syracusan with one of his own. Hence, Socrates steps in with a pre-emptive 
strike, forbidding Philippus from making his own eikasmos Socrates warns the 
gelotopoios that by comparing the Syracusan in any way whatsoever, he will 
commit loidoria against the kaloi kagathoi. Any comparison, favourable or 
otherwise, will lessen their standing by association. Hence, Socrates forbids 
Philippus from comparing the Syracusan to either kaloi kagathoi or someone
26 See Hesk, 2003, who shows that the two-way effect of loidoria is central to its application in 
tlie improvised verbal duelling, or flyling, by which Meiielaus and Teucer challenge one 
another’s manliness in Sophocles’ Ajax.
" Gray, 1992: 68.
28 Xen. Smp. 6.9.1-2.
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worse (poneroleros)™ Socrates’ subsequent command that the gelotopoios keep 
quiet unless whatever he has to say is necessary or fitting (dei\ illuminates 
Socrates’ principal concern,29 30 By performing any eikasmoi in the proposed vein, 
Philippus will exceed the boundaries which the philosopher has been attempting 
to impose on the symposion. He will continue the pattern of abuse initiated by 
the Syracusan, and become abusive himself Antisthenes’ response to the 
Syracusan has already implied there is no room in this symposion for that kind of 
behaviour. And indeed, with Philippus’ acquiescence (and silence) the paroinia 
is extinguished.
Gray ties her analysis of this section into her picture of Xenophon’s 
Socrates as the wise man for the new generation. She relates the theme of silence 
to general intellectual interest in the subject, as exemplified in the figure of 
Simonides presented by Plutarch. The paroinia episode in Xenophon’s 
Symposium is constructed to allow Socrates to display his wisdom on silence.31 
Gray’s argument is undercut on the one hand by the methodological problems 
which accompany her use of Plutarch’s Simonides as evidence for the interests of 
the historical person or his wise Man persona. But moreover, Gray fails to 
consider the role of the paroinia episode within the symposion as a whole. This 
episode is framed within a discourse on fitting sympotic practice which revolves 
here around the interaction between silence and the spoken word. It opens in the 
first instance with the response of the symposiasts to Autolycus’ beauty, 
continues with Socrates’ condemnation of Hermogenes’ silence, and ends with
29 Xen. Snip. 6.9.3-10.4.
30 Xen. Smp. 6.10.7-8.
31 Gray, 1992:67-8.
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his recommendation to Philippus that he keep his mouth shut. Montiglio’s study 
of Athenian religion and poetiy emphasises the role of silence as the great 
excluder. In religious ritual, epic, epinician poetry, and on the tragic stage, 
silence emphasises a person’s removal from society and his or her usual social 
persona.32 However, in Xenophon’s symposion this exclusion functions in 
different ways depending on who is being silent. For Hermogenes, a fully paid 
up kalos kagathos, participating verbally in the symposion is vital; to be silent is 
fatal. His silence upsets the communality of the event and prevents it from 
proceeding according to Socrates’ plan. If Hermogenes does not take part in the 
spoken symposion, he cannot cheer or benefit anyone. In contrast, the uninvited 
Philippus should keep quiet unless he can say something worthwhile. Moreover, 
the Syracusan’s logoi are abusive and unsuitable within the current playful and 
communal situation. Socrates implements different protocols for different 
participants in the symposion.
The motif of silence versus the spoken word extends into Xenophon’s 
self-representation. Xenophon claims to show us the men he was with when he 
realised the playful deeds of the kaloi kagathoi were worth remembering. 
However, Xenophon is completely absent from the proceedings. He is not on the 
guest list, and he never recalls his own actions; none of the symposiasts address 
him, or allude to him in any way. However, despite his physical absence, as 
narrator of the tale Xenophon joins his reader as a silent guest in the symposion33 
Author and reader both view the symposion from outside, watching silently.
32 Monliglio, 2000: 292, and passim.
33 Hence, Xenophon does not present himself simply as a silent, inaudible, uninvited guest, as
Strauss, 1972: 143, maintains.
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Unlike Hermogenes, their silence is thoroughly appropriate to their positions. 
They learn about kalokagathia and doing a symposion by being with the 
symposiasts, but not interfering in events. Different protocols dictate what 
behaviours are suitable for participants in the symposion and readers of the 
Symposium.
However, if silence can be a virtue for the viewer-reader of the 
Symposium, who learns kalokagathia by observing the symposion, can it also be 
a virtue for the kaloi kagathoi in the symposion? Socrates admits that 
Hermogenes’ accusation against him for talking too much is correct. The 
philosopher’s incessant chatter disrupts the flow of the symposion as much as his 
companion’s silence. Moreover, Socrates engages in psychra with the 
Syracusan; and the philosopher’s endeavour to prevent Philippus comparing 
results in a quarrel which does not immediately restore harmony to the andron. 
The philosopher is every bit as guilty of paroinia as his friend, the Syracusan and 
the gelotopoios. The recommendation that Philippus be quiet unless he has 
something suitable to say might equally be applied to Socrates himself. Through 
the paroinia of Hermogenes, the Syracusan, Philippus and Socrates, Xenophon 
suggests that silence can become a symposiast when he has nothing to contribute. 
And for the reader who can only watch and listen, it is vital.
Xenophon therefore uses the actions of Socrates and the other 
symposiasts to critique the philosopher’s recommendations for the symposion. 
Further, Socrates is not the only symposiast concerned with what is, and is not, 
appropriate to the symposion and with his role in it. When Caliias invites 
Socrates and his companions to his house, he does so to make his party more
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glamorous, as if this were a defining feature of the good party.34 Philippus is 
invited into the andron because his laughter-making will reassert the proper 
equilibrium between spoude and paidia which has been upset by his friends’ 
reactions to Autolycus’ beauty.35 He is anxious to tell jokes that will fulfil his 
obligations as gelotopoios, while Callias checks to see if Philippus’ jokes make 
an impression on Autolycus.36 When the symposiasts accept Socrates’ proposed 
pattern of drinking, they agree with him that the symposion should strive towards 
the greatest playfulness possible.37 Later, in response to Socrates’ 
recommendation that they entertain one another, many people want to know how 
this might best be achieved.38 Finally, Autolycus leaves the party when it is time 
for him to do so (ede gar hora en auldi)39 Throughout the course of events, the 
symposiasts all try their best to do what is most fitting for the current occasion.
In addition, the symposiasts generally follow Socrates’ lead, but they do 
not always agree with his pronouncements. Although the philosopher forbids 
Philippus from making a comparison of the Syracusan, the reaction of the 
symposiasts to this prohibition is not consistent. Some encourage him to do a 
comparison, while others try to stop him, resulting in a great din (ihorubos). 
This is at odds with Socrates’ desire for a well-ordered and beneficial logos, the 
philosopher is compelled to restore order by starting up a song,40 Similarly,
34 Xen. Smp. 1.4.
35 Xen. Smp. 1.13.5-6.
30 Xen. Smp. 1.14; 1.12.3-5.
J7 Xen. Smp. 2.27.1.
Xen. Smp. 2.5-6.
39 Xen. Smp. 9.1.1-2.
w Xen. Smp. 7.1.1-2.
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Socrates tells the Syracusan that if dancers were to depict the Graces, Seasons 
and Nymphs, the symposion would be much more graceful (epicharitoterori). 
However, the resulting dance which gives the symposiasts such great pleasure is 
an erotic mimesis set in the wedding chamber of Ariadne and Dionysos.41
Moreover, in a sense Xenophon himself does not always ‘agree’ with 
Socrates’ ideas for the symposion - although of course, it is Xenophon who puts 
the words into Socrates’ mouth. Not only does he critique the philosopher’s 
ambitions for speech and silence, but, as we saw in the previous chapter, Socrates 
tries hard to de-eroticise an event which Xenophon deliberately imbues with 
erds. There may be no place for Aphrodite in Socrates’ symposion, but in the 
Symposium beauty and desire are important testing-points for kalokagathia. 
Further, Socrates treats the beautiful dancers as elements of the andron which
permit conversation and allow the symposiasts to benefit one another. By 
contrast, their beauty, and the erds which it arouses, play a key role in 
Xenophon’s symposion. Similarly, Socrates attempts to prevent Philippus from 
participating in the symposion unless it is absolutely necessary. For Xenophon, 
however, the performances provided by the uninvited gelotopoios are every bit as 
instructive, and hence crucial, as those of the invited kaloi kagathoi.
Finally, if we remember the circumstances which led Callias to issue his 
invitation, Socrates was not originally intended to be at the symposion. Callias 
happened upon him by chance, and Socrates rejected his invitation as it was 
proper for him to do. Socrates controls the rounds of speaking because otherwise 
the symposiasts will not follow his instructions; on two occasions he is forced to 
intervene decisively in order to stop the conversation rambling on without clear
Xen. Smp. 7.5.1-4: 9.1-6.
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direction or purpose 42 43And the symposiasts rebel against his instruction. People 
still want Philippus to compare, in spite of Socrates’ warning, and Socrates is 
forced to use the dancers as stimuli to conversations because the symposiasts’ 
attentions keep returning to them regardless of his best efforts to the contrary. 
Although the Syracusan complains that the guests all ignore his troupe because 
they entertain one another, when Socrates’ songs are sung, the dancing girl 
immediately reappears. Socrates is forced to stall her performance with an 
analysis of the suitability, or otherwise, of her contributions to the symposion. 
When the Syracusan’s troupe emerges for one last time, Socrates’ 
recommendations for a spiritual erds, uttered in his speech only moments before,
are completely forgotten in the married symposiasts’ haste to return to their
• 43wives.
In short, Socrates’ participation in the Symposium is far from 
straightforward. On the one hand, Xenophon structures his symposion around his 
philosopher’s attempts to implement his ideas about what should go on in a good 
drinking party. On the other, the resultant symposion is continually critiqued 
from within the text. Xenophon thus sets up a dialogue between Socrates’ 
recommendations for Caliias’ party and the critique of these ideas which 
develops as the symposion progresses. By presenting these two symposia for 
consideration and comparison, the author encourages his reader to think about 
how a good symposion should progress. How should symposiasts respond to 
beautiful spectacles, what should they talk about, and what is the purpose of the 
event? Socrates’ model aims to facilitate the symposiasts’ improvement through
42 Xen. Smp. 2.6-7. and 7.1.
43 Xen. Stop. 9.7.
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conversation with one another. As I will discuss in chapter 6, Socrates’ 
ambitions offer Xenophon a means of investigating the teaching and learning of 
kalokagathia. Yet, by aligning it firmly with the figure of Socrates, Xenophon is 
able to use the other symposiasts, and the other entertainments on offer to assess 
(but not fully undermine) these ideas. As a result, negotiating appropriate 
sympotic practice becomes an important component in the process of 
demonstrating and learning kalokagathia, both for the symposiasts in Callias’ 
andron and the Symposium's reader.
Socrates Gelotopoios and Socrates Spoudaiogeloios
At the same time as Xenophon blurs the line between Socrates symposiarchos 
and his own role as symposiarch of the Symposium, he problematises our view of 
the philosopher further by aligning him directly with another character within the 
text, the gelotopoios. As we have already noted, they are both outsiders to the 
symposioir. Philippus, according to his self-presentation, is a low-status 
akletoslparasitoslkolaxlgelotopoios, and Socrates is a late and unexpected 
addition to the event, whose attempts to shape the symposion only strengthen the 
distance between him and his fellow guests. Secondly, Philippus and Socrates 
are brought into the andron to meet specific requirements: Philippus is to bring 
laughter to the serious gathering, while Socrates is to make it more glamorous. 
Neither are invited for the sake of their company alone. And together they are 
the primary source of eikasmoi and laughter.
Yet, the gelotopoios and philosopher are not identical. Their similarity is 
most apparent in the dancing episode, where Philippus’ crowning mimesis builds 
on and caps Socrates’ proclaimed desire to dance by acting out the virtual
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spectacle of a ‘dancing philosopher’, created by Socrates only moments before.44 
In this episode, both men use their bodies to raise laughter amongst the 
symposiasts. However, the ridiculous image of a dancing Socrates remains in the 
imagination of the guests, realised in the andron only through Philippus’ 
laughworthy performance. Moreover, the two men cause the symposiasts to 
laugh in different ways. Philippus only finds success with his audience when he 
moves from verbal joking into physical, self-debasing performances. On the 
other hand, Socrates raises a laugh via verbal jokes which bring physical and 
self-debasing elements into their formula. The distinction is subtle, but fits with 
the notion that specific types of performances, speech, and now jokes, are 
suitable for different members of Xenophon’s symposion.
Xenophon’s Symposium therefore contains two geldtopoioi. However, 
their status within the symposion differs, they elicit laughter through similar but 
ultimately different types of jokes, and they have varying degrees of success. By 
juxtaposing the philosopher Socrates with the self-denigrating gelotopoios, 
Xenophon effects his own sympotic eikasmos. Like the comparison which he 
establishes between the two model symposia, and like the eikasmoi of the 
symposion in general, this comparison opens up an aspect of the sympotic 
experience to the reader’s inquisition. The laughter-inducing performances of 
the official laughter-maker offer the symposiasts a warning of the dangers that 
extreme behaviours pose to their status as kaloi kagathoi45 In contrast, the jokes 
of Socrates gelotopoios open up aspects of the kalos kagathos' experience to 
further investigation. Socrates’ dancing joke turns into a discussion of exercise,
44 See chapter 4, pages 178ff, above.
45 See above, chapter 4, 177-178, and 19 Iff.
SOCRATES IN XENOPHON’S SYMPOSIUM 237
highly reminiscent of a conversation between Socrates and Epigenes in the 
Memorabilia46 And in his second laughter-making joke, the philosopher 
presents himself as a pander in order to indicate how relationships of reciprocity 
might benefit the city.47 The inappropriateness of this comparison is conveyed 
by Antisthenes’ angry response when Socrates calls him a pander too 48 Both 
performances disclose a serious message for the laughing and learning 
symposiast, although the precise delivery and content of this message varies.
The potential for these gelotopoioi to become involved in the sympotic 
exploration of kalokagathia derives from their ability to evoke laughter {gelds}. 
The Symposium is filled with verbal jokes and witticisms; yet, while these surely 
contribute towards the playful atmosphere of the symposion, they do not produce 
laughter. This distinction has often been overlooked. For example, Bassett 
aligns Xenophon’s ‘fondness for laughter’ with his view of the Symposium as a 
‘collection of pleasantries’ told for the amusement of common people.49 Gera 
equates spoudaiogeloion in Xenophon’s Symposium expressly with the 
combination of spoude and paidia50 Likewise, Huss places the ‘dancing 
Socrates’ episode within this nexus.51 However, as our analysis of joke-making 
in the last chapter implies, joking and playfulness do not necessarily lead to 
laughter. Moreover, according to Halliwell, when laughter does occur, ‘it is 
necessary to distinguish between the playful and the consequential within the
46 Xen. Smp. 2.17-18; Mem. 3.12.
47 Xen. Smp. 3.10.2,4.64.
48 Xen. Sm/?. 4.62.1.
49 Bassett, 1917; 565; 570.
00 Gera, 1993: 136. Tlie meaning of spoudaiogeloion will shortly be discussed.
51 Huss, 1999b: 389-390.
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sphere of laughter’.52 Halliwell frames this dichotomy around paizein and 
skoptein (although he notes that ta skommata can sometimes refer to 
straightforwardly playful humour). The former signifies the pleasure of play for 
its own sake, while the latter encapsulates the potential for (negative) social 
consequences. This difference is signalled by social responses to paidia and 
skommata. Unlike paidia, the potential for hybris within consequential laughter 
dictates that it be socially regulated and controlled.53
Stewart finds evidence for this in the philosophical works of Xenophon, 
Plato and Aristotle, where again laughter is made distinct from humour or 
playfulness.54 In Aristotle’s Nicomcichean Ethics, laughter is associated with 
excess, whilst in Plato’s Republic it involves a loss of enkrateia and 
sophrosyne55 Moreover, laughter was a response to to geloion, something 
ridiculous and laughable, which Plato and Aristotle linked directly to the low and 
the base, and to deformity and defect.56 In the Laws, the Athenian Stranger allots 
the ugly bodies and ideas associated with ta tou gelotos komoidemata to slaves 
and foreigners so that free and noble men might learn ta spoudaia through ta 
geloia without becoming geloioi themselves.57
52 Halliwell. 1991: 280.
53 Halliwell, 1991: 282-285.
54 Stewart, 1994: 29.
55 Arist. E7V4.8; Pl. R. 388e. Cf. Stewart, 1994: 31-32.
56 Patterson, 1982: 79; Stewart, 1994: 33. Cf. Garland, 1994.
37 PL Lg. 816d-e. The location of ta geloia within the ugly is also uncovered by Wolil, 2002: 
74-75, when she calls attention to the demos' laughter at tlie demagogue Cleon (Th. 4.23.5), who 
is characterised by Aristophanes, Eq. 902 and 1194, as a bomolochos. She further compares diis
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These attitudes towards laughter and the laughable are reflected in 
Xenophon’s Symposium. Halliwell suggests that the Greek symposion was one 
form of commensality at which laughter could be given free rein: it gives ‘an 
established and organised place to laughter, creating the space in which its 
indulgence can be recognised as legitimate and playful’.58 Indeed, it is true 
outside of this Symposium, laughter is a familiar component of sympotic 
representation. An elegiac poet of the fourth century told how at the symposion, 
andres agathoi mix playful laughter (gelan paizeiri) with serious speaking in 
turn, while a fragment of Aeschines places laughter alongside wine in the 
symposion59 Further, in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, at a feast hosted by Cyrus, the 
general Hystaspas recounts the tale of another meal at which the antics of a 
soldier greedy for meat resulted in laughter at the reported feast; and the men to 
whom Hystaspas tells his tale all laugh too 60 However, at the symposion of 
Xenophon’s Symposium, laughter is not given full expression, but is carefully 
contained. It only arises in direct response to jokes which debase the person who 
acts them out, or tells them (as is also the case in the episode from the 
Cyropaedia}. The symposiasts do not laugh at Philippus’ witty repartee or his 
comparisons, nor at any other non-abusive jokes told in the symposion. Philippus 
is only able to make laughter by adopting physical positions which are perhaps
‘buffoon’ to Thersites, tlie lame, ugly, anti-hero of ihe Iliad 2.211-277, who also draws pitying 
and scornful laughter upon himself.
58 Halliwell, 1991: 290. Tliis impression of (lie symposion fits better with the Roman literary 
tradition in which entertaining invariably involves one’s guests insulting each another: cf. 
Peaching, 2001.
59 Ades. Eleg. 27 W; Aeschin. SSR VIA 85. On tlie latter fragment, see Huss, 1999a: 66-67.
60 Xen. Cyr. 2.1.2-5.
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appropriate for the akletos and gelotopoios, but are otherwise unfitting for a free­
born Athenian citizen at a symposion. Similarly, Socrates’ jokes rely on his 
proposed association with what are presented through the reactions of his 
companions as unworthy occupations: dancing and pandering. And again the 
former is configured through an image of the philosopher dancing, if not a 
physical performance itself. As the philosopher later tells the official 
gelotopoios, the comparison of a kalos kagathos with anyone of lower status can 
only lead to loidoria, a kind of abuse which Halliwell links specifically to hostile 
laughter 61 To provoke laughter, Philippus and Socrates must play on or ally 
themselves to the base, and open themselves up to abuse. The gelotopoioi are 
makers of to geloion as well as gelds.
In content, Socrates and Philippus’ jokes fit the anthropologist Mary 
Douglas’ definition of ritual joking, where ‘a joke is a play upon form. It brings 
disparate elements into relation with one another in such a way that one accepted 
pattern is challenged by the appearance of another, which was in some way 
hidden in the first.62 Yet, while the gelotopoioi draw the coherence of the 
concept of kalokagathia into question through the physical potentialities of their 
bodies, their jokes do not definitively subvert the kalos kagathos, nor effect a 
change in the balance of power63 Xenophon’s gelotopoioi do bear some 
resemblance to Douglas’ ‘joker’, who ‘appears to be a. privileged person who can 
say certain things in a certain way which confers immunity’. This immunity 
derives from the joker’s ‘access to another reality than that mediated by the
61 Halliwell. 1991: 292.
62 Douglas, 1975: 96.
b3 Douglas, 1975: 96.
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relevant structure’.64 However, Socrates, the philosopher and reluctant 
symposiast, and Philippus, the uninvited gelotopoios, do not use this access to 
reveal truths, but to question the ‘truth’ of the kalos kagathos' self-conception. 
Moreover, it is not the gelotopoios who is made ‘safe’ from ridicule and abuse by 
his performances, but the watching symposiasts.
By locating the laughable within the outsider figures of the akletos and 
the philosopher, Xenophon protects his other symposiasts from the degrading 
experience of being derided by their fellow guests. He thereby maintains the 
harmony and communality of the sympotic group. Moreover, the jokes which 
evoke laughter play an important role within Xenophon’s conception of the 
symposion. As noted above, Philippus’ performances allow a serious 
investigation into the boundaries of kalokagathia, while Socrates follows his 
jokes with potent discussions of different aspects of the kalos kagathos' lifestyle 
and experience. This juxtaposition of to geloion with to spoudaion is made 
manifest in the serious facial expressions which Socrates pulls to accompany his 
jokes.65 On the surface, this mock-seriousness feeds into the incongruity and 
ridiculousness of whatever statement Socrates is making. But it also signals 
surreptitiously that a serious point is about to be made. Xenophon places spoude 
at the heart of to geloion to delimit the detrimental effects of laughter-making for 
the joker and his laughing audience.
Spoudaiogeloion, the combination of the serious and the laughable, is 
therefore a mediation of the serious through the laughable in Xenophon’s 
Symposium, rather than a mixture of the two. It does not simply blend the
64 Douglas, 1975: 107-108.
65 Xen. Stop. 2.17.2, 3.10.3.
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serious and the playful, as Gera argues; nor is it ‘the combination of serious and 
frivolous themes’ and/or the ‘presentation of weighty matters in a playful 
manner’.66 Instead, spoudaiogeloion makes use of a particular type of joke, the 
kind which provokes ‘hostile laughter’. Philippus’ jokes force the symposiasts to 
seriously reconsider their own identities. Socrates’ jokes have a similar effect; 
but moreover, the philosopher uses them to lead the symposiasts towards 
contemplating other serious issues; for example, the appropriate behaviour for 
men in the andron and the gymnasion, and the symposiasts’ relationships with 
one another and the democratic city. Both types involve the symposiasts in the 
serious business of learning kalokagathia. Philippus and Socrates’ jokes are 
spoudaiogeloion, whilst Socrates himself is spondaiogeloios.
The presentation of the serious through the laughable allows Xenophon to 
find a place for the dangerous phenomena of laughter and laughter-making 
within his symposion. He makes them safe by binding them to the serious 
business of learning and exploring kalokagathia. But, gelds and to geloion do 
not become sanitised in this process. The integral elements of danger (to one’s 
status) and self-debasement are central to their operation in Xenophon’s 
symposion.
This spoudaiogeloion fits into a discourse on laughter and to geloion 
which can also be found in Plato’s Symposium. At Agathon’s house being 
geloios and, hence, laughed at by others, are great taboos for the symposiasts. 
Eryximachus chides Aristophanes for playing the laughter-maker {geldlopoieiti}, 
and complains he must guard against the possibility of saying something geloios 
instead of speaking in peace. Aristophanes replies that while being geloios
66 Gera. 1993: 136.
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would be within his remit as a comic poet, he is worried whatever he says will be 
kalagelasta', in other words, even more ridiculous than his comic persona 
allows 67 * In addition, Alcibiades notes that Socrates has chosen to sit by the 
beautiful Agathon, and not Aristophanes or ‘someone else who is and tries to be 
laughable’ (tis alios geloios esti te kai bouletai)™ He thus implies that Socrates 
wishes to be agathos by association, rather than geloios. Finally, in this 
symposion, Alcibiades’ speech (the speech of an akletos) provides the only 
occasion for laughter.69 70The symposiasts cannot help but laugh at his parrhesia, 
or frank speaking: Alcibiades has just debased himself with his admission that he 
is as a slave to his passions, his ambitions, Socrates, and the demos™
In his Symposium, Plato recognises the problematic nature of laughter­
making in the symposion, and ties it into the issue of correct sympotic behaviour, 
where different levels of geloion are suitable for different characters within the 
group. However, Plato does not offer any solutions. By contrast, Xenophon sets 
out to tackle and control laughter as a potential site of social disturbance. In 
Xenophon’s Symposium, as in the episode of the Cyropaedia, laughter is always
67 Pl. Smp. 189a7-b7. On Aristophanes and to geloion, see Ercolani. 2002. This collection of 
articles on spoudaiogeloion is essentially an investigation into abuse and vulgarity in 
Aristophanic comedy. It traces these integral comic components and tlie strategies by which they 
were deployed. Thus, although it does not provide a coherent definition of spoudaiogeloion, the 
various studies together uncover tlie role of tlie geloios in developing and presenting serious 
political comment. In particular, Mastromarco, 2003: 223, highlights tlie combination of the 
camavalesque and tlie serious witliin ‘onomasti komodein', and tlie poetic with tlie political.
65 Pl. Stop. 213c3-5.
69 On Alcibiades as akletos, see chapter 4, page 203.
70 Pl. Snip. 222cl-3; 215a5-222b7.
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‘consequential’. However, by defining laughter-making as the preserve of the 
self-debasing gelotopoios and the ambivalent Socrates spoudaiogeloios, 
Xenophon harnesses it to his educational ambitions. In his symposion, laughter 
is both productive (consequential in a good way?) and, for the symposiasts at
least, ‘safe’.
Furthermore, Xenophon’s solution fits into contemporary philosophical 
concerns with the place of laughter in learning. As mentioned above, the Laws 
puts forward the proposal that it is impossible to learn ta spoudaia without ta 
geloia. Plato therefore confines the job of making shamefi.il bodies and words on 
the comic stage to slaves and foreigners. Those with beautiful {kaloi'} bodies and 
noble {gennaioi} souls might learn serious matters without opening themselves to 
abuse.71 The location of io geloion within the two ge/otopo/os-figures similarly 
distances the symposiasts from self-debasement, but allows them to learn 
through it.
Xenophon’s attempt to contain laughter within the framework of 
spoudaiogeloion also echoes the tactics of the newly-emerging Cynic movement, 
as embodied in the words and actions of Xenophon’s near-contemporary, 
Diogenes of Sinope. As Branham notes, Cynic spoudaiogeloion referred to both 
the juxtaposition of (joking) matter and (serious) manner, as well as the (joking) 
means and (serious) ends to which their jokes were employed.72 The Cynics 
used such jokes to challenge received ideas about philosophy, the nature of 
mankind, and how a good man should lead his life. Later writers referred to
71 Pl. Lg. 816d-e.
72 Branham, 1989: 27.
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practitioners of this method as spoudogeloioi13 However, our evidence for 
Diogenes derives entirely from a period of Cynic reinvention at least four 
hundred years after his death 73 4 The presentation of sayings of the philosopher, 
and the stories told about him, are therefore informed by second- and third- 
century conceptions of Cynicism, its origins and precepts, and by the 
philosophical ideas and textual ambitions of their authors. As Branham and 
Goulet-Caze state, ‘“Diogenes” is, therefore, always already in the process of 
reception’.75 It is thus difficult to untangle the threads of early practice from the 
Cynic movement it went on to produce.
In his study of spoudaiogeloion down the ages, Giangrande describes this 
tradition as ‘a kindly philosophy of the comic art wherein good-natured laughter 
asserts a moral purpose’.76 However, this interpretation fails to get to grips with 
classical ideas of ‘the comic’, and the intricate connection between to spoudaion 
and to geloion. As Branham notes, by the imperial period, Cynics understood 
their methods to involve the telling of stories which were marked by ‘comic 
incongruity and surprise’ as well as parrhesia (like Alcibiades’ speech in the 
symposion} and anaideia, or frank speaking and shamelessness.77 The deeds and 
sayings of Diogenes of Sinope, reported by Diogenes Laertius, are further 
characterised by the philosopher’s disdain for nomos. According to his 
biographer, the philosopher lived in the open air and disregarded the boundaries
73 Str. 16.2.29: D.L. 9.17.
74 Branham and Goulet-Caze, 1996: 4-6.
75 Branham and Goulet-Caze, 1996: 7.
76 Giangrande, 1972: 19.
77 Branham, 1993: 36-37.
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which custom imposed on behaviour in public spaces.78 He poured scorn on his 
contemporaries and their ‘useless toils’ (cichrestoi ponoiy and in addition, he 
challenged his opponents, and answered any charges levelled against him, with 
not only clever words but actions too. He trampled on Plato’s carpet, declaring 
at the same time that he trampled on Plato’s pride; and when that philosopher 
described man as a two-footed, featherless animal, Diogenes plucked a chicken 
and brought it to his school.79 He defecated and masturbated in public, spat on a 
man’s face and ate raw meat; he wandered about town with a tablet round his
neck proclaiming his humiliation and abuse at the hands of young symposiasts, 
and on another occasion tied a wine jar around his neck and dragged it across the 
Cerameicus.80 Thus, he not only uttered witty maxims which highlighted 
deficiencies and incongruities in men’s behaviours and philosophical ideas, but 
often combined them with self-debasing behaviour in order to make serious 
points. With this strong emphasis on the body and its functions, Diogenes’ 
philosophical performances were truly geloios.
The jokes of Philippus and Socrates are both characterised by surprise 
and shamelessness, and play on incongruity in order to address similar questions 
to those posed by the Cynics. Like Diogenes, their bodies act as the primary 
locus for their jokes, and for the serious contemplation which they provoke. 
Socrates’ desire to dance in the andron also displays a potential disregard for 
propriety in terms of his status as a symposiast-/az/a? kagathos and the use of
78 D. L. 6.22. Diogenes sunning liimself in the Craneum; 6.38; dining in a temple; 6.64; doing 
tlie ‘deeds of Demeter and Aphrodite’ 6.69; cf. D.Clir. 8.36; stealing from temples: 6.73.
79 D. L. 6.24, and passim:, 6.71. D. L. 6.26.
D. L. 6.69, 32, 34, 33, 35.
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communal space. A final similarity emerges when Charmides claims to have 
seen Socrates dance, whereupon he thought the philosopher was going mad 
(mainomai)^ This is the very term which Diogenes Laertius maintains that 
Plato used when he described Diogenes of Sinope as Sokrates mainomenos*2
However, a clear distinction exists between the traditional Diogenes and 
Xenophon’s Socrates. Through his shaming and laughable performances, the 
Cynic placed himself (like the gelotopoios Philippus) firmly outside the bounds 
of accepted society. By comparison, the spectacles which Socrates provides, and 
which raise laughter amongst the symposiasts, remain spectres. The revered 
philosopher can make himself geloios in the mind’s eyes of his companions 
without really debasing himself. The philosopher’s ability to invite virtual abuse 
upon himself without becoming truly geloion derives also from the liminal 
position he holds within the symposion. He is invited into the heart of elite 
society, but doesn’t really fit in. He acts like a symposiarch, but doesn’t quite 
succeed. On occasions, he has more in common with the gelotopoios than the 
men with whom he dines. Socrates is not always playful, nor always serious. In 
addition, Xenophon gives the impression that while he is not completely right in 
his manipulation of the symposion, neither is he simply wrong. It is through this 
outside, ambivalent figure that the dangers of the symposion, for instance abusive 
laughter, excessive drinking, and erotic desire are mediated.
Thus, while Diogenes the Cynic placed his laughable, antinomian ways at 
the centre of his philosophical endeavours, Xenophon seeks to circumscribe to * *
81 Xen. Smp. 2.19.5-6.
82 D.L. 6.54. Diogenes Laertius uses tlie same word to describe Diogenes of Sinope’s pupil
Monimus: D. L. 6.82.
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geloion within the bounds of sympotic society. Philippus gelotopoios and 
Socrates spondaiogeloios provide a means for their author to bring laughter into 
the symposion, and at the same time control it. Moreover, he harnesses the 
laughter-making capabilities of the former, and the latter’s ability to mediate the 
ridiculous through the serious, to draw this unavoidable but potentially unhealthy 
feature of sympotic experience into his ambitions for the symposion.
To allege that Xenophon deploys techniques of spoudaiogeloion in the 
Symposium does not make him an early Cynic. Indeed, his methods differ quite 
significantly from those of Antisthenes, the philosopher whom Cynics of the 
Second Sophistic appropriated as their ‘founding father’ (and a participant in 
Callias’ symposion)™ Diogenes Laertius’ record of the life and opinions 
(gnomai) of Antisthenes show the philosopher using witty maxims and 
absurdities (alogoi) to make statements about life, learning and virtue.83 4 
However, these are not geloioi'. Antisthenes’ body did not become a site for his 
lessons, nor did the philosopher’s actions invite abuse and scorn. And although 
Antisthenes’ contributions to the symposion are ‘cynical’ in their often biting 
tone and promotion of austerity and self-denial, Xenophon does not champion 
their values.85 As the next chapter will show, in the rounds of speaking,
83 While ancient Cynics liked to imagine tlieir descent from Antisthenes ‘the Dog’. Branham 
and Goulet-Caze, 1996: 7, submit tliat he might better be understood as tlie ‘fore-runner’ to a 
movement which really gained its shape and momentum tlirough tlie teacliings and actions of 
Diogenes and his followers.
84 D.L. 1.8. On gnotnai, see pages 258-259, below.
On (he potentially ‘cynical’ components of Antisthenes performances, see Rankin, 1986: 13­
23. However, tlie task of working out which aspects of Xenophon’s representation of
Antisthenes are ‘true’ to the philosopher’s methods and beliefs is difficult when the majority of
SOCRATES IN XENOPHON’S SYMPOSIUM 249
Antisthenes is chiefly Socrates’ side-kick in their task of uncovering the self­
delusion of their fellow symposiasts. This representation, and the stories of 
Diogenes Laertius, suggest that cynicism as it became known in later centuries 
was only in its embryonic stage at this time.86
Yet, if the stories which later Cynics told of their progenitors have any 
grounding in their fourth-centuiy activities, then Xenophon’s use of laughter and 
his presentation of Socrates as a laughter-maker suggest that our philosopher 
interacted closely with contemporary questions regarding the philosopher’s role 
in the pursuit of virtue, and the place of laughter and the laughable within it. 
Xenophon’s refusal to dislocate Socrates entirely from the sympotic group, and 
his concern with how virtue might be achieved through social interaction, may 
even show him reacting against the type of philosophical investigation which 
became manifest in the figure of Diogenes.
To conclude, under Xenophon’s guidance, laughter, laughter-making, and 
spoudaiogeloion, defined as the mediation of the serious through the laughable, 
are not only accepted as aspects of the sympotic experience, but become vital 
components of it. However, just as at Agathon’s house the drunken, shameless 
Alcibiades is the only character to be evaluated by his peers as geloios, the roles 
of gelotopoios and spoudaiogeloios are restricted to Philippus and Socrates. 
Although Caliias’ guests might mix seriousness and playfulness in their jokes 
and speeches, they never invite abusive laughter upon themselves. Thus,
‘fragments’ compiled by Caizzi are second hand accounts of what Antisthenes said. Moreover, 
these mainly derive from tlie imperial period, and include Antisthenes’ appearances in 
Xenophon’s Symposium and Memorabilia.
36 Indeed, Rankin, 1986: 27, prefers to view Antisthenes as ‘not merely a “Cynic” but as a
philosopher and individual of Socratic tone and flavour’.
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Xenophon’s symposion is not a place where playful laughter has free rein, as 
Halliwell’s understanding of the symposion would require. Nor is it a Bakhtinian 
carnival, where mocking laughter and grotesque realism, expressed primarily 
through the material body, run free. In Bakhtin’s world of mediaeval carnivals, a 
world he extends back into so-called primitive cultures (like ancient Greece and 
Rome), there is no distinction between spectator and performer, carnival and 
performance. There, the grotesque provides a positive living embodiment of the 
shared community.87 But, in the Symposium, to geloion separates the 
symposiasts from, and places them in opposition to, the gelotopoios. Only 
Socrates, who fluctuates from being symposiarch to symposiast to laughter- 
maker, can transcend this opposition. The symposion does not provide a safe 
space for laughter because it is a symposion, but because it is a place for 
gelotopoioi and spoudaiogeloioi.
The notion that being a gelotopoios in the literal sense is inappropriate to 
the kalos kagathos is affirmed when the symposiasts ask Philippus what makes 
him proud. He replies that his laughter-making skills bring people to him when 
they are happy, but keep them away when they are in trouble.88 89Although 
Niceratus jokes that this is a good state of affairs for him to be in, it is in direct 
contrast with the picture of friendship based on reciprocity which Hermogenes 
has just recommended to the kaloi kagathoi*9 Kaloi kagathoi are emphatically 
not gelotopoioi, nor spoudaiogeloioi. This observation raises interesting 
questions about Socrates’ place in the symposion and Symposium. Socrates tries
87 Bakhtin. 1968: 1-18.
88 Xen. Snip. 4.50.
89 Xen. Snip. 4.51; 4.47-49.
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to order the symposion to the best benefit of all; he helps set up a model for 
learning to be kai os kagathos, and about kalokagathia, and he is called kalos 
kagathos by his future accuser. But this man is also gelotopoios (and 
spondaiogeloios}.
Socrates and Xenophon in the Symposium
Xenophon’s Socrates is a highly ambivalent and ambiguous character. His 
presence within the Symposium is essential to its character as a Sokratikos logos. 
Yet, in the symposion, he is both superfluous to the drinking party - a last minute 
addition whose concept of a good party varies considerably from the ideas of the 
other symposiasts - and pivotal in the direction it actually takes. He plays a 
crucial role in constructing the symposion as a place for good sympotic practice, 
but his authority is ultimately usurped by Xenophon’s overall representation of 
the symposion'. the author’s symposion varies in significant ways from the party 
Socrates recommends.90 In addition, as we will see in the next chapter, Socrates 
sets out a model for learning kalokagathia which is embodied in the action of the 
symposion. But his own status as kalos kagathos is problematised by his distance 
from his fellow symposiasts, and his similarity to the gelotopoios.
This situation reflects the tension in Plato’s Symposium, where Socrates’ 
outsider status is confirmed through his actions, his attitude, and his learning. 
The philosopher is late for the party, accused repeatedly of hybris, and outdoes 
the other symposiasts in his understanding of erds (even if the other symposiasts 
do not recognise the brilliance of his performance). Plato plays up this tension to 
promote his theory of erotic desire against other possible conceptions of erds.
90 These differences are outlined above, pages 232-233.
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Xenophon similarly deploys the outsider Socrates to promote his own 
philosophical ambitions. Socrates’ performance within Caliias’ andron allows 
Xenophon to critique the symposion as a place for learning kalokagathia. 
Socrates does not provide a mouthpiece for Xenophon’s philosophical theories 
but offers an alternative position from which to view the processes of 
kalokagathia and the progression of the symposion.
In addition, Socrates acts as a mediating figure in the symposion and the 
Symposium. The reader might critique Xenophon’s symposion through Socrates’ 
ambitions for the party, or vice versa. Either way, he comes to think about the 
symposion, and the issues it raises, through the figure of Socrates. Xenophon’s 
relationship with Socrates is therefore ambivalent: the philosopher is the main 
authority in the symposion but not in the Symposium. As we shall discover in 
chapter 6, this reflects Xenophon’s depiction of symposiasts like Caliias, 
Critoboulus, Niceratus and Charmides. Unlike in Plato’s Symposium, the deeds 
of these symposiasts, Xenophon’s kaloi kagathoi, are not worth remembering 
because they prompt imitation. Rather, they act as a stimulus towards thinking 
about kalokagathia, and thereby learning to be kalos kagathos.
This understanding of the Symposium's Socrates might have serious 
consequences for our comprehension of Xenophon’s other Socratic dialogues 
which deal with kalokagathia. For example, in the Oeconomicus, Socrates gives 
Critoboulus an account of kalokagathia through the words and person of 
Ischomachus. Pomeroy insinuates that Socrates quotes ‘the testimony of a 
reputed expert’ to back up his claims for estate management91 However, if 
Socrates acts as a mediating figure here as he does in the Symposium, a different
Pomeroy. 1994: 30.
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understanding of the text emerges. Socrates uses the figure of Ischomachus to 
teach Critoboulus how to be kalos kagathos, but this instruction is executed by 
offering his young interlocutor a model through which to explore (and not just 
emulate) kalokagathia. This might clarify the apparent incongruity between the 
historical wife of Ischomachus - assuming Xenophon’s Ischomachus to be the 
husband of this wife - and the woman described by Socrates 92 Harvey explains 
it by suggesting that Xenophon paints a positive picture of Ischomachus’ wife in 
order to rehabilitate her reputation following her defamation at the hands of 
Andocides.93 In contrast, I would argue that Xenophon paints a positive picture 
to create a deliberate ambiguity surrounding the pious and obedient wife of
Ischomachus and the adulterous mistress of Callias. Critoboulus and
Xenophon’s reader are invited to question the validity of the methods for wife­
training and household management which Ischomachus, who is known amongst 
the Athenians as kalos kagathos, recommends.
Under this analysis, the Socrates of the Memorabilia becomes a more 
challenging figure. In a preface to the anecdotes which make up the text, 
Xenophon defends Socrates against charges of impiety and corruption. 
However, the stories which follow do not show Socrates teaching ‘correct’ views 
and opinions to his students. Rather, just as the Platonic Socrates leads his 
interlocutors to recognise the folly of their opinions, Xenophon’s Socrates 
provokes his companions to rethink their ideas. Interlocutors like Euthydemus
92 The identification of Ischomachus as tlie husband of Chrysilla was made by Davies, 1971, 
248, 265-268. However, Pomeroy, 1994: 260-264, gives references to some other historical 
Ischomachuses to whom Xenophon may have alluded.
Harvey, 1993: 70.
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are often left in a state of cipori a, with their ideas refuted but no firm set of values 
to take their place,94 As the passage I quote at the beginning of the next chapter 
shows, the Socrates of the Memorabilia did not tell others what kalokagathia 
was, but lead them towards being kalos kagathos by discussing the nature of 
different virtues and political concepts.95 He demonstrates how to achieve 
kalokagathia through inquiry and contemplation.96
Thus, the Socrates of the Symposium, Oeconomicus and Memorabilia 
cannot simply be characterised as ‘Xenophon’s ideal in dramatised form’.97 Nor 
is Socrates a one-dimensional, model kalos kagathos, created from the same 
mould as Cyrus, Agesilaus, and Lycurgus.98 Socrates’ role in the Symposium as 
a challenger and creator of kalokagathia marks him apart from other figures 
Xenophon attributes this ‘virtue’ to 99
94 Xen. Mem. 4.2.23.
95 Xen. Mew. 1.1.16.
96 Tliis interpretation also reflects Xenophon’s assertion {Mem. 1.2.3, 1.2.3) tliat Socrates never 
professed to teach virtue, which only tlie gods had mastered, but hoped liis students might come 
towards it by imitation of him. Morrison, 1994: 203-5, regards tliis comment as testimony that 
Socrates taught by moral example. However, it might equally imply that Socrates’ methods are 
to be imitated. Thus, lessons in kalokagathia are once again mediated for Xenophon’s audience 
through die figure of Socrates.
97 Tredeimick and Waterfield, 1990: 59. By ‘Xenophon’s ideal’, Waterfield means an ideal 
Xenophon; he declares diat ‘the values and character of ‘Socrates’ are really diose of Xenophon’.
98 As claimed by Tredeimick and Waterfield, 1990: 59, ft. 2; cf. Huss, 1999a: 25-30.
99 Even outside the Symposium, die kalokagathia of these figures is not as unproblematic as 
Huss’ equation of dieir personalities suggests. For example, Nadon, 2001: 162-180, shows that 
far from being an ideal leader and teacher, Cyrus and his education are contrasted negatively to
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Socrates’ influence within the symposion is bound up with Xenophon’s 
promotion of his own authority in the Symposium. While Socrates provides a 
medium for learning how to behave in the symposion, and for learning about 
kalokagathia, it is Xenophon’s text which effects these in the real world. Even 
more than Socrates, Xenophon is an outsider. As we noted above, Xenophon 
remains an ephemeral presence on the edge of the symposion, a narrator who sees 
and reports all, but makes no contribution towards the event. It is Xenophon, not 
Socrates, who structures the symposion, using the philosopher as much as the 
dancing troupe, the laughter-maker and the other symposiasts to create a 
Symposium in which to deliberate on his own philosophical interests. Socrates 
provides the mouthpiece for Xenophon’s educational principle that you can learn 
good from the good; but it is Xenophon who adds depth to this statement, not 
only illustrating this principle in action but recreating it in the experience of his 
reader. Socrates is spoudaiogeloios', yet, it is Xenophon who reveals the 
problematic nature of laughter, and finds a safe place for it within his symposion. 
Thus, the lessons which Xenophon’s reader learns are mediated ultimately 
through the text of the Symposium, and the symposion it records, not the
character of Socrates.
Xenophon’s textual usurpation of Socrates’ oral authority is cheekily 
signposted in a comment made by Charmides during Critoboulus’ speech on 
beauty. He describes the sight of Socrates and Critoboulus bent over a book 
together searching for something (masteuein ti)iQQ The Socrates of Plato’s *
liis ancestors and tlieir paideia. According to Nadon (179), Cyrus’ education is ‘essentially
defective’; tlie Persian leader does not lead others towards kalokagathia.
100 Xen. Smp. A.M.3-6.
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dialogues is famously suspicious of writing, or rather, as Dupont suggests, the 
decontextualisation of philosophy from the speech act which lends it social and 
religious meaning.101 By writing philosophy into the mouth of Socrates, Plato 
engages with this issue. Halperin shows that the narrative components of Plato’s 
Symposium map onto its author’s concerns with writing, conveyed in Socrates’ 
critique of writing in the Phaedrus™2 The juxtaposition of the different 
speeches in written forms allows the reader to compare and contrast Socrates’ 
wisdom regarding erds with the picture of Socrates conjured up by Alcibiades.103 
Through the narrative strategies of the Symposium, Plato harnesses the 
contradictions created by the possibility for multiple readings in any written text 
to the experience of doing (Plato’s) philosophy.104
In his Symposium, Xenophon goes one step further. Socrates’ spoken 
wisdom is subsumed into Xenophon’s ambitions for his text. In her study of the 
relationship between orality and writing, Dupont alleges that the ‘hot’ institution
101 Dupont, 1999: 87-91. However, Dupont fails to dissociate the historical Socrates from the 
Platonic version, hence performing an act of decontextualisation herself. Her analysis of Plato’s 
Ion, in which Socrates challenges tlie value of rhapsodic learning, fails to understand the 
ambiguities created by placing Socrates’ arguments witliin a written framework. Socrates’ claim 
tliat meaning can only emerge from tlie speech act conies alive tluough tlie act of reading.
102 Halperin, 1992. See Pl. PAeZr. 271b-273e.
103 Halperin, 1992: 114-115.
104 Halperin here builds on the argument posited by Ferrari, 204-232, that ‘wliat ultimately 
matters is neither writing nor reading but tlie way of life in wliich they can find a place’ (221). 
For both scholars, tlie primaiy intention of the Phaedrus is to assess writing as a means of doing 
philosophy; however, it also engages tlie reader in doing philosophy too. Compare their 
arguments with Yunis, 2003b: 205-212, who further examines how Plato’s texts (including tlie 
Phaedrus) stimulate critical reading.
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of the symposion lost its spontaneity when its poems, originally constructed 
orally within the andron in which they were performed, became fossilised
statements written down and learned at schools for future recitation. As a result, 
Athenians now had to be taught how to do a symposion™5 On the one hand, 
Xenophon’s Symposium contradicts this picture. The symposion he presents is a 
vibrant affair. The jokes and speeches are all highly spontaneous; for example, 
when Socrates quotes Theognis he does not merely recite lines of a poem he has 
learned by rote, but deploys them innovatively. Similarly, he adapts Gorgias’ 
wisdom on drinking to the current situation. This literary symposion is not 
‘cold’, according to Dupont’s definition of the term. Dupont charges the writing 
down of poetry with causing entropy: ‘once a culture is modelized, theorized, 
historicized, and given claims to universality, it loses its savour and its soul, and 
also its ability to communicate intoxication’.105 06 However, it is just this 
supposedly absent flavour and ‘hotness’ which Xenophon’s Symposium conveys.
On the other hand, Xenophon expressly intends to teach his reader how to 
do a symposion. The vibrancy of his event is fossilised within the text, providing 
its reader with a model which might lead him towards good sympotic practice. 
However, the reader is not invited to remember the events he sees, or to recreate 
them in his own activities. Instead, the Symposium operates within the ‘reading 
act’, transmitting its meanings in the moments at which the text is ‘read’ and ‘re­
read’.107 Xenophon’s concern with good sympotic behaviour as a doorway to
105 Dupont, 1999: 86.
106 Dupont, 1999: 87.
10' Tliis focus on reading does not limit tlie Symposium's efficacy to a strictly ‘reading’
audience. The process of reading and rereading tliat I envisage might also be performed by
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learning, exploring and performing (the quest for) kalokagathia emerge through 
the written text. The lessons learnt by the symposiasts in the symposion map 
onto, but are not identical with, the lessons they convey to Xenophon’s reader. 
The two learning processes are quite distinct. By configuring them through his 
written Symposium, Xenophon promotes his style of education above the lessons 
of the real-life symposion. The ‘silent guest’ at the Symposium learns more than 
those who participate directly in the hubbub. Moreover, by styling his 
philosopher as a reluctant and extraordinary symposiast, as well as an eager 
reader, Xenophon deploys Socrates to reinforce his own authority.
Xenophon’s ambitions for his written Symposium echo his comments in 
On Hunting, where he condemns the Sophists who have written many foolish 
things (peri ton mataion polla autois gegraptai}™* Their writings do not make 
men agathos, but offer young men pleasures and empty virtue. Moreover, 
Xenophon writes,
anyone listening to a reading of tlie text loo. It is tlie Symposium's nature as a written text which
is key. See below, chapter 6, page 310.
108 Xen. Cyn. 13.1-2.
SOCRATES IN XENOPHON’S SYMPOSIUM 259
dvopara psv yap obK dv TcaiSsuosiav, yvcopai 8s, s’l 
KuZcog Syoiev (Xen. Cyn. 13.5-6).
For words do not teach, but gnomai, if they are fine, do.
Indeed, Xenophon’s Symposium is comprised not of words but gnomai, or 
maxims: that is, short stories with understandings (noemata) embedded in them. 
Just like the Cynegeticus, this work is useful, making men sophos and agathos as 
they read,109 Xenophon is a man who understands the good (agathon ti 
epistamenos\ and leads his reader towards virtue.110
For the moment I put forward these assertions somewhat speculatively. 
However, the investigation into kalokagathia in my final chapter will allow me 
to unpack them further. In chapter 4, I inferred that Xenophon’s symposion 
promotes a comfortable atmosphere for the subtle contemplation of kalokagathia, 
mediated through the entertainments provided by outside performers and the 
conversations of the symposiasts themselves. And we have just seen how 
Socrates gelotopoios and Socrates spoudaiogeloios provide a means of bringing 
serious conversations on matters of importance to the kaloi kagathoi who attend 
the symposion. In addition, the conversations of the symposiasts are shot through 
with on-going and explicit discussions of kalokagathia, what it is and how it can 
be taught. By turning to look at some of these conversations, and the kaloi 
kagathoi who conduct them, I will now examine Xenophon’s presentation of the 
symposion as a place for learning kalokagathia. However, given the existence of
109 Xen. Cyn. 13.7.
uo Xen. Cyn. 13.4.
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two model symposia and two different Socrateses, and the dichotomy they effect 
between the symposion and Symposium, we should not expect Xenophon’s 
lessons in learning kalokagathia to provide straightforward results.
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Chapter 6: Learning to be Kalos Kagathos in 
Xenophon’s Symposium
OTicog 8e 8q Kai Tobg &%ovTag id ospvov 6vopa touto to KaZog 
T8 K&ya0dg bitoKsyalpriv, tI tcots bpya^ojxevoi tout’ &£ioivto 
Ka^sioOai, Ttavu pou fj yuxn §7te0uj.i£t abrcov tivi ouyysvsoOai. 
i<al KpcoTov pev 6ti 7ipoosK8Uo to KaAog tco dya0®, ovTiva 
ISoipi KaZov, tout® 7cpoor|8iv Kai eTCSipcopqv KarapavOavsiv, si 
tcou I8oipi KpooripTrigevov t® KaX® to &ya06v. dXX’ oOk dpa 
sl%ev ouT®g bOX fevloug feSoKouv KaTapav0avstv tcov KaZcov 
Tag poptpag rcavu po%0qpoug dvrag Tag yu/ag. bSo^sv obv pot 
dxpepevov Tfjg KaXqg 6\|/s®g fX a(n®v Ttva sXOslv tcov 
KaXoupsvcov KaXcov ts K&yaOoov. stcsI ouv tov ’ Ioxopa/ov 
fjKouov Trpog 7idvTC0v Kai dv8p®v Kai yuvaiK®v Kai £,evcov Kai 
doTcov KaXov T8 K&yaOov 87covopa^opsvov, §80^8 poi tout® 
TtsipaOqvai Guyyevec0ai.
cMy soul very much desired to become acquainted with one of those 
who are called by that dignified title kalos kagathos, so I might 
consider what behaviours deemed them worthy to be called it. And 
first, because the word ‘beautiful’ was added to the word ‘good’, 
whenever I saw some beauty, I would go up to him and try to learn if 
anywhere I might see goodness attached to beauty. But I found it
was not like that. I seemed to discover that some who were beautiful
in form were utterly depraved in their souls. And so I decided to let 
physical beauty alone, and to approach one of those called kalos te 
kagathos. And so when I heard that Ischomachus was called kalos te
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kagathos by everyone, men and women, foreigners and citizens, I 
decided to try to meet him.’ (Xen., Oec. 6.14.1-17.3 Marchant)
abide; Ss respi rmv dvOpandvcov del SisXsysTo okoxcov, tI 
sbos(3s<;, ti dospsg, ti KaXov, t! a’io%pdv, t! SiKaiov, ti dSiKov, 
ti ococppoobvq, Ti pavia, ti dvSpsia, Ti SsiXia, it 7e6At<;, Ti 
tcoXitikoc;, ti dpyq dvOpcoKcov, ti dpyiKog dvOpconrov, Kai respi 
tcov dXXcov, d toix; psv siSdiae; qysiTO KaXobg KdyaOobg sivar,
Tobg 8’ dyoobviaq dvSpaTtoScoSsu; dv SiKaiax; KSK^fjoGai.
But he [Socrates] was always inquiring about human things: what is 
piety, what is impiety, what is beautiful, what is shameful, what is 
just, what is unjust, what is self-control, what is madness, what is 
bravery, what is cowardice, what is a city, what befits a citizen, what 
is the skill of ruling mankind, what is the ruler of mankind and other 
things, the knowledge of which he thought should be kalos kagathos, 
but the ignorance of which might justly be called slavish. (Xen.
Mem. 1.1.16.2-8 Marchant)
In three out of his four Sokratikoi Logoi, Xenophon displays an explicit interest 
in kalokagathia and the kalos kagathos. The first book of the Memorabilia is 
devoted to establishing Socrates as a teacher of kalokagathia, while the 
remainder of the text shows the philosopher in action; and on recalling his 
teachings, by word and example, Xenophon appears to mould his subject into the 
greatest kalos kagathos of them all. In the Oeconomicus, Socrates again provides 
his listeners with lessons in kalokagathia, but this time they are mediated through
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a conversation on household management between the philosopher and 
Ischomachus, a man Socrates believes is justly called ho kalos le kagathos aner' 
And finally, as chapter 4 proposed, the Symposium provides a playground for hoi 
kaloi kagathoi andres, where the entertainments on offer in Callias’ andron 
provide its participants ample opportunity to reflect on, and act out, their status 
as kaloi kagathoi.
In all three texts, Xenophon constructs his lessons in kalokagathia 
through a process of epideixis, using Socrates as a lynchpin for his investigations, 
whether or not the philosopher himself provides a model. However, the 
Symposium differs significantly from its two companion texts on account of its 
sympotic setting. The performative aspect of this symposion, which turns every 
performance into an assertion and negotiation of status by the performing 
symposiast, puts each kalos kagathos forward as a potential embodiment of 
kalokagathia. However, this process is further configured through a 
conversational discourse on education, which sets up the symposion, already 
defined as a gathering of kaloi kagathoi, as a place for learning kalokagathia.
Socrates formalises this process with his observation that men learn good 
from good men. However, Xenophon’s choice of kaloi kagathoi and the words 
he puts into their mouths question the extent to which the symposion can operate 
in this way. The historical personae of the symposiasts and contradictions within 
their performances imply that these men may not be entirely kaloi kagathoi. And 
if they are not, what lessons in kalokagathia can they give? The paideutic nature 
of the symposion becomes problematic.
Xen. Oec. 6.12.
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In this chapter, I will investigate Xenophon’s presentation of the 
symposion as a place for learning kalokagathia and his objective in undermining 
it. Within the Symposium Xenophon establishes a discourse on kalokagathia 
which considers what it is, and how it might be taught. This discourse ultimately 
rejects the symposion as a suitable location for learning and experiencing 
kalokagathia and replaces it with the Symposium.
Kalokagathia in Ancient Greece and Modern Scholarship
In the fifth- and fourth-century Athens, the terms kalos kagathos and 
kalokagathia were frequently deployed by writers and orators to describe the 
city’s elite and their attributes.2 To kalon and to agathon are obviously 
implicated in the two concepts. However, modern attempts to define the kalos 
kagathos and his kalokagathia illustrate the difficulty of determining what their 
combination within the one term implied. Bourriot’s summary of scholarship on 
kalokagathia and the kalos kagathos since the nineteenth century portrays a 
general understanding of the kaloi kagathoi as a political, hereditary class 
(Kortum, Weicker, Tittman, Thirwall, Schneidewin, Wachsmuth, Hermann and 
Shoeman) defined by a distinct social lifestyle and moral education (Grote, 
Krause, Schmidt, Burckhardt).3 Some more recent studies on the subject betray 
the influence of these ideas. For example, De Ste Croix called kalos kagathos
2 Herodotus (1.30.4, 2.143.4) makes tlie first known use of kalos kagathos, whilst kalokagathia 
appeal’s for tlie first time in Xenophon’s work (although tliis does not preclude earlier usage). In 
addition, Aristophanes (fr. 439 K) uses tlieir verbal cognate, kalokagatheirr. see further Jiithner,
1930: 100.
3 For full discussion of these scholars’ arguments and an evaluation of tlieir conclusions, see
Bourriot, 1995: 1-96.
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‘the language of a class that conceives itself morally and socially superior’.* 3 4 
Other historians tried to detach the moral aspect of kalokagathia from its political 
and social components. Juthner, Ehrenberg and Wankel all supposed that the 
efforts of fourth-century philosophers made the label kalos kagathos a term of 
moral evaluation rather than (or at least alongside) an assertion of political or 
social status.5
Although these studies offer possible political, social and philosophical 
interpretations of kalos kagathos (and hence, kalokagathia), they do not address 
the issue of what values the term might convey. What might it mean for the 
gymnasion-govng, horse-riding aristocrat of the fifth and fourth centuries to be 
called ‘beautiful and good’? Dover’s definition of the kalos kagathos as ‘both 
good to look at and manifesting goodness in action’ makes some attempt to place 
the term within classical Athenian conceptions of to kalon and to agathon6 
However, Dover does not ask how the combination of these two qualities into 
one value-concept operated within the political discourse of the city.
Bourriot’s recent two-volume work entitled Kalos Kagathos — 
Kalokagathia, which devotes a good proportion of its time to Xenophon’s work, 
sheds little light on the problem. In the hope of combating the vague and 
ambivalent understandings generated by earlier scholars, Bourriot focuses
4 De Ste Croix, 1972: 376. See also tlie earlier study by Gomme, 1953: 65-67, whose analysis 
of the kalos kagathos in Aristophanes’ Knights leads him to conclude the label designates 
individuals of a certain moral character, as well as identifying tlieir membership of a ‘well-to-do’ 
class. Jaeger, 1957: 249, also views kalos kagathos as the liigliest form of arete for tlie Greek 
nobility.
3 Juthner, 1930: 107; Ehrenberg, 1951: 112; Wankel, 1961.
Dover, 1974: 41.
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directly on individual characters from Greek history whom historians, 
philosophers and orators describe as kaloi kagathoi. For example, his literal 
reading of Thucydides’ and Xenophon’s description of the Spartan army as kaloi 
kagathoi leads him to argue that the term kalos kagathos arrived in fifth-century 
Athens via Sparta.7 It was initially used as a ‘terme de publicite’ by sophists 
who had recently set up business in Athens and wanted to attract pupils.8 Once 
in the public domain, the term quickly became a criticism of sophists and their 
select group of followers, or ‘jeunes snobs’.9 Bourriot’s mid- to late fifth-century 
kaloi kagathoi gained their kalokagathia through their sophistic associations and 
education. However, a look at the plays of the late fifth-century revealed to 
Bourriot that between 411 and 403 Athens’ notables adopted the term kalos 
kagathos to parade their elite heritage (although why they should want to do this 
is unclear).10 Finally, by examining the ‘historical’ figures to whom fourth- 
century philosophers and orators called kalos kagathos, he declares that 
kalokagathia became a term of moral evaluation.
Amongst the many shortcomings in Bourriot’s work his prosopographical 
focus on individuals at the expense of examining the kalos kagathos as a social 
phenomenon is most detrimental.11 His chapter on Xenophon demonstrates why
7 Bourriot. 1995: 168-173.
8 Bourriot, 1995: 173-178; 620; 123-130.
9 So Bourriot, 1995: 133, 138, 139, 199, characterises young men like Alcibiades and 
Thrasymachus, who attached themselves to fifth-century philosophers and were called kaloi 
kagathoi by Aristophanes.
10 Namely Theramenes, Niceratus, Leon, Antiphon, Anytos: Bourriot, 1995: 234-252.
11 See Cairns, 1995: 75; 76; Fisher, 1999: 210. Cairns and Fisher condemn Iris uncritical use of
non-Spartan sources as evidence for the Spartan kalos kagathos, and liis confusing separation of
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his approach does not work. Taking each text produced by Xenophon, Bourriot 
progresses through the various combinations of kalos kagathos, kalos kai 
agathos and kalokagathia to identify who is described by these forms. However, 
his decision that kalokagathia is Ta somme de toutes les vertus concevables dans 
la vie publique’ is every bit as uninformative as his proposal that Xenophon 
paints all his kaloi kagathoi in his own image.12 He further states that 
Xenophon’s kalokagathia lacks substance as a vague and very general term 
applied to excellence in the artistic and intellectual professions.13 After all,
kalos kai agathos from kalos kagathos, as if unaware tliat the former contracts into tlie latter. 
Fisher’s main complaint is tliat in all tilings Bourriot is ‘over confident and over-precise’, while 
Cairns identifies liis tendency to overemphasise texts tliat support his argument and play down 
those which do not. He mournfully concludes, ‘tlie distinctive elements of B’s thesis [on tlie 
origins and early history of the expression] are veiy doubtful, while in the discussion of 4lh C
authors he has little to add tliat will strike an informed reader as new’.
52 Bourriot, 1995: 293; 300. On tlie inadequacy of tlie latter proposal in general, see chapter 5, 
page 254 and note 99, above. But, Bourriot is also idiosyncratic in liis assessment of who is and 
is not kalos kagathos. For example, he does not include Cyrus amongst liis list of Xenophon’s 
kaloi kagathoi because he is never described by tliis term, while other characters in his biography 
are. His reasoning tliat Cyrus cannot be kalos kagathos because he is not Athenian requires him 
to make up implausible explanations for why several other non-Athenians, including a woman, 
are labelled in tliis way. With no positive definitions of kalos kagathos or kalokagathia, tliis land 
of wriggling around tlie issue is endemic. The focus on tlie moments at which an individual is 
called kalos kagathos also results in Bourriot missing the bigger picture. The more philosophical 
exploits of Cyrus in many ways resemble those of Socrates, whom tlie French scholar is happy to 
refer to as Te type le plus pur’ (311). See for example, Gera, who notes the similarities between 
Cyrus and Socrates in the feasting scenes of the Cyropaedia-. Gera, 1993: 154-168. However, 
Cyrus is not Socrates.
Bourriot, 1995: 314.
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‘Xenophon, qui n’est pas un philosophe des abstractions, ne cherche guere a 
definier le contenu de cette valeur abstraite; il se content de la rattacher a un 
homme et a son groupe’.14 However, my discussion of kalokagathia in the 
Symposium so far has proven that this is not the case.
The combination of political meaning and moral assessment in 
kalokagathia is portrayed more convincingly in Donlan’s study of aristocratic
ideals in archaic and classical Greece. Donlan describes how the traditional
vocabulary by which aristocrats of the archaic period identified their social 
superiority, as attested in epic and lyric poetry, became problematised in the face 
of rising democratic sentiment in many Greek poleis15 For example, in the 
poetry of Theognis and Pindar, key value-terms like agathos, esthlos, and arete, 
which once related to physical and martial prowess, were internalised, moralised, 
and aligned with the values of the ‘middling’ citizen, such as pistis, sophrosyne, 
and char is 16 Further, the opposition between kakos-deilos and agathos-esthlos 
now reflected a moral and ethical evaluation of ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’, and 
not only courage, or lack of courage, in battle.17 At the same time, physical 
beauty (kallos) became more strongly connected with arete, now defined as 
moral excellence, or virtue.18 Donlan relates these changes in semantics to the 
aristocracy’s wish to maintain cohesion and separation from the masses in a 
changing world. The poetry of Theognis and Pindar, which fed on and gave 
substance to this new morality, represented attempts to fashion a new aristocracy
54 Bouniot, 1995: 314-315.
15 Donlan, 1999: 75,77-111.
16 Donlan, 1999: 90ff.
17 Donlan, 1999: 77-80.
58 Donlan, 1999: 106-107.
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within the changing polis. Similarly, the fifth century saw the development of a 
wider vocabulary designed to emphasise negatively the superiority of the 
aristocracy over the masses. The gennaioi, eugeneis, gnorimoi, epieikeis, 
epiphaneis, charient.es, sophrones, and chrestoi, opposed themselves to the 
plethos, ochlos, demos, and to the poneroi, mochtheroi, and phauloi V)
This division appears to dominate the anti-democratic rhetoric of pseudo- 
Xenophon’s Constitution of the Athenians, where the author employs just such a 
polarity to characterise his own social group against the Athenian masses.19 20 
However, tracing the rhetoric surrounding the poneros in Old Comedy, 
Rosenbloom concludes that Aristophanes deployed poneros against chrestos to 
distinguish the new wealthy citizens who aspired to leadership of the polis from 
the traditional aristocratic elite.21 The demos became poneros when led by the 
poneroi, just as it would be chrestos if it allowed the chrestoi to guide it.22 Yet, 
Aristophanes’ definition of the demos as chrestos does not merely imply a 
reversal of pseudo-Xenophon’s position.23 Instead, both men communicated 
their anxieties over democracy through an evolving moral vocabulary, which 
could be manipulated to advance their ideas.
19 Donlan. 1999: 127-128; cf. Donlan, 1977: 97-98.
20 See Hughes, Thorpe and Thorpe, 1992: 4. On the contested authorship and possible purpose 
of tliis treatise, see Moore, 1983: 19-22.
Rosenbloom, 2002. Moore, 1983: 22, also notes tliat in tlie Constitution of the Athenians, 
words like poneros and chrestos have less absolute meanings tliat Hughes et at imply.
22 Rosenbloom, 2002: 285. Olson, 1995, speculates that a similar concern with tlie demos'
subjection to demagogues of tlie new wealth elite imderlies Aristophanes’ Wasps.
23 As Rosenbloom, 2002: 288, states.
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However, at the same time as traditional value-concepts were being given 
a new significance, they were taken up by the democratic city in order to denote 
the communal qualities of the Athenian demos. On the fifth-century battlefield, 
the man who was kalos and agathos, now characterised as the aner agathos and 
kalos kagathos, became an integral component of hoplite ideology. For 
example, at Pylos, Thucydides’ Spartans evaluate their battle presence through 
the term kalos kagathos, deploying it alongside a wider rhetoric on the cowardice 
of archers designed to diminish their enemy’s battle-glory.24 5 The qualities of the 
aner agathos and kalos kagathos, newly configured as andragathia and 
kalokagathia, now relate to the ideal hoplite soldier who fights in tandem with 
his fellow citizens in defence of the polis. Whatever the reality of this ideal, 
polis ideology excluded the aristocratic cavalry from its communal vision.26 To 
be a kalos and agathos man it was necessary to adopt the martial persona of the 
hoplite, rather than the Homeric hero.
Furthermore, excellence {arete), shame {aischyne) and nobility of birth 
{eugeneia) became means of praising the democracy in late fifth- and fourth- 
century funeral orations.27 Lacking an independent moral vocabulary of its own,
24 See Cartledge, 2001: 162.
25 Th. 4.40.2. On tlie rhetoric associated with the archer, see Mackie, 1996: 49-54.
26 See Cartledge, 1998: 63-64, who reminds us of the distance between tlie democratic hoplite 
ideal and tlie demos' military experiences as sailors (nautai), and highlights some of the
consequences. In addition, in a paper presented at the Classical Association Conference 2003 on 
‘Herodotus and tlie myth of tlie “hoplite battle’”, Daly showed that hoplite warfare was not even 
tlie predominant form of land battle in Herodotus’ account of tlie Persian Wars. See also Low, 
2002, oil tlie place of cavaliy ideology in the fifth- and fourth-century Athenian polis.
27 See Loraux, 1986: 172-220.
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the democratic city glorified its military and political achievements using the 
only means at its disposal.28 Athens’ citizens were invited to imagine their 
shared equality through a (modified) language of superiority which aligned the 
democratic citizen with epic heroes of the past and with the former ruling class 
whose political prerogatives they had usurped.29 Ober observes a similar pattern 
in fourth-century forensic oratory. However, here the impetus came from the 
city’s elite rather than the demos (or, more precisely, the elite leaders of the 
demos who sought to represent the city for it). One strategy available to a 
defender or prosecutor keen to gain the jury’s favour was to present himself as ho 
metrios, an ordinary ‘middling’ citizen.30 To this end, the elite speaker addressed 
his audience as if they were his social equals. However, rather than downgrade 
his own standing, the speaker elevated the audience. As a result, social markers 
of ‘aristocratic’ status became ‘nationalised’.31 Sophrosyne and charis came to 
denote the moderation and grace expected of Athenian citizens, all of whom
28 Loraux. 1986: 218.
29 Like kalokagathia and andragathia, aischyne and eugeneia are not attested until the fifth 
century. Therefore, tlie demos defines itself tluough a modified language of aristocratic 
superiority. On the abstraction of virtues in the fiftli and fourth centuries, see Bassi, 2003, which 
will be discussed shortly on page 271.
30 On the ‘middling citizen’, see Morris, 1996: 21-22, 28-31, 40.
31 This process, recognised by Ober, 1989: 260, echoes the usurption of aristocratic terminology 
and value-concepts by Pausanias (and by implication liis audience), examined in chapter 3. 
Again ‘aristocratic’ denotes tlie way tliat Athens’ fifth- and fourth-century elite embraced value- 
concepts previously associated with birth elites to construct their own identities. These 
aristocratic markers, whether indicators of ‘elite’ status by birtli (so ‘true’ aristocracy) or by 
wealth or lifestyle, were then claimed by for the polis' rhetoric and self-identity.
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could be appealed to as well-born, eugeneis32 33Moreover, Lysias, Aeschines and 
Dinarchus could now speak of hoi polloi as kaloi kagathoi and kalokagathia as 
belonging to the whole demos.
At a communal level, the Athenian citizenry was now the city’s political 
aristocracy, and accordingly, it defined itself collectively through traditional 
aristocratic terminology. This process of appropriation raises important 
questions surrounding the meaning of terms like kalos, agathos, and andreia, and 
their amalgams kalokagathia and andragathia. If funeral orators and lawcourt 
speakers could now talk of members of the demos as kaloi kagathoi, could this 
term, or its components kalos and agathos, have meaning for the Athenian 
aristocrat outside of its new democratic application?34 Bassi attributes the 
emergence of value-concepts like kalokagathia, andragathia to signify the 
abstract qualities of the man who is kalos and agathos to ‘a destabilisation of 
dominant ethical categories over time’. Philosophers like Plato spent so much 
time defining terms like andreia because their meanings were no longer certain.35 
Democratisation of traditionally aristocratic values implies a crisis in aristocratic 
self-identity. Ideological barriers between rich and poor within the city were
32 Ober, 1989: 259-261.
33 Ober, 1989: 261: Lysias 30.14, Aeschines 1.134; Dinarchus 3.18.
34 A similar question mark hangs over andragathia, a term used by Herodotus (1.136.1, 1.65.2, 
1.99.2, 5.39.1, 6.128, 7.166) to describe rulers or to convey traditional connotations of worth in 
battle. However, it is later applied to recipients of Athenian honours for their services to tire
demos. Whitehead, 1993: 47-50, discusses the epigraphic evidence for this, and proposes that 
andragathia was not adopted to give its recipients aristocratic status, but because it intimated 
value through action.
Bassi, 2003: 53. Cf. Hobbs, 2002: 123.
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broken down, and identities were elided. Within certain bounds, Pseudo- 
Xenophon, Aristophanes and the democratic city could deploy the moral 
vocabulary of fifth-century Athens in whatever manner they liked.
Xenophon’s philosophical attempts to understand kalokagathia and 
define the kalos kagathos therefore build on developments within the democratic 
polis. Xenophon’s Symposium looks to the behaviour of symposion-go\ng kaloi 
kagathoi in an effort to uncover and display the essence of kalokagathia. Such a 
task was perhaps crucial for a self-styled member of Athens’ aristocratic (as 
opposed to civic) elite who found the traditional language of his separation and 
superiority used to emphasise his communality with the democratic polis36 37
In short, modern ambiguity and vagueness over the terms kalos kagathos 
and kalokagathia reflect the historical situation. As Donlan remarks 
kalokagathia was ‘a contested term, claimed by non-nobles as well’ as 
aristocrats. Moreover, Huss shows that within Xenophon’s various works the 
term kalos kagathos has a number of connotations. When referring to people, it 
might imply class or social stratum, membership of a political and/or military 
group, a moral mannly quality, or general nobility. Kalos kagathos might even 
be something one does or aspire to.38
Therefore, Xenophon is interested in defining kalokagathia precisely 
because there is no consensus regarding its meaning. His bafflement comes
36 Tliis may have been especially llie case for the wealthy and well-educated Xenophon who had 
been exiled from tlie Athens for political reasons, but who still interacted with its intellectual 
culture. The reasons for Xenophon’s exile are discussed by Cartledge, 1987: 60; and liis 
intellectual relationship with tlie city is explored by Higgins, 1977: 128-143.
37 Donlan, 1973: 373.
Huss, 1999a: 62-64.
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through in the Oeconomicus where Socrates professes to have looked everywhere 
to find someone he considers kalos kagathos. In the passage quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter, the philosopher recalls how he first sought out men 
characterised who were kalos, but found agathos lacking. He therefore resolved 
to find a man whom others called kalos kagathos39 When he finally encountered 
someone who met this criterion, Socrates asked him how he spent his time in the 
hope of learning how Ischomachus came to deserve the accolade.40
Of course, Socrates’ ignorance on the matter is contrived. If he did not 
know what made a man kalos kagathos before talking to Ischomachus, he 
certainly had some ideas by the time he related his meeting to Critoboulus. 
Through the reported conversation between Socrates and Ischomachus, the 
philosopher outlines what his student must do to earn the title of kalos kagathos, 
which he longs to be worth 41 Similarly, in the Symposium, Xenophon uses the 
gathering of hoi kaloi kagathoi andres in Caliias’ andron to offer his reader a 
definition of kalokagathia. However, while Xenophon presents the symposion as 
a place where kalokagathia can be learned by mixing with kaloi kagathoi, he 
critiques the efficacy of this education and recommends a better method of 
learning kalokagathia.
39 Xen. Oec. 6.14-7.
40 Xen. Oec. 7.2.
41 Xen. Oec. 6.12. Although chapter 5 proposes tliat the situation is a little more complicated
than tliis observation allows: cf. page 252.
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Lessons in Kalokagathia from Hoi Kaloi Kagathoi Andres'?
xal 6 Aukcov etrcev- ObKobv veoig gsv dv sirj Tama- 
hpag §8 Tobg iirksti ynpva^opsvoug Tivog 6£eiv 8ef|osi;
Ka?vOKdya0lag vf| AV, §(pR 6 ^©KpdTiqg.
ICal 71O08V dv Tig touto to xpipa ^apoi;
Ob pa AV, bqrq, ob rcapa t©v pupoxmXcbv.
’ A^Z,a KO0SV 8q;
' O psv Osoyvig squy
’ EoOXcov psv yap dx’ ec0Xd SiSa^eav bv §8 
kokoIoi oupployrig, dTcoZslg Kai tov sovTa voov.
Kai 6 Aukcqv efaev ’ Axoueig Taura, © bis;
And Lycon said, ‘And so that would be for young men;
for those of us who no longer exercise, what is it proper to smell of?’
'Kalokagathia, by Zeus’, said Socrates.
‘And where might one get hold of this kind of oil?’
‘By Zeus, not from the perfume-seller’.
‘But where then?’
‘Theognis said, “You will learn good from the good; but if you mix 
with bad men, you will destroy your mind’”.
And Lycon said, ‘Do you hear that, son?’ (Xen. Smp. 2.4.8-5.2)
Socrates’ recommendations for learning kalokagathia frame the entire 
symposion. When Socrates tells Lycon he will learn ‘good from the good’ he 
singles out the current gathering as a place for learning kalokagathia from kaloi 
kagathoi. But moreover, the philosopher gives the symposiasts a demonstration
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of this recommended learning process in action. By quoting Theognis, Socrates 
subsumes the poet’s authority as the educator of Cyrnus and generations of other 
young men in the symposion, into his own teaching persona. However, 
Socrates does not just repeat Theognis’ wisdom but develops it in a new way. 
The poet’s instructions to the young Cyrnus are redirected towards an older man 
and reformulated for the symposion as a gathering of kaloi kagathoi. The 
philosopher appears to tell Lykon that learning good from the good requires one 
to incorporate lessons learnt from other kaloi kagathoi into the lessons he in turn 
gives. Kalokagathia arises from the mutual lessons which are implicit in the 
conversations of kaloi kagathoi.
This model of learning arises twice more within the drama of the 
Symposium. Firstly, when the philosopher initiates a round of speaking, Caliias 
declares proudly that he has the ability to make men better (beltious-, literally 
more agathoi).^ Antisthenes immediately challenges him by asking whether he 
accomplishes this by teaching a craft or kalokagathia^ He thus assumes that a 
man might improve another through teaching him kalokagathia. But further, 
Antisthenes goes on to give his host a lesson in kalokagathia, proclaiming it to 
be the most indisputable form of justice (dikaiosyne). Although bravery 
(andreia) and wisdom (sophia) can be damaging to friends and the polis, justice 
(hence, kalokagathia) has no part in injustice (adikia)^
42 The lines quoted are Thgn. 35-6 W.
43 Xen. Smp.3A. 1-2.
44 Xen. Smp. 3.4.3-4.
45 Xen. Smp. 3.6-9.
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With this definition, Antisthenes undertakes the kind of inquiry found in 
Plato’s Protagoras and Laches. The interlocutors of these dialogues face the 
issue of how dikaiosyne, sophrosyne, and andreia relate to arete, whether they 
are all equal parts of arete, or are different names for the one virtue. 
Antisthenes teaches Callias about kalokagathia as a virtue, ordering its various 
components into a hierarchy based on their relationship to injustice, and the 
consequences that might arise from acting out certain virtues. On Antisthenes’ 
analysis, andreia and sophia, bravery and wisdom, also have a part in 
kalokagathia, but he warns that they might not always have positive 
consequences. The most indisputable form of kalokagathia does not bring harm 
to one’s friends or one’s polis, but on occasions this is just what kalokagathia 
might do.
Thus, somewhat ironically in light of his initial claim to benefit men by 
teaching them kalokagathia, Callias learns about the virtues which it embodies, 
and the dangers it can pose, from Antisthenes. Thus, the two symposiasts act out 
the learning process embodied in Theognis/Socrates’ poem. Moreover, by 
discussing justice and injustice, wisdom and bravery, and linking them to the 
polls, Antisthenes fulfils a similar role to Socrates in the Memorabilia. As the 
passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter reveals, Xenophon presents the 
discussion of such matters as topics which a man must know if he is to be kalos 
kagathos', ignorance of them could lead to the charge of slavishness.46 7 By 
coming together in the symposion and participating in its entertainments, the
46 See Hobbs, 2000: 123; Schmitt 1992.
47 Xen. Mem. 1.1.16.
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kaloi kagathoi achieve a greater understanding of kalokagathia and become more 
kalos kagathos.
These benefits are recognised by Hermogenes who proclaims how much 
he admires Socrates because he flatters Callias whilst simultaneously teaching 
him what sort of man he should be.48 49During his speech on Eros, the philosopher 
compliments Callias for choosing a beloved who reflects his own qualities. His 
boyfriend Autolycus is fond of neither luxury (habrosyne) nor softness 
(malakia), and instead displays (epideikmmai) power and strength (rhome and 
krateia), andreia and sophrosyne.^ By Hermogenes’ account, Socrates not only 
commends Callias for embodying these traits himself, but teaches him to be 
vigorous, strong, brave, self-controlled and not to revel in luxury or become 
enfeebled by soft living. Moreover, Socrates’ commendation of Callias’ conduct 
advocates ‘ouranian’ relationships between erastai and eromenoi. Callias should 
focus on friendship and doing good deeds (kala ergo) rather than Autolycus’ 
physical beauty.50 According to the comic and oratorical tradition, these are 
lessons of which the famous debaucher is in much need.51 Being instructed in 
these things, Callias learns about kalokagathia and the kind of man he should be. 
And moreover, Hermogenes’ observation teaches Callias that he should learn 
these things from Socrates’ instruction.
Thus, when Socrates states that good men teach the good he sets out an 
educational framework which makes learning kalokagathia an essential
48 Xen. Smp. 8.12.1-3.
49 Xen. Smp. S.8.2-5.
50 Xen. Smp. 8.10.1-11.1.
51 See below, page 283.
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component of being kalos kagathos. In other words, learning kalokagathia lies at 
the heart of kalokagathia (as an abstraction of the qualities of the kalos 
kagathos}. However, this view is not one Socrates’ fellow symposiasts 
necessarily share. Xenophon records the response to Socrates’ definition of 
kalokagathia.
Kai 6 psv Ttg alnmv sItcs- non obv ebpqoet toutou StSaoKa^ov;
6 8s Tig <bg ob8s StSaKTOv touto slq, brspog Ss Tig cbg step ti 
Kai &XAo Kai touto paOqTov. 6 8s ScoKpaTqg b(pq- Touto pev 
fe7tsi8q dpxpiXoYOV boTiv, s’lg auOig doioOmpeOa- vuvi Se Ta 
TtpoKsipsva arcoTS^cbpev.
And some of them said: and where might he find a teacher of this?
And some said that it could not even be taught, while some others 
said that it was just as learnable a thing as any other. So Socrates 
said, ‘As this is disputable, we should put it aside for another time.
But now let’s finish the programme’. (Xen. Smp. 2.6.1-4)
The symposiasts have not yet learnt Socrates’ lesson. Socrates remains unfazed 
by their disbelief and pretends to draw the subject to a close. However, as 
chapter 4 has discussed, Socrates immediately uses the dancing troupe, to whom 
he directs the symposiasts’ attention, to provoke his companions towards 
thinking about and discussing features related to kalokagathia., for example, 
education, the gymnasion, women, andreia, and exercise. He hopes that their 
responses, and their subsequent conversations in the symposion, will act as a 
proof to his original statement.
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Xenophon’s Kaloi Kagathoi
Socrates’ assertion that the symposion provides a location for kaloi kagathoi to 
improve one another merely by being together is put to the test as the evening 
progresses. However, even before the conversation begins, the status of 
Xenophon’s guests as kaloi kagathoi is put at issue. On the one hand, Xenophon 
goes to great pains to establish the social claims of his guests to that title. In his 
opening statement he defines his subjects as kaloi kagathoi. A quick resume of 
their portfolios reveals that these men are members of an elite circle of wealthy 
Athenian aristocrats. Callias (and his brother Hermogenes) belonged to the 
family of the Ceryces, one of the two priestly families responsible for the 
Eleusinian Mysteries.52 He was brother-in-law to Alcibiades and was involved in 
political life at Athens, acting as strategos and envoy at different stages in his 
career.53 Similar attributes are shared by other members of the group. Niceratus 
was the son of the famous general Nicias, whose great wealth allowed him to 
perform the liturgy of trierarch, and who was himself a strategos. Charmides 
was the son of Glaucon, who was cousin of the oligarch Critias, and found 
himself drafted in by the Thirty Tyrants to rule in the Piraeus. Although 
Xenophon’s symposion contains a mixture of men with oligarchic and 
democratic sympathies, they are all well-connected enough to be invited to the 
house of Callias and to participate in the aristocratic lifestyle. Thus, like
52 See Pangle, 1996: 25, who suggests on tlie basis of the Memorabilia that Hermogenes is an 
impoverished bastard of Hipponicus. Note, however, tliat as an impoverished bastard he still 
manages to participate in an elite lifestyle.
53 Huss, 1999a, 70-78, provides a detailed account of tlie historical personae of Xenophon’s
characters.
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Aristophanes in the Wasps, Xenophon gathers his guests from amongst Athens’ 
notables.54
Moreover, their aristocratic status is reinforced through revelations which 
illuminate aspects of their lifestyles. Xenophon introduces his guests, and sets 
the scene for his symposion, with the statement that it was horse-race day at the 
Panathenaea, and Callias, the son of Hipponicus, had brought his boyfriend, the 
pancratiastic victor Autolycus, to witness the spectacle.55 Thus, from the 
beginning, Callias and Autolycus are associated with athletics, the gynmasion 
and the pederastic relations for which its aristocratic participants were famous. 
The gynmasion is emphasised again when the guests arrive at Callias’ house 
newly washed and freshly oiled following their gymnastic activities.56 And later 
Socrates appeals to the imagery of the palaistra as he discusses the appropriate 
activities for free men and the benefits accrued to them by exercising.57 
Moreover, there are frequent quips about, and references to, sophistic education, 
wealth and the role of the Athenian aristocrat in the democratic city. Xenophon’s 
kaloi kagathoi are characterised in the first instance by their attendance at the 
symposion and gynmasion, their bought educations and their leadership of, and 
liturgical contributions to, the polis.
However, from the very beginning their place in the symposion is called 
into question. When Callias happens upon Socrates and his friends and invites 
them to his party, he tells them that his preparations would seem more glamorous
54 On the guests at the symposia described in Wasps, see Storey, 1985, and MacDowell, 1995: 
172-173.
Xen. Smp. 1.2.1-4.
56 Xen. S/wp. 1.7.4-8.1.
57 Xen. Smp. 2.4; 2.17-18.
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if they were adorned by men of pure souls {ekkekatharmenoi tas psuchas) like 
the philosopher and his disciples, rather than generals, cavalry leaders, and 
political hopefuls.58 He thus appears to question whether generals, cavalrymen 
and politicians bring glamour to drinking parties. Or, more precisely, he 
questions the kinds of men that should be invited to his symposion. Contrary to 
expectations, he implies that it is not famous military and political leaders who 
should be invited but men like Socrates, men of ‘pure souls’. To some extent
Callias’ sentiments fit in with Athenian rhetoric of the time. The ridicule of
political hopefuls is familiar to us from pseudo-Xenophon’s Constitution of the 
Athenians, and Aristophanes’ Knights, and Low has proposed that at a civic level 
Athens despised its cavalrymen as cowards.59 Yet the men who accompany 
Socrates to Callias’ house are, or will be, strategoi and hippeis, democratic 
leaders and political revolutionaries - in other words just the kind of men Callias 
hopes to dilute.
To complicate matters further, Socrates’ responds to Callias’ comment as 
if it were a joke, accusing his future host of mocking him as a do-it-yourself 
philosopher.60 Bowen and Huss both propose that the perceived joke revolves 
around Callias’ description of Socrates as a man of pure soul. The former alleges 
that Callias challenges Socrates by aligning his purified soul with the 
Pythagoreans and others who cleansed it before undergoing initiation at Eleusis; 
however, why Callias makes this analogy now (and why it is funny or insulting)
58 Xen. Smp. 1.4.1-6.
59 Low, 2002: 106=110. Although Low (110-117) also ai'gues that Athens’ cavalrymen fought 
back, using tlie imagery of the horseman to emphasise tlieir place hi the community of the polis.
Xen. Smp. 1.5.1-4.
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is unclear.61 Alternatively, Huss suggests Caliias is making fun of Socrates and 
Antisthenes for their inordinate interest in souls.62 This second explanation is 
more convincing given Socrates’ later praise of desire for the soul as opposed to 
that of the body, but other possible jokes exist. Perhaps Caliias’ observation that 
men of pure souls would be more glamorous party-goers than generals, cavalry 
men and politicians is insulting in itself. Or maybe it is amusing because some 
of Socrates’ companions are generals, cavalry men and politicians, and not men 
of pure souls. Or perhaps, the idea of the pure-souled Socrates in a symposion 
with all these men is funny; hence, Socrates’ initial refusal of the invitation ‘as 
was fitting’. As chapter 5 has shown, Socrates is always on the edge of the 
symposion, directing the symposiasts towards conversation amongst themselves 
when they might rather be staring at the beautiful dancers. But if this 
interpretation is correct, where does that leave the kaloi kagathoi who 
accompany Socrates? As the symposion progresses, they also require Socrates’ 
direction (Hermogenes) and embrace the erotic atmosphere of the symposion 
(Charmides).63 Yet here they are described as men of pure souls.
The ambiguity of Caliias’ invitation to Socrates, and the inconclusive 
nature of his joke, puts the moral standing of his guests at issue. Can Athens’ 
elite, men who might be defined as kaloi kagathoi through their lifestyle, also be 
of pure soul? Indeed, should they be if they are to participate in the symposion? 
If the answer is no, then what makes them worthy of recollection? What kinds of
61 Bowen. 1998: 89.
62 Huss, 1999a: 81.
63 On Hermogenes’ unsuitable paroinia, cf. chapter 5, pages 222-226.
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lessons do these kaloi kagathoi hold for one another in the symposion, and for the 
reader of the Symposium?
This problematisation of the kaloi kagathoi in Xenophon’s Symposium is 
deepened by details of the symposiasts’ ‘historical’ lives. Callias’ love of luxury, 
young boys, and all-round debauchery was immortalised in Eupolis’ Autolycus 
and The Flatterers, and Andocides’ forensic speech On the Mysteries6* Huss 
alleges that Xenophon’s Symposium presents a positive picture of Callias to 
combat these negative portraits.64 5 After all, Callias is axioiheatos when he looks 
at the beautiful young Autolycus. However, I prefer to see the positive aspects of 
Callias’ presentation standing in deliberate contrast with his historical persona. 
Callias’ conviction that he makes men just and teaches them kalokagathia by 
giving them his money is met with disbelief by Antisthenes. Can this man really 
teach others anything about justice?66 Similarly, Charmides’ story of how civic- 
minded he has become since he lost all his money is at odds with his rapacious 
actions whilst a member of the Piraeus Ten in 404/3. Moreover, the speeches of 
Niceratus and Critoboulus both undermine their arguments from within. 
Xenophon’s kaloi kagathoi are not perfect specimens of virtue, but men whose 
personalities and contributions challenge the very notion of the symposion as a 
place where ‘you will learn good from the good’.
64 And. On the Mysteries 113-135. esp. 131.
65 Huss, 1999a: 72.
66 Xen. Smp. 4.1-4.
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Educating Niceratus
’ O rcaTpp 6 fexigsZougsvoc; 6tcgx; dvpp dyaQdg ysvolgpv 
f^vdyKaos gs rcavra ra ' Ogppou slip gaOeiv- Kai vuv Suvaigpv 
dv ’ RiaSa Kai ’ O6uoosiav duo OTogaiog sinsiv.
‘My father who cared that I should become a good mail (ctner 
agathos) compelled me to learn the whole of Homer; so now I am 
able to recite the whole of the Iliad and Odyssey by heart.’ (Xen. 
Smp. 3.5.5-8)
’ Akouoit’ dv, §<pp, Kai £gou d §osoQs psXTtove<;, dv fegol ouvfjTS.
Iots yap Spxou 6ti ''Ogppog 6 oo(pc&TaTO<; TcsxoipKS oysSov 
rcspi 7tdvTG)v tcov dvOpcojcivcov. boTig dv ouv ugcnv PouXprai 
p o’lKovogiKdg p §pgpyopiKO<; fj OTparpyiKdc; ysvsoOai p 
dgoiog ’ AyiX^si p A’iavTi p Nsoropi p ’ OSuoosi, sgs 
OsparcsusTco. syco yap Taura ftavra brioTagai.
He said, ‘You shall hear from me how you might become better 
through association with me. For surely you know that Homer, the 
wisest man (ho sophotatos), has represented in poetry nearly every 
aspect of human experience. So, should any one of you wish to be 
become practised in estate management or qualified in public 
speaking or fit for command, or to become like Achilles or Aias or 
Nestor or Odysseus, cultivate me. For I understand all these things’. 
(Xen. Smp. 4.6.3-9)
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With these statements, Niceratus caps and challenges Caliias’ confidence in his 
ability to make men better with an assertion of his own competence in this 
sphere. He contends that learning Homeric epic has made him an aner agathos, 
a ‘good man’. Now that he can recite the words of Homer, the ‘wisest man’, he 
can teach this wisdom to others so that they might learn about all aspects of 
human experience from him. Hence, they will become better too.
The method of teaching proposed by Niceratus seems to exemplify the 
kind of learning and teaching utilised by Socrates in his earlier quotation of 
Theognis. Like Niceratus, Socrates uses the wisdom of an earlier poet as the 
basis for instructing his fellow symposiasts. And by following 
Theognis/Socrates’ advice to learn good from the good, they will become kaloi 
kagathoi. However, in the banter which accompanies Niceratus’ contribution, 
the validity of this educational model comes under fire, and its difference from 
Socrates’ proposed mode of learning becomes clear.
Antisthenes leads the attack by implying that in knowing Homer, 
Niceratus is no different from, or better than, a rhapsode:
’ Ekcivo 6’, £<pq 6 ’ AvuoOsvqq, ?v£X.rj0£ o£, 6ti Kai o'l pa\pco§oi 
7ravT£<; b7iioTavTai rabia xd brcri;
Kai Ttcog dv, eq>rj, XfiZqGoi dKpocopcvov y£ abxcBv 6Avyou av' 
hKaorriv f|ji£pav;
OioOa ti obv §0vog, bcpp, f|Xi0iC9T£pov baycoSfbv;
Ob pa tov AT, scpq 6 NiKqpaTO^, oOkouv bpoiyc 8ok<x>.
AqXov ydp, £<pr| 6 ZcoKpdrqq, 6ti Tag bTtovoiag ouk brtoTavTat. 
ob §£ ZTr|cigppdTco T£ Kai’ Ava^ipavSpco Kai dAAoig TioXXotg 
TtoXb SbScoKag dpybpiov, <j5ot£ ob§£v oe tcov rtoAdvob d^icov
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XsXrjOs.
Antisthenes said, ‘Has it escaped your notice, that all the rhapsodes 
know these poems too?
‘How could I forget’, he said, ‘when I listen to them almost every 
day?’
‘And do you know any body of men more foolish than rhapsodes?’,
Antisthenes said.
‘No, by Zeus’, Niceratus said, ‘not in my view’.
‘Clearly’, said Socrates, ‘they do not understand the hidden meanings 
(huponoiai). But you have given lots of money to Stesimbrotus and 
Anaximander and many others, so nothing of great worth has escaped 
you.’ (Xen. Smp. 3.6.7-7.1)
Antisthenes’ logic strikes straight at the heart of the matter; he implies that 
learning Homer has not made Niceratus an aner agathos, but a foolish 
rhapsode.67 However, as Huss demonstrates, the implication of Socrates’ 
following comment is contested.68 On the one hand, Socrates may be defending 
Niceratus, proposing that he really has learnt hnponoiai from his teachers.69
67 In light of this it would be interesting to know more about Antisthenes’ own writings on 
Homer and his approach to them. However, as Giannantoni, 1985: 333ff, demonstrates, 
unravelling Antisthenes’ method from Ins representations is a difficult process. Whether 
Xenophon’s Antisthenes offer his own opinions reflecting his approach to Homer or presents a 
viewpoint limited to die current textual situation is unclear.
08 Huss, 1999a: 189-190.
69 See Huss, 1999a: 190 and Ford, 2002: 73.
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Thus, as Bowen notes, Socrates’ follow-up is designed to stop Antisthenes in his 
tracks and maintain the harmony of the symposion, saying The philosopher 
intervenes before Antisthenes can draw the inference that Niceratus is stupid’.70 
But Socrates’ response anticipates the force of Niceratus’ later argument that he 
can use his knowledge of Homer to make men better; thus it preemptively 
supports Antisthenes’ coming attack. In this light, Socrates’ observation is 
completely ironic. While Antisthenes questions Niceratus’ status as a good man, 
Socrates undermines the value of the knowledge he will later purport to have 
acquired. One of Niceratus’ teachers, Stesimbrotus, may even have been 
rhapsode.71 If this was the case then Niceratus asserts that he has learned how to 
be an aner agathos from the very men whom he has just agreed are fools. This 
two-pronged attack by Socrates and his Antisthenes hits out at two pillars of the 
Greek educational establishment: Homeric epic and Sophists like Stesimbrotus, 
who take money in exchange for false wisdom.
When Niceratus develops his claim to improve others through his 
Homeric knowledge of household management, politics and military strategy, 
Antisthenes steps up the assault:
70 Bowen, 1998: 102.
71 On tlie identification of Stesimbrotus as a rhapsode, see Huss, 1999a: 190-191, although he 
himself comes down against tliis interpretation. Richardson, 1974: 74, suggests the 
Anaxunandrus mentioned here is an anachronistic retrojection of tlie man whom tlie Suda records 
living in tlie time of Artaxerxes (404-358 BC). Huss (191) notes that nothing remains of his 
works on Homer, but they were used by Apollodorus in his commentary on the Homeric 
catalogue of ships.
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*H Kai pamAsusiv, £q>rj 6 ’ AvTtoGsvrig, ferrtoTaoat, 6ti oloOa
E7iaivsoavTa abrov tov ’ Ayapspvova dig paotXsng ts sir) 
dyaOoq KpaTspog t’ aixpriTfig;
Kat val jxa AV, §q)p, §ycoys 6ti dppaTrjXaTobvTa Sst kyybg psv 
Tty; GTqXriq Kdp\|/ai,
auTdv 8s KXtvOrjvat su^sotoo btl Sltppou 
f)K’ feti’ foptoTspa toiiv, &Tap tov 8s£,idv Vertov 
Ksvoat bgoKVpavT’ sl^at ts o't f|vta %spot.
‘And you understand kingship too?’, asked Antisthenes, ‘You know 
that he praises Agamemnon himself as both ‘good king and strong 
spearman’.
‘Yes, by Zeus’, he said. ‘I know that it is necessary for the charioteer 
to turn near to the post, “and to lean across his well-planed chariot, 
coming slightly to the left, cheering on and goading the right-hand 
horse, the reins yielding in his hands’”. (Xen. Smp. 4.6.10-12).
The resemblance between this snippet of conversation and the Platonic dialogue 
between Socrates and the rhapsode Ion is striking.72 In the Ion, Socrates urges 
his interlocutor to demonstrate the wisdom he has found in Homer in order to
disclose how useless this knowledge really is. The philosopher forces Ion, who 
styles himself as the best rhapsode in Greece, to admit that the knowledge which 
Homer inspires in him on matters like chariot-racing, fishing and medicine is
72 In chronological terms, traditional thinking places tlie Ion near the beginning of Plato’s 
corpus, in which case it would precede Xenophon’s Symposium by a considerable margin. Cf.
Kraut, 1992b: 5ff.
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inferior to the knowledge which chariot racers, fishermen and physicians could 
give on account of their experience.73 In fourth-century Greece the wisdom of 
Homer is quite redundant. In a similar vein, Antisthenes proffers a nugget of 
Homeric wisdom which tricks Niceratus into brandishing his alleged erudition. 
When Niceratus offers the same piece of redundant advice on chariot-racing as 
Plato’s Ion gives, Antisthenes’ argument about the foolishness of rhapsodes is 
complete.74 The advice Homer offers on chariot-racing is useless to the fourth- 
century kalos kagathos, who would never need to ride a chariot, just as the model 
of kingship provided by Agamemnon would be of no benefit to him within the 
democratic polis. Homer does not teach him about estate management, politics 
or strategy, but useless trivia. Knowing Homer does not make Niceratus an aner 
agathos. In consequence, conversing with Niceratus cannot make men better
either.
Similar ideas are found in the Memorabilia where Socrates asks
Euthydemus if he owns a copy of Homer because he aspires to be a rhapsode. 
His companion replies no, for rhapsodes are very foolish (pami elithious}. 
Socrates then asks if it is because he aspires to the arete of men involved in 
politics and household management, who rule and benefit mankind.75 
Euthydemus confirms this is what he desires: he hopes to learn the very lessons 
from Homeric epic which Niceratus finds there. Socrates points out the errors of 
this ambition by leading him into a discussion on arete and justice which 
demonstrates the uselessness of all his previous attempts to approach
73 Pl. Aw 537a-538d.
74 Pl. Ion 537b.
75 Xen. Mew. 4.2.10-11.
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kalokagathia16
Niceratus follows up his observations on chariot-racing with another piece 
of Homeric wisdom, namely that onion provides a good seasoning for drink.76 7 78
Again Plato also deploys this quote in the Ion, but its tone and content are 
particularly well suited to Xenophon’s light-hearted symposion1* Niceratus 
submits this piece of Homeric insight in an effort to increase the symposiasts’ 
enjoyment of the party. This time Charmides and Socrates both jump in to 
demonstrate the limitations of Niceratus’ advice. Charmides jokes that if 
Niceratus went home smelling of onions, his wife would not suspect him of 
kissing others.79 At first the philosopher seems to defend Niceratus from this 
ridicule, agreeing that onion can serve as opson. However, he quickly moves on 
to cap Charmides’ joke with the observation that if the symposiasts ate onion, 
nobody would say they went to Callias’ house to enjoy themselves.80 These 
jokes highlight the flaw in Niceratus’ recommendation for enhancing the 
sympotic experience. Although Socrates is usually keen to expel sex from the 
symposion, here he admits that eating onions would dampen the atmosphere, 
because kissing would no longer be pleasurable. Socrates again confirms that 
‘Homeric wisdom’ is antiquated and irrelevant to contemporary Athenian 
society. Moreover, he usurps Homer’s position of authority, replacing the poet’s 
(and Niceratus’) wisdom with his own advice on what is suitable, and not 
suitable, for the symposion,
76 Xen. Mem. 4.2.23.
77 Xen, >Swp. 4.7.
78 Pl. Ion 538c.
79 Xen. Stop. 4.8.1-3.
80 Xen. Smp. 4.S.4-8.
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The failings of Niceratus’ education also constitute an indictment against 
sophistic education. Socrates’ initial probing regarding the value of huponoiai 
such as Niceratus has been taught to uncover is developed in the subsequent 
conversation. This failure builds on the negative picture of Sophistic education 
inferred by Caliias’ performance. When Caliias invites Socrates to dinner, the 
philosopher complains that his future host is always scornful of ‘do-it-yourself 
philosophers’ like Socrates because he has paid Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus 
and many others to lend him their wisdom.81 In response, Caliias promises that if 
Socrates comes into his andron he will provide an epideixis of the sophia he has 
previously kept hidden (apokruptesthai), as testimony to his worth.82 83Caliias too 
has acquired secret wisdom from the sophists which he promises to display. 
However, Caliias’ eventual epideixis attests the limits of this education. When 
Caliias professes to make men more excellent through justice, Antisthenes turns 
the table on his host, placing him in the position of student rather than teacher. 
Later, when Caliias asserts that he improves men by giving them money, 
Antisthenes questions him so harshly that his victim accuses his examiner of 
being a sophistes™ Socrates avoids the outright denunciation of sophistry which 
can be found in Xenophon’s On Hunting, and informs Plato’s The Sophist, 
Protagoras and Gorgias,84 However, with a little help from Antisthenes, the 
contributions of Caliias and Niceratus to the periodos ton logon highlight the 
inadequacies of their sophistic educations.
81 Xen. Smp. 1.5.1-4.
82 Xen. Snip. 1.6.
83 Xen. Smp. 4.4.4-5.
84 Xen. Cyn. 13. Cf. De Romilly, 1992: 27. Xenophon’s attitude towards the sophists in On
Hunting is discussed in chapter 5, pages 258-259.
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Niceratus’ participation in the periodos ton logon gives him the 
opportunity to act like Theognis’ good man who teaches others good. Indeed, 
with his ambition to make other men agathos through his understanding of 
Homer, he tries consciously to fit into this model. However, the responses of 
Antisthenes and Socrates to Niceratus’ contributions question the validity of his 
instruction; hence, his original claims are discredited. Socrates and Antisthenes’ 
double-act combines light-hearted and serious criticism to undermine Niceratus’ 
argument fatally, thus permitting a critique of the education offered by hoi kaloi 
kagathoi andres whilst the educational process is underway. The result is to 
elevate Socrates, not Niceratus, to the position of ho sophotatos in place of
Homer.
In this respect, the Niceratus episode supports Gray’s opinion that 
Xenophon’s Socratic writings adapt the Greek tradition of wisdom literature to 
present Socrates as the wise man of his generation.85 86Socrates not only fulfils 
this role by deploying Socratic methods but questions the validity of earlier 
claimants to the title as well. However, the wisdom of past authorities, and 
indeed of fifth-century sophists, is not dismissed out of hand. Over the course of 
the symposion, Socrates quotes Theognis and uses the words of Gorgias to 
outline good drinking practices; and in his speech on erds, the philosopher makes 
use of Homeric epic twice.
However, Socrates employs the words of past poets and contemporary 
sophists in quite different ways from Niceratus. Niceratus memorises Homeric 
verse so that he might learn about all aspects of human experience. Socrates, on
85 Gray, 1992, and 1998. See also chapter 5, page 228-229.
86 Xen. Snip. 2.26.4-7.1 (Gorgias); 8.30.3-5, 31.1-7 (Homer).
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the other hand, uses the wisdom of other men as a spring board to discuss his 
own ideas. Gorgias’ advice to drink little cups and often is harnessed by 
Socrates to promote a playful atmosphere in the Symposium.™ Further, 
Xenophon and Socrates build Gorgias’ observation into the shape of the 
symposion-, the small, but oft-filled, cup provides an analogy for the short bursts 
of entertainment which shape the symposion. Similarly, Socrates quotes the lines 
from Theognis to provoke a conversation on the learning of kalokagathia. 
Using the philosopher’s guiding hand, Xenophon puts this piece of wisdom to 
the test. Tlirough the claims and counter-claims of the symposiasts, his reader is 
invited to consider the validity of Theognis and Socrates’ advice. Finally, when 
Socrates quotes Homer, he corrects the epic poet, and reveals what he really 
meant to say; and he refers to the Homeric relationship between Achilles and 
Patroclus to facilitate his own discussion of pederastic relations. 87 88 9 Homer’s 
characters, and the mythological lovers of other songs, do not provide a model 
for eros\ nor are Pausanias’ opinions on the value of an army of lovers 
affirmed.90 Significantly, Socrates begins his comments on Homer, Pausanias
87 Xen. Smp. 2.26.4-27.1.
88 XQii.Smp.2A-6.
89 Xen. Smp. 8.30.4-8; 8.31.1-7.
90 Xen. Smp. 8.31-34. Socrates’ discussion of Pausanias’ opinions has elicited much excitement 
from scholars concerned with die relationship between Plato’s and Xenophon’s Symposia. 
Xenophon’s reporting of an opinion attributed to Pausanias (but spoken by Phaedrus in Plato’s 
Symposium) is perceived as evidence that Xenophon has copied Plato. See Dover, 1965; 
Thesleff, 1978. However, whether, as Huss, 1999a: 415-417, asserts, Xenophon is drawing 
imperfectly from Plato’s text or die known opinions of die historical Pausanias does not matter 
here. Socrates treats ‘Pausanias’ as an authority on die topic of male sexual relations, whose 
opinions are open to his challenge.
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and the poets by calling to Niceratus as if to say ‘look, Niceratus, this is how it’s 
done’ 91 Competing authorities from the past and present are to be used, thought 
with and explored; they should not be taken as straightforward lessons in human
affairs.
The Niceratus episode once again raises the question of how kalokagathia 
might be learned. Like their literary counterparts in other texts, Socrates and 
Antisthenes indicate to their audience that sophistic education does not divulge 
important hidden messages.92 Learning Homeric epic is not useful, and does not 
transform those who know it into andres agathoi. It cannot enable men to make 
other men more excellent unless it is deployed in the correct (Socratic) way.
Hence, Niceratus’ implicit promise to make his audience better remains 
unfulfilled. However, the symposiasts still learn from the performance. 
Socrates’ deployment of verses and opinions attributed to other so-called 
authorities invites the watching symposiasts to think about how they might 
legitimately interact with these sources of wisdom to their personal benefit. And 
it encourages the reader to think about the style and content of his education,
rather than dictate to him how it should be.
91 Xen. Smp. 8.31.1-2.
92 According to Diogenes Laertius (6.16) Antisthenes wrote Of the Sophists: a Work on 
Physiognomy. This may have made him a suitable companion for Socrates in the attack on 
Niceratus. However, Antisthenes’ argument is not known.
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The Beauty o f Critoboulus
t! yap oo, §<pq, (S Kpvrofou^e, bit r'tvi peyiorov cppoveic;;
’ EtcI KaXXei, bcpq.
41H obv Kai <5u, ecpq 6 ZcoKpaxpc;, e^eiq Xeyeiv 6ti tco a© KaX?vei 
'iKavog el feXTloug rjpag Ttoieiv;
E’l Se piq, SrjXov ye 6ti <pab?tog cpavobpai.
‘And you, Critoboulus’, he said, ‘what are you most proud of?’
‘Beauty (hallos)', he said.
‘And so you too’, said Socrates, ‘will be able to say that you are 
capable of improving us by your beauty?’
‘If not, it is clear that I will appear phaulos'. (Xen. Smp. 3.7.1-6)
Xenophon’s critique of education continues with Critoboulus’ account of the 
value of hallos (beauty). Like Niceratus, Critoboulus presents himself as an 
authority on the subject. Moreover, he not only tells his companions how he 
improves other men but uses his body to support his argument. The result is an 
investigation into the role of physical beauty in kalokagathia which highlights 
the risk it poses to the viewing halos kagathos as much as it seeks to define it. 
Like his forthcoming beauty competition with Socrates, Critoboulus’ statements 
about beauty and its effects discuss, but also problematise, an integral component 
of kalokagathia.
The subject of Critoboulus’ pride is ostensibly his physical beauty, which 
he cherishes for the influence it has on other men. However, his introductory 
joke exposes the problem of trying to dissociate the physical aspects of hallos 
from the moral. His witty juxtaposition of hallos and phaulos discloses the
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extent to which the physical qualities of beauty are moralised and socialised 
within the abstract compound kalokagathia. Critoboulus is proud of his beauty, 
and its supposed ability to make his fellow symposiasts more agathos; however, 
if cannot demonstrate his point he will appear phaulos. Like kalos, the adjective 
phaulos has several connotations. Huss notes that elsewhere in the Symposium, 
phaulos is placed in opposition to agathos, but outside the text it is used to 
describe the opposite of chrestos, ‘useful’, spoudaios, ‘serious’ or ‘excellent’, 
and sophos, ‘wise’.93 And, as discussed in chapter 3, in sociological terms it 
implies low status and vulgarity. In addition, phaulos might connote physical 
ugliness. Bowen and Huss both opt for the sense of ‘useless’ in their 
translations. This fits Socrates’ later attempt to define its opposite, kalos, as 
‘useful’; yet, it does not really convey its full meaning. After all, in the beauty 
competition Critoboulus exemplifies to kalon as physical beauty, and, alongside 
the judges, fails to be convinced by Socrates’ redefinition.94 Further, by leaving 
the meaning of phaulos open, the connotations of Critoboulus’ dilemma become 
more clear. If he cannot prove that his beauty benefits others, Critoboulus admits 
that he will be far from useful, excellent, or wise; in other words, completely 
lacking the qualities which raise him above the phauloi. Huss moves towards 
understanding this irony with the explanation, ‘wenn er sich hier nicht als 
dya06<; beweist, ist er auch kein Ka?td<; KayaOd^’.95 But the point Critoboulus 
makes is that he will no longer be kalos, nor kalos kagathos. His physical beauty 
will be called into question because of his inability to defend his proposal and
93 Huss, 1999a: 192.
94 The beauty competition is examined in chapter 4, pages 183ff.
95 Huss, 1999a: 192.
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improve others by his beauty. Thus, Critoboulus recognises that by contending 
to improve men through his physical beauty, he puts his moral and social status
to the test.
Critoboulus begins his argument by proving that he is beautiful on the 
grounds that his fellow symposiasts recognise him as such.96 He then describes 
the positive effects which Cleinias’ beauty has on him: he will gladly sacrifice 
his money and freedom, and risk his life, for his beloved.97 Like Niceratus, 
Critoboulus caps Callias’ claim to make men better. He asserts that by being 
beautiful, he is more just than his host; therefore, he leads men towards even 
greater virtue.98 By describing the qualities which the beautiful man inspires in 
those who desire him, Critoboulus composes a list of behaviours which define 
the man whose arete is complete. These include freedom in one’s spending, a 
love of ponos (stylised aristocratic toil) and of beauty, even in the face of danger, 
self-control and a sense of shame.99 However, his pride lies in his ability to 
strengthen these virtues, to make men more virtuous than they already are. His 
audience, who Critoboulus believes would go through fire for him, become more 
agathos on account of his beauty.100 In this analysis, arete becomes elided with 
to agathon and both are dependent upon hallos for their existence.
96 Xen. Smp. 4.10.
97 Xen. Smp. 4.11-12; 14.
98 Xen. Smp. 4.15.1-3
99 For ponos as stylised aristocratic toil (athletics, hunting, estate management) which exists in 
opposition to tire erga (productive works) of the common people, see Johnstone, 1994. And on 
tlie arislocratic/democratic virtue of phitokalia, see above, chapter 3, page 136.
*°° Xen. Smp. 4.16.2-4.
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Critoboulus’ words instructs his fellow symposiasts in the virtues 
associated with the perfect kalos kagathos, while his physical beauty works to 
promote those qualities within them. However, Critoboulus is not the only 
beauty in the andron. Physical beauty, combined with sophrosyne and a sense of 
shame, are Autolycus’ defining features. Moreover, Critoboulus addresses 
Caliias and the symposion at large as ‘we men of beauty’, (hemas tons kalous).101 
This emphasis reminds the reader that Critoboulus is not the only symposiast to 
exert an influence on his companions. Not unlike Theognis, he asserts that 
beautiful symposiasts become more virtuous simply by mixing together.
Like the symposiasts whom he addresses, Critoboulus is both kalos and a 
lover of kallos. Thus, he procures for himself the qualities of arete which he 
inspires in others, and which are strengthened within him. However, 
Critoboulus’ speech undermines this position. The impression which 
Critoboulus gives of himself is not that of a self-controlled kalos kagathos, but an 
intemperate lecher who loses all sense of propriety and decorum on catching 
sight of the object of his desire. His promise to improve others through his good 
looks actually highlights the damage kallos can also do to the kalos kagathos.
Critoboulus’ desire for the beautiful Cleinias is marked primarily by his 
loss of self-control. He would happily spend all day looking at his beloved at the 
expense of everything else in his life.102 He becomes angry with night-time 
because he cannot see his beloved and is grateful to the sun because it reveals
101 Xen. Stop. 4.15.3.
102 Xen. Smp. 4.12.1-4.
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Cleinias to his gaze.103 And, although he claims that his arete increases, he also
says,
f]8iov 5’ dv SouXsboipi p fe^euQepog eLqv, et gov KAeiviag 
apxsiv §0eXor.
It would be sweeter if I were a slave than free, if Cleinias wished to
rule me. (Xen. Smp, 4.14.3-4)
In short, Critoboulus admits to acting, and demonstrates willingness to act, in a 
way which is at odds with his status as a free man. In the discussion on perfume, 
Socrates tells his audience that it is important for free men to distinguish 
themselves from slaves not only by their scent, but also the means by which they 
attain it.104 105 106However, Critoboulus would happily surrender his free status in 
return for Cleinias’ affection. In Plato’s Symposium, Pausanias asserts that 
Athens indulges free men who submit themselves to slavish behaviour when it is 
done under the influence of eros.iQ5 But Critoboulus’ physical reactions to 
Cleinias place him in opposition to the model of the free, self-controlled lover 
personified in Callias’ response to Autolycus’ beauty, and later attributed to 
Hermogenes.
As discussed in chapter 4, the symposiast inspired by sophron erds holds 
his eyes affectionately, moderates his voice and holds himself more freely.506
103 Xen. Smp. 4.12.4-13.1.
104 Xen. Smp. 2.33-4.7.
105 Pl. Smp. 183a.
106 Xen. Smp. 1.10.4-7; 83.4-6.
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However, Critoboulus does not look at Cleinias affectionately but stares 
incessantly. Indeed, Socrates’ says Critoboulus resembles one of those hoi tas 
Gorgonas theomenoi, ‘who see Gorgons’. Instead of conducting his gestures in a 
moderate way, making himself more like a free man, he remains completely still. 
In comparison, the fast-flowing pace and enthusiastic tone of Critoboulus’ 
description of his desire for Cleinias is far from ‘soothing’. His conversation 
with Socrates reveals that Critoboulus’ passion is more akin to the kind derided 
earlier by Xenophon. The immoderate lover appears more gorgonesque 
{gorgoteros), sounds fearful (phoberoteros) and gestures violently 
(sphodroteros},107 Critoboulus cannot stop thinking about Cleinias, so when he 
talks about him he become enthusiastic and excitable.108 Thus, he is not the 
model of someone aidemonesteros te kai enkratesteros, but is thoroughly subject 
to his passions.109
Critoboulus’ speech and his subsequent conversation problematise the 
role of beauty in kalokagathia. It is an intrinsic part of the formula; yet, like 
andreia and sophia, it can be damaging to the kalos kagathos. Beauty, or more 
precisely the act of admiring it, carries the potential for loss of sophrosyne and 
self-control (enkrateia) in the admirer, which might be witnessed through his 
physical reactions. Whoever looks at the kalos kagathos, enthused by 
immoderate Eros, will not see a free man inspired to greater arete. Enslaved by 
his passions, the actions of this man make him a spectacle of all that is not free.
107 Xen. Smp. 1.10.2-4. Cf. chapter 4, pages 190-193.
108 Xen. Smp. 4.21.2-3, and 3ff.
109 Xen. Smp. 4.15.6.
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Critoboulus’ portrait of his erotic desire for beautiful Cleinias feeds into a 
wider discourse on the dangers of erds which permeates Xenophon’s symposion. 
Socrates blames Critoboulus’ derisible state on the physical consummation of his 
passion. Kissing arouses sweet hopes which any man capable of moderation 
must avoid.110 This observation sheds light on the philosopher’s attempts to 
restrain erds in the symposion and prefigures the sentiments articulated in his 
coming speech. There, Socrates recommends spiritual love over sexual 
gratification. The lover cannot make his beloved agathos whilst his behaviour is 
poneros', nor can he teach him modesty and temperance if he himself is 
immodest and intemperate.111 112 113 114In the Memorabilia, similar opinions are 
expressed when Critoboulus is again chided for having succumbed to the passion 
of kisses from good-looking boys. Socrates informs his interlocutor, Xenophon, 
that the normally sober {sophronikos} and cautious (pronoetikos) Critoboulus has 
become rash (thrasus}, foolish (anoetos) and fool-hardy (rhipsokindimos)n2 
Once a man has kissed a beauty he looses his freedom and becomes like a slave, 
caring nothing for the affairs of kaloi kagathoi Similarly, Agesilaus receives 
Xenophon’s praise for avoiding the kisses of Megabates. Xeneophon asks if 
Agesilaus’ reticence is not indeed to sophronema kai Han gennikon, ‘an instance 
of exceedingly noble temperance’. Agesilaus’ ability to control Aphrodite earns 
him the accolade of being ‘worth remembering’ (axion mnesthenai)n4
110 Xen. Smp. 4.25.1-26.2.
111 Xen. Smp. 8.27.3-7.
112 Xen. Mem. 1.3.8-9.
113 Xen. Mem. 1.3.11.
114 Xen.^ges. 5.4.
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Critoboulus’ discussion of beauty plays an important part in Hindley’ s 
argument that throughout his works, Xenophon sets up his own acceptance of 
male-male sexual relations as different from, if not quite in opposition to, 
Socrates’ stricter approach?15 Hindley takes seriously Critoboulus’ claim to 
inspire virtue in others and maintains that combined with his representation in the 
Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, Xenophon ‘advocates a temperate course in 
which the self-disciplined man can nonetheless enjoy a positive epcog, and in 
which physical consummation is tempered with respect for the beloved, body and 
soul’.115 16 117I would be more cautious in attributing the views of Xenophon’s 
characters (even when they purport to be ‘Xenophon’ himself) to the author and 
the real-life Socrates than Hindley, or recognising developments in his thoughts. 
When located within the nexus of erotic discourse which permeates the 
Symposium, no such claims for ‘Xenophon’s opinions’ can be made. The 
character of Critoboulus, through his speech and reported actions, exposes the 
dangers inherent in beauty and its concomitant sexual desire for the kalos 
kagathos. Although Socrates’ attempts to eject erds from the symposion are 
critiqued by Xenophon’s inclusion of erds within it, ‘sober desire’ is equated 
with the symposiasts’ physical responses. No attempt is made to promote a ‘way
of moderation’, which Hindley implies Xenophon promotes over Socrates’
• 117views.
115 Hindley, 1999. Hindley’s theory builds on liis earlier work on Xenophon’s Hellenica, which 
asserts tliat Xenophon thought tliat sexual relations between men could be honourable and 
provoke men to valour: cf. Hindley, 1994: 365.
116 Hindley, 1999: 87-88; 89.
117 Hindley, 1999: 97.
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Physical beauty, to kallos, emerges from the Symposium's discussion as a 
stimulus towards, and indeed an intrinsic part of, kalokagathia. It both serves to 
define the kalos kagathos and influences his arete. However, by inducing erds, 
kallos may be detrimental as well as beneficial to its viewers. While it can 
provoke men to live more freely, perform better in dangerous situations and 
heighten their sense of shame and self-control, it can also make them act 
slavishly and shamefully. Critoboulus embodies this duality. He proposes to 
make men more agathos and inspire them towards arete by his beauty; yet, his 
reaction to Cleinias’ beauty makes him less agathos. Critoboulus’ speech acts 
out this dilemma for his audience. Like the gelotopoios, his performance in the 
symposion and his reaction to Cleinias warn the symposiasts, and Xenophon’s 
readers, of the risks involved in being kalos kagathos. There is only a thin line 
between kalokagathia, arete, sophrosyne, enkrateia and eleutheria and negative 
counterparts. When he first proclaimed his pride in his own beauty, Critoboulus 
said that if he could not demonstrate how his beauty makes men more excellent, 
he would be phaulos. Ironically, by reporting his reactions to the beautiful 
Cleinias, he discloses that he is indeed phaulos. The lesson Critoboulus 
ultimately provides for his fellow symposiasts is quite different from that which 
he initially imagines, but it is a lesson in kalokagathia nonetheless.
Poor Charmides
Charmides’ speech in favour of poverty over wealth also offers its audience 
lessons which differ considerably from its speaker’s intentions. However, his
instruction differs in form from that of Niceratus and Critoboulus because it can
only be fully appreciated by the reading audience outside the symposion.
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Charmides argues that he is proud of his poverty, because it allows him to 
lead a better life than wealth. His opening comments expose the criteria by 
which he makes this judgement:
OOkouv to8s pev, txprj, bpo^oyeiTat, KpeuTOv elvai Oappeiv fj 
tpopeioOai Kai feXeoGepov elvai gaAAov fj SouZeueiv Kai 
OepaTceneoOai paXXov fj 0epa7teneiv Kai TtioTebecOai Otto if}<;
7taTpi5og pa^Zov fj (bnoTeloOai.
‘Very well’, he said, ‘this is agreed: it is better to be courageous than 
fearful, to be free rather than a slave, to receive attentions rather than 
give them, and to be trusted by one’s fatherland rather than 
distrusted.’ (Xen. 4.29.3-30.1)
By citing common agreement, Charmides appeals to the support of his fellow 
symposiasts, and lends his thesis the authority of society at large. With four 
oppositions, he presents a model of good and bad behaviour which corresponds 
to the specific details of his subsequent argument.118 On the good side are 
bravery, freedom, being attended to, and having the trust of one’s fatherland; on 
the bad are fearfulness, servility, attending on others and being distrusted by the 
city. As a rich man, Charmides’ actions showed him to belong to the latter 
group: he was afraid of burglars and attackers, looked after sycophants, spent 
money on the city and could not escape it.119 Now that he has no property, he is
118 Huss, 1999a: 258, usefully schematises the relationship between the opening observations 
and tlie content of liis speech in a table of opposition.
119 Xen. Smp. 4.30.
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trusted by the city, nobody threatens him, the state pays him money and he can 
leave the city hos e leather os, ‘like a free man’.120
Further, Charmides rounds up the benefits of a poor life with the
comment,
Kai e’lpl vbv psv Tupavvco feoiKdx;, totc 8s oaipdx; 8ouA.oc; fjv.
‘I am now like a tyrant, but then I was clearly a slave’. (Xen. Smp.
4.32.1-2)
He denies free status to Athens’ wealthy elite, outlining the ways by which the 
city treated him as a slave: as a rich man he paid money to the state and in return 
received abuse for the company he kept. However, as a free man, he is also a 
tyrant. In his history of the so-called Peloponnesian war, Thucydides painted a 
picture of the Athenian democracy under Pericles as a principate.121 By contrast, 
Charmides describes his contemporary polis as a city of tyrants. Charmides 
lauds himself as a courageous, free and trusted citizen whilst also voicing the 
kind of anti-democratic rhetoric which might be expected of oligarchic 
sympathisers.
Thus, a strong sense of irony underwrites Charmides’ supposed 
enjoyment of the life of a free man. To gain his freedom, Charmides has been 
forced to give up the markers of his elite, aristocratic status. He owns no 
property, is not courted by sycophants, and no longer performs the liturgies
120 Xen. Sw/p. 4.31.5.
121 Th. 2.65.
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through which Athens’ aristocrats could act as beneficiaries to the democratic 
polis and compete with one another for time.122 He glories in his role as a 
tyrant-citizen. Yet, here he sits in the symposion., at the heart of elite society. 
Like a good kalos kagathos he improves his fellow symposiasts, educating them 
with his discussion of bravery, freedom, slavery, and polis life - in other words, 
kalokagathia.
This irony extends beyond the walls of the andron and embraces the 
reader’s knowledge about the historical Charmides. The citizen who now flaunts 
the city’s trust died at the hands of Athens’ returning democrats whilst serving on 
the oligarchic Board of Ten.123 Whilst involved in this government, Charmides 
became infamous for confiscating land from his political opponents and, indeed, 
other citizens too.124 Thus, the ‘good democrat’ stance which Charmides 
assumes in his speech is quite incompatible with his real-life aristocratic and 
oligarchic activities. For the audience of the Symposium who knows his history, 
and has perhaps read or listened to Xenophon’s Memorabilia too, the contrast 
between the real-life figure and the man whom Charmides presents himself as is
remarkable.
Knowledge of Charmides’ historical persona thus imbues his speech with 
a deeper sense of irony, affecting the understanding of both Charmides’ 
immediate audience and the reader of the Symposium. Charmides’ internal 
audience can appreciate the irony of their aristocratic friend claiming to embrace
122 See Wilson. 2000.
123 Xen. Hell. 2.4.19.
124 Xen. Hell. 2.3.21; Lys. 12.6-20.
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poverty and gain benefit from a democratic life.125 Charmides talks up the 
drawbacks associated with aristocratic life, whilst being the epitome of that 
lifestyle. In content and position, Charmides’ speech stands in close proximity to 
Antisthenes’ praise of wealth. On the surface, both men appear to argue 
something quite inimical to their ‘known’ personae.126 However, in the end 
Antisthenes actually praises poverty as wealth, and Charmides’ commendation of 
poverty and democracy is insincere. However, the full impact of Charmides’ 
irony can only be appreciated by the reader of the Symposium, who also knows 
about his role in the city following Athens’ defeat by Sparta. Charmides does 
not intend his allegation that being a poor citizen gives a man courage and makes 
him trusted and free to be taken seriously. Charmides’ account of polis life is 
therefore not an endorsement of the democratic city. It outlines ways in which 
aristocrats and oligarchs might think about their place within the city. When he 
alleges that the poor are courageous rather than afraid, free rather than slave, 
cared for rather than caring for others, he does not intend to praise poor citizens 
but to outline the negative consequences of democracy. Within the democratic 
city, the aristocrats cannot be free and brave. Charmides’ speech enhances and 
politicises the symposiasts’ understanding of kalokagathia.
Yet, the future oligarch also offers his audience a more subversive lesson 
in kalokagathia, whose terminology he strikingly never deploys. His account 
discloses how a political radical, a counter-insurgent, might hide in the demos.
125 On tliis topos Huss, 1999a: 257.
126 Antisthenes’ reported stance against pleasure (D.L. 6.3) and luxury (D.L. 6.8) make liis 
supposed pride in wealth (Xen. Smp. 3.8) surprising, as Hermogenes’ questions imply. However, 
liis speech on ‘tlie wealth of one’s soul’ (4.34-44) quickly sets about redefining wealth and luxury 
in a more expected way.
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In his speeches on pandering and erds, Socrates discusses how the symposiasts 
might best use their relationships to benefit themselves in the city. Charmides 
too advances a way in which the kalos kagathos might take part in its politics. 
By adopting a demotic persona, the kalos kagathos might appear to be a good 
citizen and bide his time until an opportunity to reveal his true self appears.
Charmides’ representation of aristocratic life within the democratic city 
reflects Hiero’s depiction of his experiences as a tyrant in Syracuse. Charmides 
complains that as a rich man he was fearfi.il that men would break into his house 
and hurt him. He was distrusted by the city, and obliged to give it money.127 In 
Hiero, the tyrant laments that no-one trusts him and he lives in fear of his life.
Further, Simonides tells him that he should contribute to athletic and dramatic 
festivals from his private funds.128 These similarities signal an analogy between 
Charmides’ kalos kagathos and the tyrant. Xenophon uses Charmides’ 
contribution to alert his reader to the transiency of boundaries between being 
slave and free, slave and tyrant, and tyrant and free.
Lessons from the Symposion and or the Symposium?
As a meeting-place for kaloi kagathoi Xenophon’s symposion provides the 
perfect location to explore Socrates’ promise that ‘you will learn good from the 
good’. By mixing together and talking to one another, the symposiasts should 
(as Socrates hopes) benefit one another. However, this process is made 
problematic by Xenophon’s characterisation of his kaloi kagathoi and by their 
own performances. Callias, Niceratus and Critoboulus declare that they make
127 Xen. Smp. 4.30.1-2
128 Xen.///er. 4.1-5; 2.8-12.
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men better. Rather than prove this, however, their epideixeis open them up to 
attack. Together, Antisthenes and Socrates scrutinise their arguments, 
highlighting the symposiasts’ pretensions. Further, Critoboulus’ speech 
undermines its author’s position from within. These contributions do provide 
lessons for the symposiasts, but, as we have seen, they are not the lessons which 
their speakers originally intended. Thus, the idea of the symposion as a place for 
learning ‘good from the good’ is called into question. Can symposiasts who 
cannot even teach one another correctly learn kalokagathia without the guidance
of Socrates?
Charmides’ playfully ironic speech strengthens the sense that the kaloi 
kagathoi are not privy to the full lesson of the symposion. Although they can 
identify Charmides’ irony for themselves, the Symposium's external reader or 
listener is better placed to appreciate and benefit from his instruction. 
Knowledge about the symposiasts’ public reputations, social lives and political 
careers sheds light on their performances. For example, Callias’ insistence that 
he teaches kalokagathia to men by giving them money conflicts with the picture 
of the lecherous philanderer known from the plays of Eupolis and Andocides’ 
speeches (and perhaps other now inaccessible sources). Furthermore, familiarity 
with Xenophon’s other works and the Socratic dialogues of Plato allows the 
reader to appreciate the flaws in Niceratus’ sophistic/Homeric model of 
education more clearly than the listening symposiast. Indeed, the quotations 
which Niceratus chooses to deploy as evidence for his argument conspicuously 
direct the reader towards Plato’s Ion. Finally, if somewhat obviously, the reader 
of the Symposium can more readily bring the various performances of the 
evening into conjunction with one another than the participants in the symposion.
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Xenophon’s authorial comment draws the reader’s attention to Callias as a model 
of sober erds. Thus, when Critoboulus gives an account of his own reaction to 
the beautiful Cleinias, the Symposium's audience is better placed to realise the 
incongruity of his argument than his fellow symposiasts.
Callias’ symposion provides a forum for the discussion of kalokagathia. 
It singles out andreia, kallos and to kalon, dikaiosyne, sophrosyne, and sophia as 
virtues subsumed within the kalos kagathos. Moreover, education, exercise, 
wealth, the gymnasion, the symposion and the polis are sites for its expression, 
assertion and exploration. In this sense, Xenophon’s investigation into 
kalokagathia reflects the problem of redefining it for a fourth-century elite which 
must operate within the democratic polis. Although its component virtues are 
brought into view, kalokagathia really gains its meaning through the actions of 
the kalos kagathos. By providing a forum for discussing these actions, the 
educational symposion becomes implicated in the very process of creating 
kalokagathia. By mixing together, the kaloi kagathoi come towards a better 
understanding of kalokagathia. Like Socrates in the Memorabilia, whose 
discussion of similar themes and topics leads men to be kalos kagathos, the 
symposiasts lead one another to be kalos kagathos.
However, at the same time as Xenophon sets up the symposion as a place 
for learning kalokagathia, he challenges its efficiency. His Symposium, a literary 
reconstruction, provides a much better opportunity for exploring kalokagathia. 
It is more efficacious to learn good from good by reading about kaloi kagathoi in 
a written epideixis than by actually mixing with them in the symposion. Towards 
the end of the symposion, Socrates can still say that Hermogenes melts for desire
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of kalokagathia ‘whatever kalokagathia is’ {ho ti pot' estin he kalokagathia) ,129 
By reading the Symposium, we reach a much clearer (though in no sense 
definitive) understanding than the symposiasts.
Xenophon thus makes a claim for paideia conducted through the medium 
of writing against the traditional symposion. While Caliias’ drinking is 
spontaneous and vibrant, and not (as Dupont would have it) a fossilised event, 
Socrates’ mediating presence alone cannot realise its educational potential. The 
performances of the symposiasts and the hired entertainers combine to provide a 
lesson in how to do a symposion, but the resultant symposion is not up to the task. 
The symposion only provides a useful lesson when it is viewed through the 
textual filter of the Symposium.
In the late fifth- and fourth-century, Athens became a site of increased 
‘textualisation’. Not only were manuscripts increasingly available and reported 
as being read by groups and individuals, but the words reproduced on them 
became ‘texts’, or ‘fixed and isolated verbal constructs demanding a special form 
of appreciation’.130 Manuscripts from the fourth century made use of technical 
devices which facilitate their reading, and writers began deploying techniques 
like acrostics which can only be appreciated when read.131 Moreover, 
Thucydides and Plato incorporated strategies for enabling their audiences to
129 Xen. Smp. 8.33-4.
130 For references to individual and communal reading in Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon, 
see Knox, 1985: 9-12. This definition of ‘textualisation’ is offered by Ford, 2003: 19.
131 On the availability of manuscripts, see Knox, 1985: 9-10, and on tlie Teaderly writer’
Chaeremon’s acrostics, see Ford, 2003: 18.
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• • 132navigate within their written works which also enhanced their own arguments. 
The speeches in Thucydides’ history were artistically constructed to deprive 
them of authority outside of the moment in which they were spoken within the 
text. This permitted an ‘open-ended critical reading’ which aided Thucydides’ 
audience in his search for clarity and truth.132 33 Plato also exploited this open- 
endedness to investigate the place of writing in the Socratic method.134
Yunis uses these observations to envisage three reading audiences for 
classical texts: firstly, readers and listeners who simply enjoyed the text at face 
value; secondly, readers like teachers, scholars, and priests who appreciated their 
‘open-endedness’; and thirdly, a narrow group of ‘critical readers’ who 
recognised the need to decipher the distinction between word and meaning in 
order to uncover the latter.135 This final reader sounds surprisingly modern, 
reflecting a notion that texts demand to be read in particular, ‘critical’ ways 
simply because they are texts. However, the disjunction between word and 
meaning has only dominated the reading of a select group of scholars for the past 
fifty or so years. Further, Ford’s study on early literary criticism uncovers an 
ancient engagement with structure and form and with the written text as a 
mimetic art form.136 For Isocrates, the value of written texts lies not in their 
ability to convey the ‘truth’ but to ‘transcend mere depiction and construct a
132 Yunis. 2003b. On Plato’s manipulation of the textual nature of his Symposium, see Halperin, 
1992, discussed in chapter 5, page 252.
13j hi other words, by giving tlie speeches authority only within tlie text, Thucydides invited liis 
reader to assess their validity for themselves. See Yunis, 2003b: 199-204.
134 See Yunis, 2003b: 204-207; Halperin, 1992.
135 Yunis, 2003b: 211-212.
136 Ford, 2002: 229-249.
LEARNING TO BE KALOS KAGATHOS 313
representation that reaches the inner character and motives of his subject’. It is 
just this level of reading which Xenophon aims at with his written composition 
of gnomai which portray the deeds of men whose actions are axiomnemoneuta.
Moreover, although an increased awareness of the possibilities inherent in 
writing influenced the construction of written texts, it is not necessary to imagine 
them being read for an ‘open-ended analysis’ to take place. Indeed, the verb 
akouein served to indicate both ‘reader’ and ‘listener’.137 38 The episodic nature of 
the symposion, which guides the Symposium's audience towards thinking about 
kalokagathia in a specific way, is equally as accessible to the listener as the 
reader. After all, punctuation and paragraphing were still in their infancy, and 
searching for something in a papyrus scroll (as Socrates and Critoboulus do) 
might not have been an easy task.139 The Symposium need not be read by a 
solitary, silent reader in order for it to be re-read.140
137 Ford. 2002: 240.
138 In Aristotle’s Poetics (1453b3-7), ho akouon is tlie reader or listener who experiences 
tragedy through tlie written text, as opposed to the viewer who watches tlie play performed. Cf. 
Ford, 2003: 20. Note, however, tliat Xenophon {Symposium 7.3.2-5) uses tlie less ambiguous 
anagignoskein to conjure up the spectacle of someone reading and writing whilst spinning around
on a wheel.
539 Turner, 1987: 5-19, charts the development of different types of 'punctuation’ inserted by 
scribes to aid a manuscript’s reader. The paragraphs, a horizontal stroke placed between lines to 
mark the end of a segment, is mentioned by Isocrates {Antidosis 59), Hypereides {Against 
Demosthenes fr. cl) and Aristotle {Rhetoric 1409a20), but only found in fiftli- and fourth-century 
inventories and catalogues. Tlie dicolon (:), another separating device, was used in fourth- 
century manuscripts of comic plays and Platonic dialogues to indicate a change of speaker. Some 
other forms of punctuation are found in manuscripts of Alcaeus, Bacchylides and Demosthenes.
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Thus, the Symposium appeals equally to listening and reading audiences 
who are alert to the possible intricacies of Xenophon’s literary representations 
and not only to the reader determined to analyse the text to uncover hidden 
meanings. Furthermore, the images which Xenophon constructs are deployed 
towards overtly philosophical ends: namely, the investigation into kalokagathia, 
and how it might be learned. Xenophon calls for a style of ‘reading’ whereby the 
reader or listener improves his understanding through the written Symposium', at 
the same time, he promotes the educational value of his text. Thus, Xenophon 
challenges contemporary educational practices. Robb’s study of literacy and 
paideia implies that writing continued to be used primarily as an aid to 
memorising and performing instructive verse down into the middle of the fourth 
century.141 Even the new education advocated by Plato in the Republic continues 
to focus on these skills.142 Yet in the Symposium, this form of training is
but as Turner notes (10-11), it is unclear whether these go back to the original ‘author’, or are a 
consequence of the copyist importing later habits into old texts.
l4° However, recent articles by Gavrilov, 1997, and Bumyeat, 1997, suggest tliat silent reading 
in the ancient period was more widespread than tlie earlier focus on orality allowed. See 
Gavrilov’s Appendix (70-71) for a list of fifth- and fourth-century passages which seem to imply 
silent reading. In Thucydides’ ‘programmatic statement’ (1.22), Yunis, 2003b: 199, identifies 
three structural and interrelated oppositions between i) written and oral performance, ii) truth and 
fiction, and iii) what is useful and pleasing. However, he does not make clear that tlie historian 
hopes his work will not only be heard once but will be a possession for all time; he does not 
demand tliat his text be physically read. The emphasis (as Yunis recognises) is not on tlie 
difference between reading and listening to an oral performance, but between conveying 
messages in oral and written form.
141 Robb, 1994: 188.
142 Robb, 1994: 192-197. Pl. Rep. 376e ff.
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critiqued through Niceratus’ contribution to the round of speaking, an underlying 
scepticism regarding sophists, and Socrates’ new method for learning from past 
authorities. Unlike Niceratus, Socrates memorises poems in order to extract 
wisdom from them. Like the performances of the symposiasts, the songs of the 
symposion become reference points for his further investigations. At the same 
time as the ‘wonders’ of the symposion encourage the symposiasts to inquire into 
kalokagathia, Xenophon’s written record performs the same task for its audience.
In conclusion, Xenophon’s Symposium purports to display the playful and 
serious deeds of the kaloi kagathoi which are ‘worth remembering’. The various 
performances by the symposiasts, the dancing troupe, the gelotopoios and 
Socrates combine to promote an event characterised by viewing and performing, 
a mixture of playfulness and seriousness. Together Socrates and Xenophon 
construct the symposion as a place for learning how to do a symposion, where 
learning, experiencing and negotiating kalokagathia are central to the sympotic 
experience. However, the lesson which the Symposium provides turns in upon 
itself. The participants in this symposion do not accept Socrates’ ideas for a good 
symposion. And they do not learn kalokagathia from one another. Only the 
Symposium's reader can learn the lessons of the symposion. By visiting the 
symposion, and its constituent parts again and again, he can engage in a process 
which teaches him about kalokagathia, and leads him towards being kalos 
kagathos. Xenophon not only asserts his primacy over Socrates, but the primacy 
of the written Symposium qnqt the real-life symposion.
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Conclusion
This thesis began by positioning itself against current methodological approaches 
to the institution of the symposion. Modern scholars have performed the 
worthwhile task of establishing the Greek drinking party as a viable object of 
historical investigation. Yet, my investigations have shown that their pictures of 
the symposion are sometimes distorted by their approaches to the relevant 
sources. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the symposion gained shape as a 
sociologically significant institution, where elite members of the polis gathered 
to drink and sing; in the process they affirmed friendships and explored 
individual and communal identities. However, this symposion originally derived 
from the application of anthropological theories about homosociality and 
commensality, theories which are themselves now undergoing reassessment. 
Homeric epic, lyric poetry, and Athenian figured vases were all treated equally, 
despite having different relationships to the symposion. For example, epic poetry 
described Homeric feasting (whatever its relationship to ‘reality’ may have 
been), whilst lyric poetry and Athenian vases were both used in archaic and 
classical symposia, and sometimes recreated the symposion for their listening and 
viewing audiences. Despite these differences, these sources became direct 
evidence for the symposion. And as the varied readings of lyric poetry show, 
this evidence could be selected and read to say whatever scholars desired.
My thesis has hopefully provided an antidote to some of the more 
uncritical approaches. It has focused exclusively on representations of the 
symposion, instead of combining them with the poetiy, vases or images 
employed within the andron. I maintain that these representations do not simply
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depict reality, but re-present the symposion according to their author’s ambitions 
for it. While the ‘meaning’ of the symposion is shaped to some degree by the 
ambitions of the author, it also depends on the interaction between text and 
reader.1 The represented symposion gains its ‘reality’ in this moment of 
interaction, when the author’s ambitions are mediated through the processes of 
reading and viewing.
I chose to conduct my investigations via the symposia represented in 
Plato’s and Xenophon’s Symposia for two reasons. Firstly, their symposia were 
constructed in the early-to-mid fourth century, a period which scholarship on the 
symposion often ignores. On these scholars’ account, the classical institution 
was either so similar to its archaic predecessor that it needs no investigation, or 
so different that the institution of the symposion as we know it no longer existed. 
Yet, Fisher’s exploration of homosocial practices in the classical city, and the 
continued presence of the symposion on the comic stage, imply that the 
symposion retained a presence in the Athenian polis, whether at a practical or 
ideological level. Secondly, Plato and Xenophon both wrote Socratic dialogues
1 In The Order of Things, Foucault, 1970: 3-16, dissects this process, taking liis reader through 
liis reading/viewing of Velazquez’ Las Meninas, a painting of a painter painting an unseen 
portrait of Pliilip II and Mariana of Spain. Through tliis account, he establishes tlie intricate 
relationship between tlie image, its viewer and its creator, highlighting the interactive games 
which all tliree parties must play in order to give the painting meaning, Tliis interaction is 
achieved tluough tlie discontinuity and distancing of tlie different parties: ‘around tlie scene are 
arranged all tlie signs and successive forms of representation; but tlie double relation of the 
representation to its model and to its sovereign, to its author as well as to the person to whom it is 
being offered, tliis relation is necessarily interrupted’ (16).
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in order to promote their philosophical ideas.2 Their symposia make no 
pretension to reality, but fit into their authors’ aspirations for each Symposium. 
By studying these symposia we might uncover Plato and Xenophon’s 
philosophical objectives, and in doing so discover what it was that made the 
symposion a suitable location for their explorations.
In this conclusion, I will bring together my analyses of the symposia 
represented in Plato’s and Xenophon’s Symposia to propose a new understanding 
of these texts, and to investigate their imagined role for the symposion in the 
creation of identity. My theoretical approach requires me to stop short of 
declaring the historical symposion to be a location for constructing identities, but 
the philosophical ambitions of Plato and Xenophon for the symposion both rely 
on this property. Or rather, their representations of the symposion give the 
institution of the symposion this meaning.
Representing the Symposion'. Authorial ambitions for the Symposium
Some structural similarities underlie our two symposia', for example, their
occurrence in the house of an Athenian notable and in the aftermath of civic
festivals and competitions; the unexpected presence of Socrates; the setting of 
drinking patterns for the evening; and their focus on erds. Yet, they are 
essentially quite different events; even their shared features are shaped and 
deployed in different ways. Plato’s symposion is a place for talking and 
performing, for communality and competition, and the discussion of erds. While 
Xenophon’s symposion is a synousia which draws the agon into its proceedings, 
it is defined in different ways: by the variety of entertainments on offer, the
I use ‘idea’ in tlie modern sense, rather than tlie Platonic Idea, or Form.
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fluctuation of symposiasts from viewers to performers, the discussion of eras; 
and an underlying concern with kalokagathia. Plato’s Symposium offers a model 
of the symposion as mimesis, while Xenophon’s Symposium comprises an 
exploration of it.
In chapter 2, we discovered that Plato’s symposion was a performance, 
and a site for performance too. The Symposium sets up the sympotic action as if 
it were a theoria, a spectacle for the observation and contemplation of a theates, 
or spectator. And participants in the spectacle perform not only for this extra­
textual audience, but for one another as well. Both performances revolve around 
mimesis’, the symposiasts imitate the kind of men who are well-educated and 
kaloi kagathoi, and the extra-textual audience engages with their performance as 
a theatrical mimesis. With every reading or recitation, Plato’s reader becomes 
allied to the symposiast, whose words he utters from his mouth. Yet, the 
reader/reciter was at the same time an audience to the symposion, watching the 
events from outside. He thus participated in the mimesis of kaloi kagathoi, whilst 
interacting with the symposion as a mimesis of these mimeseis.
By drawing the reader into this relationship with his symposion, Plato 
advances his ambitions for the symposion and the Symposium. In the Republic, 
where Socrates discusses the relationships between spectacle, spectator and 
performer, the processes of viewing and performing are equated with doing 
philosophy. As Monoson notes: ‘when it comes to representing the ongoing 
activity of intellectual toil, including laboring to describe the ideal city, Plato 
consistently turns to images that liken robust intellectual work to audience 
performance’.3 Thus, mimesis, viewing and performing do not exist in
3 Monoson. 2000: 220.
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opposition to philosophy but are integral aspects of it. The symposion, with its 
discussions on erds, demonstrates how to go about discussing it.4 But the reader 
also sees men striving for virtue throughout their sympotic performances, and 
experiences their quest for virtue (or more precisely, the quest to become kaloi 
kagathoi) within the symposion.
Thus, the textuality of Plato’s Symposium does not usurp the processes of 
viewing and performing, but facilitates them. The ‘new’ theatrical dialogue 
incorporates the dynamics of its tragic and comic predecessors in its form. By 
contrast, Xenophon uses the symposion to make claims for the Symposium as a 
written text. Chapters 4 and 5 revealed how Xenophon deployed the topoi of 
sympotic representation to create an event which critiques itself as its progresses. 
The guests at Caliias’ house are preoccupied with an impulse to do what is 
fitting, and Socrates in particular has fixed ideas about what exactly ‘fitting to the 
symposion'’ means. In the guise of symposiarch, he leads the symposiasts 
towards a symposion where giving benefit and cheer to one another is facilitated 
through playful conversations on serious matters. The symposion which results 
is an amalgam of this sympotic ideal and a Xenophontic critique of Socrates’ 
attempts to create it. Whilst Socrates minimises the participation of the hired 
performers and uninvited laughter-maker, they play an important role in 
Xenophon’s symposion. And Xenophon finds a place for beauty and erds in the 
symposion, while Socrates tries to de-eroticise the event.
Xenophon thus establishes an ideal symposion where the performances of 
Caliias, his guests, the gelotopoios and the Syracusan’s dance troupe participate
4 Nussbaum. 1986: 127, and Blondell, 2000: 145 consider tliis a key purpose of Platonic
dialogues in general, as discussed in chapter 2.
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in an on-going conversation on kalokagathia. Yet, as chapters 5 and 6 
discovered, this symposion is not a straightforward ideal. While Xenophon 
establishes the symposion as a place for teaching and learning kalokagathia, and 
becoming kalos kagathos, the learning process, both in the symposion and 
outside the Symposium, is hampered by the characters who attend it. The 
symposiasts attempt to live out the method of instruction proposed by Socrates 
whereby ‘you will learn good from the good’. But their claims to make men 
better are proven false by the performances they give. Callias needs further 
instruction in kalokagathia from Antisthenes, Niceratus’ methods for educating 
others are proven to be inadequate, and Critoboulus’ discussion of beauty reveals 
him to be phaulos. The men who mix with these symposiasts risk experiencing 
the other side of Theognis/Socrates’ maxim, that ‘if you mix with bad men, you 
will destroy your mind’.
The only way to learn from this symposion is to read about it. One might 
enter Xenophon’s symposion in a similar way to the Platonic event. But aligning 
oneself with Callias’ guests would not engage you in the process of becoming 
kalos kagathos. Plato encourages the viewing of virtuous deeds to stimulate 
virtue in the audience. But on this understanding of audience-performance 
interaction, the viewer could only learn bad things from Xenophon’s mimesis of 
the symposion. Xenophon intends his symposion to be analysed and assessed 
dispassionately from a distance, a distance which is enforced by the nature of the 
Symposium as a text to be read.
The Symposium repeatedly draws attention to its textuality. To appreciate 
the intricacy of Xenophon’s argument one must visit it again and again, 
comparing disparate episodes with one another, and bringing outside knowledge
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of the characters to bear. Moreover, Xenophon emphasises his own authority. 
Where Plato notoriously resists aligning himself with any of the opinions on 
offer in his dialogues, Xenophon will show us the men he was with when he 
discovered that the playful and serious deeds of kaloi kagathoi were 
axiomnemoneuta 5 He decides what events are ‘worth remembering’ and why. 
Further, Xenophon at once distances himself from Socrates to establish his own 
version of the symposion and uses the philosopher to mediate the dangerous 
components of the symposion. And in doing so, he promotes a particular way of 
learning. While the Symposium sets up an ideal symposion for its readers’ 
consideration, it further suggests that the symposion can only live up to this ideal 
if it is experienced through the written text.
Identity and Performance in the Symposion
Although the Greeks had no word for ‘identity’, the construction of identity (as 
we would understand it) lies at the centre of our two symposia6 In Plato’s 
symposion, communal and competitive elements co-exist to promote an 
environment in which the symposiast can display and affirm his own identity, 
and test the identities of others. In Xenophon’s ideal symposion, the symposiasts
5 In tliis respect, Xenophon presents himself more as a Herodotus and a Thucydides, than a 
Plato, as both of these writers place tlieir authorial personae at tlie heart of tlieir work: cf. 
Marincola, 1997: 3-12. In tliis respect, Xenophon also resembles tlie sixth- to fifth-century poet 
Xenophanes who used his poetic representation of tlie symposion to advance his authority on tlie 
subject of sympotic conversation and aristocratic lifestyles. Cf. Ford, 2002: 46-58, discussed in 
chapter 4, note 47.
° Tlie Chambers 21st Century Dictionary/ defines ‘identity’ as ‘the state or quality of being a
specified person or tiling; who or what a person or thing is’.
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become more kaloi kagathoi, mixing with one another, and learning 
kalokagathia. Moreover, the ‘outside’ entertainments of Philippus and Socrates 
offer an anti-model of kalokagathia, against which the symposiasts might 
position themselves. Together, these symposia, or rather the stories told about 
them, the literary images they produced, and the values placed in them by their 
authors imbue the symposion with meaning as a location for the construction of 
individual and group identities.
Our authors’ concern with their symposiasts as kaloi kagathoi 
foreshadows current academic interest in the construction of identities. Indeed, 
their approaches are not dissimilar (although of course not identical) to the 
theoretical discourses which shape our conversations on identity construction 
today. For example, the symposiasts construct their identities within the 
symposion primarily through performances (a combination of epideixeis, theoriai 
and agones}, and their reactions to the performances of others. This last action 
itself constitutes a performance and is an integral component of the thedria. 
Moreover, as we discovered in chapters 2, 4 and 6, the words and actions of all 
the symposiasts are performative. The symposiasts (and the gelotopoios} do not 
indulge in Goffmanesque rounds of role playing, but invest their identities in 
their epideixeis. By entering into this proof, or self-display, they recreate what it 
means to be kalos kagathos, or not.
Pausanias’ encomium of Eros, discussed in chapter 3, provides an 
interesting insight into this process. The speaker draws on the communal 
experiences, values, and language of the sympotic group as ‘aristocrats’, and as 
elite members of the democratic city, in order to align himself with the group. 
This assertion of individual identity through the collective fits modern
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preoccupations with the place of the ‘constitutive outside’ or the ‘Other’ in 
identity formation. For psycho-analysts, Derridean deconstructionists, and 
performance theorists alike, ‘identities can function as points of identification 
and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render 
“outside”’.7 * In the symposion, these Others might be women, low status 
laughter-makers, members of the demos, or non-Athenians. This interpretation 
asserts that identification is impossible outside of the Other, and indeed, 
Pausanias defines himself (and his audience) against the practices of the demos. 
However, when called upon to define himself against another Other (the non­
Athenian poleis'), he incorporates himself into the citizen body. On Pausanias’ 
reading, the ‘identity’ of the kalos kagathos is not ‘a constructed form of 
closure’, but an amalgam and negotiation of different identities which are 
gendered, sociological, and political (created both within the polis, and in 
relation to other poleis)* The kalos kagathos is constructed through 
differentiation and association, and also association with that which it might on 
occasion differentiate itself from. In this sense, Pausanias’ performance reflects
7 See Hall, 1996: 4-5. In particular, ‘tlie Other’ and ‘otliering’ have been recognised at work in 
tlie creation of modem identities of ‘race’ and ‘gender. For example, Brali, 1992, investigates tlie 
construction of ‘ethnic’ and ‘gendered’ identities within modem Britain. On her reading, identity 
is always created through a series of oppositions, whether these oppositions are imposed 
externally (by a colonial or masculine power), or from witliin to combat these forces. Cf. Hall, 
1987; Gilroy, 1994; Bhabha, 1994; and Said’s comments on tlie reception of Orientalism hi tlie 
Afterword to tlie 1995 reprint of Said, 1978. J. Hall, 1997: 33, adopts this understanding for liis
discussion of Greek ethnic identities.
On tlie use of difference to create a ‘constructed form of closure’, see Hall, 1996: 5.
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the method of identity construction described by Hall as a combination of 
identification or suture: ‘not an essence but a positioning* 9
This understanding of identity is relevant to our Symposia in two ways. 
Firstly, the kalos kagathos who is performing in the symposion acts as a signifier 
in relation to whom his audience might position themselves. The symposiasts of 
Plato’s symposion establish what makes a man kalos kagathos through their 
recognition of performers (and themselves) as kaloi kagathoi. Secondly, 
Xenophon’s kalokagathia is not just an abstract virtue but is something which 
creates identities and which is itself ‘always in “process’”.10 However, by 
contrast, although Callias’ guests are kaloi kagathoi, and promise to teach 
kalokagathia and improve each other, they never live up to their own rhetoric. If
9 Hall, 1987: 72. On ‘suture’, see Heath. 1981. who discusses its origins in Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theories of tlie unconscious (76-86). However, as his study reveals, it has most 
profitably been applied to cinematic theory to describe tlie discourses created by tlie apparatuses 
of cinema, for example the showing and viewing of films (14-15). On tlie cinema screen, a
character acts as a "signifier’ of its spectator’s lack. Tlie spectator becomes a subject (or tlie 
viewer’s identity is invested) in tlie realisation of tliis lack (52-54). Hence, ‘tlie subject makes the 
meanings the film makes for it’ (88). ‘Lack’ in this sense signifies the absence of the ego in 
whatever one sees, promoting everything to be viewed from a point of difference. The 
specificities of tliis lack are what emerge from tlie interaction between subject and signified, and 
what give tlie subject its definition. As a process of identity formation suturation differs Irom 
Althusser’s interpellation (see above, chapter 3, page 141) because meaning is created in the 
process of recognition, and not imposed on it externally by an all-powerful ideology. Hence, 
Hirst. 1976: 404, criticises tlie application of Althusser’s interpellation to identity construction 
because it denies tliat ‘recognition, tlie crucial moment on tlie constitution (activation of tlie 
subject), presupposes a point of cognition prior to tlie recognition. Something must recognise 
tliat which it is supposed to be’.
io Hall, 1996: 2.
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their ideas were allowed to become touchstones for defining kalokagathia, then 
kalokagathia would become thoroughly debased. On one level the symposiasts 
are to all intents and purposes kaloi kagathoi, but at the same time they are not. 
Hence, Xenophon proposes a method of becoming kalos kagathos which doesn’t 
just involve imitation, but critique. The symposiasts are axionmemoneutoi for 
this reason, not because they provide one-dimensional models for emulation.
Modern theories of identity help us to identify strategies and techniques 
of identity construction in Plato and Xenophon’s symposia. However, they do 
not (and should not) map directly on to the processes in which the symposiasts 
are engaged. The performances of the guests at the houses of Agathon and 
Callias have their own cultural specificity, and are, moreover, tied into their 
author’s ambitions for the symposion.
At the beginning of this study, I set out to investigate the classical 
symposion through its representations in the philosophical Symposia of Plato and 
Xenophon. However, as the resulting thesis has revealed, the task of extracting 
the real-life institution from its literary representations is complicated. Both 
authors shaped their different symposia to fit their ambitions not only for the 
symposion, but for the text of the Symposium too. However, they both placed the 
process of becoming kalos kagathos at the heart of their symposia, and the 
symposia at the heart of so-called Athenian ‘Performance Culture’. Their 
conception of the symposion as a place for identity construction may have built 
on earlier literary traditions and contemporary ideas about it, or derive from the 
performative sympotic atmosphere which Stehle argues lyric poetry generated. 
But more significantly, through its representation in the Symposia of Plato and 
Xenophon, the fourth-century symposion gains meaning as - and hence becomes
CONCLUSION 32'
- a place for learning, teaching, viewing, performing, and exploring
kalokagathia.
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